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宗鏡錄 86.19

English (machine translation) 86.19

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86.19

Answer: Merely comprehending the two emptinesses of person and phenomena allows one to enter this contemplation. Why are person and phenomena empty? Because they are only conceptual distinctions of mental speech. Therefore, the *Mahāyānasaṃgraha* states: "From the stage of aspiration up to the ultimate stage, if one wishes to enter the contemplation of consciousness-only and cultivate the preparatory practices, what object does one take as a focal object? One takes the conceptual distinctions of mental speech as the object; apart from this, there is no separate external object. Why is that? These conceptual distinctions of mental speech appear resembling written words, speech, and referents; there are only conceptual distinctions of mental speech, and there are no separate names or words. When a bodhisattva can penetrate that names do not exist, they are free from erroneous attachments to external dust-objects. Furthermore, these referents rely on names and words, and are only conceptual distinctions of mental speech. Previously names were dispelled; below, based on names, referents are dispelled. 'Referent' means the objects cognised by the six consciousnesses; apart from names, there are no separate objects such as these. Since names and words are only mental distinctions, referents also have no separate substance. When a bodhisattva penetrates that referents do not exist, they are also free from erroneous attachments to external dust-objects. Furthermore, the intrinsic nature and particularities of these names and referents are merely conventional designations as standards. Previously, names and referents were already dispelled. Since names and referents lack both intrinsic nature and particularities, how could they be established? Apart from conventional designation, there is no separate intrinsic nature of names and referents, nor are there particularities of names and referents. Because of directly verifying and seeing that these two dharmas are ungraspable, this is called 'penetration'." In Chan Master Zhizheng's *Six Practices of the Dharma*, it states: "A bodhisattva of the Mahāyāna sudden awakening who is able to contemplate that consciousness-only is empty of the external refers to contemplating that marks are empty, which is merely a conceptualisation of emptiness. The mind creates the understanding of emptiness; there are no external marks that are empty. Therefore, those of great capacity who know consciousness-only eradicate the understanding of emptiness and transcend all contemplations of conditions. Thus the *Dazhidulun* says: 'When a bodhisattva practices the perfection of wisdom (prajñāpāramitā), they universally contemplate that all dharmas are empty, and that emptiness is also empty; eradicating all contemplations, they attain the unobstructed prajñāpāramitā.' Attested by this passage, there is no emptiness of external marks. The contemplative wisdom of those of great capacity directly verifies emptiness; 'emptiness' refers to the emptiness of dharmas. Both emptiness and existence are false views, entirely created by the mental distinctions of that moment. Just as when the mind of a human arises, one sees only a human; when the mind of subtle dust arises, one sees only subtle dust; and when the mind of emptiness arises, one sees only emptiness. Therefore, both emptiness and existence are created by the mind. Thus, ordinary people and sages seeing different objects is entirely due to variations in their mental speech at that moment. Hence, in conventional truth, there is only consciousness respectively; awakening to the absence of external bounds is called the ultimate truth. Because these two truths are not separate from each other, the absence of the external is termed the ultimate truth. Therefore, if one is able to contemplate and see consciousness-only, one immediately knows the absence of the external, and thereby also penetrates the ultimate. When one thus penetrates the ultimate, there is no conception of an external, and one dispels the mind of conventional false grasping. Therefore, the *Mahāyānasaṃgraha* says: 'Knowing that dust-objects do not exist, one penetrates the ultimate. Knowing that there is only consciousness, one penetrates the conventional. If one does not penetrate the conventional, there is no way one can see the ultimate, because apart from the conventional there is no ultimate. If one does not penetrate the ultimate, there is no way to dispel the conventional, because the conventional has no separate substance.' Thus, penetrating both the ultimate and the conventional is due to being able to understand the principle of consciousness-only. Attested by this passage, one who contemplates consciousness-only penetrates both truths and is able to dispel the false mind. Although in truth consciousness-only has no objects, according to subjective dispositions there are differences between ordinary beings and sages, Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna. That is, if one sees dust and the mind considers it a human, such mental speech is that of an ordinary person. If one contemplates this body and the mind considers it dust, such mental speech is that of the two vehicles. If one contemplates subtle dust and considers its substance to be empty, such mental speech is that of a lesser bodhisattva. If one contemplates emptiness and existence and knows they are both mental speech, that is a person who is a great bodhisattva of the Mahāyāna. Thus, although all sentient beings are nothing but consciousness, their mental speech differs and ordinary beings and sages are distinct. Therefore, those of great capacity who know consciousness-only constantly contemplate their own mind's mental speech as the object. When first contemplating this, although they have not yet become sages, partially knowing mental speech makes them bodhisattvas. Therefore, the *Mahāyānasaṃgraha* says: 'Those who first cultivate contemplation are ordinary-person bodhisattvas.' Those who are able to contemplate such profound emptiness of dharmas have also passed through the contemplations of the lesser vehicle; it is not that without understanding the selflessness of sentient beings they could all at once suddenly see the emptiness of