宗鏡錄 69.33.3

69.33.3

名覺知性。 此覺知性。 因前塵起。 畢竟無體。 以妄知強覺。 成內眾生。 因滅想凝空。 為外國土。 經云。 想澄成國土。 知覺乃眾生。 迷湛寂一心。 作內六入。 更無別體。 唯是真空。 意入既虛。 前眼等五入亦爾。 破十二處文云。 佛告阿難。 汝常意中。 所緣善惡無記三性。 生成法。 則此法為復即心所生。 為當離心別有方所。 阿難。 若即心者。 法則非塵。 非心所緣。 云何成處。 若離於心別有方所。 則法自性。 為知非知。 知則名心。 異汝非塵。 同他心量。 即汝即心。 云何汝心。 更二於汝。 若非知者。 此塵既非色聲香味。 離合冷煖。 及虛空相。 當知何在。 今於色空。 都無表示。 不應人間。 更有空外。 心非所緣。 處從誰立。 是故當知。 法則與心。 俱無處所。 則意與法。 二俱虛妄。 本非因緣。 非自然性。 釋曰。 此破意法二處也。 夫分能標所構畫成持。 立境立心。 皆是意法。 先破其分別惑本。 則前五根十處自傾。 法處是所緣。 意處是能緣。 只如法處。 為復即心不即心。 若即心者。 法則全心。 心不見心。 云何成。 處若離於心別有。 方所。 則法之自性。 為有知無知。 若有知。 則名心。 不成於法。 若無知。 則不屬自心。 同他心量。 以知二處。 俱無自體。 則善惡無記三性等法。 四種意根等心。 皆同一性。 無有能緣所緣之異。 心境皆空。 故論云。 凡所分別。 皆分別自心。 心不見心。 無相可得。 則無相理現。 有作情亡。 因緣自然。 名義俱絕。 例十處色心。 亦復如是。 破十八界文云。 佛告阿難。 汝所明意法為緣。 生於意識。 此識為復因意所生。 以意為界。 因法所生。 以法為界。 阿難。 若因意生。 於汝意中。 必有所思。 發明汝意。 若無前法。 意無所生。 離緣無形。 識將何用。 又汝識心。 與諸思量。 兼了別性。 為同為異。 同意即意。 云何所生。 異意不同。 應無所識。 若無所識。 云何意生。 若有所識。 云何識意。 唯同與異。 二性無成。 界云何立。 若因法生。 世間諸法。 不離五塵。 汝觀色法及諸聲法。 香。 法味法及與觸法。 相狀分明。 以對五根。 非意所攝。 汝識決定依於法生。 汝今諦觀。 法法何狀。 若離色空。 動靜。 通塞。 合離。 生滅。 越此諸相。 終無所得。 生則色空。 諸法等生。 滅則色空。 諸法等滅。 所因既無。 因生有識。 作何形相。 相狀不有。 界云何生。 是故當知。 意法為緣。 生意識界。 三處都無。 則意與法。 及意界三。 本非因緣。 非自然性。 釋曰。 此破意識界也。 如十八界中。 皆因意識建立。 根本立處尚空。 所生枝末何有。 既無處所可得。 又無界分可憑。 事誑理。 虛情危執劣。 惡見之根株盡拔。 妄識之巢穴齊傾。 獨朗真心。 圓周法界。 安國云。 謂色等五塵界。 是限量境。 五識親證。 都無塵相。 如來藏中頓現身器無塵相。 六七妄想。 謂有我法。 想所現相。 是分別變。 分別變相。 但可為境。 而無實用。 如日發焰帶微塵而共紅。 非實紅也。 如水澄清。 含輕雲而俱綠。 非實綠也。 若了藏性。 則知塵境而為妄也。 故知諸法但從分別而生。 分別既空。 名相何有。 夫人空易了。 法我難除。 不達法逐緣生。 執有自體。 如攝論云。 若執法體是有。 名法我執。 如二乘人。 依麁分別事識修行。 但了法中無我。 不知法體全空。 聞諸法空。 生大怖畏。 是知法空是本。 人空是末。 夜繩未曉。 蛇想寧除。 瞖目猶存。 空華豈滅。 破七大性文云。 佛告阿難。 識性無原。 因於六種根塵妄出。 汝今遍觀此會聖眾。

is named the nature of awareness and cognition. This nature of awareness and cognition arises due to the anterior dusts [of sense objects], and is ultimately without substance. Through false cognition and forced awareness, internal sentient beings are formed; due to the cessation of thought and the condensation of emptiness, external lands are formed. A sūtra says: 'Thoughts settled and clear form lands; knowing and awareness are sentient beings.' Deluded about the serene and tranquil One Mind, [beings] construct the internal six sense-entrances; there is no separate substance whatsoever, they are solely true emptiness. Since the entrance of the mind is empty, the preceding five entrances—the eye and so forth—are also like this. In the text refuting the twelve sense-bases, it says: 'The Buddha told Ānanda: In your mind, that which is conditioned by the three natures—wholesome, unwholesome, and indeterminate—generates dharmas. Then are these dharmas produced by being identical to the mind, or do they have a separate location apart from the mind? Ānanda, if they are identical to the mind, then dharmas are not dust [objects]; not being what is conditioned by the mind, how could they form a sense-base? If they are apart from the mind and have a separate location, then is the intrinsic nature of dharmas knowing or non-knowing? If it is knowing, it is called mind; being different from you, it is not an object-dust, but is equivalent to the mental capacity of another; being identical to you, it is identical to your mind—how then could your mind be further doubled apart from you? If it is non-knowing, then since this dust is neither form, sound, smell, taste, separation and union, cold and warmth, nor the characteristic of empty space, where should it be known to reside? Now within form and emptiness it has no manifestation at all; it should not be that in the human realm there is yet something outside of emptiness. If it is not what is conditioned by the mind, on what basis is the sense-base established? Therefore you should know that