宗鏡錄 92.17

92.17

答。但隨化門。無有決定。經云。無有定法。故號阿耨菩提。若執一門。皆成外道。或定一相。即是魔王。是以一切法權。一切法實。一切法亦權亦實。一切法非權非實。台教云。若一切法權。何所不破。如來有所說。尚復是權。況復人師。若一切法皆實者。何所不破。唯此一事實。但一究竟道。寧得眾多究竟道耶。若一切法亦權亦實。復何所不破。一切悉有權有實。不得一向權一向實。若一切法非權非實。復何所不破。何得紛紜。強生建立。古德云。即實而權。則有而不有。即權而實。則無而不無。若雙遮權實。即有無俱非。若雙照權實。則有無俱是。若非遮非照。則是非俱非。而遮而照。則是非俱是。若是非俱是。終日非而不非。若是非俱非。終日是而不是。若是而不是。則非是非非之非。若非而不非。則非是是是之是。是則心該色末。色徹心原。心色一如。何非何是。故知心外有法。是非競生。法外無心。取捨俱喪。

Answer: It merely accords with the teaching gate of conversion; there is nothing fixed. A sūtra says: 'Because there is no fixed Dharma, it is called anuttarā samyaksaṃbodhi.' If one clings to a single gate, all become non-Buddhist paths; or if one fixes upon a single characteristic, that is just the Māra king. Therefore, all dharmas are provisional; all dharmas are real; all dharmas are both provisional and real; all dharmas are neither provisional nor real. The Tiantai teaching says: 'If all dharmas are provisional, what would not be refuted? Even what the Tathāgata spoke is still provisional, let alone [the teachings of] human masters. If all dharmas are real, what would not be refuted? Only this one matter is real; there is only one ultimate path—how could there be many ultimate paths? If all dharmas are both provisional and real, what again would not be refuted? Everything has both the provisional and the real; one cannot have them be exclusively provisional or exclusively real. If all dharmas are neither provisional nor real, what again would not be refuted? How could there be confusion and arbitrary establishment?' An ancient worthy said: 'Being provisional right within the real, there is existence and yet no existence; being real right within the provisional, there is non-existence and yet not non-existence. If both the provisional and the real are negated, then existence and non-existence are both refuted. If both the provisional and the real are illumined, then existence and non-existence are both affirmed. If there is neither negation nor illumination, then affirmation and negation are both refuted. Yet with both negation and illumination, affirmation and negation are both affirmed. If affirmation and negation are both affirmed, then throughout the whole day one negates and yet it is not negation. If affirmation and negation are both refuted, then throughout the whole day one affirms and yet it is not affirmation. If one affirms and yet it is not affirmation, then it is not the negation of affirming what is non-negation. If one negates and yet it is not negation, then it is not the affirmation of negating what is non-affirmation. Thus citta encompasses the end-branch of form, and form penetrates the source of citta. Citta and form being one suchness, what is negated and what is affirmed? Hence we know that when there are dharmas outside citta, dispute over right and wrong arises competitively; when there is no citta outside dharmas, grasping and rejection are both extinguished.'