宗鏡錄 51.35

51.35

Answer: There would be two fallacies: first, the fallacy of inconclusiveness (anaikāntika); second, the fallacy of contradicting one's own teaching (āgama-virodha). As for the fallacy of inconclusiveness: if the inference were formulated: "In ultimate truth, universally established matter is definitely not separate from visual consciousness, because it is not subsumed under the eye, like visual consciousness," then the reason "not subsumed under the eye" would be too broad, applying over the subsequent five sets of three in the negative examples (vipakṣa), as all are not subsumed under the eye. The opponent would point out the fallacy of inconclusiveness, saying: "Does [the reason] prove that universally established matter is not separate from visual consciousness like visual consciousness, which is not subsumed under the eye and is not separate from visual consciousness? Or does it, conversely, prove that your universally established matter is definitely separate from visual consciousness like the subsequent five sets of three, which are also not subsumed under the eye and are definitely separate from visual consciousness?"'