dharmas. Therefore, the *Mahāyānasaṃgraha* says: 'If one attains the selflessness of dharmas, one must first attain the selflessness of persons.' Hence we know that to learn the Great, one must first proceed from the Small. Although one proceeds from the Small, gradual and sudden are still distinct: contemplating the emptiness of living beings and clinging to it as ultimate, and subsequently contemplating the emptiness of marks to advance one's learning, is called 'gradual'. If one has practiced for a long time and knows that the Small is not ultimate, directly understanding the emptiness of emptiness, this is called 'sudden awakening'. Although one knows there are no objects outside the mind, when entering contemplation one nonetheless begins from dust-objects, because as for material dust-objects, only the Buddha does not see them. Because the Buddha constantly verifies consciousness-only without objects, and his false conceptualisations are exhausted, he does not see external dust. Therefore, that treatise says: 'The Tathāgata never emerges from contemplation, hence he is quiescent.' When a great bodhisattva enters true contemplation, they know consciousness-only and likewise do not see dust. Therefore, that treatise says: 'If a bodhisattva enters non-conceptual contemplation, no dust-objects appear.' Attested by this passage, we know that when great sages enter true contemplation, none of them see matter. As for the rest, whether ordinary people or sages, Mahāyāna or Hīnayāna, prior to entering the contemplation of emptiness, they all see dust. When those of great capacity emerge from contemplation, although they falsely see dust, when entering contemplation they know consciousness-only. Because they themselves know that they falsely construct the conception of dust and there is no dust to be destroyed, they directly verify mind-only. If in contemplation one completely understands mind-only, then even though after emerging from contemplation one falsely sees self and other, upon reflecting again one immediately knows that it is one's own false seeing; unlike ordinary people and the lesser vehicle, one does not definitively cling to there being an external, nor does one go so far as still seeing subject and object when contemplating emptiness. Therefore, that treatise says: 'With the subsequent non-conceptual wisdom, the bodhisattva contemplates these marks of cause and effect, yet without inversion, neither clinging to external dust nor internal sense-bases as real entities; consciousness-only is a really existent dharma.' Thus we know that once those of great capacity verify mind-only, even though they later emerge from contemplation, they do not cling to the existence of an external. When contemplating their own mind falsely seeing objects, they know that sentient beings each have only consciousness. Therefore, great bodhisattvas and even the Buddhas constantly know that sentient beings have only mental false seeing. That is, they know that sentient beings either form a conception of names—and names are merely conceptual distinctions of mental speech of ordinary people, subjectively considered as appearing resembling external names, while in principle they are mind-made and are marks of their own mind—or they form a conception of the dharmas spoken of under those names; the dharmas and referents are merely conceptual distinctions of mental speech, subjectively considered as having external dharmas and referents appearing, while in reality dharmas and referents are also marks of the mind. Therefore, that treatise says: 'The twelve divisions of scripture are called the teaching; that which is explained by the twelve divisions of scripture is called the principle. The mind appears resembling this principle and teaching.' Attested by this passage, cognised objects are all mind-made, and are called marks of the mind. But these marks of the mind are also called reflections of the mind, and also called mark-consciousness and object-consciousness. All sorts of ordinary people and the lesser vehicle consider them distinct from the mind, yet in principle they have no separate substance and are truly only a single consciousness. Therefore, that treatise says: 'Consciousness-only does not go beyond two dharmas: the first is mark-consciousness, and the second is seeing-consciousness. Appearing resembling dust is called the mark, meaning the cognised object; appearing resembling consciousness is called seeing, meaning the cognising consciousness.' The mind in meditative concentration is also like this: appearing resembling dust, it is considered distinct from the concentrated mind; one part resembles consciousness, and one part resembles dust. These two are in truth only consciousness. Attested by this passage, the mark-consciousness of objects is identical to the mind without distinction, seen falsely only by subjective emotion, because it is created solely by false thoughts. This very thing is mark-consciousness, and is also called the mark-fetter (saṃyojana). Therefore, that treatise says: 'There are two kinds of fetters: first, mark-fetters; second, gross-heaviness fetters. Mark-fetters are difficult to untie; gross-heaviness fetters are difficult to extinguish. The mind conceptually distinguishing dust-objects is called the mark-fetter. Due to this conceptual distinction, afflictions such as desire and anger arise, which are called gross-heaviness fetters. If one attains non-conceptual wisdom, one immediately unties the mark-fetters. When mark-fetters do not arise, gross-heaviness fetters are immediately destroyed.' Attested by this passage, objects are mark-fetters, and ordinary people and the lesser vehicle are deluded and cling to them, hence they are called difficult to untie. Therefore, both the names and referents of all dharmas are mind-made. Ordinary people and the lesser vehicle do not know this; in principle and in reality, the names and referents cognised from beginningless time are constantly the conceptual distinctions of mental speech of ordinary people. Therefore, that treatise says: 'From the beginning, the conceptual distinctions of mental speech of ordinary people are of two kinds: first, resembling names; second, resembling referents. Names and referents subsume all dharmas exhaustively. These names and referents are merely created by conceptual distinctions of mental speech; apart from this, there are no other