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宗鏡錄 54

English (machine translation) 54

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54.1

Compiled by Yanshou, Chan Master Zhijue, Abbot of Huiri Yongming Temple

54.2

Now, mental-verbal discrimination and all existing things are completely empty; then names and referents are without nature. All sentient beings, in their seeing and hearing, should not form inversions, because there is no referent in a name and no name in a referent, both being adventitious.

54.3

Answer: The ten thousand dharmas are fundamentally empty; habituation forms them into existence. Amid fundamental emptiness, emotional clingings and inversions arise. The Ratnagotravibhāga says:

54.4

Question: If there is no referent in a name, and no name in a referent, both being adventitious—if someone grasps that a name is different from a referent, and a referent is different from a name, since this person is already without inversion, they should have no perverse clinging toward referents, and should not generate minds of grief or joy upon hearing talk of good or bad, because name and referent are unrelated. Therefore, you should know that the adventitious meaning is your inversion.

54.5

Answer: It is due to having habituated delusions for a long time that there is this perverse clinging; it is not related to words and referents corresponding. Because words and speech perfuse the mind, one inevitably gives rise to discriminative thought and generates false and perverse clingings through this very teaching. As the verse in the Ghanavyūhasūtra says:
‘Then Vajragarbha
again addressed the great assembly:
“From beginningless time, the ālayavijñāna
has been perfused by conceptual proliferation,
bound by all karmas,
and transmigrates without end.
It is like the great ocean
producing waves due to the wind:
constantly arising and constantly perishing,
neither broken nor permanent.
Because of not awakening to one's own mind,
[external realms] appear according to the object-fields of consciousness.
If one understands one's own mind,
it is like fire consuming fuel completely;
penetrating into the undefiled (anāsrava),
one is then called a noble one.
The storehouse consciousness transforms into multiple realms,
encompassing the entire world.
The manas clings to self and mine,
and deliberating, constantly flows on.
The varieties of consciousnesses differ;
each perceives its own realm.
Accumulating karma is called citta;
universal accumulating is called manas;
discrimination is called vijñāna.
The five consciousnesses grasp present realms,
like clouded vision seeing hairs and wheels;
following what is seen, they are bewildered:
in the mind that resembles form,
they impute form where there is no form.
Just like a maṇi jewel
illuminated by the light of the sun and moon
rains down its own kinds of things
according to what should appear,
the ālayavijñāna is likewise:
the pure storehouse of the Tathāgata (tathāgatagarbha),
combined with karmic impressions (vāsanā),
transforms and appears throughout the world;
corresponding with the undefiled,
it rains down all dharmas of merit.
Just as milk transforms,
becoming curds and on to whey,
the storehouse consciousness is also like this,
transforming to resemble various forms.
Just as clouded vision sees hairs and wheels,
sentient beings are also like this:
with the cataract of bad karmic impressions
dwelling in the eye of the storehouse consciousness,
in places where there is no form,
these forms that are seen
are just like a mirage,
far removed from existence and non-existence,
and are all manifested by the ālaya.
O noble ones, dependent on the eye and forms,
consciousness resembling form arises;
like an illusion dwelling in the eye,
it flutters like a shimmering mirage.
Forms are all the storehouse consciousness
corresponding with the karmic impressions of form;
transforming to resemble [them], its substance does not exist;
fools falsely conceptualize [them].
All states of intoxication and heedlessness,
sitting, lying down, and frantic running,
and suddenly undertaking various activities,
are all the ālayavijñāna.
Just like the blazing, radiant sun
spreading its light and illuminating the ground,
with vapors resembling flowing water,
and thirsty beasts running toward it in the distance,
the ālaya is also like this:
its essential nature is truly not form,
yet it appears as if it were form;
with bad discernment one falsely gives rise to attachment.
Like a magnet attracting iron,
swiftly moving and shifting,
though it lacks sentient consciousness,
it moves as if it were sentient consciousness.
Thus the ālayavijñāna
is subsumed by birth and death;
going and coming throughout the various destinies,
it is not a self, yet resembles a self.
Like an object drifting in the ocean,
it follows the flow of water without thought;
the ālaya is free from discrimination,
yet it initiates the subsequent body.
Just as when two elephants fight,
the injured one retreats forever,
the ālaya is also like this:
when defilement is severed, there is no more transmigration.
Just like a pure lotus flower
emerging from the mud, bright and pure,
which gods and humans all enjoy
and none fail to treasure and revere,
so too the ālayavijñāna
emerges from the mud of karmic impressions,
attains purity through the transformation of the basis (āśrayaparavṛtti),
and is treasured by the Buddhas and Bodhisattvas.
Just like a supreme jewel,
which is disdained by a rustic,
if used to adorn a crown,
it is worn on the head of a king.
So too the ālayavijñāna
is the pure Buddha-nature;
in the stage of an ordinary person it is always defiled,
while in the fruit of Buddhahood it is constantly cherished.
Just like fine jade in the water
covered and wrapped by moss,
the ālaya dwells in birth and death,
entangled by karmic impressions and not apparent.
In this ālayavijñāna,
the characteristics of the two graspings (grāhya and grāhaka) arise;
like a snake with two heads,
it proceeds together according to what it desires.
The ālaya is also like this,
endowed with all characteristics of form;
all the worlds
grasp it and consider it to be form.
Those of bad discernment are bewildered
and conceive of it as self and mine;
whether existent or non-existent,
it sovereignly creates the world.
Although the ālaya transforms and appears,
its essential nature is ever exceedingly profound;
among all those who lack wisdom,
none are able to perceive or comprehend it.
Just like an illusionist
magically creating various beasts,
some walking and some running,
which resemble sentient beings but are not real,
the ālaya is also like this,
magically creating the world;
the essential nature of all sentient beings
has no reality.
Ordinary fools cannot comprehend it
and falsely give rise to graspings and attachments,
generating [views of] subtle atoms and primordial nature (pradhāna),
discriminations of existence, non-existence, and difference,
as well as various views regarding Brahmā,
the Puruṣa, and so forth.’”

