宗鏡錄 60
English (machine translation) 60
- Language
- English
60.1
Compiled by Yanshou, Chan Master Zhijue, Abbot of Huiri Yongming Temple.
60.2
Now, are these phenomena of the three natures identical or different? If you say they are identical, it is improper to say that the other-dependent and consummate are existent while the imagined is non-existent. If you say they are different, it is also said that they are all of the same nature, namely no-nature.
60.3
Answer: This teaching of the three natures is spoken with hidden intention by the buddhas; it is the place where the various consciousnesses arise, the source and origin of the doctrinal net. If one approaches and grasps them, one falls into ordinary, worldly views; if one leaves and abandons them, one loses the gateway of noble wisdom.
Therefore Master Zang [Fazang], relying on the Huayan school, explained the meaning of identity and difference of the three natures:
First, the consummate tathatā has two meanings: (1) unchanging, and (2) according with conditions.
Second, the other-dependent has two meanings: (1) seeming existence, and (2) lack of nature.
Third, the imagined grasping has two meanings: (1) existence in deluded sentiment, and (2) non-existence in principle.
By virtue of tathatā being unchanging, the other-dependent having no nature, and the grasped being non-existent in principle, through these three meanings, the three natures are of one single limit. Furthermore, in terms of tathatā according with conditions, the other-dependent having seeming existence, and the grasped existing in deluded sentiment, through these three meanings, they are also not different.
Therefore, the real covers the false, seeking the branch penetrates the source of reality, and nature and characteristics blend and penetrate, without hindrance or obstruction.
60.4
Question: How could the seeming existence of the other-dependent and so forth be the same as the existence in sentiment of the grasped?
60.5
Answer: Because of two senses, they are not different. First, because what is grasped by that [imagination] grasps the apparent as real, there are no different dharmas. Second, if one is separated from what is grasped, the apparent would not arise; and within the true, following conditions is also like this, because without what is grasped, there would be no following of conditions. Furthermore, because the three natures each have two senses that do not contradict one another, there are no different natures. For instance, although the consummate [nature] follows conditions to form defilement and purity, it constantly does not lose its intrinsically pure nature. Simply because it does not lose its intrinsically pure nature, it can follow conditions to form defilement and purity. It is just like a bright mirror manifesting defilement and purity while constantly not losing the mirror's brightness and purity. Simply because it does not lose the mirror's brightness and purity, it is then able to manifest the characteristics of defilement and purity. Through manifesting defilement and purity, one knows the mirror is bright and pure; through the mirror being bright and pure, one knows it manifests defilement and purity. Therefore, the two senses are only one nature. Although manifesting pure dharmas, it does not increase the mirror's brightness; although manifesting defiled dharmas, it does not defile the mirror's purity. Not only does it not defile it, but on the contrary, it is also due to this that the brightness and purity of the mirror are manifested. Tathatā is also like this: not only does its unmoving, pure nature form defilement and purity, but it is also due to the formation of defilement and purity that its pure nature is manifested. Not only does it not destroy defilement and purity to illuminate the pure nature, but it is also due to the pure nature that defilement and purity are formed. Therefore, the two senses fully encompass one another; the one nature is without duality—how could they contradict one another? Through the dependent [nature] lacking own-nature, it can form the apparent existent; through forming the apparent existent, it is therefore without own-nature. This means that lack of own-nature is precisely conditioned arising, and conditioned arising is precisely lack of own-nature; this is the non-dual Dharma-gate. Within the imagined nature, although it appears as existent according to emotional clinging, in terms of principle it is ultimately non-existent, because in a place of nothingness, existence is falsely imputed. It is like falsely imputing a ghost upon a stump. Now, since it is a false imputation, one clearly knows it is non-existent in principle. Therefore, there are not two; there is only one nature.
60.6
Question: Is tathatā existent?
60.7
Answer: No. Because it follows conditions without changing, it is empty; and because tathatā is free from deluded thoughts.
60.8
Question: Is tathatā non-existent?
60.9
Answer: No. Because it is unchanging while following conditions; because it is not empty; and because it is the sphere of action of noble wisdom.
60.10
Question: Is tathatā both existent and non-existent?
60.11
Answer: No. Because it is without dual natures, and because it is free from mutual contradiction.
60.12
Question: Is tathatā neither existent nor non-existent?
60.13
Answer: Because it is endowed with dharmas, and because it is free from conceptual proliferation.
60.14
Question: Is the dependent [nature] existent?
60.15
Answer: No. Because conditioned arising is without own-nature; because it is dispelled in terms of contemplation; and because it is different from the consummate [nature].
60.16
Question: Is the dependent [nature] non-existent?
60.17
Answer: No. Because it is conditioned arising devoid of own-nature; because it can manifest non-arising; because it is different from the imagined [nature]; and because it is the objective sphere of wisdom.
60.18
Question: Is the dependent [nature] both existent and non-existent?
60.19
Answer: No. Because it is without dual natures, and because it is free from mutual contradiction.
60.20
Question: Is the dependent [nature] neither existent nor non-existent?
60.21
Answer: No. Because it has many doctrinal gates, and because it is free from conceptual proliferation.
60.22
Question: Is the imagined [nature] existent?
60.23
Answer: No. Because it is non-existent in principle, and because it has no substance or characteristics.
60.24
Question: Is the imagined [nature] non-existent?
60.25
Answer: No. Because it exists in emotion; because it is the objective sphere for signless contemplation; and because it can obstruct the true.
60.26
Question: Is the imagined [nature] both existent and non-existent?
