宗鏡錄 51
English (machine translation) 51
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- English
51.1
Compiled by Yanshou, Chan Master Zhijue, Abbot of Huiri Yongming Monastery.
51.2
Now, names are established on the basis of characteristics, and characteristics are manifested on the basis of names. Names have already been extensively distinguished; what are the characteristics of consciousness?
51.3
Answer: Expressing, denoting, and addressing are designated as 'names'; observable states of activity are called 'characteristics.' The sixth consciousness of distinguishing phenomena is a name; taking cognitive objects with a defiled mind is its characteristic. The seventh, the manifesting consciousness, is a name; avidyā perfuming the deluded mind is its characteristic. The eighth, the storehouse consciousness (ālayavijñāna), is a name; the mind's purity is its characteristic. The ninth, the true consciousness, is a name; the unchanging nature of its substance is its characteristic. All of these are names without name, characteristics without characteristic. Why? Because names and characteristics do not go beyond mind and its objects. Therefore, mind has no inherent nature; it arises dependent on objects. Objects have no inherent nature; they exist dependent on mind. Thus, when mind expands, there are no objects outside mind; when objects expand, there is no mind outside objects. If they mutually negate each other and both perish, mind and objects are both extinguished. If they mutually support each other and stand together, mind and objects appear distinct. This is being empty due to having no nature, yet empty without being [merely] empty; existing due to having no nature, yet existing without being [truly] existent. An existence that is non-existent manifests the One Suchness; an emptiness that is non-empty accomplishes myriad virtues. This may truly be called crushing the myriad existences into emptiness of nature, and sweeping away the solitary nothingness into the ultimate! Furthermore, the Weishi shuyao states: 'The phrase "arising from the characteristics of one's own mind" has two explanations: one says it is the reflected image (pratibimba) characteristic; the second says it is the characteristic of what is clung to. Although they have no real substance, they appear before one's consciousness.' All statements regarding the characteristics of the mind should be understood accordingly. Explanation: Regarding the reflected image characteristic, the myriad phenomena are the reflected images of the mind. Regarding the characteristic of what is clung to, the various objects have no substance; they arise following one's clinging. Arising due to one's own mind, they in turn serve as characteristics for the mind.
51.4
Question: How does the ālayavijñāna acquire its name? Does it arise from its own substance, or does it exist through combination?
51.5
Answer: If one says it arises from itself, that is the delusion of self-arising. If one says it arises from another, that is the delusion of other-nature. If one says it arises from combination, that is the delusion of shared nature. If one says it arises apart from self and other, that is the delusion of causelessness. Now, speaking in accordance with the conventional truth (saṃvṛtisatya) as a skillful means of siddhānta: it is like the nature of phenomena combining with avidyā to produce all phenomena, or like the sleeping mind combining with dreams to see the states of all cognitive realms. This fundamental consciousness is established from the aspect of arising and ceasing, and acquires its name through the combination of the true and the deluded. The Treatise on the Awakening of Faith says: 'The aspect of the mind belonging to arising and ceasing means that, based on the tathāgatagarbha, the mind that arises and ceases turns; the non-arising and non-ceasing combines with arising and ceasing, neither one nor different, which is called the ālayavijñāna. This consciousness has two meanings: namely, it can contain all phenomena, and it can produce all phenomena. Furthermore, it has two meanings: first, the meaning of awakening; second, the meaning of non-awakening. As for the meaning of awakening: it means the mind's ultimate nature is free from all characteristics of deluded thought. Because it is free from all characteristics of deluded thought, it is equal to the realm of empty space, pervading everywhere. The single characteristic of the dharmadhātu is precisely the equal dharmakāya of all tathāgatas. Based on this dharmakāya, all tathāgatas are spoken of as original awakening. It is established as original awakening only in contrast to initial awakening. Yet at the time of initial awakening, it is precisely original awakening; no other awakening arises. Initial awakening is established because, dependent on original awakening, there is non-awakening; and dependent on non-awakening, initial awakening is said to exist. Furthermore, because of awakening to the source of the mind, it is called ultimate awakening; because of not awakening to the source of the mind, it is not ultimate awakening. As for the meaning of non-awakening: it means that from beginningless time, because one does not truly know the oneness of the true Dharma, the unawakened mind arises and deluded thoughts occur. They have no real characteristics of their own, and are not apart from original awakening. Just as a confused person is disoriented dependent on cardinal directions, yet disorientation has no characteristic of its own and is not apart from the directions. Sentient beings are also like this: dependent on awakening, non-awakening exists, and deluded thoughts are confusedly produced. Yet that non-awakening has no real characteristic of its own and is not apart from original awakening. Furthermore, dependent on non-awakening, true awakening is spoken of. Once non-awakening is gone, true awakening is also dismissed.' The masters of old explained: '"The mind that does not arise or cease combines with arising and ceasing, neither one nor different" means that the defiled phenomena of the seven consciousnesses are arising and ceasing, while the pure phenomena of the tathāgatagarbha are non-arising and non-ceasing. Because the non-arising and non-ceasing mind moves in its entire substance, the mind is not apart from the characteristics of arising and ceasing. Because the characteristics of arising and ceasing are none other than spiritual understanding, arising and ceasing are not apart from the characteristics of mind. In this way, being inseparable, their combination is called the