宗鏡錄 71.3

71.3

Answer: There is. Bodhisattva Dharmapāla said: 'Mind in its arising does not necessarily have an archetype.' The correct doctrine is that regarding the mediate objective condition, its presence or absence is indefinite; without depending on an archetype, mind is still able to arise in the sphere of consciousness-only. As for the immediate nimittabhāga, if it had to depend on an external archetype to arise, Ci'en said: 'Truly, I fear this principle would contradict consciousness-only.'

Regarding the eighth and sixth consciousnesses having or lacking [archetypes] indefinitely: when the eight consciousnesses cognize objects, the first five and the seventh definitely have archetypes. If the eighth consciousness cognizes the supporting sensory matter of another person, the receptacle realm of another world, or form produced by meditative absorption (dhyānaphala-rūpa), it then has an archetype. If it cognizes its own three realms, it is solely an immediate transformation and immediate cognition, and thus has no archetype. If the sixth consciousness cognizes the present eighteen dhātus, it may have an archetype; if it cognizes the past eighteen dhātus or cognizes phenomena lacking substance, what could serve as the archetype? Therefore, we know that whether the sixth and eighth consciousnesses rely on archetypes is indefinite.

Regarding form produced by meditative absorption, there are transformations (biàn) and creations (huà). 'Transformations' means that it relies on an archetype, so there is an archetype. 'Creations' means that it is detached from an archetype. If it arises in dependence on something else, that has the meaning of transformation—relying on something else as the archetype to transform an image of its own, such as churning a long river into ghee, or transforming the great earth into gold; these all have archetypes. If it is produced by the power of meditative absorption, that has the meaning of creation—creation detached from an archetype, suddenly existing from non-existence, like flowers in empty space, creating towers, the seven jewels, and so forth; these are all created detached from archetypes by the meditative mind.

One should formulate four propositions to differentiate the presence or absence of the archetype, nimittabhāga, and the three realms:
1. There is an archetype and nimittabhāga, which is a real objective realm of nature (xìngjìng): namely, the first five consciousnesses, the initial moment of distinct manovijñāna, and a small part of solitary manovijñāna.
2. There is an archetype and nimittabhāga, which is unreal: namely, the solitary shadow with an archetype (yǒuzhì dúyǐng) and the realm with substance (dàizhìjìng).
3. There is no archetype and there is a nimittabhāga, which is unreal: namely, the solitary shadow without an archetype (wúzhì dúyǐng).
4. There is no archetype and there is a nimittabhāga, which is a real objective realm of nature: namely, the eighth citta-king cognizing the three realms, and fundamental wisdom cognizing suchness.

Furthermore, the Piexing chao states: 'Objective condition (ālambanapratyaya) means that because it is the locus deliberated upon by the mind, it is called the ālambana (object). It is this very objective realm that also attracts the mind to arise; because it is that which the mind relies upon, it is also called pratyaya (condition). Thus the object acting as a condition is called an objective condition. Condition is the substance; object is the function. Within the six consciousnesses, the object is itself the condition: this is a karmadhāraya compound.'

Now to first establish the correct doctrine: Master Guptā does not understand the meaning of ālambanapratyaya in our Mahāyāna. In our Mahāyāna, when it is said that it 'bears its own characteristic' (dài zǐ xiāng), 'bearing' (dài) and 'its own characteristic' (zǐ xiāng) each have two meanings. 'Bearing' has two meanings: first, holding directly (xiédài), where the cognizing mind directly holds the substance of the object and cognizes it; second, transformative bearing (biàndài), where the cognizing mind transforms into a nimittabhāga and cognizes it. 'Its own characteristic' also has two meanings: first, the essential characteristic (tǐxiāng) is called characteristic; second, the apparent form (xiāngzhuàng) is called characteristic.

First, regarding holding directly the essential characteristic: fundamental wisdom cognizing tathatā is cognizing by holding directly the essential characteristic, which is an objective condition; and likewise, the inner two parts cognizing each other, as well as the svasaṃvittibhāga cognizing the darśanabhāga, are also holding directly the essential characteristic, termed objective conditions, meaning that the cognizing mind directly holds the inner two parts' darśana and nimitta.

Second, regarding transformative bearing of the apparent form: there are two differing interpretations. First, the author of the Longxing chao says: defiled citta and caittas, as well as the darśanabhāga of undefiled subsequent wisdom (pṛṣṭhalabdhajñāna), when cognizing objects, transform into characteristics and cognize them; without distinguishing whether there is an archetype or no archetype, all are called 'bearing' by transformative bearing, and called 'characteristic' by apparent form, serving as objective conditions. Second, the Xianyou chao says: when the darśanabhāga of the eight consciousnesses cognizes its own immediate characteristic, it is always holding directly. However, although many say this, I fear the principle is not so. If it were so, there would be three faults:
1. The fault of no distinction between holding directly and transformative bearing: cognizing by directly holding the substance of the object is called holding directly, while cognizing by transforming into a nimittabhāga is called transformative bearing. Now, if you call the nimittabhāga 'holding directly', we know there is no distinction.
2. The fault of contradiction between modern and ancient: the ancient view of holding directly slightly violated the principle, but regarding transformative bearing, there was no violation. Now saying that the nimittabhāga is holding directly, while the ancients said transformative bearing—how could they not contradict each other?
3. The fault that transformative bearing only cognizes an archetype: could a nimittabhāga without an archetype not be a transformation of mind? Now, inferring by principle: whatever is a nimittabhāga, regardless of whether it has an archetype or no archetype, is called transformative bearing. If it does not transform into a nimittabhāga but directly adheres to the substance of the object, it is called holding directly. For this reason, the Tang Tripiṭaka Master [Xuanzang] used 'holding directly' to rescue the former doctrine, because ancient Mahāyāna masters only explained transformative bearing.