54.6

Question: When the eye sees forms, does the eye see, or does consciousness see?

54.7

Answer: It is not that the eye, consciousness, sense-objects, and so forth each possess a determinate nature of seeing; it is merely through the combination of the three that it is nominally designated as 'seeing'. The lower five sense-bases of hearing, smelling, tasting, touching, and so on are also like this. The Abhidharmasamuccayavyākhyā says: 'It is not that the eye sees forms, nor is it consciousness and so on, because all phenomena are devoid of active functioning. Due to the presence of a combination, it is nominally established as seeing, and therefore it is said that the eye can see forms.' Furthermore, consciousness in relation to the sense-bases emerges suddenly and enters suddenly, like a deer in a net or a bird in a cage, pecking at one and letting go of another, cycling endlessly without a moment's rest. Consciousness within the cage of the sense-bases is also like this: sometimes in the ear, sometimes in the eye, coming and going without certainty; it cannot be grasped as permanent. Although it is not fixed, it is continuous and unbroken. Why is it unbroken? Because its subtle function is uninterrupted. If an ordinary person is bound by the sense-dust of forms, they do not attain sovereign ease. If they see one phenomenon, they are obstructed by that one phenomenon and cannot completely penetrate the dharmadhātu. For this reason, the Diamond Sūtra says: 'If a bodhisattva's mind abides in dharmas while practicing giving, it is like a person entering darkness who sees nothing.' The Śūraṅgamasūtra says: 'From the sense-dust awareness is generated; dependent on the sense-base characteristics exist. The characteristics and the seeing lack intrinsic nature, just like intertwined reeds.' 'From the sense-dust awareness is generated' refers to the darśanabhāga. 'Dependent on the sense-base characteristics exist' refers to the nimittabhāga. 'The characteristics and the seeing lack intrinsic nature' means that mind and object mutually generate each other, each lacking self-substance. The mind does not stand on its own: from the sense-dust awareness is generated. The object does not arise on its own: dependent on the sense-base characteristics exist. The two false entities rely on each other, just like intertwined reeds. Establishing knowledge within knowing and seeing is the very root of avidyā. When knowing and seeing are free from seeing, this is nirvāṇa. Simply seeing clearly that there is nothing to be seen is penetrating the dharmadhātu; seeing is itself nirvāṇa. If one hears clearly that there is nothing to be heard, then having nothing to be heard is penetrating the dharmadhātu; hearing is itself nirvāṇa. All dharmas are originally nirvāṇa, but due to the discriminative mind they are separated by false views; not knowing one's own consciousness, it turns into avidyā. Furthermore, the Śūraṅgamasūtra says: 'Conditioned seeing depends on light; darkness brings about non-seeing; without light it spontaneously arises. If one does not depend on light, darkness, and so forth to see, then when seeing forms, one would see the other sense-bases.' If one is free from conceptual thoughts, seeing pervades the dharmadhātu; none of the characteristics of the Iron Ring Mountains can obstruct it. If the six sense-bases are subdued, then one cannot apprehend the characteristics of the six sense-bases. It is like ten people suffering from clouded vision who together see flowers in the sky: if one person's eyes recover, they do not see them, while the remaining nine people still see them. When each person individually eliminates their false seeing, they will not apprehend any characteristics, and every single thing will be true. Furthermore, if there are ten sky-flowers that one person can see, and the ten people's eyes recover, the remaining flowers all completely vanish. As long as a single falsity is removed, none of the characteristics are seen. One characteristic is all characteristics, for all characteristics arise from my mind. Thus we know: with a single cataract in the eye, a thousand flowers flutter in confusion; with a single false movement of the mind, all sense-dusts arise together. If one can be free from conceptual thoughts, then right where one is, one sits in the bodhimaṇḍa, turns the great wheel of Dharma, and together attains the Buddha path.

54.8

Question: When the ear hears the sound of preaching the Dharma, how many consciousnesses are present in total?

54.9

Answer: Three consciousnesses are present. The eighth first takes the Buddha's undefiled sounds, names, phrases, and syllables as the fundamental substance (vastu); the ear consciousness conditions the sound, and the manovijñāna simultaneously conditions the names, phrases, syllables, and so forth. Only then is it called 'hearing'.

54.10

An ancient master asked: 'Now, when conditioning the Buddha's sounds, names, phrases, and syllables, is it that one's own ear consciousness and manovijñāna condition the names, phrases, and syllables so that it is called hearing, or is it that one's own eighth consciousness must first take the Buddha's fundamental sound as substance, transform and raise a nimittabhāga, and then the ear consciousness and manovijñāna take the eighth's nimittabhāga as substance, transforming their own nimittabhāga to condition it, so that hearing is attained?'