ālayavijñāna. Because they are combined, they are neither one nor different. If they were one, there would be no combination; if they were different, there would also be no combination. Because they are neither one nor different, they are able to combine. Furthermore, the pure mind of the tathāgatagarbha acts as arising and ceasing without being separated, which is why it is called a combination. It does not mean that there is a separate arising and ceasing coming to combine with the true. It means that the mind of arising and ceasing, and the arising and ceasing of the mind, are without characteristic; the mind's arising and ceasing is brought about by avidyā. The mind of arising and ceasing arises from original awakening, yet they do not have two substances and do not abandon or separate from each other, which is why it is called a combination. It is like the water of the great ocean moving in waves due to the wind: the characteristics of water and the characteristics of wind do not separate from each other. If arising and non-arising were one, when the characteristics of the arising and ceasing consciousness are completely extinguished, the substance of the mental spirit should also perish along with them, falling into the extreme of annihilation. If they were different, when it is perfumed and moved by the wind of avidyā, the substance of the tranquil mind should not follow conditions, thus falling into the extreme of permanence. Free from these two extremes, they are neither one nor different. Furthermore, regarding what was stated above about awakening and non-awakening: the two phenomena mutually perfume each other to form defilement and purity. Since they have no inherent substance, they are entirely the one awakening. Why? Due to avidyā, non-awakening is formed; because the meaning of non-awakening perfumes original awakening, the various defiled phenomena arise. Furthermore, because original awakening perfumes non-awakening, the various pure phenomena arise. Based on these two meanings, all is universally produced. Therefore it is said: "The consciousness has two meanings, producing all phenomena."'
51.6
Question: What does the ālayavijñāna take as its cause, what does it take as its condition, and what does it take as its substance?
51.7
Answer: The Prakaraṇāryavācāśāstra states: 'Regarding the ālayavijñāna: it takes the karma and kleśas produced and increased in past lives as its conditions; it takes beginningless conceptual proliferation (prapañca) habituation (vāsanā) as its cause; and it takes the maturation (vipāka) of all seeds produced thereby as its substance. This consciousness can grasp and discern the physical sense faculties, the physical bases of the faculties, and the habituation of conceptual proliferation. At all times, it is a single uniform stream of birth and death that cannot be consciously discerned. Furthermore, it can maintain and discern the external container world, and it is associated with neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling, and so forth. It is strictly unhindered and neutral (anivṛtāvyākṛta), serving as the causal support for the transforming consciousnesses (pravṛttivijñāna) and the rest. A sūtra says: "Shrouded by avidyā and bound by the bonds of craving, the foolish common person obtains a body possessing consciousness." This statement manifests that there is a vipāka-ālayavijñāna.'
51.8
Question: The ālayavijñāna in its very substance is the self-characteristic; because it recompenses good and bad causes, it is the result-characteristic; because it receives perfuming and holds seeds, it is the cause-characteristic. Since the eighth consciousness possesses both cause and result characteristics, among the six causes, to which causes does it belong? And among the five results, which result is it?
51.9
Answer: Among the six causes, it has four. From the aspect of being able to hold seeds, it is a seed-holding cause; if the cause and the seed exist simultaneously, it is a co-existent cause (sahabhūhetu); if viewed with respect to seeds of its own kind inducing one another sequentially, it is an identical-type cause (sabhāgahetu); if viewed with respect to simultaneous mental factors (caitta) and so forth, it is an associated cause (samprayuktakahetu). It does not have the remaining two causes: the maturation cause (vipākahetu) is of good or bad nature, whereas this consciousness is neutral; the universal cause (sarvatragahetu) is defiled, meaning views, doubt, avidyā, and so forth, whereas this consciousness is not defiled. Among the five results, it possesses four, excluding only the result of disconnection (visaṃyogaphala). Viewed with respect to its own seeds, it is an equal-outflow result (niṣyandaphala); viewed with respect to mental factors such as attention (manaskāra), it is an anthropomorphic result (puruṣakāraphala); viewed with respect to the seventh consciousness, it is a dominant result (adhipatiphala); viewed with respect to good and bad causes, it is a maturation result (vipākaphala).
51.10
Question: Among the various minds and consciousnesses, which consciousness is firm and solid, and not swayed or shaken by various conditions?
51.11
Answer: In the world, there is not a single dharma that does not arise from conditions. Conditioned dharmas are all impermanent. Only the fundamental citta does not arise from the past boundary, does not abide in the present boundary, and does not cease in the future boundary. It is truly the foundation of the myriad beings and the abode of all buddhas. Therefore, it is likened to a mirror: it can meticulously discern the beautiful and the ugly, and profoundly penetrate the mysterious and subtle. Looking up to it as the source, it is like a vast flood receiving rivers, or empty space containing forms.
The Ghanavyūhasūtra says: 'Mind is of eight kinds, or also of nine. Together with avidyā, it is the cause of the world. The world is entirely the manifestation of citta and caittadharmas. These citta and caittadharmas, along with the sense faculties, arise, cease, and transmigrate, being transformed by avidyā and so forth. Their fundamental citta is firm and unmoving. Wordly causes and conditions have twelve divisions. Whether faculties or objects, the capable of producing and the produced, they break and perish in a kṣaṇa. From the Brahmā world up to [the sphere of] neither-perception-nor-non-perception, all arise from causes and conditions. Only the Tathāgata is free from all causes and conditions. Inner and outer worlds, moving and unmoving dharmas, are all like pots and the like, having destruction as their nature.'
