宗鏡錄 86.19

86.19

答。但了人法二空。即入此觀。人法何以成空。以唯有意言分別。故攝論云。從願樂位。乃至究竟位。若欲入唯識觀。修加行。緣何境界。緣意言分別為境。離此無別外境。何以故。此意言分別。似文字言說。及義顯現。唯有意言分別。無別有名言。菩薩能通達名無所有。則離外塵邪執。又此義依名言。唯意言分別。前以遣名。此下依名遣義。義者。即六識所緣境。離名無別此境。名言既唯意分別故。義亦無別體。菩薩通達義無所有。亦離外塵邪執。又此名義自性差別。唯假說為量。前已遣名義。名義既無自性及差別。云何可立。若離假說。無別名義自性。及名義差別。由證見此二法不可得故。名為通達。智整禪師六行。法云。大乘頓悟菩薩。能觀唯識無外空者。謂觀相空。唯是空解。心作空解。無外相空。是故大根知唯識者。則滅空解。離諸緣觀。故智論云。菩薩行般若波羅蜜時。普觀諸法皆空。空亦復空。滅諸觀。得無礙般若波羅蜜。以此文證。無外相空。大根觀智則證空。空謂法空。空有皆是妄見。悉是當時意分別作。如人心起。則唯見人。微塵心起。則唯見微塵。空心起時。則唯見空。是故空有皆是心作。故諸凡聖見境不同。皆是當時意言有異。是以世諦各唯有識。覺無外邊。則名真諦。以其二諦不相離故。即以無外名為真諦。是故若能觀見唯識。即知無外。則亦達真。此達真時。則無外解。便遣世俗妄取之心。故攝論云。知塵無所有。通達真。知唯有識。通達俗。若不通達俗。無以能得見真。以離俗無真故。若不通達真。無以遣俗。以俗無別體故。所以通達真俗。由能解唯識理故。以此文證。觀唯識者。即達二諦。能遣妄心。雖復就實唯識無境。稱情則有凡聖大小。謂若見塵。意謂是人。如此意言。則是凡夫。若觀此身。意謂是塵。如此意言。則是二乘。若觀細塵。意謂體空。如此意言。是小菩薩。若觀空有知皆意言。即是大乘大菩薩人。故諸眾生。雖皆唯識。意言不同。凡聖各異。故大根人知唯識者。恒觀自心意言為境。此初觀時。雖未成聖。分知意言。則是菩薩。故攝論云。初修觀者。則是凡夫菩薩。此等能觀深法空者。即亦曾逕小乘觀來。非是不解眾生無我。一往即能頓見法空。故攝論云。若得法無我。必先得人無我。故知學大。要先從小。雖復從小。漸頓仍別。謂觀生空執為極者。後觀相空進學。名漸。若有久習。知小非極。即解空空。名為頓悟。雖知心外無境。然入觀時亦從塵起。以其色塵。唯佛不見。以佛常證唯識無境。妄想盡故。不見外塵故。彼論云。如來常不出觀。故寂靜。若大菩薩入真觀時。則知唯識。亦不見塵故。彼論云。菩薩若入無分別觀。一切塵不顯現。以此文證。故知大聖入真觀時。皆不見色。自餘凡聖莫問大小。未入空觀。則皆見塵。大根出觀。雖妄見塵。若入觀時。則知唯識。以其自知。妄作塵解。無塵可破。便證唯心。若能觀中了知唯心。後雖出觀妄見自他。尋復思時知自妄見。不同凡小定執有外。乃至觀空猶見能所。故彼論云。菩薩以無分別後智。觀此因果相。然無顛倒。不執有外塵內根。唯識是實有法。故知大根一證唯心。後雖出觀。不執有外。若觀自心妄見境時。則知眾生各唯有識。故大菩薩。乃至佛來。常知眾生唯心妄見。謂知眾生或作名解。名則是凡意言分別。情謂似外名字顯現。理是心作。是自心相。或作名下所說法解。法義則是意言分別。情謂有外法義顯現。理實法義。亦是心相。故彼論云。十二部經。是名為教。十二部經所詮。是名為理。心相似此理教顯現。以此文證。所緣境界悉是心作。名為心相。但此心相。亦名心影。亦名相識及境界識。種諸凡小。謂與心異。理無別體。實唯一識。故彼論云。唯識不出二法。一者相識。二者見識。似塵顯現名相。謂所緣境。似識顯現名見。謂能緣識。定心亦爾。顯現似塵。謂異定心。一分似識。一分似塵。此二實唯是識。以此文證。境界相識即心無別。唯情妄見。以其唯是妄念作故。即此是相識。亦名相結。故彼論云。結有二種。一者相結。二者麁重結。相結難解。麁重結難滅。心分別諸塵。名相結。由此分別起欲瞋等惑。名麁重結。若得無分別智。即解相結。相結不起麁重結即墮滅。以此文證。境是相結。凡小迷執。故名難解。是故諸法名之與義。皆是心作。凡小不知。理實無始所緣名義。常是凡夫意言分別。故彼論云。凡夫從本。來意言分別有二種。一似名。二似義。名義攝一切法皆盡。此名義。但是意言分別所作。離此無別餘法。以此文證。故知凡夫妄見境界。或名或義。皆是當時意言分別。如食蒗蕩妄見針火。據彼妄情意謂是實。不知妄見謂有外火。據實唯是意作火解。火則唯是意言分別。謂有火名。名是意言。謂有火事。事是意言。眾生妄見自身他身地水火風等。皆亦似彼。雖復就實義唯識無外。據凡妄情謂有能所。故彼論云。唯識義不失。亦不無能取所取義。雖復據情謂有內外。理唯一心。無別塵體。故彼論云。識所變異。雖有內外事相不同。實唯一識。無有塵等別體。故知自他內外事相。唯是一心轉變妄解。故諸大聖知生妄見。自恒不見凡所見境。如人不食蒗蕩之者。唯見他人妄見針火。自仍不見空中火事。佛知唯識。其事似此。故不同凡妄見境界。以生妄見。本無外塵。是以如來恒不見色。唯凡與聖有見不見。但真異妄。莫不唯識。凡唯識。直是妄心故。唯識論偈云。唯識無境界。無塵虛妄見。若佛唯識。但有真心。故攝論云。唯有真如及真智獨存。說名法身。又唯識論云。諸佛如來行處。唯有真識。更無餘識。以此文證。佛無識故。故不同凡妄見外境。以實唯識本無外故。業不同者。一質異見。如人見水。鬼見為火。魚謂住處。天以為地。又如舍利妄見穢土。螺髻菩薩即此見淨。若使實有水火染淨。同處相妨。不得和合。以各妄見齊無外故。多心共處。得作別解。若諸眾生同業之者。妄見則同。更無別解。此同業者遞互為因。妄想見聞。唯心緣合。故唯識論云。一切眾生虛妄分別。思惟憶念。彼說我聞。依彼前人說者意識。於此聽人聞者意識。起如是心。彼說我聞。而實無有彼前境界。是偈言遞共增上因。彼此心緣合。以此文證。業相由者。遞互為因。各妄見聞。以其六道皆心緣合。三界則是唯心轉作。故十地經云。三界虛妄。但一心作。論自釋言。一心作者。唯心轉故。故知三界同見別見。皆是自心轉變。解異。同見聞者。雖心緣合。心無形相。恒非內外。若謂心外有他心者。則是妄解。實無外識。故唯識論云。而實無有外識可取。乃至二乘知他心者。謂有外識。亦仍是妄。故彼論云。虛妄分別。此心知彼心。彼心知此心。以此文證。實無外識。直是凡小妄作外解。故彼論云。他心智者。不如實知。何以故。以自內心虛妄分別。以為他心。不能了知。

Answer: Merely comprehending the two emptinesses of person and phenomena allows one to enter this contemplation. Why are person and phenomena empty? Because they are only conceptual distinctions of mental speech. Therefore, the *Mahāyānasaṃgraha* states: "From the stage of aspiration up to the ultimate stage, if one wishes to enter the contemplation of consciousness-only and cultivate the preparatory practices, what object does one take as a focal object? One takes the conceptual distinctions of mental speech as the object; apart from this, there is no separate external object. Why is that? These conceptual distinctions of mental speech appear resembling written words, speech, and referents; there are only conceptual distinctions of mental speech, and there are no separate names or words. When a bodhisattva can penetrate that names do not exist, they are free from erroneous attachments to external dust-objects. Furthermore, these referents rely on names and words, and are only conceptual distinctions of mental speech. Previously names were dispelled; below, based on names, referents are dispelled. 