翻譯名義集 6.35.3

6.35.3

或以七識為能相，第八識為所相），由此彼皆無（此見、相二分上，妄執彼實我法，二執是無，即由此見、相二分外，妄情執有心外我法之境，皆是無故），故一切唯識（唯遮境有，識簡心空。 將唯字遮薩婆多執心外有其實境，將識字簡清辨等執惡取空，破空有二邊，正處中道）。 」又，諸師所明，總有四分義：一、相分（一、實相名相，體即真如，是真實相故。 二、境相名相，為能與根心而為境故。 三、相狀名相，此唯有為法，有相狀故。 通影及質，唯是識之所變。 四、義相名相，即能詮下所詮義相分是。 此四相中，取後三相而為相分。 又相分有二：一識所頓變，即是本質。 二識等緣境，唯變影緣，不得本質），二、見分，《唯識論》云：於自所緣，有了別用（見分有五類，一、證見名見，即三根本智見分是。 二、照燭名見，此通根心俱有照燭義故。 三、能緣名見，即通內三分俱能緣故。 四、念解名見，以念解所詮義故。 五、推度名見，即比量心推度一切境故。 於此五種見中，除五色根及內外二分，餘皆見分所攝）。 三、自證分，謂能親證自見分、緣相分不謬，能作證故。 四、證自證分，謂能親證第三自證分、緣見分不謬故。 從所證處得名。 此四分義，鏡如自證分，鏡明如見分，鏡象如相分，鏡後弝（必罵）如證自證分。 此四分有四師立義：第一，安慧菩薩，立一分自證分。 《識論》云：「此自證分，從所緣生，是依他起故，故說為有。 見、相二分，不從緣生，因遍計心妄執而有。 如是二分，情有理無。 唯自證分，是依他起性，有種子生，是實有故。 見、相二分是無，更變起我法二執又是無，以無似無。 若準護法菩薩，即是以有似無。 見、相二分，是有體； 變起我法二執，是無體。 故安慧引《楞伽》云：『三界有漏心心所，皆是虛妄分別為自性。 』故知八識見、相二分，皆是遍計妄執有故。 唯有自證一分，是依他起性，是實有故。 」二、難陀論師，立二分成唯識。 初標宗者，即一切心生，皆有見、相二分。 見、相二分，是能所二緣也。 若無相分牽心，心法無由得生； 若無能緣見分，誰知有所緣相分耶？ 即有境有心等成唯識也。 見分為能變，相分是所變，能所得成，須具二分。 見分相分，是依他起性。 有時緣獨影境，即同種生，有時緣帶質境，即別種生，故非遍計也。 若不許者，諸佛不應現身土等種種影像也。 三、陳那菩薩立三分。 安慧立一分，但有體而無用； 難陀立見、相二分，但有用而無體，皆互不足。 立理者，謂立量果義。 論云：能量，所量，量果，別故，相見必有所依體故。 相分為所量，見分為能量，即要自證分為證者，是量果也。 喻尺量絹，絹為所量，尺人為能量，記數之智名為量果。 今見分、緣相分不錯，皆由自證分為作果故。 今眼識見分緣青時，定不緣黃，如見分緣不曾見境。 忽然緣黃境時，定不緣青，若無自證分，即見分不能自記憶。 故知須立三分。 若無自證分，即相、見亦無。 若言有二分者，即須定有自證分。 《集量論》頌云：「似境相所量，能取相自證。 」釋云：「似境相所量者，即相分似外境現。 能取相自證者，即是見分能取相分。 故自證即是體也。 」四，護法菩薩立四分。 立宗者，心心所若細分別，應有四分。 立理者，若無第四分，將何法與第三分為量果耶？ 汝陳那立三分者，為見分有能量了境用故，即將自證分為量果。 汝自證分亦有能量照境故，即將何法與能量自證分為量果耶？ 即須將第四證自證分，為第三分量果也。 引《密嚴經》云：「眾生心二性，內外一切分（內一分為一性，見、相二分為第二性，即心境內外二性），所取能取纏（能緣麤動是能緣見分，所取是所緣相縛也），見種種差別（見分通三量，故言種種差別）。 」夫為量果，須是現量，方為量果。

Or taking the seventh consciousness as the defining characteristic and the eighth consciousness as what is characterized.) "Therefore, both are nonexistent" (On these two aspects of seeing and seen, the false grasping of real self and phenomena—both graspings are nonexistent; that is, apart from these two aspects of seeing and seen, the realms of self and phenomena outside the mind falsely grasped by deluded sentiment are entirely nonexistent). "Therefore, everything is consciousness-only" (Only consciousness refutes the existence of external objects; 'consciousness' excludes the emptiness of mind. Using the word 'only' refutes the Sarvāstivādin grasp of real external objects outside the mind; using the word 'consciousness' excludes Bhāviveka and others who grasp at a pernicious emptiness. It dismantles the two extremes of emptiness and existence, properly abiding in the Middle Way.) Furthermore, what the various masters have clarified generally comprises the doctrine of the four aspects: First is the aspect of the seen (nimittabhāga) (1. The real mark is called 'aspect': its substance is precisely Suchness (tathatā), because it is the real mark. 2. The objective mark is called 'aspect', because it can serve as the objective realm for the sense faculties and mind. 3. The appearance is called 'aspect': this applies only to conditioned phenomena, because they possess appearances. It encompasses both shadow-images and underlying substances, which are solely transformations of consciousness. 4. The semantic mark is called 'aspect': that is, the semantic aspect that is signified beneath the signifying expression. Among these four aspects, the latter three are taken as the aspect of the seen. Moreover, the aspect of the seen is twofold: one is that which consciousness transforms abruptly, which is the underlying substance; the other is when consciousness and so forth cognize an object, it only transforms a shadow-image to cognize, unable to grasp the underlying substance). Second is the aspect of seeing (darśanabhāga). The Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi says: With respect to its own cognized object, it has the function of discerning (The aspect of seeing has five categories: 1. Seeing as realization is called 'seeing', which is the aspect of seeing of the three fundamental wisdoms. 2. Illuminating is called 'seeing', because both the sense faculties and the mind possess the meaning of illumination. 