Furthermore, the verses say: / 'Why do you, children of the Buddha, not see and hear / That the substance of the storehouse consciousness is pure, / The support of all bodies? / Sometimes it possesses the thirty-two / Marks of a buddha or a cakravartin; / Sometimes it assumes various forms, / Which are all seen in the world. / Just as the moon in a clear sky / Is encircled by all the stars, / The ālayavijñāna and the [other] consciousnesses / Dwell in this manner within the body. / Just as the lord of the desire gods, / Accompanied by attendants, roams the jeweled palace, / And the deities of rivers and seas / Roam freely in the waters, / The storehouse consciousness dwelling in the world / Should be known to be likewise. / Just as the earth produces myriad things, / This citta manifests many things. / Just as the sun deva, / Splendidly riding his jeweled chariot, / Circles Mount Sumeru / And courses about, illuminating all under heaven, / While the gods and people of the world / Behold and venerate him, / So within the buddha-stage / The characteristics of the storehouse consciousness are also like this. / Practicing myriad practices on the ten stages, / It reveals and manifests the Mahāyāna dharmas, / Universally gives joy to sentient beings, / And constantly praises the Tathāgata. / When in the body of a bodhisattva, / It is designated a bodhisattva. / The Buddha and the bodhisattvas / Are all names for the ālaya. / The Buddha and the children of the Buddha, / Who have received or will receive prediction, / Rely on the vast ālaya / To achieve right awakening. / Practitioners of meditation in the Ghanavyūha, / Being in harmony with wondrous meditation, / Are able to clearly observe / And perceive the ālayavijñāna. / The Buddha, pratyekabuddhas, / Śrāvakas, and various other paths— / Persons undaunted in seeing the principle— / What they contemplate is entirely this consciousness. / The various objects of the consciousnesses / Are all transformed from the citta. / Pots, garments, and other myriad things— / Such entities are all nonexistent in nature. / All rely on the ālayavijñāna, / Yet sentient beings perceive them through delusion. / Due to the various vāsanās, / Grasper and grasped operate. / This nature is not like an illusion, / A mirage, or a hair-ring; / It is neither produced nor unproduced, / Neither empty nor existent. / Just as with long and short and so forth, / Departing from one, all are nonexistent. / The wise contemplate illusory phenomena: / These are all merely illusory arts; / Never has there been a single thing / That arose together with the illusion. / Illusions, mirages, and hair-rings / Can be seen in combination; / Departing from one, there is no combination; / They do not exist in the past or the future either. / Illusions, hair-rings, and the like, / The characteristics of the various things present everywhere, / Are all transformations of citta, / Lacking substance and lacking name. / Deluded people in the world, / Their cittas lacking autonomy, / Falsely speak of that which can produce illusion, / Magically creating various things. / The bricks, tiles, and such of an illusionist, / The classes of myriad things created, / Whether they appear to go or come in various ways— / All such sights are not real. / Just as iron moves in the direction / Induced by a lodestone, / The storehouse consciousness is also like this, / Operating in accordance with discrimination. / Throughout all the worlds, / There is nowhere it does not pervade. / Like the sun and the cintāmaṇi jewel, / It is devoid of thought and discrimination. / This consciousness pervades all places; / Seeing it, one calls it transmigration. / It neither dies nor is born; / Originally it is not a dharma of transmigration. / Practitioners of meditation diligently contemplate: / Birth and death are just like a dream. / At that time there is the transformation of the basis, / Which is called liberation. / This is the supreme / Doctrine and principle of all buddhas, / Assessing all dharmas / Like a scale and like a bright mirror, / Also like a great bright lamp, / And also like a touchstone, / Far removed from annihilationism, / The sign of the right path. / For those who cultivate wondrous meditation, / It is the cause leading to liberation, / Forever free from all defilements, / Manifesting through the transformation of the basis.'
51.12
Question: The fundamental consciousness and the various consciousnesses are conjoined, arising together and ceasing together. When reaching the stage of the transformation of the basis, the defiled consciousnesses cease, and only the fundamental consciousness remains. How does one distinguish the difference between what ceases and what does not cease?
51.13
Answer: The Mahāyānasaṃgraha says: 'If the fundamental consciousness and the non-fundamental consciousnesses arise together and cease together, just like water and milk mixed together, how is it that the fundamental consciousness does not cease, while the non-fundamental consciousnesses cease? It is like the milk drunk from water by a swan.'
The commentary explains: 'For example, although water and milk are mixed together, when a swan drinks, it drinks only the milk and does not drink the water; therefore, although the milk is exhausted, the water is not depleted. The fundamental consciousness and the non-fundamental consciousnesses are also like this: although they are conjoined, one ceases and one remains.'
51.14
Question: Since this fundamental consciousness-citta is called the substance of all dharmas, and is also said to be eternally abiding and unmoving: are the myriad dharmas existent as this citta, or existent apart from this citta? If they are this citta, then the myriad dharmas change and alter; how can this citta be called eternally abiding? If they exist apart from this citta, how can it be the substance of all dharmas?