'Referent' means the objects cognised by the six consciousnesses; apart from names, there are no separate objects such as these. Since names and words are only mental distinctions, referents also have no separate substance. When a bodhisattva penetrates that referents do not exist, they are also free from erroneous attachments to external dust-objects. Furthermore, the intrinsic nature and particularities of these names and referents are merely conventional designations as standards. Previously, names and referents were already dispelled. Since names and referents lack both intrinsic nature and particularities, how could they be established? Apart from conventional designation, there is no separate intrinsic nature of names and referents, nor are there particularities of names and referents. Because of directly verifying and seeing that these two dharmas are ungraspable, this is called 'penetration'." In Chan Master Zhizheng's *Six Practices of the Dharma*, it states: "A bodhisattva of the Mahāyāna sudden awakening who is able to contemplate that consciousness-only is empty of the external refers to contemplating that marks are empty, which is merely a conceptualisation of emptiness. The mind creates the understanding of emptiness; there are no external marks that are empty. Therefore, those of great capacity who know consciousness-only eradicate the understanding of emptiness and transcend all contemplations of conditions. Thus the *Dazhidulun* says: 'When a bodhisattva practices the perfection of wisdom (prajñāpāramitā), they universally contemplate that all dharmas are empty, and that emptiness is also empty; eradicating all contemplations, they attain the unobstructed prajñāpāramitā.' Attested by this passage, there is no emptiness of external marks. The contemplative wisdom of those of great capacity directly verifies emptiness; 'emptiness' refers to the emptiness of dharmas. Both emptiness and existence are false views, entirely created by the mental distinctions of that moment. Just as when the mind of a human arises, one sees only a human; when the mind of subtle dust arises, one sees only subtle dust; and when the mind of emptiness arises, one sees only emptiness. Therefore, both emptiness and existence are created by the mind. Thus, ordinary people and sages seeing different objects is entirely due to variations in their mental speech at that moment. Hence, in conventional truth, there is only consciousness respectively; awakening to the absence of external bounds is called the ultimate truth. Because these two truths are not separate from each other, the absence of the external is termed the ultimate truth. Therefore, if one is able to contemplate and see consciousness-only, one immediately knows the absence of the external, and thereby also penetrates the ultimate. When one thus penetrates the ultimate, there is no conception of an external, and one dispels the mind of conventional false grasping. Therefore, the *Mahāyānasaṃgraha* says: 'Knowing that dust-objects do not exist, one penetrates the ultimate. Knowing that there is only consciousness, one penetrates the conventional. If one does not penetrate the conventional, there is no way one can see the ultimate, because apart from the conventional there is no ultimate. If one does not penetrate the ultimate, there is no way to dispel the conventional, because the conventional has no separate substance.' Thus, penetrating both the ultimate and the conventional is due to being able to understand the principle of consciousness-only. Attested by this passage, one who contemplates consciousness-only penetrates both truths and is able to dispel the false mind. Although in truth consciousness-only has no objects, according to subjective dispositions there are differences between ordinary beings and sages, Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna. That is, if one sees dust and the mind considers it a human, such mental speech is that of an ordinary person. If one contemplates this body and the mind considers it dust, such mental speech is that of the two vehicles. If one contemplates subtle dust and considers its substance to be empty, such mental speech is that of a lesser bodhisattva. If one contemplates emptiness and existence and knows they are both mental speech, that is a person who is a great bodhisattva of the Mahāyāna. Thus, although all sentient beings are nothing but consciousness, their mental speech differs and ordinary beings and sages are distinct. Therefore, those of great capacity who know consciousness-only constantly contemplate their own mind's mental speech as the object. When first contemplating this, although they have not yet become sages, partially knowing mental speech makes them bodhisattvas. Therefore, the *Mahāyānasaṃgraha* says: 'Those who first cultivate contemplation are ordinary-person bodhisattvas.' Those who are able to contemplate such profound emptiness of