3. Being the cognizing subject is called 'seeing', because all three internal aspects are capable of cognizing. 4. Remembering and understanding is called 'seeing', because one remembers and understands the signified meaning. 5. Inferential deliberation is called 'seeing', which is the mind of inferential valid cognition deliberating all realms. Among these five kinds of seeing, excluding the five physical faculties and the two inner and outer aspects, the remainder are all subsumed under the aspect of seeing). Third is the aspect of self-awareness (svasaṃvittibhāga), meaning that which can directly realize that its own aspect of seeing cognizes the aspect of the seen without error, because it is capable of serving as a witness. Fourth is the aspect of awareness of self-awareness (svasaṃvitti-saṃvittibhāga), meaning that which can directly realize the third aspect of self-awareness cognizing the aspect of seeing without error. It takes its name from what it realizes. As for the meaning of these four aspects: the mirror itself is like the aspect of self-awareness; the mirror's clarity is like the aspect of seeing; the reflections in the mirror are like the aspect of the seen; and the back handle of the mirror (bì mà) is like the aspect of awareness of self-awareness. Regarding these four aspects, four masters established their doctrines: First, Bodhisattva Sthiramati established the single aspect of self-awareness. The Treatise on Consciousness says: "This aspect of self-awareness arises from conditions and is of other-dependent nature (paratantra); therefore, it is said to exist. The two aspects of seeing and seen do not arise from conditions, but exist due to the false grasping of the conceptualizing mind. These two aspects exist in deluded sentiment but are nonexistent in principle. Only the aspect of self-awareness is of other-dependent nature, born from seeds, and is truly existent. The two aspects of seeing and seen are nonexistent, and the further transformed grasping of self and phenomena is likewise nonexistent; thus, nonexistence resembles nonexistence. If following Bodhisattva Dharmapāla, then existence resembles nonexistence. The two aspects of seeing and seen have substantial entity; the transformed graspings of self and phenomena lack substantial entity. Therefore Sthiramati cited the Laṅkāvatāra: 'The defiled minds and mental factors of the three realms all have false conceptualization as their intrinsic nature.' Hence we know that the two aspects of seeing and seen in the eight consciousnesses all exist through the false grasping of the imagined nature. Only the single aspect of self-awareness is of other-dependent nature and is truly existent." Second, the Master Nanda established two aspects to constitute consciousness-only. In setting forth his thesis: whenever any mind arises, it invariably possesses the two aspects of seeing and seen. The two aspects of seeing and seen are the cognizing subject condition and the cognized object condition. If there were no aspect of the seen to pull the mind, mental factors would have no way to arise; if there were no aspect of seeing as the cognizing subject, who would know that there is an aspect of the seen as the cognized object? Thus, having both object and mind constitutes consciousness-only. The aspect of seeing is that which transforms, and the aspect of the seen is what is transformed; for subject and object to be established, both aspects must be present. The aspect of seeing and the aspect of the seen are both of other-dependent nature. Sometimes cognizing a solitary shadow-image, they arise from the same seed; sometimes cognizing an object with underlying substance, they arise from distinct seeds; thus they are not the imagined nature. If one does not accept this, the Buddhas should not manifest various reflected images such as