51.15
Answer: Opening and uniting follow conditions; it is neither identical nor separate. Because conditions gather, there is uniting; because conditions disperse, there is opening. Opening and uniting are merely conditions; rolling up and unrolling have no substance. Conditions are merely opening and uniting, and conditions are also fundamentally empty. The one and the other have no cognition of each other; grasper and grasped are both tranquil.
The verse of the Ghanavyūhasūtra says: / 'Just as gold, stone, and the like / Originally have no water-form, / Yet when combined with fire, / They flow like water, / The storehouse consciousness is also like this: / In substance it is not a dharma of transmigration, / Yet conjoined with the various consciousnesses, / It transmigrates together with dharmas. / Just as iron, because of a lodestone, / Turns and moves all around, / While both are devoid of thought, / Yet appear as if they had thought and perception, / The ālaya and the seven consciousnesses / Should be known to be likewise. / Bound by the rope of conditioning, / Without a person, it seems as if one exists; / Pervading the bodies of sentient beings, / Traveling through the skandhas and destinies, / Like iron and a lodestone, / Mutually they do not know each other.'
51.16
Question: How many kinds are there of the eighth storehouse consciousness?
51.17
Answer: The *Shi Moheyan lun* states: "There are altogether ten kinds of ālayavijñāna. Why is this? Because they are explained separately across the sūtras. First is the ālayavijñāna named 'Great Sovereign of Inclusion,' which refers precisely to the great consciousness of the universal characteristic, the meaning of which is as explained before. Second is that named 'Fundamental Ignorance,' established separately as the ālayavijñāna. Thus, in the sūtra on the ten kinds of conceptual elaboration, it is stated: 'The king-consciousness of *chajizhiditi* is entirely a false dharma; it cannot comprehend the substance of the one dharmadhātu. All defiled dharmas take the ālayavijñāna as their root to be produced and to grow without interruption. If there were no such king-consciousness, the retinues of the dark category would forever have no basis and could not grow.' Under what determination and inclusion does this ālayavijñāna fall? In the root treatise it is stated: 'What is called the meaning of non-enlightenment is that, because one does not truly know the oneness of the dharma of tathatā, an unenlightened citta arises and has thoughts,' up to extensive explanations. Third is the ālayavijñāna named 'Pure Original Enlightenment,' which refers to the spontaneous original wisdom, established separately as the ālaya. Thus, in the sūtra of original enlightenment, it is stated: 'The ālayavijñāna of the intrinsically pure Buddha is fully endowed with uncontaminated, complete virtues; it is eternal, constant, and determinate, devoid of the characteristic of receiving perfuming and devoid of the characteristic of alteration; the substance of its wisdom is unmoved and fully endowed with the white category; therefore it is named the uniquely pure consciousness.' Under what determination and inclusion does this ālayavijñāna fall? In the root treatise it is stated: 'Furthermore, regarding the substance and characteristic of enlightenment, there are four great meanings, equal to empty space, like a clean mirror,' up to extensive explanations. Fourth is the ālayavijñāna named 'Defiled and Pure Original Enlightenment,' which refers to the dhāraṇī-wisdom that does not preserve its own nature, established separately as the ālayavijñāna. Thus, in the sūtra on the conditioned arising of the root cause, it is stated: 'At that time the youth Prabhāvyūha said to the Buddha: "O Venerable One! For what reason is it stated in the assembly of the difficult-to-enter unprecedented that the dhāraṇī-wisdom of conditioned arising following other [conditions] is called the king-of-Laṅkā consciousness? Why is it named the king of Laṅkā, using it as an analogy to show that dhāraṇī-wisdom of conditioned arising?" Thereupon the Venerable One said to Prabhāvyūha: "O youth! This king of Laṅkā constantly abides in Mount Malaya in the great ocean, leading an assembly of one hundred and six thousand ghosts and spirits as his retinue. These retinues, riding flower palaces and roaming through the various realms, all depend on that king of Laṅkā in order to roam. That is to say, the assembly of ghosts and spirits say: 'We spirits have no majesty and virtue, no energy and strength, and have no ability in whatever we do. As appropriate, Great King, grant capability and power amidst our assembly.' That king of Laṅkā then, according to the time, grants supreme strength, not abandoning them but operating together with them. This means that although the king of Laṅkā does not divide his body, he can pervade the assembly of spirits, enabling each to obtain the measure of a whole body, operating together without departing at all times and in all places. The wisdom that does not preserve its own nature is also like this: it can receive the perfuming of the ghost-and-spirit assembly of all immeasurable and boundless kleśas and defiled dharmas, not abandoning them but operating together." For this reason, in the difficult-to-enter [assembly] I stated: "The awakened wisdom that operates in accordance [with conditions] is called the king-of-Laṅkā consciousness."' Under what determination and inclusion does this ālayavijñāna fall? In the root treatise it is stated: 'The intrinsically pure citta is stirred by the wind of avidyā. Both citta and avidyā are without physical form, and are not separated from each other,' up to extensive explanations. Fifth is the ālayavijñāna named 'Karmic Characteristic and Karmic Consciousness,' which refers to the fundamental karmic characteristic together with the karmic consciousness, established separately as the ālaya. Thus, in the sūtra of intrinsic nature wisdom, it is stated: 'The ālayavijñāna has nothing that can actively cognize, nothing that is actively