宗鏡錄 60.47

60.47

Answer: [Sthiramati] concedes that they are the nimittabhāga of the eighth consciousness.

Objection: Since it is so, the seeds are parikalpita, and the five consciousnesses they produce are also parikalpita.

Sthiramati rescues his position, saying: Seeds are merely qi-aspects (dispositions) upon the eighth consciousness; because they have the function of producing active manifestations, they are provisionally called seeds; they are merely an alternative name for vāsanā, not real entities.

Objection: All the noble teachings state that what is produced from seeds is called real, while what is designated based on other things is called provisional. How could provisional seeds produce real active manifestations? If they are provisional seeds, how could they directly yield their own fruit? If seeds are provisional phenomena, then the principle of the transformation of causes and conditions (hetupratyaya-pariṇāma) in the eighth consciousness as cause would not be established. If it were not a transformation of causes and conditions, that would contradict all [teachings].

Sthiramati is left without a rescue.

Since both the cognizing and cognized conditions exist and both are real paratantra nature, one knows that the darśanabhāga and nimittabhāga are real.

Citing scriptural proof: The Ghanavyūhasūtra says:
“Everything is only awareness; / The objects of awareness are all non-existent. / The aspects of cognizer and cognized / Each arise naturally.”

Explanation: “Everything is only awareness” means vijñaptimātra. “The objects of awareness are all non-existent” means that the real objects falsely grasped outside the mind do not exist. “The aspects of cognizer and cognized”: the cognizer is the real paratantra darśanabhāga, and the cognized is the real paratantra nimittabhāga. “Each arise naturally”: the darśanabhāga arises from mental seeds, and the nimittabhāga arises from nimittabhāga seeds. Therefore, one knows that two aspects must be established for vijñaptimātra to be established.

Reconciliation of contradictions: Sthiramati objects: If so, how do you reconcile the two earlier passages from the Ghanavyūha and Laṅkāvatāra?

Correct reconciliation: The earlier scriptural passages do not prove a single aspect; they merely refute grasping that there are real selves, phenomena, and so forth outside the mind, without refuting that the nimittabhāga is not separate from the mind.

Third, Bodhisattva Dignāga establishes three aspects, refuting the previous masters: Sthiramati’s establishment of one aspect possesses only substance and lacks function; Nanda’s establishment of the two aspects of darśana and nimitta possesses only function and lacks substance; both are mutually deficient.

Establishing the principle: This refers to establishing the principle of the result of cognition (pramāṇaphala). The treatise states: because the means of cognition (pramāṇa), the object of cognition (prameya), and the result of cognition (pramāṇaphala) are distinct, and because the nimitta and darśana must have an underlying substance they rely upon. The nimittabhāga is the object of cognition, the darśanabhāga is the means of cognition, and there must be the svasaṃvittibhāga to serve as the witness, which is the result of cognition. By analogy, when a ruler measures silk: the silk is the object of cognition, the ruler and the person [measuring] are the means of cognition, and the intellect recording the count is called the result of cognition. Now, that the darśanabhāga cognizes the nimittabhāga without error is entirely because the svasaṃvittibhāga serves as its result. When the darśanabhāga of the present eye-consciousness cognizes blue, it certainly does not cognize yellow. Just as when the darśanabhāga cognizes an object never seen before and suddenly cognizes a yellow object, it certainly does not cognize blue. If there were no svasaṃvittibhāga, the darśanabhāga could not remember itself. Therefore, one knows that three aspects must be established. If there were no svasaṃvittibhāga, the nimitta and darśana would also not exist. If one says there are two aspects, then there must definitely be a svasaṃvittibhāga. The svasaṃvittibhāga is like an ox’s head, and the two horns are like the two aspects of nimitta and darśana. A verse in the Pramāṇasamuccaya says:
“The simulated object-aspect is the object of cognition; / The grasping aspect is self-cognizing.”

Explanation: “The simulated object-aspect is the object of cognition” means that the nimittabhāga manifests resembling an external object. “The grasping aspect is self-cognizing”: the grasping aspect is the darśanabhāga, because it grasps the nimittabhāga; “self-cognizing” (svasaṃvitti) is the substance.

Fourth, Bodhisattva Dharmapāla establishes four aspects.

Establishing the thesis: If citta and caitasikas are finely analyzed, there should be four aspects.

Establishing the principle: If there is no fourth aspect, what phenomenon will serve as the result of cognition for the third aspect? You, Dignāga, establish three aspects: because the darśanabhāga has the function of cognizing and discerning objects, you make the svasaṃvittibhāga its result of cognition. Your svasaṃvittibhāga also has the capacity to cognize and illuminate objects; what phenomenon, then, will serve as the result of cognition for the cognizing svasaṃvittibhāga? One must take the fourth, the svasaṃvitti-saṃvittibhāga, as the result of cognition for the third aspect.

Citing scriptural proof: A verse in the Ghanavyūhasūtra says:
“The mind of sentient beings has two natures, / All inner and outer divisions; / Bound by the apprehended and the grasper, / It sees various distinctions.”

“The mind has two natures”: the two internal aspects form one nature, and the two aspects of darśana and nimitta form the second nature; these are the two natures of internal mind and external object. “Bound by the grasper” refers to the coarse movement of cognizing, which is the cognizing darśanabhāga. “Bound by the apprehended” is the bondage of characteristics (nimittabandhana), the bondage of the cognized object. “It sees various distinctions”: the darśanabhāga extends through the three pramāṇas; with this meaning, it says “it sees various distinctions.”

