宗鏡錄 59

English (machine translation) 59

Language: English

59.1

Compiled by Yanshou, Chan Master Zhijue, Abbot of Huiri Yongming Monastery.

59.2

Now, as for the two gates of the conditioned and the unconditioned, are they identical or are they different?

Answer: They are neither one nor different, neither obliterated nor persisting. Why so? If they were one, the Benevolent King Sūtra would not say: "All bodhisattvas fully accomplish both conditioned merits and unconditioned merits." Furthermore, the Vimalakīrti Sūtra says: "A bodhisattva does not exhaust the conditioned, nor does he dwell in the unconditioned," and so forth. Both senses are clearly illuminated—how could they be one? If they were different, in the Prajñā Sūtra the Buddha tells Subhūti: "One cannot speak of the unconditioned apart from the conditioned, nor can one speak of the conditioned apart from the unconditioned." How could they be different? If one says both are obliterated, the Avataṃsaka Sūtra says: "In the conditioned realm, one demonstrates the principle of the unconditioned without annihilating the characteristics of the conditioned; in the unconditioned realm, one demonstrates the phenomena of the conditioned without destroying the nature of the unconditioned." Thus existence and non-existence, nature and characteristics, mutually persist without obstruction. If one says both persist, as the preceding treatise says, the two are nominally designated based on the nature of phenomena, referring to the tathatā revealed by emptiness and selflessness; both existence and non-existence are negated, and the path of mind and speech is cut off. Thus none of the hundred negations can confuse it, and the four propositions cannot express it. It is not something to be grasped by ordinary sentiment as existing or non-existing; only when wisdom transcends words and images can one reach the true nature of the conditioned and unconditioned as vijñapti-mātra. As the Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa states: "Furthermore, regarding arising and ceasing phenomena: if mind exists first and arising exists later, then mind does not depend on arising. Why? Because the mind already exists beforehand. If arising exists first, then arising has nothing that arises. Moreover, the natures of arising and ceasing contradict each other: where there is arising, there should not be ceasing; at the time of ceasing, there should not be arising. Therefore, [arising and ceasing] at one time cannot be found, nor can they be found as distinct. This, then, is non-arising. If there is no arising, then there is neither abiding nor ceasing. If there is no arising, abiding, or ceasing, then there are no mental factors (caitta). If there are no mental factors, then there are no formations non-associated with mind (cittaviprayuktasaṃskāra) or material phenomena (rūpa). Because material phenomena do not exist, unconditioned phenomena also do not exist. Why? Because of the conditioned, there is the unconditioned. If there is no conditioned, then there is also no unconditioned. Therefore, one should not say that all phenomena exist." Furthermore, the Viśeṣacintabrahmaparipṛcchāsūtra says: "Regarding conditioned and unconditioned phenomena, the difference exists merely in written words and verbal explanations." The Lokadhāraparipṛcchāsūtra says: "The real characteristic of conditioned phenomena is itself the unconditioned."

59.4

Question: With how many meanings are mental factors endowed so as to establish the category of mental factors?

59.5

Answer: The masters of old explained: "Mental factors have three meanings: first, they always arise depending on citta; second, they are associated with citta; third, they are bound and subordinate to citta." The principal mind apprehends general characteristics, like a master painter drawing an outline. Mental factors comprehensively apprehend both general and specific characteristics, like an apprentice filling in various colors within the master's outline. That is, the mental factor [acts] upon the principal mind's general [apprehension of] blue: when the principal mind of eye-consciousness apprehends a blue object, that is the general characteristic, without producing multiple varied modes of cognitive understanding. As for mental factors apprehending specific characteristics, like attention (manaskāra) among the five [omnipresent] mental factors, which takes alerting and directing the mind as its specific characteristic, it subsequently takes in, conceptualizes, and generates various modes of activity. This is to comprehensively apprehend both general and specific characteristics.

59.6

Question: Are the principal mind and mental factors identical or distinct?