60.27
Answer: No. Because it is without dual natures.
60.28
Question: Is the imagined [nature] neither existent nor non-existent?
60.29
Answer: No. Because the imagined nature is established. The above completes the protection against clinging. Now, as for clinging turning into faults: if one grasps tathatā as solely existent, there are two faults: first, it would not follow conditions; second, it would not depend on an uncovering cause.
60.30
Question: The teachings say that tathatā is frozen and permanent. Since it does not follow conditions, how could that be a fault?
60.31
Answer: When the noble ones say tathatā is frozen, this means that when it follows conditions to form defilement and purity, it constantly acts as defilement and purity without losing its own substance. This is permanence not different from impermanence, called the inconceivable permanent; it does not mean it does not perform all dharmas, like the frozenness imagined by emotions. The permanence not different from impermanence lies outside emotional concepts; thus it is called the permanence of tathatā. A sūtra says: 'Undefiled yet defiled' clarifies that the permanent acts as impermanent; 'defiled yet undefiled' clarifies that when acting as impermanent, it does not lose permanence. Furthermore, because it is impermanence not different from permanence, tathatā is spoken of as impermanent. A sūtra says: 'The tathāgatagarbha experiences suffering and pleasure together with causes, whether arising or ceasing.' Moreover, the dependent [nature] is a dharma of arising and ceasing, yet it also has impermanence not different from permanence, and permanence not different from impermanence. Because all impermanent dharmas of conditioned arising are devoid of own-nature, only then is conditioned arising accomplished. Therefore, not different from the permanent nature, impermanence is attained. Hence it is said: 'Non-arising and non-ceasing is the meaning of impermanence.' This is precisely accomplishing impermanence without being different from permanence. Furthermore, all conditioned arising is precisely devoid of own-nature; it is not that own-naturelessness is stated only upon the cessation of conditioned arising. This is precisely permanence not different from impermanence. A sūtra says: 'Form is emptiness; it is not that the cessation of form is emptiness.' Furthermore, 'Sentient beings are precisely nirvāṇa; they do not undergo further cessation.' This is identical with the two senses of tathatā: the true and the conventional are mutually fused, two yet without duality. Therefore a treatise says: 'The hindrance of knowledge is utterly blind and dark, meaning that the true and conventional are grasped as separate.' Furthermore, if tathatā did not follow conditions to form defilement and purity, defiled and pure dharmas would have nothing on which to rely. If there were dharmas without anything on which to rely, that would fall into [the fault of] permanence. Furthermore, if tathatā were [solidly] existent, it would not follow defilement and purity. Since defiled and pure dharmas have no self-substance, and the true also would not follow them, dharmas could not exist; this would also be [the fault of] annihilation. And so on, clinging to the four propositions such as neither existent nor non-existent all falls into annihilation and permanence. If one grasps the dependent [nature] as existent, that means it already has a substance and does not depend on conditions; dharmas existing without conditions is precisely permanence. Furthermore, because of grasping it as existent, it does not depend on conditions; because it does not depend on conditions, dharmas cannot exist, which is precisely annihilation.
60.32
Question: If the dependent nature having the sense of existence entails faults, why does the Mahāyānasaṃgraha say that the dependent nature is existent?
60.33
Answer: This is existence not different from emptiness. Arising from conditions, it is without substance, because within each single condition there is no agent. Due to conditions having no agent, conditioned arising is then possible. Therefore, existence that is non-existent is the existence of the dependent [nature]; this is establishing all dharmas without moving from the true limit. If one holds that the dependent [nature] exists literally as spoken, then conditioned arising would have an own-nature. If conditions had an own-nature, they would not depend on each other; not depending on each other, that would destroy the dependent [nature]. The destruction of the dependent [nature] is truly due to clinging to existence. You fear falling into emptiness, so you establish existence, not realizing that what arises from conditions is devoid of own-nature in dharma; thus you destroy conditioned arising and fall into empty nothingness. Furthermore, if one grasps the dependent [nature] as non-existent, there are also two faults: if the dependent [nature] is a non-existent dharma, then conditions have nothing to give rise to, and dharmas cannot exist, which is precisely annihilation.
60.34
Question: If stating that conditioned arising is empty and non-existent falls into annihilation, why does the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā broadly explain conditioned arising as ultimately empty?