54.11

Answer: If it were so, what fault would be entailed? Both entail faults. If the eighth does not first transform the Buddha's sound, and the two consciousnesses of ear and mind then condition the names, phrases, and syllables, then because the first six are inferior in the causal state, they cannot condition them directly, but must first depend on the transformation by the eighth. If the eighth does not first transform them, this would be apprehending dharmas outside the mind, and vijñaptimātra would not be established. If they take the nimittabhāga of their own eighth as substance to condition, then the nimittabhāga transformed by the sixth consciousness would lack names, phrases, and syllables; since there would be no names, phrases, or syllables, the mind could not produce understanding, because the eighth consciousness only transforms into the direct, unmediated sound of the Buddha's fundamental substance, and on this direct sound of the fundamental substance there are as yet no names, phrases, or syllables, because the eighth does not condition them. The answer to this is: in terms of actual principle, the sixth consciousness conditions the nimittabhāga of its own eighth as its object. That is, the sound of the Buddha's fundamental substance and the reflected sound transformed by one's own eighth combine into one sound. Since the World-Honoured One's fundamental sound already possesses names, phrases, syllables, and so forth, when the sixth consciousness conditions the sound of the eighth's nimittabhāga at its own ear sense-base, the three—names, phrases, and syllables—are not absent, because they exist on the Buddha's fundamental sound. For example, people in the world together look at a piece of writing on paper: if a person cannot read, they only see the black and white colors of the paper and ink, and cannot know the differences in meaning and principle; if a person can read, they see the black and white of paper and ink and can also know the differences in meaning and principle within them. Now, the ear consciousness and the eighth are like the illiterate person, while the sixth is like the literate person. Since the sixth conditions the real sound, it can also condition names, phrases, and syllables. Furthermore, sound is that on which they rely, and names, phrases, and syllables are that which rely; names, phrases, and syllables exist dependent on the real sound. Since the real sound exists, its names, phrases, and syllables naturally adhere to and exist on the sound; and because the manovijñāna has the capacity for discrimination, it naturally conditions them. Furthermore, hearing is inference (anumāna): when listening to and hearing the three—names, phrases, and syllables—one infers and generates understanding toward the mental factors (caitasikas). Only the sixth consciousness is endowed with inference. If it conditions names and referents, they are already within the mind.

54.12

Question: Since the hearer of the Dharma takes the compassionate vows of the Buddhas as the fundamental substance (vastu) serving as the sovereign condition (adhipatipratyaya), and what sentient beings attain are merely the nimittabhāga of images, syllables, and meanings transformed within their own conscious minds, this means there are truly no dharmas outside the mind. For those whose attachments to views have not yet produced faith, how can affairs in worldly phenomena be cited as evidence to confirm and produce subsequent faith, so that they may enter the gate of the One Vehicle?

54.13

Answer: Worldly dharmas are the Buddha Dharma; the Buddha Dharma is worldly dharmas. Why should one further cite events to make an analogy? However, for those who have not yet formed resolute faith, how could there be no expedient means? In terms of inferential knowledge, whatever meets the eye is entirely this. Let us cite one or two to broadly categorize this principle: for instance, when Brahmins in the western lands sought intelligence, they constantly made offerings to devas and the like. Later, in dreams, they saw heavenly beings conferring dhāraṇīs, treatises, and other teachings upon them. Yet in the dream there were truly no heavenly beings preaching teachings, treatises, and dhāraṇīs of intelligence to them; taking the devas as a sovereign condition, their own conscious minds transformed and produced the understanding of treatises and dhāraṇīs. Now, the seeing and hearing of sentient beings is also like this. Among analogies, the dream analogy is the closest, because within one's own dream there are truly no external realms; they are all transformed and raised by the dreaming mind, which can serve as direct evidence. Again, in this land, when Zhou Chang was plowing the field, his mother wished for her son to return, so his mother bit her finger; Zhou Chang felt pain in his heart while in the field, and thought, 'My mother is calling me.' When he returned, it was indeed as she said. Although the mother had the intention to call her son, she did not utter a sound. The Tathāgata merely has the mind to preach the Dharma, but does not speak; it is naturally transformed and raised within the minds of sentient beings. When correctly understood: the compassionate vows of the Buddhas are the response, and the readiness and appropriateness of the capacities to hear is the resonance. The mutual resonance of stimulus and response is neither identical nor different; only through Mind is it revealed, falling neither into annihilationism nor eternalism. One must not grasp either side, contradicting the Middle Way.

54.14

Question: When sense-bases and sense-objects confront each other, direct realization is distinct and clear. How can one achieve complete penetration and enter the principle of emptiness?