dharmas have also passed through the contemplations of the lesser vehicle; it is not that without understanding the selflessness of sentient beings they could all at once suddenly see the emptiness of dharmas. Therefore, the *Mahāyānasaṃgraha* says: 'If one attains the selflessness of dharmas, one must first attain the selflessness of persons.' Hence we know that to learn the Great, one must first proceed from the Small. Although one proceeds from the Small, gradual and sudden are still distinct: contemplating the emptiness of living beings and clinging to it as ultimate, and subsequently contemplating the emptiness of marks to advance one's learning, is called 'gradual'. If one has practiced for a long time and knows that the Small is not ultimate, directly understanding the emptiness of emptiness, this is called 'sudden awakening'. Although one knows there are no objects outside the mind, when entering contemplation one nonetheless begins from dust-objects, because as for material dust-objects, only the Buddha does not see them. Because the Buddha constantly verifies consciousness-only without objects, and his false conceptualisations are exhausted, he does not see external dust. Therefore, that treatise says: 'The Tathāgata never emerges from contemplation, hence he is quiescent.' When a great bodhisattva enters true contemplation, they know consciousness-only and likewise do not see dust. Therefore, that treatise says: 'If a bodhisattva enters non-conceptual contemplation, no dust-objects appear.' Attested by this passage, we know that when great sages enter true contemplation, none of them see matter. As for the rest, whether ordinary people or sages, Mahāyāna or Hīnayāna, prior to entering the contemplation of emptiness, they all see dust. When those of great capacity emerge from contemplation, although they falsely see dust, when entering contemplation they know consciousness-only. Because they themselves know that they falsely construct the conception of dust and there is no dust to be destroyed, they directly verify mind-only. If in contemplation one completely understands mind-only, then even though after emerging from contemplation one falsely sees self and other, upon reflecting again one immediately knows that it is one's own false seeing; unlike ordinary people and the lesser vehicle, one does not definitively cling to there being an external, nor does one go so far as still seeing subject and object when contemplating emptiness. Therefore, that treatise says: 'With the subsequent non-conceptual wisdom, the bodhisattva contemplates these marks of cause and effect, yet without inversion, neither clinging to external dust nor internal sense-bases as real entities; consciousness-only is a really existent dharma.' Thus we know that once those of great capacity verify mind-only, even though they later emerge from contemplation, they do not cling to the existence of an external. When contemplating their own mind falsely seeing objects, they know that sentient beings each have only consciousness. Therefore, great bodhisattvas and even the Buddhas constantly know that sentient beings have only mental false seeing. That is, they know that sentient beings either form a conception of names—and names are merely conceptual distinctions of mental speech of ordinary people, subjectively considered as appearing resembling external names, while in principle they are mind-made and are marks of their own mind—or they form a conception of the dharmas spoken of under those names; the dharmas and referents are merely conceptual distinctions of mental speech, subjectively considered as having external dharmas and referents appearing, while in reality dharmas and referents are also marks of the mind. Therefore, that treatise says: 'The twelve divisions of scripture are called the teaching; that which is explained by the twelve divisions of scripture is called the principle. The mind appears resembling this principle and teaching.' Attested by this passage, cognised objects are all mind-made, and are called marks of the mind. But these marks of the mind are also called reflections of the mind, and also called mark-consciousness and object-consciousness. All sorts of ordinary people and the lesser vehicle consider them distinct from the mind, yet in principle they have no separate