The previous two masters were neither entirely incorrect. The third master Dignāga’s three aspects seem to have substance and function, yet in establishing a valid cognition, the principle therein is still insufficient; thus one must further establish a fourth aspect. The nimittabhāga is the object of cognition, the darśanabhāga is the means of cognition, and the svasaṃvittibhāga is taken as the result of cognition. If the darśanabhāga is taken as the object of cognition and the svasaṃvittibhāga as the means of cognition, what phenomenon further serves as the result of cognition? Hence one knows that taking the svasaṃvitti-saṃvittibhāga as the result of cognition is sufficient. The darśanabhāga cognizes externally, which is vague and loose, and extends to inference (anumāna) and false cognition (abhimāna/apramāṇa); therefore, one does not take the darśanabhāga as the result of cognition for the svasaṃvitti. The two internal aspects are exclusively direct perception (pratyakṣa); hence their serving mutually as results is without fault. As a rule, to be a result of cognition, it must be direct perception to be a result of cognition. Inference and false cognition are definitely not results of cognition. By analogy, a guarantor must be honest and upright to serve as a witness; if someone is slightly deceptive, they cannot serve as a guarantor. Furthermore, although the darśanabhāga of the first five consciousnesses and the eighth consciousness are direct perception, because they cognize externally, they are not results of cognition. As a rule, a result of cognition must cognize internally to be a result of cognition. Furthermore, although the seventh consciousness cognizes internally, it is false cognition and also cannot be a result of cognition. As a rule, to be a result of cognition requires two meanings: first, direct perception; second, internal cognition. Furthermore, although the darśanabhāga of the subsequently attained [wisdom] in the fruit state is direct perception, when cognizing internally it transforms an image to cognize it, and thus is not a result of cognition; thus it must possess three meanings. Furthermore, although the darśanabhāga of the fundamental wisdom in the fruit state directly realizes tathatā without transforming an image, because it is a mental function, it is not a result of cognition; thus it must possess the mental substance, requiring four meanings: first, direct perception; second, internal cognition; third, not transforming an image; fourth, being the mental substance—only then is it a result of cognition.

Furthermore, the treatise states: These four aspects may be subsumed into three, because the fourth is subsumed into the svasaṃvittibhāga; or they may be subsumed into two, because the latter three are all of the nature of cognizers and thus are all subsumed under the darśanabhāga—here “seeing” means the cognizer; or they may be subsumed into one, because their substance is non-different. As the Laṅkāvatārasūtra says:
“Due to attachment to one's own mind, / Mind turns resembling external objects. / What is seen by it does not exist; / Therefore, it is said to be only citta.”

Thus in place after place, it speaks of only one mind. This phrase “one mind” also subsumes mental factors (caitasikas).

Explanation: “In place after place, only one mind” means that because external objects do not exist, there is only one mind. Because of inner attachment, it turns resembling external objects. External objects are definitely non-existent; one admits only one's own mind. Because they are not separate from mind, they are collectively named one consciousness. Mental factors are associated with mind, material phenomena are transformations of mind, and tathatā is the real nature of consciousness. Furthermore, because none are separate from consciousness, all are termed vijñaptimātra.

Furthermore, the Qingliang Record cites the treatise to explain the fourth, the svasaṃvitti-saṃvittibhāga: If this did not exist, what would witness the third? Since they are equally mental aspects, they should all be witnessed. Explanation: The darśanabhāga is a mental aspect and must have the svasaṃvittibhāga; the svasaṃvitti is a mental aspect, so it should have a fourth to witness it. The treatise also states: The svasaṃvittibhāga would lack a result, whereas all means of cognition have results. Explanation: The darśanabhāga is a means of cognition and must have the svasaṃvitti as its result; the svasaṃvitti cognizes the darśanabhāga, so it must have a fourth as its result. Fearing that someone might rescue the position by saying that the darśanabhāga is instead used as the result for the third, the treatise next states: It should not be that the darśanabhāga is the result of the third, because the darśanabhāga is sometimes subsumed under non-pramāṇa (false cognition); hence the darśanabhāga does not witness the third, for that which witnesses its own substance must be direct perception. Furthermore, the meaning is made clear that the darśanabhāga extends through the three pramāṇas. The three pramāṇas are: direct perception, inference, and non-pramāṇa (false cognition). This clarifies that when the darśana cognizes the nimitta, it may be non-pramāṇa; a non-pramāṇa phenomenon cannot serve as the result for direct perception. Or when the darśana cognizes the nimitta, it is in inference, and when it cognizes the svasaṃvitti, it is again direct perception. Thus the svasaṃvitti is the mental substance, and can serve as the result for inference and non-pramāṇa. The darśanabhāga is not the mental substance and cannot serve as the result of cognition for the svasaṃvitti; hence the darśanabhāga cannot witness the third, because that which witnesses its own substance must be direct perception. Since both the third and fourth aspects are direct perception, they can mutually witness each other without the fallacy of infinite regress. The meaning is: if one takes the darśanabhāga as the means of cognition, using only three aspects is also sufficient; but if one takes the darśanabhāga as the object of cognition, one must have the fourth as the result of cognition. If one were to make a general analogy: silk is like the object of cognition, the ruler is like the means of cognition, and the intellect is the result of cognition, which is the svasaṃvittibhāga. If the ruler is that which is employed, and the intellect is the employer, what uses the intellect? It is the person, like the svasaṃvitti-saṃvittibhāga. The person can use the intellect, and the intellect can employ the person; hence they can further witness each other. It is also like a bright mirror: the reflection in the mirror is the nimitta, the brightness of the mirror is the darśana, the mirror face is like the svasaṃvitti, and the back of the mirror is like the svasaṃvitti-saṃvitti. The face relies on the back, and the back relies on the face; thus they can mutually witness. One may also take the bronze as the svasaṃvitti-saṃvitti: the mirror relies on the bronze, and the bronze relies on the mirror.