54.15

Answer: When the eye faces a form object, where there was nothing, seeing arises; this maturation karmic fruit is inconceivable, known only by wisdom, not fathomable by [ordinary] sentiment. Only through personal realization is the true nature of all phenomena illuminated. That there is seeing and hearing belongs to the measure of worldly minds; if considered from the ultimate truth, sense faculties and sense objects are both empty. Now, in the conventional gate, seeing has no self-nature. For instance, the eye's ultimate-truth faculty is like fire: it can both produce consciousness and illuminate the object; consciousness is like a person: it can discern; the object is like a thing. Therefore, we know that without the faculty, consciousness cannot arise; without consciousness, the object cannot be discerned; without the object, seeing cannot occur. Only when these three phenomena harmoniously combine is the nature of seeing accomplished. Thus, the nature of seeing has no source, and the harmonious combination is not inherently existent. As a verse in the Viśeṣacintibrahmaparipṛcchāsūtra says: 'Seeing all lands of the ten directions / and all classes of sentient beings, / yet regarding the eye and form / one ultimately produces no dual characteristics. / All the teachings spoken by all buddhas / one is completely able to hear and receive, / yet regarding the ear and sound / one likewise produces no dual characteristics. / Able within one mind / to know the various minds of sentient beings, / between one's own mind and the minds of others / one makes no distinction between these two.' The 'Chapter on Refuting Faculties and Objects' in the Śataśāstranirbhāsa says: 'If faculties and objects such as the eye are grasped as truly existent, this must be logically untenable. Why is this? Because it contradicts inference. That is to say, the eye is not seeing, just like the ear and other faculties; the ear is also not hearing, just like the eye and other faculties; the nose cannot smell, just like the tongue and other faculties; the tongue cannot taste, just like the nose and other faculties; the body cannot feel tactile sensation, just like the above faculties. All of them are due to their nature of derived form, or due to the great elements, or due to karmic fruition. Furthermore, because faculties such as the eye all have physical obstruction, they can be analyzed and all reduced to emptiness; otherwise, there would be the fault of infinite regress. Therefore, one should not grasp them as truly existent; they are merely the false manifestation produced by one's own mind in accordance with the power of causes and conditions, like magical illusions and the like: existent conventionally, nonexistent in the ultimate.' Also, the 'Chapter on Refuting Sentiment' says: 'Does the eye see by reaching form, or does it see without reaching form? If the eye sees by going to and reaching form, a distant form should be seen slowly and a near form should be seen quickly. Why is this? Because this is the nature of going. Yet now, the near vase and the distant moon are seen at the same time. Therefore, we know the eye does not go. If it does not go, there is no harmonious combination. Furthermore, if the power of the eye sees without reaching form, why does it see what is near and not what is distant? Far and near should be seen at the same time. Therefore, we know the nature of seeing has no source.' The other faculties are also like this. As the gate of contemplation on self and other in the Huanyuan ji says: 'Two bodies constitute self and other: that body is other, one's own body is self. One body further constitutes self and other: the form body is other, citta is self. Citta further constitutes self and other: citta is other, wisdom is self. Wisdom further has self and other: wisdom with attainment is other, wisdom without attainment is self. Wisdom without attainment further has self and other: pure wisdom is other, that purity is also pure is self. Contemplating the true characteristic of the body, contemplating the Buddha is also like this. Bowing to that which is like empty space without support; the mind being pure has already crossed over all dhyānas. If there is no abiding, there is no root. Awakening—this is named Buddha. Conventionally designated as Buddha, there is also no Buddha to be attained; without attainment that can be attained, without emergence that can emerge, this is called the emergence of the Buddha. Having nothing seen, one sees clearly; seeing clearly, there is nothing seen. There are only names; the nature of names is empty and without anything existent. A mirror image is like empty space, empty space is like a mirror image; form and citta are like empty space, empty space is like form and citta; form and citta are like a mirror image. The mirror image and the body are not two, nor are they one. If one can understand like this, all buddhas emerge from within it. All buddhas have only names, like empty space echoing a sound. The mind-free ultimate path: phenomenon by phenomenon is naturally equal. At the point of equality, there is also no equality; where there is no equality, one speaks of equality. Here words are cut off, and the place of mental activity also ceases. The emptiness of the eye protects the emptiness of form; the emptiness of form protects the emptiness of the eye; the two emptinesses mutually protect each other, and then there is no thief of eye-consciousness. The emptiness of the ear protects the emptiness of sound; the emptiness of sound protects the emptiness of the ear; the two emptinesses mutually protect each other, and then there is no thief of ear-consciousness. The emptiness of the nose protects the emptiness of fragrance; the emptiness of fragrance protects the emptiness of the nose; the two emptinesses mutually protect each other, and then there is no thief of nose-consciousness. The emptiness of the tongue protects the emptiness of taste; the emptiness of taste protects the emptiness of the tongue; the two emptinesses mutually protect each other, and then there is no thief of tongue-consciousness. The emptiness of the body protects the emptiness of touch; the emptiness of touch protects the emptiness of the body; the two emptinesses mutually protect each other, and then there is no thief of body-consciousness. The emptiness of the mind protects the emptiness of dharmas; the emptiness of dharmas protects the emptiness of the mind; still it is that one emptiness can protect two emptinesses, and can also protect one emptiness. Therefore, it is called the emptiness of emptiness; it is conventionally designated as seeing the truth. If one knows that the six faculties are pure, then there are no thieves of the six sense objects. If there are no thieves of the six sense objects, the citta-king is naturally pure. Expediently maintaining this transforms ordinary mortals; inscribing its name is lodged in Buddha-nature.' Explanation: Thus, if the eye is empty and form is not empty, or form is empty and the eye is not empty, they cannot protect each other; because faculty and object would be different, there would inevitably be harm. If they are of the same nature, there is no doubt. Just as in the world, regarding those who serve as guarantors: if one is a loyal and good person, one may act as a guarantor for a loyal and good person; if one is an evildoer, they cannot be guaranteed, because their sentiments and natures are different. Since the harmonious unity of the six faculties and objects is like this, the accordant intent of all the myriad phenomena is likewise so. Therefore, the Śūraṅgamasūtra says: 'The Buddha told Ānanda: The faculties and objects have the same source; bondage and liberation are not two. The nature of consciousness is false and deceptive, like flowers in the sky. Ānanda, knowing is produced from sense objects, and characteristics exist due to faculties. Characteristics and seeing have no nature; they are like crossed reeds. Therefore, for you now, to establish knowing upon seeing and knowing is the very root of avidyā. Seeing and knowing free from seeing [characteristics] is itself nirvāṇa's undefiled, true purity. How could there be room for any other thing within it?'