substance and are truly only a single consciousness. Therefore, that treatise says: 'Consciousness-only does not go beyond two dharmas: the first is mark-consciousness, and the second is seeing-consciousness. Appearing resembling dust is called the mark, meaning the cognised object; appearing resembling consciousness is called seeing, meaning the cognising consciousness.' The mind in meditative concentration is also like this: appearing resembling dust, it is considered distinct from the concentrated mind; one part resembles consciousness, and one part resembles dust. These two are in truth only consciousness. Attested by this passage, the mark-consciousness of objects is identical to the mind without distinction, seen falsely only by subjective emotion, because it is created solely by false thoughts. This very thing is mark-consciousness, and is also called the mark-fetter (saṃyojana). Therefore, that treatise says: 'There are two kinds of fetters: first, mark-fetters; second, gross-heaviness fetters. Mark-fetters are difficult to untie; gross-heaviness fetters are difficult to extinguish. The mind conceptually distinguishing dust-objects is called the mark-fetter. Due to this conceptual distinction, afflictions such as desire and anger arise, which are called gross-heaviness fetters. If one attains non-conceptual wisdom, one immediately unties the mark-fetters. When mark-fetters do not arise, gross-heaviness fetters are immediately destroyed.' Attested by this passage, objects are mark-fetters, and ordinary people and the lesser vehicle are deluded and cling to them, hence they are called difficult to untie. Therefore, both the names and referents of all dharmas are mind-made. Ordinary people and the lesser vehicle do not know this; in principle and in reality, the names and referents cognised from beginningless time are constantly the conceptual distinctions of mental speech of ordinary people. Therefore, that treatise says: 'From the beginning, the conceptual distinctions of mental speech of ordinary people are of two kinds: first, resembling names; second, resembling referents. Names and referents subsume all dharmas exhaustively. These names and referents are merely created by conceptual distinctions of mental speech; apart from this, there are no other separate dharmas.' Attested by this passage, we know that the objects falsely seen by ordinary people, whether names or referents, are all the conceptual distinctions of mental speech of that moment. Just like someone who has eaten henbane falsely seeing needles and fire: based on their false subjective feelings, their mind considers them real, not knowing that it is false seeing and supposing there is an external fire; in reality, it is only the mind creating the conception of fire, and fire is merely a conceptual distinction of mental speech. Supposing there is the name 'fire', the name is mental speech; supposing there is the fact of 'fire', the fact is mental speech. Sentient beings falsely seeing their own bodies, other bodies, earth, water, fire, wind, and so forth are all like that. Although in real truth consciousness-only has no external, based on ordinary false feelings there is considered to be grasping and grasped. Therefore, that treatise says: 'The meaning of consciousness-only is not lost, nor is the meaning of grasper and grasped non-existent.' Although based on feelings there are considered to be internal and external, in principle there is only one mind and no separate substance of dust-objects. Therefore, that treatise says: 'As for the transformations of consciousness, although there are different aspects of internal and external phenomena, in truth there is only a single consciousness, and there are no separate substances such as dust.' Thus we know that the phenomena of self and other, internal and external, are only false conceptions transformed by the one mind. Therefore, all great sages know the false seeing of living beings, and themselves constantly do not see the objects seen by ordinary people. Just as a person who has not eaten henbane only sees another person falsely seeing needles and fire, while they themselves still do not see the phenomena of fire in the air. The Buddha's knowledge of consciousness-only is similar to this. Therefore, it is unlike the objects falsely seen