59.7

Answer: In terms of the conventional, they seem identical and seem distinct; in terms of the ultimate, they are neither identical nor separate. The Vijñaptimātratāsiddhiśāstra states: "Do these six categories of mental factors have distinct self-natures apart from the substance of mind, or are they simply positional distinctions of mind? Supposing so, what is the fault? Both hold errors. If they have distinct self-natures apart from the substance of mind, how could the sacred teachings say there is consciousness only? Moreover, how could they say: 'The mind wanders far and travels alone; defilement and purification depend on the mind'? And [how could they say] the person consists of six elements? How, further, could the Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra be reconciled? As its verse says: 'It is acknowledged that mind appears like two; / likewise it appears as greed and the like, / or appears as faith and the like: / there are no distinct defiled or wholesome phenomena.' If they were simply positional distinctions of mind, how could the sacred teachings speak of association with mind? Association is with other natures, not with self-nature. Moreover, how could they say that mind and mental factors arise simultaneously, like the sun and its light? The Yogācārabhūmiśāstra states that mental factors are not identical to mind. Therefore, one should say that apart from mind they have distinct self-natures. Because mind is superior, it is said to be vijñapti-mātra and so forth. Because mental factors arise by the force and power of mind, they are said to appear resembling it, not that they are identical to mind. Furthermore, the words 'consciousness' and 'mind' also subsume mental factors, because they are constantly associated. Thus the words 'vijñapti-mātra' and so forth, as well as 'appearing resembling it', are both without error. This is according to the conventional. If according to the ultimate truth, mental factors and mind are neither identical nor separate. One should know that the same applies when the various consciousnesses are viewed in relation to one another. This is called the subtle principle of ultimate and conventional in the Mahāyāna." A verse in the Mahāyānasaṃgraha says: "Traveling far and wandering alone, / bodiless, slumbering in a cave: / one who tames this mind difficult to tame / is called a true brāhmaṇa." The Commentary on the Hundred Dharmas explains: "The Tathāgata, based on the sense-base of the manas, speaks of 'traveling far' and 'wandering alone'. Following avidyā, the manovijñāna ubiquitously takes all objects as its cognitive conditions, and hence it is called 'traveling far'. Furthermore, because the various [moments of] mind occur in continuous succession one by one, without a real ruler, it is called 'wandering alone'. 'Bodiless' means that the mind has no physical form or substance. 'Slumbering in a cave' means relying on the sense faculties and secretly operating within the body; this is called 'slumbering in a cave'. 'Slumbering' means hiding, referring to the mind being stored within the body. The purport of this verse is to refute the non-Buddhists' grasping at a real self. The World-Honoured One said that it is merely the mind wandering alone without a distinct controller; hence he says 'wandering alone'. Moreover, because from beginningless time it traverses the objects of the six sense-fields, it is called 'traveling far'; because there are no distinct mental factors, it is called 'wandering alone'. One clearly knows that there are no distinct mental factors." Regarding the "person's six elements", the Yogācārabhūmiśāstra states: "The Buddha's teachings all say that the four great elements, space, and consciousness are capable of constituting a sentient being. The three phenomena of matter, movement, and mind are the most supreme, serving as the bases. The basis of matter is the four great elements. The basis of movement is space, meaning internal space, not taking the external: because there is this element of space within the physical body, movement exists; thus it serves as the basis of movement. The basis of mind is consciousness. Thus it is said that the six elements can constitute a sentient being, without speaking of an element of mental factors." The commentary explains: "Regarding 'it is acknowledged that mind appears like two', the word 'like' here means that it appears like the real two parts [of grāhaka and grāhya] and other phenomena conceptualized outside the mind; hence it is called 'like'. Regarding 'there are no distinct defiled or wholesome phenomena', this means that only the mind transforms into the resemblance of the two parts of darśanabhāga and nimittabhāga; apart from mind, the two parts have no distinct existing phenomena. Furthermore, it is said that mind transforms into the resemblance of greed, faith, and so forth; therefore, apart from mind, greed, faith, and the like have no distinct defiled or wholesome phenomena: their substance is the mind itself, just like the two parts. Regarding 'one should say that apart from mind they have distinct self-natures; because mind is superior, it is said to be vijñapti-mātra and so forth': since it is said that apart from mind there are mental factors, why is it said to be vijñapti-mātra, that 'the mind wanders far and travels alone', that 'defilement and purification depend on the mind', and among the six elements only mind is spoken of? Because mind is superior, it speaks of this vijñapti-mātra and so forth. How is it superior? In general, there are four meanings: first, it can serve as the master; second, it can serve as the basis; third, its cognitive mode is general; fourth, it is always determinate, unlike mental factors and the like, which are sometimes indeterminate. Furthermore, if based on the first truth, the manifestation of substance and function, then the principal mind is the substance and the mental factors are the function; thus substance and function are neither identical nor separate. If based on the ultimate truth, it is the truth of the distinction between cause and effect; thus the principal mind and mental factors serve mutually as cause and effect, and are naturally not separate. If based on the third ultimate truth of realization, that which is revealed through designation: if spoken according to the paratantra nature that designates, they are not identical; if spoken according to the principle of the two kinds of selflessness that is designated, the principal mind and mental factors are not separate. If based on the fourth ultimate truth of the ultimate, words are discarded and the purport is discussed; here too one speaks neither of identity nor of separation. That is, the one true dharmadhātu transcends speech and severs characteristics, because the principle of both the principal mind and mental factors equally resolves into the one tathatā."