cognized, cannot be analyzed, and cannot be separated; solely due to the meaning of subtle motion and hidden flowing, it is called *karman*.' Under what determination and inclusion does this ālayavijñāna fall? In the root treatise it is stated: 'Furthermore, dependent on non-enlightenment, three kinds of characteristics are produced, which are associated with and not separated from that non-enlightenment. What are the three? The first is the karmic characteristic of avidyā: because of reliance on non-enlightenment, the citta is stirred, which is called karma. When enlightened, it is unmoved; when moved, there is suffering, because the fruit is not separated from the cause.' Sixth is the ālayavijñāna named 'Transforming Characteristic and Transforming Consciousness,' which refers to the characteristic of being able to perceive the objective realm together with the transforming consciousness, established separately as the ālaya. Thus, in the sūtra of the great immeasurable, it is stated: 'In the ālayavijñāna, seeing transforms with seeing, and seeing arises without seeing.' Under what determination and inclusion does this ālayavijñāna fall? In the root treatise it is stated: 'The second is the characteristic of the perceiver: because of reliance on motion, it can perceive; if unmoved, there is no seeing.' Seventh is the ālayavijñāna named 'Manifesting Characteristic and Consciousness,' which refers to the characteristic of the objective realm together with the manifesting consciousness, established separately as the ālaya. Thus, in the sūtra of the actual limit, it is stated: 'Distinctly and differently, it transforms present before the ground; differing in characteristics, it transforms operating with completeness; therefore it is named the ālayavijñāna. Furthermore, this ālayavijñāna is truly a vipāka and indeterminate dharma; because of its white and pure characteristic, it is sometimes named accomplishment.' Under what determination and inclusion does this ālayavijñāna fall? In the root treatise it is stated: 'The third is the characteristic of the objective realm: because of reliance on the perceiver, the objective realm falsely manifests; apart from the perceiver, there is no objective realm.' Eighth is the ālayavijñāna named 'Principle of the Nature of Tathatā,' which refers to the pure tathatā realized by correct wisdom, established separately as the ālaya. Thus, in the sūtra of the identical substance of all dharmas, it is stated: 'There is a consciousness; this consciousness is not included within the consciousness of consciousness; it is the so-called tathatā-ālayavijñāna.' Under what determination and inclusion does this ālayavijñāna fall? It is included within the pure prajñā-ground-of-essence tathatā. Ninth is the ālayavijñāna named 'Pure Initial Enlightenment,' which refers to the originally existing, pure, and white prajñā of initial enlightenment, established separately as the ālaya. Thus, in the sūtra of the fulfillment of the fruit, it is stated: 'The Buddha told the Bodhi Tree King: "The natural initial-enlightenment ālayavijñāna is always inseparable from pure original enlightenment; pure original enlightenment is always inseparable from the pure consciousness of initial enlightenment. Following the existence of that, this exists; following the existence of this, that exists; they are neither of the same kind nor of a different kind."' Under what determination and inclusion does this ālayavijñāna fall? In the root treatise it is stated: 'Regarding the meaning of original enlightenment, in contrast to initial enlightenment, it is identical with original enlightenment.' Tenth is the ālayavijñāna named 'Defiled and Pure Initial Enlightenment,' which refers to the prajñā of initial enlightenment that accords with conditions, established separately as the ālaya. Thus, in the sūtra of the fulfillment of the fruit, it is stated: 'Furthermore, Tree King, just as the pure consciousness of initial enlightenment and its own original enlightenment are spoken of, the defiled and pure initial-enlightenment ālayavijñāna, not preserving its own nature, is the conditioned arising of original enlightenment; it is also like this.' Under what determination and inclusion does this ālayavijñāna fall? In the root treatise it is stated: 'Regarding the meaning of initial enlightenment: dependent on original enlightenment, there is non-enlightenment; dependent on non-enlightenment, there is initial enlightenment. Moreover, because of awakening to the source of citta, it is named ultimate enlightenment; because of not awakening to the source of citta, it is non-ultimate enlightenment.' Having thus explained the gate of analyzing the characters and distinct characteristics of the storehouse consciousness, next is explained the gate of the universal consciousness's inclusion and production of completeness: 'This consciousness has two meanings, which can include all dharmas and produce all dharmas: the first is the meaning of enlightenment, and the second is the meaning of non-enlightenment,' which universally displays the supreme and complete characteristic of the great consciousness. What is this meaning? It refers to being fully endowed with two kinds of completeness: the first is the completeness of merits, and the second is the completeness of faults. Regarding the completeness of merits: the words and phrases of the meaning of enlightenment can include all immeasurable, boundless merits that exceed the sands of the Ganges, inseparable and uninterrupted; and they can produce all immeasurable, boundless merits that exceed the sands of the Ganges, inseparable and uninterrupted. Regarding the completeness of faults: the words and phrases of the meaning of non-enlightenment can include all immeasurable, boundless faults that exceed the sands of the Ganges, both separate and detached; and they can produce all immeasurable, boundless faults that exceed the sands of the Ganges, both separate and detached."
51.18
Question: If one does not establish this eighth consciousness, what kind of faults would there be?