by ordinary people, because the false seeing of living beings fundamentally lacks external dust. Hence, the Tathāgata constantly does not see matter. Only between ordinary beings and sages is there seeing and not seeing; it is simply that the true differs from the false, but none is not consciousness-only. For ordinary people, consciousness-only is straightforwardly the false mind. Therefore, a verse of the *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhiśāstra* says: 'Consciousness-only has no objects; / devoid of dust, there is false seeing.' As for the Buddha's consciousness-only, there is only the true mind. Therefore, the *Mahāyānasaṃgraha* says: 'Only tathatā and true wisdom exist in isolation, which is called the dharmakāya.' Furthermore, the *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhiśāstra* says: 'The realm of practice of the Buddhas, Tathāgatas, has only the true consciousness, and no other consciousness.' Attested by this passage, because the Buddha is free from [defiled] consciousness, he is not like ordinary people falsely seeing external objects, because in real consciousness-only there is fundamentally no external. As for karma being different, a single entity is seen differently: as humans see water, ghosts see it as fire, fish regard it as a dwelling place, and devas consider it earth. Furthermore, Śāriputra falsely saw an impure land, whereas the Bodhisattva Śikhin saw purity right there. If water, fire, defilement, and purity actually existed, occupying the same place they would obstruct each other and could not combine. Because their respective false seeings equally lack an external, multiple minds coexisting in the same place can form distinct conceptions. If sentient beings share the same karma, their false seeings are identical, and there are no distinct conceptions. Those sharing the same karma mutually act as causes for one another, and their falsely conceptualised seeing and hearing are merely the conjunction of mental conditions. Therefore, the *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhiśāstra* says: 'All sentient beings falsely conceptualise, contemplate, and recall: "They speak, and I hear." Relying on the mental consciousness (manovijñāna) of the speaker in front, in the mental consciousness of this listener there arises such a thought: "They speak, and I hear." Yet in reality there is no such object in front of them.' This is what the verse means by: 'Mutually acting as predominant causes, / each other's mental conditions conjoin.' Attested by this passage, those whose karmas depend on one another mutually act as causes for one another, each falsely seeing and hearing; because the six destinies are all the conjunction of mental conditions, and the three realms are transformations created solely by the mind. Therefore, the *Daśabhūmikasūtra* says: 'The three realms are false; they are made solely by the one mind.' The commentary explains it itself: '"Made by the one mind" means that they are solely the transformations of the mind.' Thus we know that the shared seeings and distinct seeings of the three realms are all transformations of one's own mind and differences in conceptualisation. As for those who share seeing and hearing, although their mental conditions conjoin, the mind has no shape or characteristics, and is eternally neither internal nor external. If one claims that outside the mind there is another's mind, that is a false conception; in reality, there is no external consciousness. Therefore, the *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhiśāstra* says: 'Yet in reality there is no external consciousness that can be grasped.' Even the knowledge of other minds possessed by the two vehicles, which supposes that there is an external consciousness, is still false. Therefore, that treatise says: 'Falsely conceptualising, this mind knows that mind, and that mind knows this mind.' Attested by this passage, there is in reality no external consciousness; it is simply ordinary people and the lesser vehicle falsely constructing an external conception. Therefore, that treatise says: 'One with knowledge of other minds does not know as it truly is. Why is that? Because with their own internal mind they falsely conceptualise, taking it to be another's mind, and are unable to fully understand it.'