宗鏡錄 92.17

92.17

Answer: It merely accords with the teaching gate of conversion; there is nothing fixed. A sūtra says: 'Because there is no fixed Dharma, it is called anuttarā samyaksaṃbodhi.' If one clings to a single gate, all become non-Buddhist paths; or if one fixes upon a single characteristic, that is just the Māra king. Therefore, all dharmas are provisional; all dharmas are real; all dharmas are both provisional and real; all dharmas are neither provisional nor real. The Tiantai teaching says: 'If all dharmas are provisional, what would not be refuted? Even what the Tathāgata spoke is still provisional, let alone [the teachings of] human masters. If all dharmas are real, what would not be refuted? Only this one matter is real; there is only one ultimate path—how could there be many ultimate paths? If all dharmas are both provisional and real, what again would not be refuted? Everything has both the provisional and the real; one cannot have them be exclusively provisional or exclusively real. If all dharmas are neither provisional nor real, what again would not be refuted? How could there be confusion and arbitrary establishment?' An ancient worthy said: 'Being provisional right within the real, there is existence and yet no existence; being real right within the provisional, there is non-existence and yet not non-existence. If both the provisional and the real are negated, then existence and non-existence are both refuted. If both the provisional and the real are illumined, then existence and non-existence are both affirmed. If there is neither negation nor illumination, then affirmation and negation are both refuted. Yet with both negation and illumination, affirmation and negation are both affirmed. If affirmation and negation are both affirmed, then throughout the whole day one negates and yet it is not negation. If affirmation and negation are both refuted, then throughout the whole day one affirms and yet it is not affirmation. If one affirms and yet it is not affirmation, then it is not the negation of affirming what is non-negation. If one negates and yet it is not negation, then it is not the affirmation of negating what is non-affirmation. Thus citta encompasses the end-branch of form, and form penetrates the source of citta. Citta and form being one suchness, what is negated and what is affirmed? Hence we know that when there are dharmas outside citta, dispute over right and wrong arises competitively; when there is no citta outside dharmas, grasping and rejection are both extinguished.'