宗鏡錄 60.45

60.45

Answer: Although one perceives mountains, rivers, and the like to be real, this is originally an erroneous attachment to the existence of external mountains, rivers, the great earth, and so forth. In truth, none of them are separate from the svasaṃvittibhāga. Therefore, a verse in the Laṅkāvatārasūtra says:

'Due to the attachment of one's own citta,
Citta turns resembling external objects.
What is seen therein does not exist;
Therefore, it is said to be citta-only.'

Thus we know that apart from the svasaṃvittibhāga, there are no real darśana- and nimitta-bhāgas.

As for the second master, the commentator Nanda, who established two bhāgas to constitute consciousness-only: First, to present his thesis, whenever any citta arises, it necessarily possesses both darśana- and nimitta-bhāgas. The darśana- and nimitta-bhāgas are the active and objective conditions (ālambana). If there were no nimittabhāga to draw the citta, the mental dharmas would have no way to arise; if there were no darśanabhāga as the grāhaka, who would know that there is an objective nimittabhāga? Thus, with both object and citta, they equally constitute consciousness-only. The darśanabhāga is that which transforms, and the nimittabhāga is that which is transformed. For the grāhaka and grāhya to be established, both bhāgas must be present. Both the darśanabhāga and the nimittabhāga belong to the paratantrasvabhāva. Sometimes, when apprehending a 'solitary image' (dvy-ākāra / solitary reflection) object, it arises from the same seed; sometimes, when apprehending an 'interdependent image' object, it arises from a distinct seed. Because it arises from seeds, it is not parikalpita (imputed). If this were not accepted, the Buddhas would not manifest various reflections such as bodies and lands.

Sthiramati in turn objected: 'If you establish a nimittabhāga, does there not exist an object outside citta? How could that be called consciousness-only?'

Nanda replied: 'The darśanabhāga is that which apprehends, and the nimittabhāga is that which is apprehended. Subsuming the apprehended into that which apprehends, it is still consciousness-only. Furthermore, if you say there is no nimittabhāga, then your thesis of a single-bhāga consciousness-only cannot be established. Why is this? You, Sthiramati, grasp the nimittabhāga as existing only through false sentiment. But the seeds of the nimittabhāga within the eighth consciousness—which are the objects it cognizes—are subsumed under the nimittabhāga. That is, the seeds are the direct causal condition (hetupratyaya) that generates the actualized svasaṃvittibhāga. If the seeds of the nimittabhāga are merely false sentiment, what prevents the actualized svasaṃvittibhāga produced by them from also being false sentiment? This would not contradict the meaning of a seed-consciousness. If you do not accept that the svasaṃvittibhāga is false sentiment, then the seeds that generate it must also be real existents. Thus both cause and effect are real, proving that the nimittabhāga is also a real existent. Since the nimittabhāga exists, the darśanabhāga must exist. Since the grāhaka and grāhya are established, consciousness-only is established through the two bhāgas. Furthermore, the five sense faculties are the nimittabhāga of the eighth consciousness. If the nimittabhāga were merely imputed (parikalpita), how could an imputed faculty give rise to the five consciousnesses?'

Sthiramati said: 'The five consciousnesses do not rely on the five faculties to arise; all five consciousnesses arise from their own seeds.'