宗鏡錄 60.31

60.31

Answer: When the noble ones say tathatā is frozen, this means that when it follows conditions to form defilement and purity, it constantly acts as defilement and purity without losing its own substance. This is permanence not different from impermanence, called the inconceivable permanent; it does not mean it does not perform all dharmas, like the frozenness imagined by emotions. The permanence not different from impermanence lies outside emotional concepts; thus it is called the permanence of tathatā. A sūtra says: 'Undefiled yet defiled' clarifies that the permanent acts as impermanent; 'defiled yet undefiled' clarifies that when acting as impermanent, it does not lose permanence. Furthermore, because it is impermanence not different from permanence, tathatā is spoken of as impermanent. A sūtra says: 'The tathāgatagarbha experiences suffering and pleasure together with causes, whether arising or ceasing.' Moreover, the dependent [nature] is a dharma of arising and ceasing, yet it also has impermanence not different from permanence, and permanence not different from impermanence. Because all impermanent dharmas of conditioned arising are devoid of own-nature, only then is conditioned arising accomplished. Therefore, not different from the permanent nature, impermanence is attained. Hence it is said: 'Non-arising and non-ceasing is the meaning of impermanence.' This is precisely accomplishing impermanence without being different from permanence. Furthermore, all conditioned arising is precisely devoid of own-nature; it is not that own-naturelessness is stated only upon the cessation of conditioned arising. This is precisely permanence not different from impermanence. A sūtra says: 'Form is emptiness; it is not that the cessation of form is emptiness.' Furthermore, 'Sentient beings are precisely nirvāṇa; they do not undergo further cessation.' This is identical with the two senses of tathatā: the true and the conventional are mutually fused, two yet without duality. Therefore a treatise says: 'The hindrance of knowledge is utterly blind and dark, meaning that the true and conventional are grasped as separate.' Furthermore, if tathatā did not follow conditions to form defilement and purity, defiled and pure dharmas would have nothing on which to rely. If there were dharmas without anything on which to rely, that would fall into [the fault of] permanence. Furthermore, if tathatā were [solidly] existent, it would not follow defilement and purity. Since defiled and pure dharmas have no self-substance, and the true also would not follow them, dharmas could not exist; this would also be [the fault of] annihilation. And so on, clinging to the four propositions such as neither existent nor non-existent all falls into annihilation and permanence. If one grasps the dependent [nature] as existent, that means it already has a substance and does not depend on conditions; dharmas existing without conditions is precisely permanence. Furthermore, because of grasping it as existent, it does not depend on conditions; because it does not depend on conditions, dharmas cannot exist, which is precisely annihilation.