宗鏡錄 8.5.1

8.5.1

Answer: If they had an intrinsic nature, not a single phenomenon would be established. Because they lack intrinsic nature, all conditions are established together. Within the lack of intrinsic nature, both existence and non-existence are unobtainable; how then could it lead to the views of annihilationism or eternalism? As the Mahāprajñāpāramitāsūtra says: 'All bodhisattva-mahāsattvas are extremely rare. Practicing the profound prajñāpāramitā, they contemplate the two emptynesses. Although they know that all phenomena are entirely like a dream, like an echo, like an image, like a shadow, like a mirage, like an illusion, like a phantom, all not truly existent, having no intrinsic nature as their nature, and their own characteristics are all empty, yet they can establish the distinctions of all phenomena, such as good and non-good, all without confusion.' It also says: 'Subhūti said to the Buddha: "World-Honoured One, the Buddha states that all phenomena have no intrinsic nature as their intrinsic nature. If all phenomena have no intrinsic nature as their intrinsic nature, who is defiled and who is purified? Who is bound and who is liberated? Because people do not comprehend defilement and purification, and bondage and liberation, they break the precepts, break right view, break deportment, and break pure livelihood; they will fall into the hells, animals, and ghost realms, undergoing all manner of severe suffering." Up to where the Buddha said: "Subhūti, excellent, excellent! So it is, so it is. Just as you say, all phenomena take the lack of intrinsic nature as their intrinsic nature. Within intrinsic nature, both having an intrinsic nature and lacking an intrinsic nature are unobtainable. One should not grasp at either existence or non-existence here."' Therefore we know that one can neither grasp at existence nor grasp at non-existence, because within intrinsic nature, there is neither existence nor non-existence. The teachings spoken regarding existence and non-existence are all skillful means to break attachment and enter into the Dharma. Hence an earlier master of virtue said: 'Using the unobtainable as an expedient means has two aspects: First, by using the unobtainable, it guides what was previously accompanied by characteristics, so that wading into existence one is not confused by emptiness; this serves as an expedient means for entering existence. Second, one borrows the unobtainable to enter existence without holding onto the unobtainable; thus the unobtainable itself is also an expedient means; this serves as an expedient means for entering emptiness. For this reason, with no-attainment, characteristics are empty; with no-maker, the person is empty; with no limit, the nature is empty. When these three characteristics are exhausted, the principle of the dharmadhātu manifests.' Thus the bodhisattva does not destroy emptiness yet is constantly existent—the phenomena of defilement and purification are distinct; and does not obstruct existence yet is constantly empty—the path of the one reality is ever-manifest. Illumining both in this way, one only then enters what is profound. As the Prajñāpradīpaśāstra says: 'When I speak of negating the entry into existence, it is negating that there is an inherent substance; it is not stating that there is no substance. As a verse in the Laṅkāvatārasūtra says: / Existence and non-existence are both extremes, / Up to wherever the mind proceeds. / When that mental proceeding has ceased, / It is called the cessation of the true mind.' The commentary says: 'In this way, one does not cling to an existing substance, nor does one cling to a non-existing substance. If a phenomenon had no substance, then there would not be a single thing that could be made. Also, as a verse says: / Refuting existence, one speaks of non-existence, / Because one does not grasp at non-existence. / Just as refuting blue is "not blue", / One does not wish to say it is white.' The commentary says: 'These two kinds of views are called unwholesome. Therefore, one who possesses wisdom, wishing to still conceptual proliferation and attain the bliss of remainderless [nirvāṇa], must refute these two kinds of evil views. Furthermore, how is this so? Whether subsumed by the three realms or transcendent of the world, whether wholesome, unwholesome, neutral, and so forth, like the seeds of worldly truth and all that is undertaken: if they had an inherent substance in the ultimate truth, then rousing diligent expedients and committing wholesome and unwholesome actions—all these karma-actions—would be empty and without fruit. Why is this? Because they would already exist beforehand. For example, just as a vase, cloth, and so forth already existed beforehand. In this way, the happy would always be happy, and the suffering would always be suffering. Like painted figures on a wall, their shapes, sizes, and deportments would have unchanging characteristics. All sentient beings would also be like this. Furthermore, if they lacked an inherent substance, then those [actions] subsumed by the three realms or transcendent of the world, wholesome and unwholesome phenomena, rousing diligent expedients would be empty and without fruit, because they would not exist. In this way, the world would fall into annihilationism. For example, it is like grinding and polishing a hare's horn to make it sharp—in the end, it can never be attained. Therefore, the verse says: / Those of inferior wisdom see phenomena / As either existent or non-existent and so forth; / Those persons do not see / The ultimate truth that ceases views.' Furthermore, as in the Ratnarāśisūtra, the Buddha told Kāśyapa: 'Existence is one extreme; non-existence is one extreme. In this way, that internal earth element and the external earth element are both without duality. All Buddha-tathāgatas realize and know this with true wisdom, attaining complete awakening to the non-dual single characteristic, which is called characteristiclessness.' Therefore, an earlier master of virtue said: 'What the various schools propound mostly says that only the intrinsic nature is empty, but phenomena are not empty. For example, the Faxiang school only holds that the parikalpita is non-existent, not that the paratantra is non-existent. Those who mistakenly study the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā and the like without grasping the intent also say: "Phenomena lack an intrinsic nature, therefore they are said to be empty"—in which case the present characteristics would not be empty. Now, since there is no intrinsic nature, they exist through dependent origination; the existent substance is immediately empty. Arising through conditions without intrinsic nature, they are therefore empty; empty, yet constantly existent. Only when they mutually interpenetrate are they true emptiness and wondrous existence. Therefore, their words are largely the same, but their purports differ.' Moreover, regarding the teaching of conditioned origination, there are two aspects: First, characteristiclessness like space, which completely sweeps away everything so that nothing exists; this is the emptiness of characteristics. Second, lack of intrinsic nature like an illusion, whereby karmic fruits are never lost; this is the emptiness of nature. Because characteristics are empty, the myriad phenomena are hollow in substance and entirely unobtainable. Because nature is empty, the path of karma is not destroyed and cause and effect are distinct. Only through these two emptynesses of nature and characteristics is the principle of true emptiness established. Thus, it is not the limits of beginning, middle, and end, yet beginning and end are distinct; there is no person who can act, yet retribution is not lost. Therefore we know that the principle of no intrinsic nature is established, the Dharma-eye completely illumines, and not a single phenomenon has a real root or origin. Now, citing further evidence to broadly clarify this, completing the Mirror of the Source: As for the two truths of ultimate and conventional, all phenomena do not go beyond emptiness and existence. The phenomena of emptiness and existence both arise from conditions. Phenomena that arise from conditions fundamentally lack inherent substance; manifesting based on citta, they are entirely without intrinsic nature. Arising through conditions, they are therefore without intrinsic nature; being without intrinsic nature, they therefore arise through conditions. Through these two gates of conditions and nature, the myriad phenomena are uniformly equal. Therefore, the Huayan commentary broadly explains: 'Because they arise from conditions, they exist—this is the meaning of existence; because they lack intrinsic nature, they are empty.'