54.16

Question: Form objects have physical obstruction, so they can be analyzed and reduced to emptiness. The nature of sound is empty and pervasive, so it should be truly existent.

54.17

Answer: Sound-objects arise and cease; movement and stillness are both empty. Sound does not reach the ear faculty, nor does the faculty go to the place of the sound. Since not a single thing comes and goes between them, citta and objects are both void, and sound is unattainable. As the Śūraṅgamasūtra states: “Furthermore, Ānanda, how are the twelve āyatanas fundamentally the tathāgatagarbha, the wondrous nature of tathatā? Ānanda, just observe this Jeta Grove and these springs and pools. What do you think? Are these forms producing the sight of the eyes, or are the eyes producing the characteristics of form? Ānanda, if the eye faculty produced the characteristics of form, then upon seeing space, which is not form, the nature of form would be annihilated. If it were annihilated, this would reveal that all is completely nonexistent; and since the characteristics of form would be nonexistent, who would elucidate the substance of space? The same is true of space. If the form-object produced the sight of the eyes, then upon viewing space, which is not form, sight would be extinguished; and being extinguished, all would be nonexistent, so who would elucidate space and form? Therefore, you should know that sight, form, and space all have no fixed place. Thus the two āyatanas of form and sight are false; fundamentally, they are neither [caused by] causes and conditions nor a spontaneous nature.”

Also, the passage investigating the āyatana of sound states: “Ānanda, listen further to the striking of the drum when food is prepared in this Jeta Grove, and the ringing of the bell when the assembly gathers, the sounds of the bell and drum following one another in succession. What do you think? Do these sounds come to the ear, or does the ear go to the place of the sound? Ānanda, if this sound came to the ear, it would be as when I go to beg for food in Śrāvastī: while in the Jeta Grove, I am not there [in the grove]. If this sound must come to Ānanda’s ear, then Maudgalyāyana and Kāśyapa should not both hear it at the same time—how much less the one thousand two hundred and fifty śramaṇas who, upon hearing the sound of the bell, come together to the refectory! If your ear went to the side of the sound, it would be as when I return to dwell in the Jeta Grove: while in Śrāvastī, I am not there [in Śrāvastī]. When you hear the drum, your ear would have already gone to the place where the drum was struck; then when the sound of the bell rang out at the same time, you should not be able to hear it as well—how much less the various sounds of elephants, horses, cattle, and sheep! If there is no coming and going, there is also no hearing. Therefore, you should know that listening and sound both have no fixed place. Thus the two āyatanas of listening and sound are false; fundamentally, they are neither [caused by] causes and conditions nor a spontaneous nature.”

Also, the passage investigating the āyatana of odor states: “Ānanda, smell again the sandalwood in this censer. If even a single grain of this incense is burned, its scent is smelled simultaneously within forty li in the city of Śrāvastī. What do you think? Does this scent arise from the sandalwood tree, does it arise from your nose, or does it arise from empty space? Ānanda, if this scent arose from your nose, then being said to arise from the nose, it should issue forth from the nose. The nose is not sandalwood; how could there be the scent of sandalwood in the nose? Since you are said to smell incense, it should enter into the nose; that incense issues from the nose cannot properly be called ‘smelling’. If it arose from empty space, the nature of space is permanent and constant, so the scent should always be present; why rely on burning this dry wood in a censer? If it arose from the wood, then this fragrant substance becomes smoke through burning. If the nose could smell it, it ought to be shrouded in the smoke; yet before the smoke has risen far into the air, how could it already be smelled within forty li? Therefore, you should know that odor, nose, and smelling all have no fixed place. Thus the two āyatanas of smelling and odor are false; fundamentally, they are neither [caused by] causes and conditions nor a spontaneous nature.”

The passage investigating the āyatana of taste states: “Ānanda, twice a day you hold your bowl among the assembly, and in it you may encounter curd, cheese, or clarified butter, which are called superior tastes. What do you think? Does this taste arise from empty space, does it arise from the tongue, or does it arise from the food? Ānanda, if this taste arose from your tongue, there is only one tongue in your mouth; if that tongue has already become the taste of curd at that time, when it encounters dark cane sugar it should not alter. If it does not alter, it cannot be called cognising taste. If it does alter, the tongue is not multiple substances; how could multiple tastes be cognised by a single tongue? If it arose from the food, the food has no consciousness; how could it cognise itself? Moreover, if the food cognised itself, it would be the same as someone else eating; what would that have to do with you being said to cognise the taste? If it arose from empty space, when you ate empty space, what taste would it have? If empty space must have a salty taste, since it saltened your tongue, it would also salten your face, and the people of this realm would be just like ocean fish. Constantly experiencing saltiness, they would have no knowledge of blandness; and if they did not recognise blandness, they would not perceive saltiness either. If there were necessarily no cognition, how could it be called taste? Therefore, you should know that taste, tongue, and tasting all have no fixed place. Thus both tasting and taste are false; fundamentally, they are neither [caused by] causes and conditions nor a spontaneous nature.”