60.35
Answer: When the noble ones speak of conditioned arising as empty, this is emptiness not different from existence. This is explaining the dharma of true reality without moving from conditioned arising. If one holds that conditioned arising is empty literally as spoken, then there is no conditioned arising; and because conditioned arising is non-existent, there is no principle of emptiness. The lack of the principle of emptiness is truly due to clinging to emptiness. Therefore, you fear falling into existence, so you establish emptiness, not realizing that conditioned arising is devoid of own-nature; thus losing the emptiness of nature, you fall back into the perverse grasping of emptiness within emotions. Therefore, Bhāviveka refuted existence in order to establish existence; Dharmapāla refuted emptiness in order to establish emptiness. Grasping non-existence according to emotion is the fault of annihilation. If one says that a non-existent dharma is the dependent [nature], a non-existent dharma is not a condition, and a dharma that is not a condition is permanent. And so on, clinging to neither existent nor non-existent also constitutes the two perils of annihilation and permanence. If within the imagined nature one conceives what is grasped as existent, illuminated by noble wisdom it ought in principle not to be empty, which is permanence. If one deludedly grasps the imagined as non-existent in principle, then one loses emotional existence, which is annihilation. And so on, neither existent nor non-existent possesses the above faults. The above has guarded against faults; now the virtues shall be revealed: Tathatā has the sense of existence—why? Because it is the basis of delusion and awakening, because it is not empty, and because it is indestructible. Tathatā has the sense of emptiness because it follows conditions and because it is relative to defilement. Tathatā has the sense of both existence and non-existence because it is endowed with virtues, because compliance and opposition are autonomous, and because it is thoroughly fused. Tathatā has the sense of neither existence nor non-existence because the two are non-dual, and because it cannot be determinately grasped. The dependent [nature] has the sense of existence because it is formed by conditions devoid of own-nature. The dependent [nature] has the sense of non-existence because being formed by conditions, it is devoid of own-nature. The dependent [nature] has the sense of both existence and non-existence because it is formed by conditions and because it is devoid of own-nature. The dependent [nature] has the sense of neither existence nor non-existence because whichever one [attempts to] grasp cannot be apprehended. The imagined [nature] has the sense of existence from the standpoint of emotion. The imagined [nature] has the sense of non-existence from the standpoint of principle. The imagined [nature] has the sense of both existence and non-existence because it is what is grasped. The imagined [nature] has the sense of neither existence nor non-existence because of what is grasped. Therefore, know that if one clings, they become the two perils of annihilation and permanence; if one does not cling, they become the gate to natural virtues. One merely eliminates deluded emotion, not banishing the dharmas. Therefore, one does not depart from existence to speak of the true, seeing the fundamental limit of existence; nor does one dwell in non-existence to contemplate dharmas, comprehending the true origin of non-existence. Thus one does not go beyond existence and non-existence, nor does one abide in existence and non-existence. How could grasping and rejecting disturb the mind, or annihilation and permanence perplex it? Thus, the three natures are the one nature: emotional existence is precisely true emptiness; the one nature is the three natures: tathatā can accomplish conditioned arising. All day long existent yet not existent, existence penetrates the source of emptiness; all day long empty yet not empty, emptiness encompasses the boundary of existence. Spontaneously, the one mind has nothing to rely upon, the ten thousand dharmas are all at rest, objective sphere and wisdom correspond, principle and practice are fused and identical; only then does one enter the mirror of the source, lustrous, pure, and without blemish, illuminating and piercing past and present, its light swallowing the ten thousand beings.
60.36
Question: If one does not establish the three natures, what kinds of faults are there?
60.37
Answer: If there were no three natures, the ordinary and noble could not be established, the great causal conditions would be lost, and the faults of annihilation and permanence would occur. The Mahāyānasaṃgraha says: 'In the world, apart from the two dharmas of discrimination and dependency, there are no other dharmas. The ālayavijñāna is the dependent nature; all other dharmas are the discriminative nature. These two dharmas subsume all dharmas completely, because the three realms are only consciousness.' The Abhidharmasūtra states: 'The dharma of the three natures has a defiled portion and a pure portion. Those two portions are spoken of in relation to the dependent nature: the discriminative nature is the defiled portion, and the real nature is the pure portion. For example, in an ore of gold and earth, three things can be seen: first, the earth element; second, earth; third, gold. Within the earth element, earth is non-existent yet can be seen, while gold is truly existent yet cannot be seen. If burned with fire, the earth does not appear and the gold is revealed. Furthermore, within the earth element, when the characteristic of earth appears, it is the appearance of a false substance; when the substance of gold appears, it is the appearance of a pure substance. Therefore, the earth element has two portions. Just so, when this nature of consciousness has not been burned by the fire of non-conceptual wisdom, within the nature of consciousness the false discriminative nature appears, and the pure nature does not appear. If this nature of consciousness is burned by the fire of non-conceptual wisdom, within the nature of consciousness the truly existent pure nature appears, and the false discriminative nature does not appear.' Therefore, know that the false arises depending on the true, yet can conceal the true; the true is revealed by means of the false, yet can strip away the false. The true and the false have no [separate] substance; both rely on the nature of consciousness, just as earth and gold both rely on the earth element.
60.38
The Mahāyānasaṃgraha asks: 'How does the one consciousness become the features of all the various consciousnesses—the eight consciousnesses, the eleven consciousnesses, and so forth?'
60.39
Answer: It wishes to show that the dependent nature possesses all three natures. The one consciousness arising from seeds is the dependent; having the features of various consciousnesses is discrimination; that discrimination is truly non-existent is the real nature. The one consciousness refers to the one fundamental consciousness; because the fundamental consciousness transforms, it becomes the various consciousnesses.
60.40
Question: The active characteristics of the three natures include both the provisional and the real; their principles are distinguishable. Why is it further stated that there are three naturelessnesses, and that all phenomena lack an intrinsic nature?
60.41
Answer: The treatise says in verse:
'Relying precisely on these three natures,
Those three naturelessnesses are established.
Therefore the Buddha, with esoteric intent, taught
That all phenomena are without nature.
The first is the naturelessness of characteristics;
The next is the naturelessness of spontaneous arising;
The last is due to being far removed from the previously
Clung-to natures of self and phenomena.
This ultimate truth of all phenomena
Is also none other than tathatā,
Because it is constantly as its nature is.
This is the real nature of consciousness-only.'
That is to say, relying upon the three natures previously taught, those three kinds of naturelessness subsequently taught are established—namely, the naturelessness of characteristics, of arising, and of ultimate truth. Therefore, the Buddha with esoteric intent stated that all phenomena are without intrinsic nature; it is not that natures are entirely non-existent. Speaking with 'esoteric intent' reveals that this is not the definitive meaning. That is, although the substance of the latter two natures is not non-existent but exists, fools superimpose onto them, falsely clinging that there truly exist intrinsic natures of self and phenomena. This is called the 'parikalpita' [nature]. In order to eliminate this clinging, the Buddha, the World-Honoured One, collectively spoke of naturelessness with regard to both existence and non-existence.