dharmas and the mind both lack a location; thus the mind and dharmas are both false, originally neither causes and conditions nor spontaneous nature.' Explanation: This refutes the two sense-bases of the mind and dharmas. In dividing that which can mark and designating what is constructed, projecting and maintaining, establishing object and establishing mind—all are mind and dharmas. If one first refutes the root of their discriminative delusion, the preceding five sense-faculties and ten sense-bases will naturally collapse. The dharma sense-base is what is conditioned; the mind sense-base is that which conditions. Just take the dharma sense-base: is it identical to the mind, or not identical to the mind? If it is identical to the mind, then dharmas are entirely mind; the mind does not see the mind, so how could it form a sense-base? If it is apart from the mind and has a separate location, then is the intrinsic nature of dharmas with-knowing or without-knowing? If it has knowing, it is called mind and does not form a dharma. If it is without knowing, it does not belong to one's own mind, being equivalent to the mental capacity of another. Since one knows that neither of the two sense-bases has an intrinsic substance, the dharmas of the three natures—wholesome, unwholesome, and indeterminate—and the minds of the four kinds of mind-faculties, are all of the same nature; there is no distinction between that which conditions and what is conditioned. Mind and object are both empty. Therefore a treatise says: 'All that is discriminated is merely the discrimination of one's own mind; the mind does not see the mind, and no characteristics can be apprehended.' Then the principle of signlessness manifests, the feelings of constructed existence perish, and both the name and meaning of causes, conditions, and spontaneity are utterly extinguished. By extension, the form and mind of the ten sense-bases are also like this. In the text refuting the eighteen dhātus, it says: 'The Buddha told Ānanda: As you understand, mind and dharmas serve as conditions to produce the manovijñāna. Is this consciousness produced by cause of the mind, taking the mind as its dhātu, or produced by cause of dharmas, taking dharmas as its dhātu? Ānanda, if it is produced by cause of the mind, in your mind there must be something thought of to bring forth your mind. If there are no preceding dharmas, the mind has nothing from which to arise; apart from conditions it has no form—what would the consciousness use? Furthermore, is your conscious mind, together with the various deliberations and the cognising nature, the same or different? If it is the same as the mind, it is the mind itself—how could it be what is produced? If it is different from the mind and not the same, it should have no consciousness; if it has no consciousness, how could it be produced from the mind? If it has consciousness, how could consciousness be the mind? Only sameness and difference: neither of the two natures is established—how could the dhātu be posited? If it is produced by cause of dharmas, the various worldly dharmas are not separate from the five dusts. You observe the dharmas of form, and the dharmas of sound, smell, taste, and tangibles: their characteristics are distinct and correspond to the five sense-faculties; they are not subsumed by the mind. If your consciousness is definitely produced in reliance on dharmas, you should now contemplate carefully: what is the shape of the dharma-dharmas? If separated from form and emptiness, movement and stillness, permeability and blockage, union