The passage investigating the āyatana of tangible objects states: “Ānanda, each morning you rub your head with your hand. What do you think? In this cognition of rubbing, what is that which touches? Is the touch in the hand, or is it in the head? If it were in the hand, the head would have no sensation; how could contact be established? If it were in the head, the hand would have no function; how could it be called contact? If each had its own, then you, Ānanda, would have two bodies. If head and hand arose from a single contact, then hand and head would be one substance; if they were one substance, contact could not be formed. If they were two substances, where would the contact reside? If it resided in the subject, it would not be in the object; if it resided in the object, it would not be in the subject. Empty space could hardly form contact with you. Therefore, you should know that feeling, touch, and the body all have no fixed place. Thus both body and touch are false; fundamentally, they are neither [caused by] causes and conditions nor a spontaneous nature.”

Now, investigating the twelve faculties and objects, since they have no fixed place, the former six sense gates have no place through which to enter, and the latter eighteen dhātus have no realms into which to divide. It can be verified that within the realm of sentient beings, the currently functioning citta and objects right now are both empty; within conventional truth, all conventionally designated dharmas are completely nonexistent. Indeed, what is recorded in this Mirror of the Source consists entirely of teachings of immediate realization: once entered, it is completely true, without before or after. If you do not believe this, simply reflect in quietude and see. If you see that a single thought is unarisen, you will naturally merge with the sūtras. As a verse in the Bodhisattva-buddhānusmṛti-samādhi-sūtra states:
“This body is perpetually without sentience, / like grass, trees, tiles, and rubble. / Bodhi has no form or color; / it is quiescent and ever unproduced. / The body does not touch bodhi, / and bodhi does not touch the body. / Citta does not touch bodhi, / and bodhi does not touch citta. / Yet that they are able to touch one another / is truly inconceivable.”

Commentary: Therefore we know that form does not reach the eye, and the ear does not go to the sound; yet that seeing and hearing occur is inconceivable. Because appearance occurs within the separation of self-nature, we know that the six faculties having no counterpart are all the Dharma-gate of non-contention. The various objects contain emptiness, entirely merging into the path of non-duality. The present realm of sentient beings is truly inconceivable! Why seek afar the functions of the sages and belittle oneself? This Mirror of the Source illuminates the dark ignorance of sentient beings and is identical to the radiant light of all buddhas, causing sentient beings throughout the dharmadhātu to attain complete realization all at once. As the Dharmasaṃgītisūtra states: “Subhūti said to the Buddha: ‘World-Honoured One, the two dharmas of eye and form have no dispute, because they do not unite, and because these two dharmas do not reach one another. Dharmas that do not unite and do not reach one another are free from conflict and dispute. World-Honoured One, dharmas are without duality; therefore there is no dispute.’”

Chapter on Refuting Sense Faculties and Objects in the Śatakaśāstra-vaipulya states: “Furthermore, if the ear faculty and its object united to cognise, one should not hear both far and near simultaneously. Since sound comes from a physical source and thus has far and near, it should not reach the ear faculty in a single moment. The ear has no light, so it should not proceed toward the object. Moreover, that sound leaves the physical source and enters the ear to be heard is also illogical, because the sounds of bells, drums, and so forth are perceptually not separated from their source, since they can be heard from afar. If the ear grasped sound without hearing, like scent and so forth, it would not discern direction. If the ear grasped sound without contact, it should hear all sounds regardless of distance, since the non-contact has no substance and its characteristics have no distinction; or else it should be unable to hear anything at all. Therefore, whether the ear faculty contacts sound or does not contact it, its actual grasping of its own object is untenable in both ways.”

It also states: “If citta proceeded to the dust-object, its substance would not be pervasive. If citta constantly went to the object, ‘I’ should be without citta. Yet subtle citta is ever-present within the body, constantly functioning in various states such as sleep and fainting—because there is respiration, because dreams can occur, because fatigue increases, because an awakening citta is induced, because it sustains the body, and because touch on the body is felt. Moreover, if the internal body were constantly devoid of citta, it would be like a corpse: killing it would incur no fault, and offering to it would produce no merit; thus one would be identical to the non-Buddhists who hold the view of voidness. If one holds that the substance of citta does not pervade or go, but only its function goes, this also incurs the same fault, because citta's function and citta's substance are not separate. Furthermore, if the substance of citta went forth to the external object, when the internal body was touched, there should be no feeling, and movement of thought should not impair the internal citta. Therefore, the assertions of various schools clinging to real faculties and objects are all illogical; one should have faith that they are not real. Furthermore, regarding the semantic characteristics of all dharmas, whether sentient or insentient, in all worldly realms: just as the thought of water arises based on a mirage, deluding one’s own citta and also being spoken to others, so based on this false thought the faculties, objects, and other various differences of worldly phenomena are established. As this thought is shown to be established based on multiple dharmas, it is conventional and not real; therefore it is said that the saṃjñā-skandha, up to all illusory things, although devoid of real substance, can produce various false consciousnesses. The eyes and so forth are also like this: substance and characteristic are both empty; like an impostor deceiving someone and giving rise to other false consciousnesses, saṃjñā arises in accordance with this—how could the object be real? Faculties and objects are both empty, just like illusory affairs.”