How, relying on this, are those three established? Relying on this first, parikalpita [nature], the naturelessness of characteristics is established, because its substance and nature are completely non-existent, like sky-flowers. Next, relying on the paratantra [nature], the naturelessness of arising is established; this is like an illusion, arising dependent on multiple conditions; because it is like the falsely clung-to spontaneous nature, it is provisionally said to lack nature, not that its nature is entirely non-existent. Relying on the last, pariniṣpanna [nature], the naturelessness of ultimate truth is established; that is, the ultimate truth itself, because it is far removed from the previously parikalpita-clung natures of self and phenomena, is provisionally said to lack nature, not that its nature is entirely non-existent. It is like the great sky: although it pervades all colors and forms, it is revealed by the absence of intrinsic nature in all colors and forms.
So it continues, up to [the point where it says that] the statement of naturelessness in the sūtras is not of the ultimate definitive meaning. Those of wisdom should not, relying upon it, totally repudiate all phenomena as lacking any intrinsic nature whatsoever. A verse in the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra states:
'The naturelessnesses of characteristics, arising, and ultimate truth—
Such have I entirely revealed.
If one does not know this esoteric intent of the Buddha,
One corrupts the correct path and cannot proceed.'
'Characteristics' refers to parikalpita; 'arising' refers to paratantra; 'ultimate truth' refers to pariniṣpanna. 'Without intrinsic nature' means that upon these three natures, none possess the intrinsic nature of the falsely clung-to self and phenomena, parikalpita and spontaneous [arising]. If a person does not know the Buddha's esoteric intent and, when three naturelessnesses are spoken of upon the three natures to destroy the self-grasping of non-Buddhists and the Hīnayāna, proceeds to repudiate bodhi, nirvāṇa, paratantra, and pariniṣpanna as all non-existent, then this person corrupts the correct path and cannot reach [the goal]. This statement of the three natures and three naturelessnesses does not mean that the substances of paratantra and pariniṣpanna are also non-existent; it merely means they lack the parikalpita falsely clung-to self and phenomena, and hence are called 'naturelessness.'
Therefore, the three natures are without bounds; following any one of them, all are completely gathered. Truth and delusion interpenetrate; nature and characteristics are unimpeded. The Tathāgata's teachings of an entire lifetime, with their sands-of-the-Ganges doctrinal gates and esoteric intent, are completely within the gate of the three natures. Truth and convention, root and branch, are all gathered at once, thereby revealing the correct principle of consciousness-only without any divergent track. Because the paratantra nature is the substance of consciousness-only: giving rise to discrimination from paratantra is precisely parikalpita; awakening to reality from paratantra is precisely pariniṣpanna. Due to discrimination, one portion becomes saṃsāra; due to reality, one portion becomes nirvāṇa. Understanding discrimination as empty of nature, saṃsāra becomes nirvāṇa; being deluded about the real nature as existent, nirvāṇa becomes saṃsāra.
All of this is one single phenomenon according with sentiment, manifesting meaning to become three. Three is not three, yet the one principle is perfect; one is not one, yet the three natures are complete. Rolling up and unfolding are not lost; hidden and manifest are ever as they are. Neither one nor three, nature and characteristics are obliterated in the ground of reality; yet three and yet one, progressive practices shine in the sky of meaning. In summing up that to which all returns, nothing precedes this purport.
60.42
Question: The characteristics of the three transformers have already been explained in detail. How are the characteristics of what is transformed expounded?
60.43
Answer: The three transformers refer to the consciousnesses of vipāka, cogitation, and discrimination of objects. These are the substance of that which can transform. What is transformed refers to the two aspects, darśanabhāga and nimittabhāga, because they are transformed by the substance-aspect and are the functions of the substance-aspect. Therefore, the substance is said to be the basis of the two aspects.
The Vijñaptimātratāsiddhiśāstra says:
'How should it be known that, relying on the transformations of consciousness, self and phenomena are provisionally designated, and are not separately real, and that from this everything is consciousness-only?'
The verse says:
'It is the transformation of these consciousnesses,
Discriminating and what is discriminated.
Due to this, both of those are non-existent;
Therefore, all is consciousness-only.'
'These consciousnesses' refers to the three transforming consciousnesses previously explained and their mental factors; they all can transform to resemble the two aspects, darśanabhāga and nimittabhāga, and are established under the name 'transformation.' The transformed darśanabhāga is called 'discriminating,' because it can grasp characteristics. The transformed nimittabhāga is called 'what is discriminated,' because it is what is grasped by the darśana. Due to this correct principle, those real selves and phenomena, apart from the transformations of consciousness, are all definitely non-existent. Apart from that which grasps and that which is grasped, there is no other entity, because there is no real entity apart from the two characteristics. Therefore, all conditioned and unconditioned [phenomena], whether real or provisional, are not apart from consciousness. The word 'only' is meant to exclude real entities apart from consciousness, not to deny mental factors and so forth that are not apart from consciousness.
Alternatively, 'transformation' means that the internal consciousnesses transform to resemble the external objective characteristics of self and phenomena that appear. This ability to transform is named 'discrimination,' having false discrimination as its nature—namely, the minds and mental factors of the three realms. The objects clung to by this are called 'what is discriminated'—namely, the falsely clung-to real natures of self and phenomena. Because of this discrimination transforming to resemble external objects, the provisional characteristics of self and phenomena appear; those discriminated real natures of self and phenomena are definitely all non-existent, as previously cited teachings and reasonings have already extensively refuted. Therefore, all is consciousness-only, because the existence of false discrimination is extremely well established.