and separation, production and cessation, going beyond these various characteristics, nothing whatsoever can be apprehended. When produced, form, emptiness, and all dharmas are equally produced; when ceasing, form, emptiness, and all dharmas equally cease. Since that which is the cause does not exist, when a consciousness is produced by that cause, what shape and characteristic does it have? If characteristics do not exist, how can the dhātu arise? Therefore you should know: mind and dharmas serving as conditions to produce the manovijñāna-dhātu—all three places do not exist. Thus the mind, dharmas, and the mind-dhātu—these three—are originally neither causes and conditions nor spontaneous nature.' Explanation: This refutes the manovijñāna-dhātu. Within the eighteen dhātus, all are established on the basis of the manovijñāna. If the root where they are established is already empty, how could the produced branches exist? Since no location can be found, nor any boundary to rely upon, phenomena deceive and principle is empty; sentiments collapse and attachments weaken. The roots and trunks of evil views are completely uprooted; the nest and den of false consciousness simultaneously collapse. The true mind alone shines brightly, completely pervading the dharmadhātu. Anguo said: 'This means that the dhātus of the five dusts—form and so forth—are objects of direct perception. When the five consciousnesses directly experience them, there are no dust-characteristics at all. In the tathāgatagarbha, the body and the receptacle[-world] appear suddenly without dust-characteristics. The sixth and seventh [consciousnesses] give rise to false thoughts, supposing that there are self and dharmas; the characteristics manifested by thought are transformations of discrimination. The transformed characteristics of discrimination can only serve as objects, but have no real function. Just as when the sun sends forth rays bearing fine dust particles, they appear red together, but are not truly red; or just as when water is clear and pure, holding thin clouds, it appears green together, but is not truly green. If one realizes the nature of the [tathāgata]garbha, one knows that the dust-objects are false.' Therefore we know that all dharmas merely arise from discrimination. Once discrimination is empty, how could names and characteristics exist? Now, the emptiness of persons is easy to comprehend, but the self of dharmas is difficult to eliminate. Failing to understand that dharmas arise following conditions, one clings to their having an intrinsic substance. As the Mahāyānasaṃgraha says: 'If one clings to the substance of dharmas as existent, this is called the attachment to the self of dharmas.' For instance, people of the two vehicles practice by relying on the coarse discriminative vastu-prativikalpa-vijñāna; they only comprehend that within dharmas there is no self, but do not know that the substance of dharmas is entirely empty. Hearing that all dharmas are empty, they give rise to great dread. Hence we know that the emptiness of dharmas is the root, and the emptiness of persons is the branch. When the rope in the night is not yet understood, how could the thought of a snake be removed? While the cataracts in the eyes still remain, how could the flowers in the sky vanish? In the text refuting the natures of the seven great elements, it says: 'The Buddha told Ānanda: The nature of consciousness has no origin; it falsely issues forth due to the six kinds of sense-faculties and dusts. You now observe all the noble assembly in this gathering.'