A verse in the Mahāsaṃnipātasūtra states:
“With the utmost citta mindfulness of the Dharma and contemplation of the Dharma, / one therefore does not see form and sound. / If one is able to enter the profound dharmadhātu, / at that time there is neither form nor sound.”

A verse in the Prajñāpradīpaśāstra states:
“The eye does not see form-objects, / and the manas does not know dharmas. / This is called the supreme reality, / which worldly people cannot fathom.”

Therefore, faculties and objects are citta only; name and characteristic are both quiescent. Thus we know that conventional truth and ultimate truth together tend toward the Buddha vehicle, and the sentient and the insentient alike return to the stage of wisdom. Because in true nonexistence, names and characteristics are severed and the path of citta and intellect is cut off, it is inconceivable. Because in conventional existence, phenomena are like illusions and apparitions, appearing out of nonexistence, it is inconceivable. It cannot be known through emotional consciousness, nor measured through existence and nonexistence. Therefore the Śatakaśāstra-vaipulya explains that worldly dharmas have five kinds of unfathomability. A verse says:
“Among all things in the world, / there is none that is not difficult to fathom. / The principle of faculties and objects is just the same; / why should the wise be astonished?”

The treatise states: “As a single volition-karma can produce the infinite differences of internal and external fruition-characteristics in the future, which even the most skilled craftsman could never make—this is called the first unfathomability in the world. Again, as external seeds give rise to sprouting stems, countless branches, leaves, flowers, roots, and fruits, with variegated shapes and colors, vividly adorned—this is called the second unfathomability in the world. Again, as with the flower tree named ‘Aśoka’: when touched by a courtesan, its many flowers burst forth competing, and its branches hang down brushing, as if possessing a loving heart—this is called the third unfathomability in the world. Again, as with the flower tree named ‘Like Musical Sound’: hearing the sound of music, its whole body shakes, and its branches sway like a dancing person—this is called the fourth unfathomability in the world. Again, as with the flower tree named ‘Singing of Fine Birds’: hearing the sound of birds singing, it immediately shakes, and its branches sway like an applauding person—this is called the fifth unfathomability in the world. With such unfathomable worldly phenomena being boundless, comparing the existence or nonexistence of faculties and objects to them is very easy: they exist conventionally, yet are empty ultimately; those who have wisdom should not be astonished.”

As a verse in the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā states:
“Through dharmas one knows there is a person; / through a person one knows there are dharmas. / Apart from dharmas, how could there be a person? / Apart from a person, how could there be dharmas?”
“Dharmas” refers to the eyes, ears, suffering, pleasure, and so forth. “Person” refers to the fundamental dweller. You claim that because there are dharmas one knows there is a person, and because there is a person one knows there are dharmas; now, apart from dharmas such as eyes and ears, how could there be a person? Apart from a person, how could there be dharmas such as eyes and ears? Furthermore, all faculties such as the eyes truly have no fundamental dweller; the various faculties such as eyes and ears are distinguished through different characteristics. The various faculties such as eyes and ears, and the various dharmas such as suffering and pleasure, truly have no fundamental dweller. Due to the eye conditioning form, visual consciousness arises; through harmonious causes and conditions one knows that the various faculties such as the eye exist, not because of a fundamental dweller. Therefore the verse says: “All faculties such as the eyes and ears truly have no fundamental dweller; the various faculties such as eyes and ears are each able to distinguish.”

54.18

Question: If the sense faculties such as the eye have no primordial abode, how can each individual faculty, such as the eye, know sense objects? If all the faculties such as the eye and ear, and all phenomena such as pain and pleasure, have no primordial abode, how does each individual faculty now know sense objects? The faculties such as the eye and ear have no thought; they should not possess knowledge, yet in fact they know sense objects. Thus one should know that, apart from the faculties such as the eye and ear, there must be another knower of sense objects.