Next, refuting the Hīnayāna meaning of objective condition based on the treatise has two parts. First, refuting the masters of the Saṃmatīya school. The author of the treatise states: 'The object cognized by the five consciousnesses means that the cognizing consciousness arises bearing its characteristic, and it has real substance, causing the cognizing consciousness to arise relying upon it. If you, masters of the Saṃmatīya school, say that the meaning of objective condition consists solely of the single meaning of being capable of generating consciousness, and do not accept that the cognizing eye-consciousness arises bearing its characteristic, then it should not be an objective condition.'
The Mahāyāna inference (anumāna) states:
[Thesis:] Your eye-consciousness's objective condition is the subject (dharmin);
[Probandum:] It should not be the objective condition of the eye-consciousness.
[Reason:] Because it only possesses the single meaning of being capable of generating consciousness.
[Example:] Like the causal condition (hetupratyaya) of the eye-consciousness.
And conversely, establishing an inference to refute them:
[Thesis:] Your eye-consciousness's causal condition is the subject;
[Probandum:] It should be the objective condition of the eye-consciousness.
[Reason:] Because it possesses the single meaning of being capable of generating [consciousness].
[Example:] Like when the eye cognizes form.
The meaning here is: if ancient Mahāyāna masters did not speak of holding directly, then when fundamental wisdom cognizes tathatā as an objective condition, the meaning would seem flawed. If the Saṃmatīya does not accept transformative bearing, then when the eye-consciousness cognizes form, the meaning of objective condition cannot be established.

Next, refuting the Sautrāntika masters: the author of the treatise states: 'It is incorrect for you Sautrāntika masters to make external, aggregated, nominal form into an objective condition. Even granted that your eye-consciousness bears that gross form-characteristic and it is granted to be an ālambana, it still cannot be called a condition (pratyaya). For the nominal form you cling to lacks real substance, just as an eye-consciousness in error sees a second moon. That [second moon] lacks real substance and cannot generate consciousness; it is only called an ālambana, and cannot be called a pratyaya. Aggregated nominal form is just the same.'
Setting up an inference to refute them:
[Thesis:] Your aggregated gross form is the subject;
[Probandum:] Even if it is the ālambana of the eye-consciousness, it is not a pratyaya.
[Reason:] Because you maintain it is nominal and lacks real substance.
[Example:] Like the second moon.
The verse of the Ālambanaparīkṣā says:
'The aggregate to the five consciousnesses,
Even if an object, is not a condition,
Because its substance is really non-existent,
Just like the second moon.'

A Sautrāntika may adhere to this view: 'Although aggregated gross form is nominal, the individual subtle atoms (paramāṇu) that constitute it are truly real; each is able to act as a condition to induce and generate the five consciousnesses—why would that not be acceptable?'
The author of the treatise refutes this: 'Even if the subtle atoms that constitute aggregated form and so on are granted to be conditions, they are still not objects (ālambana), because the arising of consciousnesses such as the eye-consciousness does not bear the characteristic of those subtle atoms, just as the arising of the eye-consciousness does not bear the characteristic of the visual faculty. The five faculties such as the eye can only generate the five consciousnesses such as the eye-consciousness, yet the five consciousnesses cannot cognize the five faculties.'
Taking the faculty as an example, an inference is established:
[Thesis:] Your subtle atoms that constitute form and so on are the subject;
[Probandum:] Even if they are conditions for the five consciousnesses, they are not objects.
[Reason:] Because the arising of the five consciousnesses does not bear their characteristics.
[Example:] Like the five faculties.
The verse of the Ālambanaparīkṣā says:
'Subtle atoms to the five consciousnesses,
Even if granted [to be conditions], are not objects,
Because their nimittabhāga is non-existent,
Just like the visual faculty and so on.'
As for the doctrine of the masters of the eighteen schools, because they already accept bearing its characteristic, they are not refuted here.

Now, for the correct interpretation: the Commentary says: 'It means if a phenomenon exists, it bears its own characteristic.' As for the phrase 'if a phenomenon exists' (yǒufǎ), there are two interpretations. First, the Xianyou chao explains: 'An existing phenomenon' means a real phenomenon with substance, excluding nominal phenomena and the substance-lacking phenomena of pervasive conceptualization (parikalpita), which are merely objects (ālambana) and do not constitute conditions (pratyaya). In order to be a condition, it must be a real phenomenon with substance, possessing efficacy and function, capable of drawing forth and generating consciousness—that is, the consummate (pariniṣpanna) and other-dependent (paratantra) natures, which are phenomena with substance.
Second, the Longxing states: 'What is called an existing phenomenon' refers to the other-dependent and consummate natures; because they have substance, they are able to attract the mind and are termed conditions, not extending to what lacks substance. If it is pervasive conceptualization, because it lacks substance, there is only an object, not the substance of a condition. If it is an object, its substance extends to both existence and non-existence.