separate dharmas.' Attested by this passage, we know that the objects falsely seen by ordinary people, whether names or referents, are all the conceptual distinctions of mental speech of that moment. Just like someone who has eaten henbane falsely seeing needles and fire: based on their false subjective feelings, their mind considers them real, not knowing that it is false seeing and supposing there is an external fire; in reality, it is only the mind creating the conception of fire, and fire is merely a conceptual distinction of mental speech. Supposing there is the name 'fire', the name is mental speech; supposing there is the fact of 'fire', the fact is mental speech. Sentient beings falsely seeing their own bodies, other bodies, earth, water, fire, wind, and so forth are all like that. Although in real truth consciousness-only has no external, based on ordinary false feelings there is considered to be grasping and grasped. Therefore, that treatise says: 'The meaning of consciousness-only is not lost, nor is the meaning of grasper and grasped non-existent.' Although based on feelings there are considered to be internal and external, in principle there is only one mind and no separate substance of dust-objects. Therefore, that treatise says: 'As for the transformations of consciousness, although there are different aspects of internal and external phenomena, in truth there is only a single consciousness, and there are no separate substances such as dust.' Thus we know that the phenomena of self and other, internal and external, are only false conceptions transformed by the one mind. Therefore, all great sages know the false seeing of living beings, and themselves constantly do not see the objects seen by ordinary people. Just as a person who has not eaten henbane only sees another person falsely seeing needles and fire, while they themselves still do not see the phenomena of fire in the air. The Buddha's knowledge of consciousness-only is similar to this. Therefore, it is unlike the objects falsely seen by ordinary people, because the false seeing of living beings fundamentally lacks external dust. Hence, the Tathāgata constantly does not see matter. Only between ordinary beings and sages is there seeing and not seeing; it is simply that the true differs from the false, but none is not consciousness-only. For ordinary people, consciousness-only is straightforwardly the false mind. Therefore, a verse of the *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhiśāstra* says: 'Consciousness-only has no objects; / devoid of dust, there is false seeing.' As for the Buddha's consciousness-only, there is only the true mind. Therefore, the *Mahāyānasaṃgraha* says: 'Only tathatā and true wisdom exist in isolation, which is called the dharmakāya.' Furthermore, the *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhiśāstra* says: 'The realm of practice of the Buddhas, Tathāgatas, has only the true consciousness, and no other consciousness.' Attested by this passage, because the Buddha is free from [defiled] consciousness, he is not like ordinary people falsely seeing external objects, because in real consciousness-only there is fundamentally no external. As for karma being different, a single entity is seen differently: as humans see water, ghosts see it as fire, fish regard it as a dwelling place, and devas consider it earth. Furthermore, Śāriputra falsely saw an impure land, whereas the Bodhisattva Śikhin saw purity right there. If water, fire, defilement, and purity actually existed, occupying the same place they would obstruct each other and could not combine. Because their respective false seeings equally lack an external, multiple minds coexisting in the same place can form distinct conceptions. If sentient beings share the same karma, their false seeings are identical, and there are no distinct conceptions. Those sharing the same karma mutually act as causes for one another, and their falsely conceptualised seeing and hearing are merely the conjunction of mental conditions. Therefore, the *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhiśāstra* says: 'All sentient beings falsely conceptualise, contemplate, and recall: "They speak, and I hear." Relying on the mental consciousness (manovijñāna) of the speaker in front, in the mental consciousness of this listener there arises such a thought: "They speak, and I hear." Yet in reality there is no such object in front of them.' This is what the verse means by: 'Mutually acting as predominant causes, / each other's mental conditions conjoin.' Attested by this passage, those whose karmas depend on one another mutually act as causes for one another, each falsely seeing and hearing; because the six destinies are all the conjunction of mental conditions, and the three realms are transformations created solely by the mind. Therefore, the *Daśabhūmikasūtra* says: 'The three realms are false; they are made solely by the one mind.' The commentary explains it itself: '"Made by the one mind" means that they are solely the transformations of the mind.' Thus we know that the shared seeings and distinct seeings of the three realms are all transformations of one's own mind and differences in conceptualisation. As for those who share seeing and hearing, although their mental conditions conjoin, the mind has no shape or characteristics, and is eternally neither internal nor external. If one claims that outside the mind there is another's mind, that is a false conception; in reality, there is no external consciousness. Therefore, the *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhiśāstra* says: 'Yet in reality there is no external consciousness that can be grasped.' Even the knowledge of other minds possessed by the two vehicles, which supposes that there is an external consciousness, is still false. Therefore, that treatise says: 'Falsely conceptualising, this mind knows that mind, and that mind knows this mind.' Attested by this passage, there is in reality no external consciousness; it is simply ordinary people and the lesser vehicle falsely constructing an external conception. Therefore, that treatise says: 'One with knowledge of other minds does not know as it truly is. Why is that? Because with their own internal mind they falsely conceptualise, taking it to be another's mind, and are unable to fully understand it.'

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