51.19
Answer: There would be great faults: all defiled and pure dharmas would not be established, because both would be without a cause. The *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhiśāstra* states: "If this consciousness did not exist to hold the seeds of the kleśas, then when traversing between realms and stages, after an undefiled citta, when the kleśas arise, they would all be without a cause, because other dharmas cannot hold those seeds. If the kleśas arose without a cause, then the fruits of the learners and non-learners of the three vehicles would not exist, because those [kleśas] that had already been severed would all arise again. Furthermore, if this consciousness did not exist to hold the worldly and supramundane seeds of the pure path, then when those pure dharmas arise after a citta of a different category, they would all be without a cause. Moreover, the supramundane path could never arise initially, because there would be no dharma to hold those inherently existent seeds. Since it could not arise initially, it would also not arise subsequently; in that case, there would be no path and fruit of the three vehicles. If this consciousness did not exist to hold the seeds of the kleśas, the fruit of severance through transformation of the basis could also not be accomplished. This is because when the path arises, both the active kleśas and their seeds do not exist, and defiled and pure cittas do not arise together; the citta associated with the path does not hold those seeds, since their intrinsic natures are mutually contradictory, just like nirvāṇa. That other dharmas hold the seeds is logically unfeasible. Since there would be nothing to be severed, that which can sever would also not exist. Dependent on what and by means of what would the fruit of severance be established? If one says that through the power of the path subsequent afflictions do not arise and thus establishes the fruit of severance, then when the initial path arises, one should already become a non-learner, because all subsequent kleśas would already be without cause and would never arise again. If one accepts that this consciousness exists, everything is accomplished, because only this [consciousness] can hold the defiled and pure seeds." The reasons proving the existence of this consciousness are boundless; fearing that [the reader] will weary of verbose text, its essentials are briefly recounted. Thus, that this consciousness exists is obvious in both teaching and reason; all wise persons should deeply believe and accept it. Furthermore, this principle of true Vijñaptimātra is followed in common by a thousand sages; neither in this land nor in the Western Heavens has anyone refuted it. As the *Baifa chao* states: "Regarding the inference of true Vijñaptimātra: this inference is precisely what the Tripiṭaka [master] of the Great Tang established during the eighteen-day unobstructed great assembly convened by King Śīlāditya in the city of Kanyākubja in Central India. [The king] broadly summoned the śramaṇas, brāhmaṇas, and others of the five regions of India who understood the meanings of the Dharma, together with [proponents of] the Hīnayāna and non-Buddhist traditions, to serve as opponents. [Xuanzang] established a single inference, wrote it on a golden placard, and throughout the eighteen days, there was not a single person who dared to refute it." Therefore, the *Yinming shu* states: "Furthermore, when the Great Master traveled through the Western Regions, had completed his studies, and was about to return, King Śīlāditya ruled the five regions of India and convened an eighteen-day unobstructed great assembly for him, commanding the Great Master to establish his thesis. Selecting the worthy and good from all across India, they all gathered at the meeting place, and non-Buddhists and Hīnayānists were sent to compete in raising objections and interrogations. The Great Master established the inference, and none dared to respond. The Great Master's inference of Vijñaptimātra stated: 'As a thesis: In the ultimate sense, universally established matter is the subject; it is definitely not separate from the visual consciousness. As the reason: Because it is accepted by oneself as being included within the first three and not included within the eye [faculty]. As the positive example: Like visual consciousness. As the application: All that is included within the first three and not included within the eye [faculty] is not separate from visual consciousness; like visual consciousness as the positive example, and like the eye faculty as the negative example.'"
51.20
Question: Why does the application not include the phrase 'accepted by oneself'?
51.21
Answer: It is not the primary reason (hetu); rather, it is merely an inserted word at the start of the reason to eliminate a fallacy. Nor is it that the Hīnayāna does not accept it while the Mahāyāna accepts it on its own. The reason applies over the subject (dharmin), and all three members are shared (sādhāraṇa). First, the thesis (pakṣa) and reason are explained; afterward, questions and answers are set forth. The first section has two parts: first, distinguishing the thesis, and next, explaining the reason. Now, in the first [part], the thesis: the previous subject-phrase states five characters, 'In ultimate truth, universally established matter' (zhengu jicheng se). The single character 'matter' (se) is precisely the subject. The remaining four characters merely protect against fallacies. First, regarding the protection against fallacies by the two characters 'in ultimate truth' (zhengu): they eliminate the fallacy of contradiction with worldly convention (loka-viruddha) and the fallacy of contradiction with scriptural authority (āgama-viruddha).
51.22
An opponent asks: 'Worldly convention is superficial and immediate; from birth, people know that matter exists apart from consciousness. Now the Mahāyāna posits that matter is not separate from visual consciousness; because this is not shared with what the world universally knows, why does this inference not commit the fallacy of contradiction with worldly convention?'
51.23
Answer: In formulating an inference, there are self-oriented (svānumāna), other-oriented (parānumāna), and shared (samānumāna) types; according to what is appropriate, each has its markers of qualification. If it is a self-oriented inference, it is qualified by the words 'accepted by oneself' (zixu). If it is an other-oriented inference, it is qualified by the words 'held by you' (ru zhi). If it is a shared inference, it is qualified by the words 'in ultimate truth' (paramārthataḥ). Now, this shared inference contains a qualification: the words 'in ultimate truth' signify reliance on the ultimate truth. That is, it is established relying on the 'truth of substance and function becoming manifest' among the four kinds of ultimate truths.
