宗鏡錄 51.39

51.39

Answer: It would also commit two fallacies: first, the fallacy of inconclusiveness; second, the fallacy of decisive contradiction with the intrinsic nature of the predicate (dharma-svarūpa-viparīta-sādhana). First, as for inconclusiveness: if one formulated the inference: "In ultimate truth, universally established matter is definitely not separate from visual consciousness, because it is subsumed under the first three, like visual consciousness," then the reason "subsumed under the first three" would be too broad, applying over the visual organ in the negative example. One would point out the inconclusiveness, saying: "Does [the reason] prove that universally established matter is not separate from visual consciousness like visual consciousness, which is subsumed under the first three and is not separate from visual consciousness? Or does it prove that your universally established matter is not definitely non-separate from visual consciousness like the visual organ, which is also subsumed under the first three but is not definitely non-separate from visual consciousness?"'