Since 'only' does not exclude phenomena that are not apart from consciousness, tathatā and so forth are also of existent nature. Due to this, the two extremes of superimposition and denigration are left behind, the meaning of consciousness-only is established, and one tallies with the Middle Way.
The commentary explains:
'The transformation of these consciousnesses': 'Transformation' means the sense of altering and turning. That is, the one substance of consciousness alters and turns to give rise to two characteristics, differing from its own substance: namely, the darśanabhāga has the function of grasping, and the nimittabhāga has the function of obstruction. This is because the substance of consciousness turns and gives rise to that which can grasp and that which has obstruction.
'The transformed darśanabhāga is called discrimination, because it can grasp characteristics': Among what is previously transformed, the transformed darśanabhāga is called discrimination; it is of paratantra nature. Because it can grasp the transformed paratantra nimittabhāga, it gives rise to various parikalpita discriminations. It is the transformed function of this substance of consciousness, and because it can discriminate, it is called 'discrimination.' The paratantra nature-aspect transformed by the substance of consciousness, which resembles the clung-to nimittabhāga, is called 'what is discriminated,' because it is the characteristic grasped by the preceding discriminating darśanabhāga. It is not that the substance of consciousness itself being able to take objects is called 'discrimination'; giving rise to discriminating views is the function of consciousness, because both nimitta and darśana arise dependent on self-witnessing.
'Since only does not exclude phenomena not apart from consciousness, tathatā and so forth are also of existent nature': The word 'only' does not exclude phenomena that are not apart from consciousness. Tathatā and mental factors are also not apart from consciousness, and thus their substances all exist. At this stage, it merely excludes the existence of what is discriminated apart from consciousness; it does not exclude the existence of tathatā and so forth that are not apart from consciousness. This should be known in accordance with reason.
This means: since there exist the transforming, discriminating consciousness and the transformed objective paratantra nimittabhāga, the discriminated real phenomena external to the mind and so forth are definitely all non-existent; only phenomena such as tathatā and mental factors are not apart from consciousness, and are also truly existent.
'Far removed from the two extremes of superimposition and denigration': Because there are no phenomena outside mind, the extreme of superimposition is eliminated; because there are deluded minds and so forth, the extreme of denigration is avoided. Avoiding the extreme of denigration eliminates the repudiation of existence as like empty space taught by Bhaviveka and others; avoiding the extreme of superimposition eliminates the Hīnayāna clingings to the existence of phenomena outside mind. Thus the meaning of consciousness-only is established, tallying with the Middle Way without one-sided grasping.
Furthermore, what the various masters have clarified consists of a total of four aspects: first, the nimittabhāga; second, the darśanabhāga; third, the svasaṃvittibhāga; fourth, the saṃvittisvasaṃvittibhāga.
There are four kinds of nimittabhāga:
1. The real characteristic is called 'nimitta': its substance is tathatā, because it is the true characteristic.
2. The objective characteristic is called 'nimitta': because it can serve as an object for the faculties and mind.
3. The perceptual appearance is called 'nimitta': this is only conditioned phenomena, because they have visible appearances; it extends to both the reflection and the archetype, and is solely transformed by consciousness.
4. The conceptual characteristic is called 'nimitta': namely, the signified meaning under the signifier.
As for the nimittabhāga [here], among the above four kinds of characteristics, it takes only the latter three characteristics to be the characteristic of the nimittabhāga.
Furthermore, the nimittabhāga is twofold: first, that which is suddenly transformed by consciousness, which is the archetype; second, consciousness and so forth taking objects, which merely transform a reflection to take as object and do not attain the archetype.
Second, the darśanabhāga: The Vijñaptimātratāsiddhiśāstra says that it has the function of discerning its own object. There are five categories of this darśanabhāga:
1. Direct-witnessing seeing is called 'darśana': that is, the darśanabhāga of the three fundamental cognitions.
2. Illumination is called 'darśana': this applies to both sense faculties and mind, because both possess the sense of illumination.
3. Grasping of objects is called 'darśana': this extends through the three internal aspects, because all can take objects.
4. Thoughtful understanding is called 'darśana': because of thoughtfully understanding the signified meaning.
5. Inference is called 'darśana': that is, the mind of inference (anumāna), because it infers with respect to all objects.
Among these five kinds of seeing, excluding the five physical faculties and the two internal aspects, all the rest are subsumed under the darśanabhāga.
Third, the svasaṃvittibhāga: Because it can personally verify that its own darśanabhāga takes the nimittabhāga as object without error, it is able to act as witness.
Fourth, the saṃvittisvasaṃvittibhāga: It refers to that which can personally verify that the third, the svasaṃvittibhāga, takes the darśanabhāga as object without error; it receives its name from that which is verified.
The meaning of these four aspects is generally illustrated with the metaphor of a mirror: the mirror itself is like the svasaṃvittibhāga; the mirror's brightness is like the darśanabhāga; the mirror's reflections are like the nimittabhāga; the handle at the back of the mirror is like the saṃvittisvasaṃvittibhāga.