51.24
Question: 'If it does not contradict the world of the non-learned, that may be so. Furthermore, just as the World-Honoured One in the Hīnayāna Āgamas also accepted that matter exists apart from consciousness, and Hīnayāna scholars universally reckon that real objects exist outside of mind, does this not contradict scriptures such as the Āgamas and Hīnayāna scholars?'
51.25
Answer: It is established solely on the basis of the supreme ultimate truth of the Mahāyāna; it does not commit the error of contradicting the teachings of the Hīnayāna or worldly scholars.
51.26
Question: 'The words "in ultimate truth" eliminate fallacies such as contradiction with worldly convention and contradiction with scriptures; what fallacy do the two characters "universally established" (jicheng, prasiddha) eliminate?'
51.27
Answer: Positing the words 'universally established' eliminates two kinds of unestablished matter. Among the twenty Hīnayāna schools, excluding the four schools of the Ekavyāvahārika, Prajñaptivāda, Lokottaravāda, and Kaukkutika, the remaining sixteen schools all accept the defiled matter of a bodhisattva in their final existence, as well as the tainted matter of a Buddha. The Mahāyāna does not accept these; this is one kind of unestablished matter. The Mahāyāna speaks of the matter of Buddhas of other directions and the untainted matter of a Buddha; although the Sautrāntika accepts the matter of Buddhas of other directions, it does not accept that it is untainted; the remaining nineteen schools all reject its existence. Together with the former, these are matter not universally established between the two masters. If one did not say 'universally established' but merely said 'In ultimate truth, matter is the subject, and it is definitely not separate from visual consciousness is the thesis,' then when saying 'matter', whether accepted or unaccepted, all would be encompassed within the subject. As for what was previously accepted by the Hīnayāna but not accepted by the Mahāyāna, if one now posits it as consciousness-only, one would commit [the fallacy of] the partial non-establishment of one's own qualificand (aśrāyāsiddha / dharmi-asiddhi), and also commit the error of partial contradiction of one's own thesis. Furthermore, what is accepted by the Mahāyāna is not accepted by the Hīnayāna; if one now posits it as the subject, one commits [the fallacy of] the partial non-establishment of the other's qualificand. And when adducing the reason 'because it is subsumed under the first three and not subsumed under the eye,' one would commit the non-establishment of the substratum (āśrayāsiddha) for either one part of oneself or the other, because in the subject-phrase there would be no universally established matter to serve as the substratum. Now, in order to fully eliminate these four kinds of [fallacies], the words 'universally established' are posited.
51.28
Question: 'The two characters "universally established" eliminate the matter unestablished between the two traditions; we do not yet know which matter the Tripiṭaka Master establishes as consciousness-only?'
51.29
Answer: Excluding the matter not universally established by the two traditions, one takes the remaining all forms of matter jointly accepted by proponent and opponent together as consciousness-only. Therefore, the commentary on Hetuvidyā states: 'Because all the remaining jointly accepted forms of matter of both parties are established as consciousness-only.' The predicate-phrase of the thesis states: 'definitely not separate from visual consciousness,' which is a universally established qualifier (prasiddha-viśeṣaṇa).
51.30
Question: 'Why does it not commit the fallacy of the unestablished qualifier (viśeṣaṇāsiddha)? Indeed, who among the Hīnayāna accepts that matter is not separate from visual consciousness?'
51.31
Answer: Here, this is the basis of the thesis (pakṣa-saṃbandhin). So long as there is an unseparated sense within the other tradition, it can be employed: because the Hīnayāna accepts that visual consciousness cognises matter, taking its substance directly, there is the sense of non-separation; and in addition, they accept that visual consciousness itself is essentially not separate from visual consciousness; therefore, there is no fallacy of an unestablished qualifier.
51.32
Question: 'Since they accept that visual consciousness grasps the cognised matter with the sense of non-separation, when these are subsequently combined into the substance of the thesis, should there not be the fallacy of proving what is already accepted (sādhya-sama / siddhasādhana)?'
51.33
Answer: There is no error of proving what is already accepted. Now the Mahāyāna only maintains that the object is not separate from mind, and that externally there are no real objects. If the subject-phrase and predicate-phrase are combined into the thesis, clearly the proponent accepts it while the opponent rejects it. What is jointly disputed by proponent and opponent is called the substance of the thesis. In this context, one disputes only what is explicitly stated in words, not yet probing what is intended. The analysis of the thesis is complete. Next is the analysis of the reason, which has two parts: first, clarifying the primary reason; next, explaining the insertion of words to eliminate fallacies. First, regarding the primary reason: saying 'subsumed under the first three' refers to taking the first realm among the three sets of six realms of the eighteen dhātus. That is, the visual organ realm, the visual consciousness realm, and the visible form object realm are the first three realms among the eighteen dhātus.
51.34
Question: 'Suppose one did not say "subsumed under the first three" and merely said "not subsumed under the eye"; what fallacy would there be then?'
