弘明集 9.38

9.38

難曰。論云。人之質有知也。木之質無知也。豈不以人識涼燠知痛癢。養之則生。傷之則死耶。夫木亦然矣。當春則榮。在秋則悴。樹之必生拔之必死。何謂無知。今人之質猶如木也。神留則形立。神去則形廢。立也即是榮木。廢也即是枯木。子何以辯。此非神知而謂質有知乎。凡萬有皆以神知無以質知者也。但草木昆蟲之性。裁覺榮悴生死。生民之識則通安危利害。何謂非有如木之質以為形。又有異木之知以為神耶。此則形神有二居可別也。但木稟陰陽之偏風。人含一靈之精照。其識或同。其神則異矣。骨骸形骸之論死生授受之說。義既前定。事又不經。安用曲辯哉。

Objection: The treatise says that human material substance has sentience and wood's material substance lacks sentience. Is this not because humans recognize cold and warmth, feel pain and itching, live when nurtured, and die when harmed? But wood is also like this: in spring it flourishes, in autumn it withers; planted, it must live, uprooted, it must die. How can you call it insentient? Now human material substance is just like wood: when the spirit remains, the corporeal form stands; when the spirit departs, the corporeal form falls into ruin. Standing is the flourishing tree; falling into ruin is the withered tree. How do you argue that this is not the sentience of the spirit, but instead claim that the material substance has sentience? All of the myriad beings have sentience through the spirit; none have sentience through material substance. It is only that the nature of plants and insects barely perceives flourishing and withering, life and death, whereas the consciousness of living human beings comprehends security and danger, benefit and harm. Why say that humans do not have a material substance like wood to serve as corporeal form, and also have a sentience different from wood to serve as spirit? Thus corporeal form and spirit are two, and their dwelling places can be distinguished. It is simply that wood receives an uneven qi of yin and yang, while humans contain the refined illumination of a singular soul. Their perception may be alike, but their spirits are different. The debate on skeletal remains and physical bodies, and the discussion of the transmission of life and death, have already been determined in principle, and [your claims] are unprecedented in affairs. What is the use of your tortuous arguments?