59.8

Question: How does one explain the nominal and the real regarding the principal mind and mental factors?

59.9

Answer: That which is born from seeds is called real; that which is established based on others is called nominal. Mental dharmas are exclusively real existents. Among mental factors, the omnipresent and the specific-object [factors] are exclusively real existents; the remaining phenomena are either nominal or real. Although tathatā as the unconditioned does not itself arise from seeds, it is also called real, because it does not depend on others. Alternatively, the names and meanings of all phenomena are both nominal, and only the single unconditioned tathatā is nominal in name but real in substance, because it transcends verbal designation.

59.10

Question: The Vijñaptimātratāsiddhiśāstra says that merely speaking of consciousness subsumes mental factors. Tathatā and consciousness are not like mental factors; why is it not mentioned?

59.11

Answer: Because it is the real nature of consciousness, because it is co-existent with consciousness, because it is not separate from consciousness, and because it is not a basis for [grasping at] self or phenomena, it merely mentions consciousness and does not mention tathatā. Therefore, know that tathatā is consciousness, and consciousness is tathatā.

59.12

Question: Tathatā is consciousness, and consciousness is tathatā. Yet tathatā is not what is transformed and manifested by consciousness; how does it constitute vijñapti-mātra?

59.13

Answer: Although it is not transformed by consciousness, because it is the real nature of consciousness, it is also named vijñapti-mātra. Tathatā transcends words, and is neither identical with nor different from the conceptualizing consciousness. It is not like material form and so forth, upon which grasping can arise; therefore, it is not a basis of grasping. It is not spoken of here. Yet viewed remotely and distantly, words can also serve as the basis for grasping, because latter-day students rely upon them to give rise to grasping. Furthermore, since tathatā is not transformed by consciousness, it might seem not to be vijñapti-mātra. It is not because of transformation that it is named vijñapti-mātra; rather, because it is not separate from consciousness, it is properly named vijñapti-mātra.

59.14

Question: Among the one hundred dharmas, do ordinary beings and noble ones fully possess them all?

59.15

Answer: In the stage of ordinary beings, when comprehensively considering the seeds of the three realms and nine stages, they all fully possess the one hundred dharmas. In the fruitional stage of the Buddhas, they possess only sixty-six dharmas: removing the six fundamental kleśas, twenty upakleśas, four indeterminate factors, and four among the non-associated formations, thirty-four dharmas in total are excluded.

59.16

Question: The mind subsumes everything; why merely designate the category of the five categories and one hundred dharmas?

