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宗鏡錄 69.33.3

English (machine translation) 69.33.3

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69.33.3

is named the nature of awareness and cognition. This nature of awareness and cognition arises due to the anterior dusts [of sense objects], and is ultimately without substance. Through false cognition and forced awareness, internal sentient beings are formed; due to the cessation of thought and the condensation of emptiness, external lands are formed. A sūtra says: 'Thoughts settled and clear form lands; knowing and awareness are sentient beings.' Deluded about the serene and tranquil One Mind, [beings] construct the internal six sense-entrances; there is no separate substance whatsoever, they are solely true emptiness. Since the entrance of the mind is empty, the preceding five entrances—the eye and so forth—are also like this. In the text refuting the twelve sense-bases, it says: 'The Buddha told Ānanda: In your mind, that which is conditioned by the three natures—wholesome, unwholesome, and indeterminate—generates dharmas. Then are these dharmas produced by being identical to the mind, or do they have a separate location apart from the mind? Ānanda, if they are identical to the mind, then dharmas are not dust [objects]; not being what is conditioned by the mind, how could they form a sense-base? If they are apart from the mind and have a separate location, then is the intrinsic nature of dharmas knowing or non-knowing? If it is knowing, it is called mind; being different from you, it is not an object-dust, but is equivalent to the mental capacity of another; being identical to you, it is identical to your mind—how then could your mind be further doubled apart from you? If it is non-knowing, then since this dust is neither form, sound, smell, taste, separation and union, cold and warmth, nor the characteristic of empty space, where should it be known to reside? Now within form and emptiness it has no manifestation at all; it should not be that in the human realm there is yet something outside of emptiness. If it is not what is conditioned by the mind, on what basis is the sense-base established? Therefore you should know that dharmas and the mind both lack a location; thus the mind and dharmas are both false, originally neither causes and conditions nor spontaneous nature.' Explanation: This refutes the two sense-bases of the mind and dharmas. In dividing that which can mark and designating what is constructed, projecting and maintaining, establishing object and establishing mind—all are mind and dharmas. If one first refutes the root of their discriminative delusion, the preceding five sense-faculties and ten sense-bases will naturally collapse. The dharma sense-base is what is conditioned; the mind sense-base is that which conditions. Just take the dharma sense-base: is it identical to the mind, or not identical to the mind? If it is identical to the mind, then dharmas are entirely mind; the mind does not see the mind, so how could it form a sense-base? If it is apart from the mind and has a separate location, then is the intrinsic nature of dharmas with-knowing or without-knowing? If it has knowing, it is called mind and does not form a dharma. If it is without knowing, it does not belong to one's own mind, being equivalent to the mental capacity of another. Since one knows that neither of the two sense-bases has an intrinsic substance, the dharmas of the three natures—wholesome, unwholesome, and indeterminate—and the minds of the four kinds of mind-faculties, are all of the same nature; there is no distinction between that which conditions and what is conditioned. Mind and object are both empty. Therefore a treatise says: 'All that is discriminated is merely the discrimination of one's own mind; the mind does not see the mind, and no characteristics can be apprehended.' Then the principle of signlessness manifests, the feelings of constructed existence perish, and both the name and meaning of causes, conditions, and spontaneity are utterly extinguished. By extension, the form and mind of the ten sense-bases are also like this. In the text refuting the eighteen dhātus, it says: 'The Buddha told Ānanda: As you understand, mind and dharmas serve as conditions to produce the manovijñāna. Is this consciousness produced by cause of the mind, taking the mind as its dhātu, or produced by cause of dharmas, taking dharmas as its dhātu? Ānanda, if it is produced by cause of the mind, in your mind there must be something thought of to bring forth your mind. If there are no preceding dharmas, the mind has nothing from which to arise; apart from conditions it has no form—what would the consciousness use? Furthermore, is your conscious mind, together with the various deliberations and the cognising nature, the same or different? If it is the same as the mind, it is the mind itself—how could it be what is produced? If it is different from the mind and not the same, it should have no consciousness; if it has no consciousness, how could it be produced from the mind? If it has consciousness, how could consciousness be the mind? Only sameness and difference: neither of the two natures is established—how could the dhātu be posited? If it is produced by cause of dharmas, the various worldly dharmas are not separate from the five dusts. You observe the dharmas of form, and the dharmas of sound, smell, taste, and tangibles: their characteristics are distinct and correspond to the five sense-faculties; they are not subsumed by the mind. If your consciousness is definitely produced in reliance on dharmas, you should now contemplate carefully: what is the shape of the dharma-dharmas? If separated from form and emptiness, movement and stillness, permeability and blockage, union and separation, production and cessation, going beyond these various characteristics, nothing whatsoever can be apprehended. When produced, form, emptiness, and all dharmas are equally produced; when ceasing, form, emptiness, and all dharmas equally cease. Since that which is the cause does not exist, when a consciousness is produced by that cause, what shape and characteristic does it have? If characteristics do not exist, how can the dhātu arise? Therefore you should know: mind and dharmas serving as conditions to produce the manovijñāna-dhātu—all three places do not exist. Thus the mind, dharmas, and the mind-dhātu—these three—are originally neither causes and conditions nor spontaneous nature.' Explanation: This refutes the manovijñāna-dhātu. Within the eighteen dhātus, all are established on the basis of the manovijñāna. If the root where they are established is already empty, how could the produced branches exist? Since no location can be found, nor any boundary to rely upon, phenomena deceive and principle is empty; sentiments collapse and attachments weaken. The roots and trunks of evil views are completely uprooted; the nest and den of false consciousness simultaneously collapse. The true mind alone shines brightly, completely pervading the dharmadhātu. Anguo said: 'This means that the dhātus of the five dusts—form and so forth—are objects of direct perception. When the five consciousnesses directly experience them, there are no dust-characteristics at all. In the tathāgatagarbha, the body and the receptacle[-world] appear suddenly without dust-characteristics. The sixth and seventh [consciousnesses] give rise to false thoughts, supposing that there are self and dharmas; the characteristics manifested by thought are transformations of discrimination. The transformed characteristics of discrimination can only serve as objects, but have no real function. Just as when the sun sends forth rays bearing fine dust particles, they appear red together, but are not truly red; or just as when water is clear and pure, holding thin clouds, it appears green together, but is not truly green. If one realizes the nature of the [tathāgata]garbha, one knows that the dust-objects are false.' Therefore we know that all dharmas merely arise from discrimination. Once discrimination is empty, how could names and characteristics exist? Now, the emptiness of persons is easy to comprehend, but the self of dharmas is difficult to eliminate. Failing to understand that dharmas arise following conditions, one clings to their having an intrinsic substance. As the Mahāyānasaṃgraha says: 'If one clings to the substance of dharmas as existent, this is called the attachment to the self of dharmas.' For instance, people of the two vehicles practice by relying on the coarse discriminative vastu-prativikalpa-vijñāna; they only comprehend that within dharmas there is no self, but do not know that the substance of dharmas is entirely empty. Hearing that all dharmas are empty, they give rise to great dread. Hence we know that the emptiness of dharmas is the root, and the emptiness of persons is the branch. When the rope in the night is not yet understood, how could the thought of a snake be removed? While the cataracts in the eyes still remain, how could the flowers in the sky vanish? In the text refuting the natures of the seven great elements, it says: 'The Buddha told Ānanda: The nature of consciousness has no origin; it falsely issues forth due to the six kinds of sense-faculties and dusts. You now observe all the noble assembly in this gathering.'

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