bodies and lands. Third, Bodhisattva Dignāga established three aspects. Sthiramati established one aspect, having only entity but lacking function; Nanda established the two aspects of seeing and seen, having only function but lacking entity; both are mutually deficient. As for the establishing logic, it refers to establishing the meaning of the result of valid cognition (pramāṇa-phala). The treatise says: because the means of valid cognition (pramāṇa), the object of valid cognition (prameya), and the result of valid cognition (pramāṇaphala) are distinct, the seen and the seeing must have a substantial entity upon which they rely. The aspect of the seen is the object of valid cognition, and the aspect of seeing is the means of valid cognition; thus one requires the aspect of self-awareness to verify it, which is the result of valid cognition. By analogy, a ruler measuring silk: the silk is the object of measurement, the person with the ruler is the means of measurement, and the knowledge of recording the number is called the result of measurement. Now, that the aspect of seeing cognizes the aspect of the seen without error is entirely because the aspect of self-awareness acts as the result. Now, when the aspect of seeing of the eye consciousness cognizes blue, it definitely does not cognize yellow, like the aspect of seeing cognizing an unseen object. When it suddenly cognizes a yellow object, it definitely does not cognize blue; if there were no aspect of self-awareness, the aspect of seeing would not be able to remember itself. Therefore, we know that three aspects must be established. If there were no aspect of self-awareness, the seen and the seeing would also be nonexistent. If one asserts that there are two aspects, then there must definitively be the aspect of self-awareness. The verse of the Pramāṇasamuccaya states: 'The cognized object resembles the form of the external object; that which grasps the form is self-awareness.' The commentary explains: 'The cognized object resembling the form of the external object' means the aspect of the seen manifests resembling an external object. 'That which grasps the form is self-awareness' means the aspect of seeing can grasp the aspect of the seen. Therefore, self-awareness is precisely the substance. Fourth, Bodhisattva Dharmapāla established four aspects. Setting forth the thesis: if minds and mental factors are finely analyzed, they should possess four aspects. Setting forth the logic: if there were no fourth aspect, what phenomenon would serve as the result of valid cognition for the third aspect? You, Dignāga, established three aspects because the aspect of seeing has the function of acting as the means of valid cognition to discern objects, and you thus took the aspect of self-awareness as the result of valid cognition. Your aspect of self-awareness also possesses the capacity of a means of valid cognition to illuminate objects; therefore, what phenomenon would serve as the result of valid cognition for the aspect of self-awareness as the means of valid cognition? Thus one must take the fourth aspect, awareness of self-awareness, as the result of valid cognition for the third aspect. He cited the Ghanavyūha Sūtra: 'The minds of sentient beings have two natures, all divisions inner and outer (the one inner division is one nature, and the two divisions of seeing and seen are the second nature, which are the inner and outer natures of mind and object), entangled by the grasped and the grasper (the coarse activity of the cognizing subject is the aspect of seeing as the grasper; the grasped is the bondage to the cognized aspect), seeing manifold distinctions (the aspect of seeing encompasses the three kinds of valid cognition, hence it is said to have manifold distinctions).' Now, to be a result of valid cognition, it must be direct perception (pratyakṣa) before it can serve as a result of valid cognition.