Regarding these four aspects, four masters establish doctrines. First, Bodhisattva Sthiramati establishes only one aspect: the svasaṃvittibhāga. The Vijñaptimātratāsiddhiśāstra says: 'This svasaṃvittibhāga arises from conditions; because it is paratantra-originated, it is said to exist. The two aspects of darśana and nimitta do not arise from conditions; they exist due to false grasping by the parikalpita mind. As such, these two aspects exist emotionally but are absent in principle. Only the svasaṃvittibhāga is of paratantra nature, born from seeds, and is truly existent.'
The two aspects of darśana and nimitta are non-existent, yet further transform and give rise to the two graspings of self and phenomena, which are also non-existent; this is using non-existence to resemble non-existence. If one goes by Bodhisattva Dharmapāla, it is using existence to resemble non-existence: the two aspects of darśana and nimitta have substance, while the two graspings of self and phenomena that they transform and give rise to are without substance. Sthiramati cites the Laṅkāvatārasūtra, which says: 'The defiled minds and mental factors of the three realms all have false discrimination as their nature.' Therefore, one knows that the darśana and nimitta aspects of the eight consciousnesses are all parikalpita falsely clung-to existences; thus only the single aspect of svasaṃvitti is of paratantra nature and is truly existent.
A verse in the Ghanavyūhasūtra says:
'What fools discriminate,
External objects, are all truly non-existent.
Vāsanās stir and defile the mind,
So it turns to resemble them.'
Therefore, one knows that it is merely fools who, relying upon the real svasaṃvittibhāga, give rise to parikalpita deluded sentiments, which transform to appear resembling the substanceless two aspects. In principle and reality, the two aspects lack real substance; it is merely that fools do not understand and falsely cling to them as real. Therefore, the treatise says: 'Ordinary beings cling to them as existent; the noble ones comprehend them as non-existent.'
60.44
Question: If one says that the two aspects of nimitta and darśana are provisional, taking for instance the great earth, mountains, and rivers—these are subsumed under the nimittabhāga and are presently seen to be real. How can they be said to be provisional?
60.45
Answer: Although one perceives mountains, rivers, and the like to be real, this is originally an erroneous attachment to the existence of external mountains, rivers, the great earth, and so forth. In truth, none of them are separate from the svasaṃvittibhāga. Therefore, a verse in the Laṅkāvatārasūtra says:
'Due to the attachment of one's own citta,
Citta turns resembling external objects.
What is seen therein does not exist;
Therefore, it is said to be citta-only.'
Thus we know that apart from the svasaṃvittibhāga, there are no real darśana- and nimitta-bhāgas.
As for the second master, the commentator Nanda, who established two bhāgas to constitute consciousness-only: First, to present his thesis, whenever any citta arises, it necessarily possesses both darśana- and nimitta-bhāgas. The darśana- and nimitta-bhāgas are the active and objective conditions (ālambana). If there were no nimittabhāga to draw the citta, the mental dharmas would have no way to arise; if there were no darśanabhāga as the grāhaka, who would know that there is an objective nimittabhāga? Thus, with both object and citta, they equally constitute consciousness-only. The darśanabhāga is that which transforms, and the nimittabhāga is that which is transformed. For the grāhaka and grāhya to be established, both bhāgas must be present. Both the darśanabhāga and the nimittabhāga belong to the paratantrasvabhāva. Sometimes, when apprehending a 'solitary image' (dvy-ākāra / solitary reflection) object, it arises from the same seed; sometimes, when apprehending an 'interdependent image' object, it arises from a distinct seed. Because it arises from seeds, it is not parikalpita (imputed). If this were not accepted, the Buddhas would not manifest various reflections such as bodies and lands.
Sthiramati in turn objected: 'If you establish a nimittabhāga, does there not exist an object outside citta? How could that be called consciousness-only?'
Nanda replied: 'The darśanabhāga is that which apprehends, and the nimittabhāga is that which is apprehended. Subsuming the apprehended into that which apprehends, it is still consciousness-only. Furthermore, if you say there is no nimittabhāga, then your thesis of a single-bhāga consciousness-only cannot be established. Why is this? You, Sthiramati, grasp the nimittabhāga as existing only through false sentiment. But the seeds of the nimittabhāga within the eighth consciousness—which are the objects it cognizes—are subsumed under the nimittabhāga. That is, the seeds are the direct causal condition (hetupratyaya) that generates the actualized svasaṃvittibhāga. If the seeds of the nimittabhāga are merely false sentiment, what prevents the actualized svasaṃvittibhāga produced by them from also being false sentiment? This would not contradict the meaning of a seed-consciousness. If you do not accept that the svasaṃvittibhāga is false sentiment, then the seeds that generate it must also be real existents. Thus both cause and effect are real, proving that the nimittabhāga is also a real existent. Since the nimittabhāga exists, the darśanabhāga must exist. Since the grāhaka and grāhya are established, consciousness-only is established through the two bhāgas. Furthermore, the five sense faculties are the nimittabhāga of the eighth consciousness. If the nimittabhāga were merely imputed (parikalpita), how could an imputed faculty give rise to the five consciousnesses?'
Sthiramati said: 'The five consciousnesses do not rely on the five faculties to arise; all five consciousnesses arise from their own seeds.'
60.46
Question: If they do not rely on the faculties to arise, but only arise from seeds, do you accept that the seeds of the five consciousnesses are the nimittabhāga of the eighth [consciousness] or not?
60.47
Answer: [Sthiramati] concedes that they are the nimittabhāga of the eighth consciousness.
Objection: Since it is so, the seeds are parikalpita, and the five consciousnesses they produce are also parikalpita.
Sthiramati rescues his position, saying: Seeds are merely qi-aspects (dispositions) upon the eighth consciousness; because they have the function of producing active manifestations, they are provisionally called seeds; they are merely an alternative name for vāsanā, not real entities.