51.35
Answer: There would be two fallacies: first, the fallacy of inconclusiveness (anaikāntika); second, the fallacy of contradicting one's own teaching (āgama-virodha). As for the fallacy of inconclusiveness: if the inference were formulated: "In ultimate truth, universally established matter is definitely not separate from visual consciousness, because it is not subsumed under the eye, like visual consciousness," then the reason "not subsumed under the eye" would be too broad, applying over the subsequent five sets of three in the negative examples (vipakṣa), as all are not subsumed under the eye. The opponent would point out the fallacy of inconclusiveness, saying: "Does [the reason] prove that universally established matter is not separate from visual consciousness like visual consciousness, which is not subsumed under the eye and is not separate from visual consciousness? Or does it, conversely, prove that your universally established matter is definitely separate from visual consciousness like the subsequent five sets of three, which are also not subsumed under the eye and are definitely separate from visual consciousness?"'
51.36
Question: 'Now, can the Mahāyāna state that the subsequent five sets of three are also not separate from visual consciousness, or not?'
51.37
Answer: If the Mahāyāna were to accept that the subsequent five sets of three are also not separate from visual consciousness, while avoiding the fallacy of inconclusiveness, it would contradict its own school's tenets, because the Mahāyāna school maintains that the subsequent five sets of three are definitely separate from visual consciousness. Therefore, half of the reason, "subsumed under the first three," is posited to exclude the subsequent five sets of three from being subsumed under the first three.
51.38
Question: 'If one only says "subsumed under the first three" and does not say "not subsumed under the eye," what fallacy would there be?'
51.39
Answer: It would also commit two fallacies: first, the fallacy of inconclusiveness; second, the fallacy of decisive contradiction with the intrinsic nature of the predicate (dharma-svarūpa-viparīta-sādhana). First, as for inconclusiveness: if one formulated the inference: "In ultimate truth, universally established matter is definitely not separate from visual consciousness, because it is subsumed under the first three, like visual consciousness," then the reason "subsumed under the first three" would be too broad, applying over the visual organ in the negative example. One would point out the inconclusiveness, saying: "Does [the reason] prove that universally established matter is not separate from visual consciousness like visual consciousness, which is subsumed under the first three and is not separate from visual consciousness? Or does it prove that your universally established matter is not definitely non-separate from visual consciousness like the visual organ, which is also subsumed under the first three but is not definitely non-separate from visual consciousness?"'
51.40
Question: 'Why does it not say "definitely separate," but instead says "not definitely non-separate"?'
51.41
Answer: In the Mahāyāna, the visual organ in relation to visual consciousness is neither definitely identical nor separate. First, as for being non-separate: the organ is the cause and the consciousness is the fruit; because they are simultaneous, they are non-separate. Moreover, because matter and mind are distinct, they are termed non-identical. Therefore, one merely says 'not definitely non-separate.' Second, regarding the fallacy of decisive contradiction with the intrinsic nature of the predicate: the 'intrinsic nature of the predicate' refers to the intrinsic nature of the property in the predicate-phrase of the thesis. 'Decisive contradiction' means that the reason contradicts the thesis. The opponent presents a counter-inference: 'In ultimate truth, universally established matter is the subject; it is not non-separate from visual consciousness is the thesis; because it is subsumed under the first three is the reason; like the visual organ is the example.' That is, the opponent takes the negative example of the previous inference as a positive example, and takes the positive example as a negative example.
51.42
Question: 'Does this successfully constitute contradiction with the intrinsic nature of the predicate?'
51.43
Answer: It is not a genuine refutation. For an inference of contradiction with the intrinsic nature of the predicate, it is required that for the proponent, positive examples do not have it and negative examples have it, while for the opponent, positive examples have it and negative examples do not have it; only then does it constitute contradiction with the intrinsic nature of the predicate. Now, for both proponent and opponent, it is present in the positive example and present in the negative example; therefore, it is not a genuine fallacy of contradiction with the intrinsic nature of the predicate.
51.44
Question: 'Since it is not a contradiction with the intrinsic nature of the predicate, does it constitute the inconclusive fallacy of decisive contradiction (viruddhāvyabhicārin)?'
51.45
Answer: It is not that either. In the inconclusive fallacy of decisive contradiction, the proponent and opponent dispute a single subject, but the reasons and examples are distinct, both possessing the three marks: presence in the subject of the thesis (pakṣadharmatva), definite presence in similar instances (sapakṣe sattvam), and complete absence from dissimilar instances (vipakṣe 'sattvam). Yet neither generates correct cognition against the other; both parties are left in hesitation and unable to definitively establish either thesis; this is called the inconclusive fallacy of decisive contradiction. Now, although "In ultimate truth, universally established matter" is a single subject under shared dispute, the reason is shared, and moreover, both lack the third mark; therefore, it is not the inconclusive fallacy of decisive contradiction.
51.46
Question: 'Since this fallacy does not exist, why does the commentary on Hetuvidyā say that it commits the fallacy of decisive contradiction with the intrinsic nature of the predicate?'
51.47
Answer: This is merely a rhetorical flourish by the commentator. It was distinguished out of the previously mentioned shared inconclusive fallacy, and is only a semblance of the fallacy of decisive contradiction with the intrinsic nature of the predicate, not a genuinely existing one. Due to this factor, the reason "subsumed under the first three and not subsumed under the eye" is posited, mutually eliminating various inconclusivenesses, contradictions, and other fallacies. Next is the explanation of inserting words to eliminate fallacies.
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- 宗鏡錄 — Classical Chinese