59.17

Answer: Although the hundred dharmas are set out as the outline, the sequence of the five categories here has already subsumed them, and the inexhaustible teachings of the Dharma do not go beyond this. Why is that? The Hundred Dharmas says: First, it clarifies citta dharmas. That is to say, among conditioned dharmas, these eight kinds of citta-kings are the most supreme, because nothing mundane or supramundane is not created by citta. Second, it clarifies dharmas concomitant with citta (caitasika). Because they are always associated with these citta-kings, they are called associated dharmas. In relation to the preceding citta-kings, these are inferior; the superior precedes and the inferior follows, which is why they are clarified next. Third, rūpa dharmas, which are the reflected images manifested by the citta-kings and so forth. That is to say, these rūpa dharmas cannot arise on their own; they must rely on the transformations and manifestations of the preceding two—the citta-kings and caitasikas. Transformation is not direct grasping; hence the word 'image' is used. Alternatively, they may encompass the original substance (dharmin/bimbamātra); the preceding two are the active transformers, and these are what is transformed. The active precedes and the passive follows, which is why they are clarified next. Fourth, conditioned dharmas not associated [with citta]. That is to say, these twenty-four dharmas such as acquisition (prāpti) cannot arise on their own; they are nominally posited based on the distinct states of the preceding three categories. The preceding three are real, whereas these are nominal. The real precedes and the nominal follows, which is why they are clarified next. Fifth, unconditioned (asaṃskṛta) dharmas. Their essential nature is extremely profound; if unconditioned dharmas are not clarified in reference to [conditioned] dharmas, there would be no means for them to be revealed. Therefore, they are revealed by relying on the preceding four as the severing of defilement to achieve purity. The preceding four are conditioned, whereas these are unconditioned. What exists precedes and what does not exist follows, which is why they are clarified last. Furthermore, it is extensively explained in the commentary: Regarding the first, 'citta dharmas are the most supreme,' a verse of the Avataṃsakasūtra says: 'Citta is like a master painter, / Capable of painting all worlds; / Among all the worlds, / There is no dharma that it does not create.' These eight consciousness citta-kings are the most supreme, just like a painter who is able to paint the images of all humans, devas, and the five destinies, and even the images of buddhas, bodhisattvas, and so forth. However, in the simile given in the sūtra, the Buddha took only a partial aspect, because a painter can only paint the rūpa aggregate, and cannot paint the remaining four aggregates. In terms of dharmas, if it is the eight consciousnesses, they can completely create all five aggregates. Consider, for instance, the sixth consciousness: associated with non-shared avidyā and other distinct conceptual and innate afflictions, if it creates the karma for the general and particular retributions of the hells, it paints of itself the five aggregates of the hells; up to if it creates the karma for the general and particular retributions of humans and devas, it paints of itself the forms of humans and devas; if it fully cultivates the myriad practices and attains the fruit of the two transformations of the basis, it paints of itself the form of the fruit of buddhahood. Therefore, one knows that all mundane and supramundane five aggregates are painted by one's own sixth consciousness; without distinguishing between circumstantial and direct retributions, all are transformations of citta. Therefore, citta dharmas alone are called the most supreme. Regarding the second, 'because they are associated with this,' the Yogācārabhūmiśāstra briefly explains association through five meanings: First, time—namely, king and associates arise at the same time. Second, support—namely, king and associates share the same supporting sense-faculty. Third, object—namely, king and associates share the same objective sphere. Fourth, mode of operation—namely, the three means of cognition and the subjective aspects (ākāra) of king and associates are all identical. Fifth, entity—namely, king and associates each have their own self-witnessing part (svasaṃvittibhāga) entity. Regarding the third, 'rūpa dharmas, because they are the reflected images manifested by the two,' 'manifest' means transform, because the eleven kinds of rūpa are all transformed and manifested by citta and caitasikas. 'Image' refers to a reflected image, which has the meaning of being of a similar category: that is to say, the nimittabhāgas of these eleven kinds of rūpa are of the same category as the original substance and resemble the original substance; if there is no original substance, they resemble the internal citta, and thus are called 'images.' Regarding 'transformation is not direct grasping, hence the word image is used': because the eight consciousnesses all possess the meaning of transforming into a nimittabhāga and cognizing it. For example, when the first five consciousnesses cognize the spheres of the five sense-data, they must transform into a reflected image to cognize it; when the sixth cognizes the dharmas of the eighteen dhātus, it also transforms into a nimittabhāga to cognize them; when the seventh cognizes the darśanabhāga of the eighth as the self, it also transforms into a nimittabhāga to cognize it; when the eighth cognizes others' gross sense-faculties, form born of meditation (dhyāna-rūpa), and the receptacle world, it also transforms into a nimittabhāga to cognize them. The nimittabhāga, in relation to the eight consciousnesses, is the direct objective condition (pratyaya); the original substance, in relation to the eight consciousnesses, is the distant objective condition. What has been said above is stated in reference to cases where there is both an original substance and an image. If there is only a nimittabhāga without an original substance, that is the eighth cognizing its own three spheres, or the meditative manovijñāna cognizing its own form born of meditation. Regarding the fourth, 'because of distinctions in state,' these twenty-four dharmas such as acquisition are nominally posited upon the dependent seeds and actualities of the preceding three categories. Regarding the fifth, 'because of displaying the real nature,' these are the five unconditioned dharmas, as already explained above. Furthermore, the first, the eight kinds of citta-kings, is the approach of the most supreme active cognizers; the second, the dharmas concomitant with citta, being associated with citta, is the approach of sharing supremacy and identical cognizing; the third, rūpa dharmas, being the reflected images of citta, is the approach of the objective sphere cognized; the fourth, dharmas not associated [with citta], is the approach of establishing states; the fifth, unconditioned dharmas, is the approach of displaying the real nature. As described above, superiority and inferiority, manifestation and display, the mutual fulfillment of active and passive, nominal and real assessment, existence and non-existence, concealment and revelation, and so forth, are able to make clear the inexhaustible teachings of the Dharma. The inexhaustible teachings of the Dharma do not go beyond the five categories and hundred dharmas; the five categories and hundred dharmas do not go beyond the two dharmas of rūpa and citta; gathering the branches and returning to the root, they do not go beyond the single dharma of mind-only (cittamātra).