Objection: All the noble teachings state that what is produced from seeds is called real, while what is designated based on other things is called provisional. How could provisional seeds produce real active manifestations? If they are provisional seeds, how could they directly yield their own fruit? If seeds are provisional phenomena, then the principle of the transformation of causes and conditions (hetupratyaya-pariṇāma) in the eighth consciousness as cause would not be established. If it were not a transformation of causes and conditions, that would contradict all [teachings].
Sthiramati is left without a rescue.
Since both the cognizing and cognized conditions exist and both are real paratantra nature, one knows that the darśanabhāga and nimittabhāga are real.
Citing scriptural proof: The Ghanavyūhasūtra says:
“Everything is only awareness; / The objects of awareness are all non-existent. / The aspects of cognizer and cognized / Each arise naturally.”
Explanation: “Everything is only awareness” means vijñaptimātra. “The objects of awareness are all non-existent” means that the real objects falsely grasped outside the mind do not exist. “The aspects of cognizer and cognized”: the cognizer is the real paratantra darśanabhāga, and the cognized is the real paratantra nimittabhāga. “Each arise naturally”: the darśanabhāga arises from mental seeds, and the nimittabhāga arises from nimittabhāga seeds. Therefore, one knows that two aspects must be established for vijñaptimātra to be established.
Reconciliation of contradictions: Sthiramati objects: If so, how do you reconcile the two earlier passages from the Ghanavyūha and Laṅkāvatāra?
Correct reconciliation: The earlier scriptural passages do not prove a single aspect; they merely refute grasping that there are real selves, phenomena, and so forth outside the mind, without refuting that the nimittabhāga is not separate from the mind.
Third, Bodhisattva Dignāga establishes three aspects, refuting the previous masters: Sthiramati’s establishment of one aspect possesses only substance and lacks function; Nanda’s establishment of the two aspects of darśana and nimitta possesses only function and lacks substance; both are mutually deficient.
Establishing the principle: This refers to establishing the principle of the result of cognition (pramāṇaphala). The treatise states: because the means of cognition (pramāṇa), the object of cognition (prameya), and the result of cognition (pramāṇaphala) are distinct, and because the nimitta and darśana must have an underlying substance they rely upon. The nimittabhāga is the object of cognition, the darśanabhāga is the means of cognition, and there must be the svasaṃvittibhāga to serve as the witness, which is the result of cognition. By analogy, when a ruler measures silk: the silk is the object of cognition, the ruler and the person [measuring] are the means of cognition, and the intellect recording the count is called the result of cognition. Now, that the darśanabhāga cognizes the nimittabhāga without error is entirely because the svasaṃvittibhāga serves as its result. When the darśanabhāga of the present eye-consciousness cognizes blue, it certainly does not cognize yellow. Just as when the darśanabhāga cognizes an object never seen before and suddenly cognizes a yellow object, it certainly does not cognize blue. If there were no svasaṃvittibhāga, the darśanabhāga could not remember itself. Therefore, one knows that three aspects must be established. If there were no svasaṃvittibhāga, the nimitta and darśana would also not exist. If one says there are two aspects, then there must definitely be a svasaṃvittibhāga. The svasaṃvittibhāga is like an ox’s head, and the two horns are like the two aspects of nimitta and darśana. A verse in the Pramāṇasamuccaya says:
“The simulated object-aspect is the object of cognition; / The grasping aspect is self-cognizing.”
Explanation: “The simulated object-aspect is the object of cognition” means that the nimittabhāga manifests resembling an external object. “The grasping aspect is self-cognizing”: the grasping aspect is the darśanabhāga, because it grasps the nimittabhāga; “self-cognizing” (svasaṃvitti) is the substance.
Fourth, Bodhisattva Dharmapāla establishes four aspects.
Establishing the thesis: If citta and caitasikas are finely analyzed, there should be four aspects.
Establishing the principle: If there is no fourth aspect, what phenomenon will serve as the result of cognition for the third aspect? You, Dignāga, establish three aspects: because the darśanabhāga has the function of cognizing and discerning objects, you make the svasaṃvittibhāga its result of cognition. Your svasaṃvittibhāga also has the capacity to cognize and illuminate objects; what phenomenon, then, will serve as the result of cognition for the cognizing svasaṃvittibhāga? One must take the fourth, the svasaṃvitti-saṃvittibhāga, as the result of cognition for the third aspect.
Citing scriptural proof: A verse in the Ghanavyūhasūtra says:
“The mind of sentient beings has two natures, / All inner and outer divisions; / Bound by the apprehended and the grasper, / It sees various distinctions.”
“The mind has two natures”: the two internal aspects form one nature, and the two aspects of darśana and nimitta form the second nature; these are the two natures of internal mind and external object. “Bound by the grasper” refers to the coarse movement of cognizing, which is the cognizing darśanabhāga. “Bound by the apprehended” is the bondage of characteristics (nimittabandhana), the bondage of the cognized object. “It sees various distinctions”: the darśanabhāga extends through the three pramāṇas; with this meaning, it says “it sees various distinctions.”