54.19

Answer: If that were so, does each individual faculty have its own knower, or is there a single knower present within all the faculties? Both incur errors. Why? If each of the faculties has its own knower, then there would be multiple persons. If there is a single knower within all the faculties, then when the eye is actively taking form as its object, the knower already belongs to the eye; when the sound object arises, the ear should not hear it. As a verse in the Wuyanshuo jing says: / 'The inner and outer earth elements have no duality of meaning; / The Tathāgata’s wisdom is able to awaken to and comprehend them. / They have neither dual characteristics nor non-duality; / With a single characteristic that is no-characteristic, he knows them thus.' / The Jinguangnü jing says: 'Mañjuśrī said to that maiden, "You should contemplate the dhātus." The maiden replied, "Mañjuśrī, it is just like when the kalpa is burned: the three realms and so forth are also like this."' The Prajñāpāramitāsūtra says: 'Among all those phenomena, there is no knower and no seer. That master who expounds the Dharma is also ungraspable; it cannot be discriminated by the citta, nor can it be known by the manas.' The Fomu jing says: 'Elder sister, the eye does not see form, up to the manas does not know mental objects. Thus, bodhi is detached; therefore the eye and form are detached, up to bodhi is detached; therefore the manas and mental objects are detached, and so forth.' A verse in the Laṅkāvatārasūtra says: / 'Just as when a stream of water dries up, / Waves no longer arise, / So when the manovijñāna ceases, / The various consciousnesses do not arise.' / Another verse says: / 'Herein there is no citta or vijñāna, / Like space and a mirage; / Knowing all phenomena thus, / Yet not knowing a single phenomenon.' / A verse in the Ratnagotravibhāga of the definitive Ekayāna says: / 'Just as all worlds / Arise and perish dependent on space, / Dependent on the uncontaminated realm / There are the arising and perishing of the faculties. / Fire does not burn space; / If it burned it, that would be impossible; / Likewise old age, sickness, and death / Cannot burn the Buddha-nature. / The earth rests dependent on water, / Water again rests dependent on wind, / Wind rests dependent on space, / Space does not rest on the earth and so forth. / Likewise the aggregates, elements, and faculties / Abide in defilements and karma; / All defilements, karma, and so forth / Abide in improper thinking; / The activities of improper thinking / Abide in the pure citta; / The intrinsically pure citta / Does not abide in those phenomena. / The aggregates, sense bases, and elements are like the earth; / Defilements and karma are like water; / Incorrect mindfulness is like wind; / The pure citta-realm is like space. / Dependent on the nature, false thought arises; / Thought arising, defilements and karma arise, / Able to give rise to the aggregates, elements, and sense bases. / Dependent on the five aggregates, / The elements, sense bases, and other phenomena, / There are the arising and perishing of the faculties, / Like the formation and destruction of the world. / The pure citta is like space: / It has no cause and no conditions, / And lacks the meaning of combination; / Nor does it have arising, abiding, or cessation. / Like space, the pure citta / Is ever luminous and without alteration; / It is tainted by false discrimination / And adventitious defilements.' / Furthermore, the five presentative consciousnesses do not stir; only the manovijñāna discriminates. As the Śūraṅgamasūtra says: 'The Buddha told Ānanda: "The nature of consciousness has no origin; it arises falsely dependent on the six kinds of faculties and objects. Now, look all around at the assembly of noble ones in this gathering; use your eyes to scan across them. When your eyes gaze around, it is merely like a mirror without making distinct analyses. Within it, your consciousness identifies and points in succession: 'This is Mañjuśrī; this is Pūrṇa; this is Maudgalyāyana; this is Subhūti; this is Śāriputra,' and so forth."' It is like the five direct perceptions: they gaze all around comprehensively, like reflections appearing in a mirror without discrimination. As for the sixth mental faculty, it discriminates successively; it is not like the simultaneous seeing of the five direct perceptions. Furthermore, the sūtra says: 'When consciousness stirs, seeing becomes clear.' 'Seeing becomes clear' refers to the five consciousnesses of direct perception; discrimination constitutes 'stirring'. Furthermore, the sūtra says: 'Originally having nowhere it comes from.' This conscious mind is originally limpid and clear; it is not attained through cultivation, but is originally serene and silent. The five consciousnesses of direct perception are also like this.

54.20

Question: How many objects does the manovijñāna take as conditions? How are the three kinds of objects and the three kinds of valid cognitions differentiated [with respect to it]?

54.21

Answer: The ancient masters said: The sixth manovijñāna is inference. The manovijñāna is able to take as conditions the phenomena of the three times, the phenomena of the three natures, the phenomena of the three realms, the one hundred phenomena, and so forth; naturally, these are all conditions taken by the sixth manovijñāna. It has two modes: first, the lucid [manovijñāna]; second, the solitary [manovijñāna]. As for the lucid one, it grasps the objects of the five sense fields exclusively at the gates of the five faculties. In the initial thought-moment when it cognizes the same object together with the five, in the spontaneous mind, it is exclusively direct perception, taking the actual objects of the five sense fields as conditions. If it is from subsequent moments onward, it may certainly extend to inference and non-valid cognition. When it forms an interpretative understanding taking nominal forms such as length as conditions, that is inference. Or when it gives rise to attachment with respect to the five sense fields, that is non-valid cognition. Thus, the lucid manovijñāna is admitted to span the three kinds of cognition across prior and subsequent moments. Among the three kinds of objects: when it takes the real phenomena of the five sense fields as conditions, they are objects of intrinsic nature. When the subsequent interpretative mind takes nominal forms such as length as conditions, they are true solitary images, resembling cognitive-substance-bearing [objects]. Second, the solitary manovijñāna has three varieties: 1. Solitary in dreams: this also takes the phenomena of the eighteen dhātus as conditions, but they are exclusively solitary image objects and not real. These dream objects are subsumed exclusively under the locus of mental phenomena, and they also lack real bases. 2. Solitary in waking: this takes all phenomena as conditions—contaminated and uncontaminated, conditioned and unconditioned, mundane and supramundane, existent in substance and non-existent in substance, sky-flowers, rabbit horns—all phenomena of the three times can be completely taken as conditions.

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