59.18

Question: As the true source of the eight consciousnesses and the dwelling place of all dharmas, according to their essential nature, how many kinds are there in all?

59.19

Answer: The sūtras and treatises generally explain that there are three kinds of nature. Distinguishing in terms of active and passive, defiled and pure, three are spoken of in accordance with phenomena. Even if there is contraction and expansion, none depart from the nature of consciousness. Conjoined, they are one substance without difference; opened out, they are three characteristics that are not the same. That the three characteristics are not the same is graded arrangement according to function; that they are one substance without difference is perfect fusion with respect to nature. Graded arrangement operates in accordance with meanings; perfect fusion is calm and quiescent in accordance with the nature. If there were no graded arrangement, there would be nothing to perfectly fuse, just as without deluded feelings, true wisdom would not be established. Once defilement and purity are lost, the two truths cannot be established. Therefore, discerning the true on the basis of the deluded must be thoroughly understood in terms of subjective aspects; tracing the footprints to find the root relies on causes and conditions for illumination. These teachings of the three natures encompass the realms of both ordinary beings and sages; no phenomenon is unexhausted, no principle unplumbed. Now, when speaking of the three natures, they are established jointly by the sūtras and treatises: first, the parikalpitasvabhāva (nature of conceptual construction); second, the paratantrasvabhāva (dependent nature); third, the pariniṣpannasvabhāva (consummated nature). As for the parikalpitasvabhāva, it means that fools ubiquitously conceptualize and grasp at the aggregates and so forth as a real self and real dharmas; this is called the conceptually constructed nature. It has two aspects: First, self-nature: grasping generally that all dharmas have a real self-nature. Second, distinction: grasping particularly that they have a real self-substance as permanent, impermanent, and so forth. Or, conceptualizing the referent based on the name: such as not yet knowing what an ox is, and upon hearing the name 'ox', one ponders and surmises: for what reason and principle is it named an 'ox'? Or, conceptualizing the name based on the referent: seeing an object without knowing its name, one falsely ponders and surmises: what is this object named? Just as not yet knowing an ox, they jointly ponder and surmise, saying: 'Is it a ghost? Is it a beast?' All these conceptualizations, in terms of substance, do not go beyond the two substances of person and dharma; in terms of grasping, they do not go beyond the two kinds: name and referent. Furthermore: First, there is conceptualizing that is ubiquitous but not grasping: such as all outflow-free minds and good outflow-bound consciousnesses, which can ubiquitously and broadly cognize without grasping. Outflow-free minds are the outflow-free wisdom of all the sages, which understands that all dharmas are empty; thus there is no dharma it does not pervade, yet it is completely without grasping, which is called 'not grasping'; this is only the subsequently attained wisdom. Good outflow-bound consciousnesses are the bodhisattvas prior to the stages (bhūmi): although in their outflow-bound minds, because they are able to perform the contemplation of selflessness, they can also contemplate that all are devoid of self; this too is ubiquitous but not grasping. Second, there is grasping that is not ubiquitous: such as the outflow-bound seventh consciousness, which constantly cognizes the darśanabhāga of the eighth and gives rise to the two graspings at self and dharmas. When one enters the contemplation of the emptiness of persons from the sixth consciousness, within the seventh consciousness it still cognizes the darśanabhāga of the eighth and gives rise to grasping at dharmas; therefore one knows it grasps but is not ubiquitous. Third, both ubiquitous and grasping: namely, the defiled minds of sentient beings. Fourth, neither ubiquitous nor grasping: namely, the outflow-bound five consciousnesses and the eighth ālaya[vijñāna], which each perceive their own portion of the objective sphere, are not ubiquitous, and have no conceptualizing or recollective discrimination, and therefore do not grasp. The ālaya only cognizes three kinds of spheres—seeds, the bodily sense-faculties, and the receptacle world—and cannot even cognize the actual active states of the preceding seven; hence it is neither ubiquitous nor grasping. For outflow-bound seeds, it can both hold and cognize them; for outflow-free seeds, it holds them but does not cognize them; how much less other spheres? Furthermore, ancient masters said: Within the dependent self-nature, the defiled minds of sentient beings should be understood to have two kinds of grasping at the conceptually constructed self-nature: First, grasping following awareness, which is active grasping. Second, habituation, the anuśayas of latent impressions, which is the seed of grasping. As for the paratantrasvabhāva: it arises from the harmony of other multiple conditions, like an illusion; hence it is named the dependent nature. As for the pariniṣpannasvabhāva: it is the single-taste tathatā, fully and completely accomplished.