The previous two masters were neither entirely incorrect. The third master Dignāga’s three aspects seem to have substance and function, yet in establishing a valid cognition, the principle therein is still insufficient; thus one must further establish a fourth aspect. The nimittabhāga is the object of cognition, the darśanabhāga is the means of cognition, and the svasaṃvittibhāga is taken as the result of cognition. If the darśanabhāga is taken as the object of cognition and the svasaṃvittibhāga as the means of cognition, what phenomenon further serves as the result of cognition? Hence one knows that taking the svasaṃvitti-saṃvittibhāga as the result of cognition is sufficient. The darśanabhāga cognizes externally, which is vague and loose, and extends to inference (anumāna) and false cognition (abhimāna/apramāṇa); therefore, one does not take the darśanabhāga as the result of cognition for the svasaṃvitti. The two internal aspects are exclusively direct perception (pratyakṣa); hence their serving mutually as results is without fault. As a rule, to be a result of cognition, it must be direct perception to be a result of cognition. Inference and false cognition are definitely not results of cognition. By analogy, a guarantor must be honest and upright to serve as a witness; if someone is slightly deceptive, they cannot serve as a guarantor. Furthermore, although the darśanabhāga of the first five consciousnesses and the eighth consciousness are direct perception, because they cognize externally, they are not results of cognition. As a rule, a result of cognition must cognize internally to be a result of cognition. Furthermore, although the seventh consciousness cognizes internally, it is false cognition and also cannot be a result of cognition. As a rule, to be a result of cognition requires two meanings: first, direct perception; second, internal cognition. Furthermore, although the darśanabhāga of the subsequently attained [wisdom] in the fruit state is direct perception, when cognizing internally it transforms an image to cognize it, and thus is not a result of cognition; thus it must possess three meanings. Furthermore, although the darśanabhāga of the fundamental wisdom in the fruit state directly realizes tathatā without transforming an image, because it is a mental function, it is not a result of cognition; thus it must possess the mental substance, requiring four meanings: first, direct perception; second, internal cognition; third, not transforming an image; fourth, being the mental substance—only then is it a result of cognition.
Furthermore, the treatise states: These four aspects may be subsumed into three, because the fourth is subsumed into the svasaṃvittibhāga; or they may be subsumed into two, because the latter three are all of the nature of cognizers and thus are all subsumed under the darśanabhāga—here “seeing” means the cognizer; or they may be subsumed into one, because their substance is non-different. As the Laṅkāvatārasūtra says:
“Due to attachment to one's own mind, / Mind turns resembling external objects. / What is seen by it does not exist; / Therefore, it is said to be only citta.”
Thus in place after place, it speaks of only one mind. This phrase “one mind” also subsumes mental factors (caitasikas).
Explanation: “In place after place, only one mind” means that because external objects do not exist, there is only one mind. Because of inner attachment, it turns resembling external objects. External objects are definitely non-existent; one admits only one's own mind. Because they are not separate from mind, they are collectively named one consciousness. Mental factors are associated with mind, material phenomena are transformations of mind, and tathatā is the real nature of consciousness. Furthermore, because none are separate from consciousness, all are termed vijñaptimātra.
Furthermore, the Qingliang Record cites the treatise to explain the fourth, the svasaṃvitti-saṃvittibhāga: If this did not exist, what would witness the third? Since they are equally mental aspects, they should all be witnessed. Explanation: The darśanabhāga is a mental aspect and must have the svasaṃvittibhāga; the svasaṃvitti is a mental aspect, so it should have a fourth to witness it. The treatise also states: The svasaṃvittibhāga would lack a result, whereas all means of cognition have results. Explanation: The darśanabhāga is a means of cognition and must have the svasaṃvitti as its result; the svasaṃvitti cognizes the darśanabhāga, so it must have a fourth as its result. Fearing that someone might rescue the position by saying that the darśanabhāga is instead used as the result for the third, the treatise next states: It should not be that the darśanabhāga is the result of the third, because the darśanabhāga is sometimes subsumed under non-pramāṇa (false cognition); hence the darśanabhāga does not witness the third, for that which witnesses its own substance must be direct perception. Furthermore, the meaning is made clear that the darśanabhāga extends through the three pramāṇas. The three pramāṇas are: direct perception, inference, and non-pramāṇa (false cognition). This clarifies that when the darśana cognizes the nimitta, it may be non-pramāṇa; a non-pramāṇa phenomenon cannot serve as the result for direct perception. Or when the darśana cognizes the nimitta, it is in inference, and when it cognizes the svasaṃvitti, it is again direct perception. Thus the svasaṃvitti is the mental substance, and can serve as the result for inference and non-pramāṇa. The darśanabhāga is not the mental substance and cannot serve as the result of cognition for the svasaṃvitti; hence the darśanabhāga cannot witness the third, because that which witnesses its own substance must be direct perception. Since both the third and fourth aspects are direct perception, they can mutually witness each other without the fallacy of infinite regress. The meaning is: if one takes the darśanabhāga as the means of cognition, using only three aspects is also sufficient; but if one takes the darśanabhāga as the object of cognition, one must have the fourth as the result of cognition. If one were to make a general analogy: silk is like the object of cognition, the ruler is like the means of cognition, and the intellect is the result of cognition, which is the svasaṃvittibhāga. If the ruler is that which is employed, and the intellect is the employer, what uses the intellect? It is the person, like the svasaṃvitti-saṃvittibhāga. The person can use the intellect, and the intellect can employ the person; hence they can further witness each other. It is also like a bright mirror: the reflection in the mirror is the nimitta, the brightness of the mirror is the darśana, the mirror face is like the svasaṃvitti, and the back of the mirror is like the svasaṃvitti-saṃvitti. The face relies on the back, and the back relies on the face; thus they can mutually witness. One may also take the bronze as the svasaṃvitti-saṃvitti: the mirror relies on the bronze, and the bronze relies on the mirror.
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- 宗鏡錄 — Classical Chinese