宗鏡錄 8.5.2

8.5.2

is the meaning of emptiness. The two meanings are the reasons for emptiness and existence. That is, 'because of having no nature, it exists' is the reason for existence; 'because of arising from conditions, it is empty' is the reason for emptiness. The reason is precisely causes and conditions. That is, why is it that having no nature can establish the meaning of emptiness? Because it arises from conditions, therefore it has no nature; hence arising from conditions is the reason for natureless emptiness. Why is it that arising from conditions can constitute the meaning of existence? Purely because it has no fixed nature, it only then comes to form illusory existence from conditions; therefore having no nature is the reason for existence. Hence a verse in the Madhyamakaśāstra says: 'If someone does not know emptiness, does not know the causes and conditions of emptiness, and does not know the meaning of emptiness, they therefore create afflictions for themselves, like being unskillful in magical spells or unskillful in grasping a poisonous snake.' If one looks at these four phrases collectively in relation to emptiness and existence, they are all called 'reasons'. Therefore it is said: 'Because of arising from conditions, it is called existence; because of arising from conditions, it is called emptiness. Because of having no nature, it is called existence; because of having no nature, it is called emptiness.' Truly, all dharmas must arise from conditions. Because they exist from conditions, they must lack self-nature. Because they have no nature, they therefore arise from conditions. Conditioned existence and naturelessness are never two different dharmas. Yet, with regard to illusory existence, the myriad kinds are distinct; therefore it is called conventional truth. Because having no nature is of one single flavor, it is called ultimate truth. Furthermore, as to why, among the four phrases, only the third phrase was cited to provide proof: it is because 'due to having no nature, it exists' is a principle difficult to make clear. If one were to provide complete proofs: First, regarding 'arising from conditions, therefore it exists': The Lotus Sūtra says: 'They exist only through causes and conditions; they are spoken of as arising from inversion.' The Vimalakīrtinirdeśa says: 'Through causes and conditions all dharmas arise.' A verse in the Madhyamakaśāstra says: 'There has never been a single dharma that does not arise from causes and conditions,' and so forth—these are all the meaning of 'existence due to causes and conditions.' Second, regarding 'arising from conditions, therefore it is empty': A sūtra says: 'What is born of causes and conditions has no birth.' A verse in a śāstra says: 'If a dharma arises from conditions, then it lacks self-nature. If it lacks self-nature, how can this dharma exist?' Furthermore, a verse says: 'Because the meaning of emptiness exists, all dharmas can be established.' Because in the preceding chapters of that treatise, existence was refuted through emptiness, the Hīnayāna posed an objection to the Bodhisattva, saying: 'If all dharmas are without arising and without cessation, then the dharmas of the Four Noble Truths would not exist.' The Bodhisattva replied conversely, saying: 'If all were not empty, being without arising and without cessation, then the dharmas of the Four Noble Truths would not exist.' That is to say, the Hīnayāna held that because of emptiness there are no Four Truths, while the Bodhisattva held that because of non-emptiness one would lose the Four Truths. If there is the meaning of emptiness, only then are the Four Truths established. Therefore the verse says: 'Because the meaning of emptiness exists, all dharmas can be established. If there were no meaning of emptiness, everything would not be established.' Furthermore, the Prajñāpāramitāsūtra says: 'If dharmas were not empty, then there would be neither path nor fruition.' This is precisely 'due to having no nature, it exists.' The Vimalakīrtinirdeśa says: 'Mañjuśrī asked further: "Saṃsāra is terrifying. Upon what should a bodhisattva rely?" Vimalakīrti said: "A bodhisattva amidst the fears of saṃsāra should rely on the power of the Tathāgata's merit." Mañjuśrī asked further: "If a bodhisattva wishes to rely on the power of the Tathāgata's merit, where should he abide?" He replied: "One who wishes to rely on the power of the Tathāgata's merit should abide in liberating all sentient beings." He asked further: "Wishing to liberate sentient beings, what should be eliminated?" He replied: "Wishing to liberate sentient beings, one eliminates their kleśas." He asked further: "Wishing to eliminate kleśas, what practice should be undertaken?" He replied: "Right mindfulness should be practiced." He asked further: "How does one practice right mindfulness?" He replied: "One should practice non-arising and non-cessation." He asked further: "What dharma does not arise, and what dharma does not cease?" He replied: "Unwholesome dharmas do not arise, and wholesome dharmas do not cease." He asked further: "What is the root of the wholesome and unwholesome?" He replied: "The body is the root." He asked further: "What is the root of the body?" He replied: "Craving and desire are the root." He asked further: "What is the root of craving and desire?" He replied: "False discrimination is the root." He asked further: "What is the root of false discrimination?" He replied: "Inverted notions are the root." He asked further: "What is the root of inverted notions?" He replied: "Non-abiding is the root." He asked further: "What is the root of non-abiding?" He replied: "Non-abiding has no root. Mañjuśrī, from this root of non-abiding all dharmas are established."' Master Sengrui explained: 'Non-abiding is another name for the real mark. The real mark is another name for the emptiness of nature. Therefore, from having no nature, all dharmas exist.' Furthermore, the Vimalakīrtinirdeśa says: 'Mañjuśrī said: "Householder, how should a sick bodhisattva subdue his mind?" Vimalakīrti said: "A sick bodhisattva should think: 'Now this illness of mine has all arisen from the false discrimination, inversion, and kleśas of previous lives; there is no real dharma, so who is it that experiences illness?' Why is this? Because the four great elements combine, it is provisionally named a 'body.' The four great elements have no master, and the body is also without self. Furthermore, that this illness arises is entirely due to grasping at a self; therefore, toward the self, one should not generate attachment. Having known the root of illness, one immediately eliminates the notion of a self and the notion of sentient beings, and should give rise to the notion of dharmas. One should think: 'It is merely that numerous dharmas combine to form this body. When it arises, only dharmas arise; when it ceases, only dharmas cease. Furthermore, these dharmas do not know one another; when arising, they do not say, "I arise," and when ceasing, they do not say, "I cease."' That sick bodhisattva, in order to extinguish the notion of dharmas, should think: 'This notion of dharmas is also an inversion. Inversion is a great calamity; I should abandon it.' How does one abandon it? One abandons the self and what belongs to the self. How does one abandon the self and what belongs to the self? That is, one abandons the two dharmas. How does one abandon the two dharmas? That is, by not being mindful of internal and external dharmas, and practicing equality. What is equality? It is that self is equal and nirvāṇa is equal. Why is this? Self and nirvāṇa—both of these are empty. Why are they empty? They are empty merely because of names. Since these two dharmas have no determinate nature, when one attains this equality, there is no other illness, only the illness of emptiness; and the illness of emptiness is also empty."' 'Because of having no nature and arising from conditions, it is empty'—this takes up both kinds of emptiness from the previous four phrases together.