59.20

Question: What is the principle of the active conceptualizer of self-nature?

59.21

Answer: According to Dharmapāla, the sixth and seventh mental cohorts that grasp at self and dharmas are the active conceptualizers, because it is said that only manovijñāna is able to ubiquitously conceptualize.

59.22

Question: What is the principle of the conceptually constructed self-nature as the object?

59.23

Answer: According to the Mahāyānasaṃgraha, it is the dependent [nature], because it is the objective condition of the conceptualizing mind and so forth. Ci'en says: Among the three natures, it is the dependent nature. Stating 'the object' must mean an existent dharma; the conceptualizing mind and so forth take this as condition. The direct nimittabhāga must be dependent; it does not take the consummated as its objective sphere, because they are not similar.

59.24

Question: Among the three natures, the conceptually constructed is false imagination, and thus does not exist. The dependent belongs to causes and conditions; does it exist or not?

59.25

Answer: These two natures mutually produce each other as active and passive, and both lack self-substance. Why is that? Because of false imagination, names and marks are established; because of names and marks, causes and conditions are established. If false imagination does not arise, how could names and marks exist? If names and marks do not exist, causes and conditions are empty, because the myriad dharmas do not depart from names. A verse of the Laṅkāvatārasūtra says: 'Just as in the practice of meditation, / Manifold [appearances] appear within a single thing, / Yet therein there are no manifold things: / The marks of false imagination are like this.' The explanation says: This refutes the conceptually constructed nature of false imagination. Just as when the two vehicles cultivate various meditative contemplations, when they perform the blue-visualization contemplation, nothing among heaven, earth, and the myriad things is not blue. Seeing blue where there is no blue is due to the transformation of citta: with respect to a single rūpa sphere, there are manifold differences. It is like ordinary beings falsely seeing birth and death, which is also falsely seeing birth and death where there is no birth and death. Furthermore, a verse of the sūtra says: 'Just as with various cataracts, / False imagination manifests manifold forms; / The cataract is neither form nor non-form: / Arising from conditions is realized to be like this.' This refutes the dependent nature of causes and conditions. Just as what is seen through cataracts of the eye has distinct differences, those dharmas arising from conditions are truly not existent. Thus, the substance of false imagination is empty, and causes and conditions lack self-nature; this itself is the ultimate single dharma of the consummated [nature]. Just as a person with clear eyes sees pure empty space, how much more so for the one true citta, which has nothing whatsoever beyond it.

59.26

Question: Among these three natures, how many dharmas are nominal, and how many dharmas are real?

59.27

Answer: The *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhiśāstra* states: "Because the imagined nature (*parikalpita*) is falsely posited, it can be said to be nominal (prajñapti). Because it lacks substance and characteristics, it is neither nominal nor real. The other-dependent nature (*paratantra*) has both the real and the nominal: because of its nature as agglomeration, continuity, and states, it is said to be nominal; because citta, caittas, and rūpa are produced from conditions, it is said to be really existent. If there were no real phenomena, nominal phenomena would also not exist, for nominal phenomena are designated based on real causes. The consummate nature (*pariniṣpanna*) is exclusively really existent, because it is designated without relying on other conditions."

An explanation states: In the imagined nature, there is a name but no substance; posited by deluded sentiment, it can be said to be nominal. But speaking of its phenomenal substance, since it has no characteristics at all, it is neither nominal nor real. It is not like a rabbit's horns and the like, which can be spoken of as nominal or real; nominal and real must be established based on general and specific phenomena that possess substance.

