宗鏡錄 59.27

59.27

Answer: The *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhiśāstra* states: "Because the imagined nature (*parikalpita*) is falsely posited, it can be said to be nominal (prajñapti). Because it lacks substance and characteristics, it is neither nominal nor real. The other-dependent nature (*paratantra*) has both the real and the nominal: because of its nature as agglomeration, continuity, and states, it is said to be nominal; because citta, caittas, and rūpa are produced from conditions, it is said to be really existent. If there were no real phenomena, nominal phenomena would also not exist, for nominal phenomena are designated based on real causes. The consummate nature (*pariniṣpanna*) is exclusively really existent, because it is designated without relying on other conditions."

An explanation states: In the imagined nature, there is a name but no substance; posited by deluded sentiment, it can be said to be nominal. But speaking of its phenomenal substance, since it has no characteristics at all, it is neither nominal nor real. It is not like a rabbit's horns and the like, which can be spoken of as nominal or real; nominal and real must be established based on general and specific phenomena that possess substance.

In the other-dependent, the nominal has three kinds:
First, the nominality of agglomeration (*saṃghātaprajñapti*): such as vases, basins, sentient beings, and so forth. These are agglomerated phenomena; because they are formed together by multiple phenomena at one time, though what forms them is real, what is formed is nominal.
Second, the nominality of continuity (*prabandhaprajñapti*): such as past, future, and other time periods, where there are only causes and effects, which is a continuous nature; on multiple phenomena across multiple times, a single nominal phenomenon is established. As the Buddha said: 'The deer king of long ago was my present body.' Although the underlying five skandhas that perish in each kṣaṇa are real in substance, upon this continuity of multiple phenomena, a single sentient being is nominally established as remaining present to this day.
Third, the nominality of states (*avasthāprajñapti*): such as the conditioned factors not associated with mind (*cittaviprayuktasaṃskāra*). Being natures of states, they are all nominal. They are established upon a single phenomenon at a single time: just as upon a single piece of matter (rūpa), it is called defiled (sāsrava), visible (sanidarśana), possessing resistance (sapratigha), and also called rūpa, and so on; all these are nominal designations upon a single phenomenon. If they were real, they would entail multiple substances. Indignation, resentment, and so on are all subsumed under this nominality. Citta, caittas, and rūpa are produced from seeds that are causes and conditions; hence they are said to be real.

Furthermore, the three natures are precisely one nature, and the one nature is precisely no-nature. Why? The imagined is without characteristic; the other-dependent is without arising; the consummate is without nature. The *Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra* says: 'A person with cataracts is like the imagined; appearing as blue or yellow is like the other-dependent; a pure eye is like the consummate.' The *Mahāyānasaṃgraha* says: 'The discriminated nature is like a snake; the other-dependent nature is like a vine. If someone attends to the characteristics of the four particles and analyzes this vine, they see only four characteristics and see no separate vine, because there are only the characteristics of color, smell, taste, and touch. The vine is not really existent, for apart from the four particles, there is no other vine.' Therefore, the śāstra verse says:
'Upon a vine, the cognition of a snake arises;
Seeing the vine, the object is gone.
If one already knows the parts of the vine,
The cognition of the vine is like the cognition of the snake.'
If one knows that the nature and parts of the vine are empty, it is just like falsely giving rise to the idea of a snake on a vine.

The *Mahāyānasaṃgraha* says: 'A bodhisattva does not see external particles; seeing only the discrimination of mental discourse, they immediately comprehend the other-dependent nature. How do they comprehend it? If this phenomenon were apart from causes and conditions, it could not arise by itself. Sense organs and sense objects are its causes and conditions; since sense organs and sense objects are not established, this phenomenon has no causes and conditions—how could it arise? Relying on the first true contemplation, one enters the other-dependent nature. By means of the second true contemplation, one removes the other-dependent nature; then the idea of consciousness-only ceases, and the manifestations of mental discourse and discrimination—resembling all objects heard and contemplated, up to resembling the very idea of consciousness-only—are all unable to arise. The conditions for arising are two: namely, the discriminated nature and the other-dependent nature. The discriminated nature having already ceased, the other-dependent nature again cannot arise. Since both objects are absent, all objects, up to the resemblance of the idea of consciousness-only, cannot arise. If even the idea of consciousness-only cannot arise, how much less could the remaining mental discourse and discrimination arise! Where does the bodhisattva abide? They abide solely in non-discrimination, equal and impartial among all names and referents. Furthermore, relying on two kinds of equality: namely, the grasper and the grasped. The grasper is non-discriminative cognition; because cognition is non-discriminative, it is called equal. The grasped is the realm of tathatā; the realm is also non-discriminative, so it is called equal. Furthermore, this realm and cognition do not abide in the sense of grasper and grasped, just like empty space; therefore it is said to be equal and impartial.' Because of this principle, the bodhisattva is able to enter the true nature. This stage cannot be spoken of, for it is self-signified, and at the time of realization it is free from vitarka, vicāra, reflective thought, and discrimination.