In the other-dependent, the nominal has three kinds:
First, the nominality of agglomeration (*saṃghātaprajñapti*): such as vases, basins, sentient beings, and so forth. These are agglomerated phenomena; because they are formed together by multiple phenomena at one time, though what forms them is real, what is formed is nominal.
Second, the nominality of continuity (*prabandhaprajñapti*): such as past, future, and other time periods, where there are only causes and effects, which is a continuous nature; on multiple phenomena across multiple times, a single nominal phenomenon is established. As the Buddha said: 'The deer king of long ago was my present body.' Although the underlying five skandhas that perish in each kṣaṇa are real in substance, upon this continuity of multiple phenomena, a single sentient being is nominally established as remaining present to this day.
Third, the nominality of states (*avasthāprajñapti*): such as the conditioned factors not associated with mind (*cittaviprayuktasaṃskāra*). Being natures of states, they are all nominal. They are established upon a single phenomenon at a single time: just as upon a single piece of matter (rūpa), it is called defiled (sāsrava), visible (sanidarśana), possessing resistance (sapratigha), and also called rūpa, and so on; all these are nominal designations upon a single phenomenon. If they were real, they would entail multiple substances. Indignation, resentment, and so on are all subsumed under this nominality. Citta, caittas, and rūpa are produced from seeds that are causes and conditions; hence they are said to be real.

Furthermore, the three natures are precisely one nature, and the one nature is precisely no-nature. Why? The imagined is without characteristic; the other-dependent is without arising; the consummate is without nature. The *Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra* says: 'A person with cataracts is like the imagined; appearing as blue or yellow is like the other-dependent; a pure eye is like the consummate.' The *Mahāyānasaṃgraha* says: 'The discriminated nature is like a snake; the other-dependent nature is like a vine. If someone attends to the characteristics of the four particles and analyzes this vine, they see only four characteristics and see no separate vine, because there are only the characteristics of color, smell, taste, and touch. The vine is not really existent, for apart from the four particles, there is no other vine.' Therefore, the śāstra verse says:
'Upon a vine, the cognition of a snake arises;
Seeing the vine, the object is gone.
If one already knows the parts of the vine,
The cognition of the vine is like the cognition of the snake.'
If one knows that the nature and parts of the vine are empty, it is just like falsely giving rise to the idea of a snake on a vine.

The *Mahāyānasaṃgraha* says: 'A bodhisattva does not see external particles; seeing only the discrimination of mental discourse, they immediately comprehend the other-dependent nature. How do they comprehend it? If this phenomenon were apart from causes and conditions, it could not arise by itself. Sense organs and sense objects are its causes and conditions; since sense organs and sense objects are not established, this phenomenon has no causes and conditions—how could it arise? Relying on the first true contemplation, one enters the other-dependent nature. By means of the second true contemplation, one removes the other-dependent nature; then the idea of consciousness-only ceases, and the manifestations of mental discourse and discrimination—resembling all objects heard and contemplated, up to resembling the very idea of consciousness-only—are all unable to arise. The conditions for arising are two: namely, the discriminated nature and the other-dependent nature. The discriminated nature having already ceased, the other-dependent nature again cannot arise. Since both objects are absent, all objects, up to the resemblance of the idea of consciousness-only, cannot arise. If even the idea of consciousness-only cannot arise, how much less could the remaining mental discourse and discrimination arise! Where does the bodhisattva abide? They abide solely in non-discrimination, equal and impartial among all names and referents. Furthermore, relying on two kinds of equality: namely, the grasper and the grasped. The grasper is non-discriminative cognition; because cognition is non-discriminative, it is called equal. The grasped is the realm of tathatā; the realm is also non-discriminative, so it is called equal. Furthermore, this realm and cognition do not abide in the sense of grasper and grasped, just like empty space; therefore it is said to be equal and impartial.' Because of this principle, the bodhisattva is able to enter the true nature. This stage cannot be spoken of, for it is self-signified, and at the time of realization it is free from vitarka, vicāra, reflective thought, and discrimination.

59.28

An ancient master asked: "If the reflected image that is the object of the view of self is other-dependently existent, then there should be a real self of the other-dependent nature."

59.29

Answer: This characteristic arises relying on causes and conditions; it is merely an illusory existent phenomenon of the other-dependent nature, not a self. Because that [mind] falsely grasps it as a self, it is called false grasping. Here there is a twofold characteristic: in terms of this characteristic arising from causes and conditions and possessing the capacity to produce mind, this is indeed existent, and is called a phenomenon of the other-dependent nature. In terms of this not matching the sense of the grasped phenomenon, it is called the imagined grasping, and is thus called non-existent. It is like someone in the dark grasping a stone as an ox: the substance of the stone is not non-existent. The objective condition (*ālambanapratyaya*) of the view of self exists as an other-dependent characteristic; just as the stone is fundamentally not an ox, but the deluded mind grasps it as an ox—this grasped ox is completely devoid of substance. Just so, the nimittabhāga is fundamentally not a self, but the deluded mind grasps it as a self—this grasped [self] is completely devoid of substance. There is only the grasping mind, but no grasped self. That is to say, at this stone there is the stone as object, but no ox as grasped; upon this nimittabhāga, there is a phenomenon as object, but no self as grasped.

Another analogy says: It is like a person from the south who does not recognize camel's hair; having once heard tortoise hair spoken of elsewhere, when suddenly seeing camel's hair later, because of not recognizing it, falsely takes the camel's hair to be tortoise hair. Because this camel's hair that is seen exists, it is like the phenomenon of the other-dependent nature. That there is no tortoise hair on the camel's hair, and yet the deluded mind takes it to be tortoise hair, is like the grasped real self and phenomena.

The treatise says: "Some say: all [citta] and caitta phenomena, by the power of perfuming, transform into the two parts; because they are produced from conditions, they are called other-dependent. The imagined nature relies on these to falsely grasp determinate reality, existence, non-existence, identity, difference, both, neither, and so forth. These two are called the imagined nature."

59.30

Question: Among the three natures, how many natures cannot be extinguished, and how many natures can be extinguished?

59.31

Answer: According to the *Buddhadhātuśāstra*, two natures cannot be extinguished, and one nature can be extinguished. Why? The discriminated nature is fundamentally non-existent, so it cannot be extinguished. The true nature is fundamentally true, so it cannot be extinguished. Although the other-dependent nature exists, it is not real; therefore it can be extinguished. Thus the *Madhyāntavibhāgaśāstra* says: 'The discriminated nature refers to the six sense objects, which can never be obtained, like sky-flowers. The other-dependent nature refers only to confused consciousness; because it exists without being real, it is like an illusory object. The true nature refers to the grasper and the grasped being both non-existent; because it is truly existent and non-existent [in terms of duality], it is like empty space.'

59.32

Question: The characteristics of the other-dependent arise merely as existing through false discrimination of one's own mind; principle and phenomena are both quiescent, and name and substance are both empty. How can there be realms of experience of sorrow and joy?

59.33

Answer: For example, when walking at night, one sees a tree stump and takes it for a ghost, or suspects a rope to be a snake. Both the snake and the ghost are entirely devoid of name and substance; their natures and characteristics are ever quiescent. Although they cannot be found, fear arises in the mind, because affairs are accomplished though the substance is empty.

The commentary of Qingliang states: According to the analogies given in the *Mahāyānasaṃgraha*, all are analogies for the other-dependent nature. However, they are all meant to dispel doubts; because the doubts are different, the analogies are also distinct.
First, outsiders hearing that the characteristics of the other-dependent nature merely exist through false discrimination and are not real referents, immediately gave rise to the doubt: 'If there are no real referents, how can there be realms of experience?' Therefore it is said to be like an illusion, meaning that an illusion is magically created—how could the six places of objects of cognition be real?
Second, they doubted: 'If it is not real, how can there be the operation of citta and caittas?' Therefore it is said to be like a mirage, fluttering, not water yet resembling water, where mental activity falsely occurs.
Third, they doubted: 'If it is not real, how can there be the enjoyment of agreeable and disagreeable [things]?' Therefore it is said to be like in a dream, where there are really no men or women, yet there is the enjoyment of agreeable and disagreeable [things]; the waking state is also like this.
Fourth, they doubted: 'If it is not real, how can there be conceptual proliferation and speech?' Therefore it is said to be like an echo: there is really no sound, but the hearer takes it to be present.
Fifth, they doubted: 'If it is not real, how can there be wholesome and unwholesome karmic fruits?' Therefore it is said to be like a shadow, meaning like a reflected image in a mirror, hence also not real.
Sixth, they doubted: 'If it is not real, why do bodhisattvas perform deeds of benefit and joy?' Therefore it is said to be like a magical creation: one who creates transformations, though knowing they are not real, performs magical deeds; the bodhisattva is also like this.

Therefore, although the ten thousand phenomena are empty, their substance is empty yet accomplishes affairs; the one truth is not [conditionally] existent, yet without nature it follows conditions. Thus, serenely solid and congealed, it constantly follows the transformations of things; abundantly arising in activity, it does not stir from tathatā.

59.34

Record of the Mirror of the Source, Fascicle Fifty-Nine

59.35

Printing blocks carved in the wushen year by the General Directorate of the Great Canon at the Branch Office.

Linked texts (1)

宗鏡錄 — Classical Chinese