翻譯名義集 6.35.3

6.35.3

Or taking the seventh consciousness as the defining characteristic and the eighth consciousness as what is characterized.) "Therefore, both are nonexistent" (On these two aspects of seeing and seen, the false grasping of real self and phenomena—both graspings are nonexistent; that is, apart from these two aspects of seeing and seen, the realms of self and phenomena outside the mind falsely grasped by deluded sentiment are entirely nonexistent). "Therefore, everything is consciousness-only" (Only consciousness refutes the existence of external objects; 'consciousness' excludes the emptiness of mind. Using the word 'only' refutes the Sarvāstivādin grasp of real external objects outside the mind; using the word 'consciousness' excludes Bhāviveka and others who grasp at a pernicious emptiness. It dismantles the two extremes of emptiness and existence, properly abiding in the Middle Way.) Furthermore, what the various masters have clarified generally comprises the doctrine of the four aspects: First is the aspect of the seen (nimittabhāga) (1. The real mark is called 'aspect': its substance is precisely Suchness (tathatā), because it is the real mark. 2. The objective mark is called 'aspect', because it can serve as the objective realm for the sense faculties and mind. 3. The appearance is called 'aspect': this applies only to conditioned phenomena, because they possess appearances. It encompasses both shadow-images and underlying substances, which are solely transformations of consciousness. 4. The semantic mark is called 'aspect': that is, the semantic aspect that is signified beneath the signifying expression. Among these four aspects, the latter three are taken as the aspect of the seen. Moreover, the aspect of the seen is twofold: one is that which consciousness transforms abruptly, which is the underlying substance; the other is when consciousness and so forth cognize an object, it only transforms a shadow-image to cognize, unable to grasp the underlying substance). Second is the aspect of seeing (darśanabhāga). The Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi says: With respect to its own cognized object, it has the function of discerning (The aspect of seeing has five categories: 1. Seeing as realization is called 'seeing', which is the aspect of seeing of the three fundamental wisdoms. 2. Illuminating is called 'seeing', because both the sense faculties and the mind possess the meaning of illumination. 3. Being the cognizing subject is called 'seeing', because all three internal aspects are capable of cognizing. 4. Remembering and understanding is called 'seeing', because one remembers and understands the signified meaning. 5. Inferential deliberation is called 'seeing', which is the mind of inferential valid cognition deliberating all realms. Among these five kinds of seeing, excluding the five physical faculties and the two inner and outer aspects, the remainder are all subsumed under the aspect of seeing). Third is the aspect of self-awareness (svasaṃvittibhāga), meaning that which can directly realize that its own aspect of seeing cognizes the aspect of the seen without error, because it is capable of serving as a witness. Fourth is the aspect of awareness of self-awareness (svasaṃvitti-saṃvittibhāga), meaning that which can directly realize the third aspect of self-awareness cognizing the aspect of seeing without error. It takes its name from what it realizes. As for the meaning of these four aspects: the mirror itself is like the aspect of self-awareness; the mirror's clarity is like the aspect of seeing; the reflections in the mirror are like the aspect of the seen; and the back handle of the mirror (bì mà) is like the aspect of awareness of self-awareness. Regarding these four aspects, four masters established their doctrines: First, Bodhisattva Sthiramati established the single aspect of self-awareness. The Treatise on Consciousness says: "This aspect of self-awareness arises from conditions and is of other-dependent nature (paratantra); therefore, it is said to exist. The two aspects of seeing and seen do not arise from conditions, but exist due to the false grasping of the conceptualizing mind. These two aspects exist in deluded sentiment but are nonexistent in principle. Only the aspect of self-awareness is of other-dependent nature, born from seeds, and is truly existent. The two aspects of seeing and seen are nonexistent, and the further transformed grasping of self and phenomena is likewise nonexistent; thus, nonexistence resembles nonexistence. If following Bodhisattva Dharmapāla, then existence resembles nonexistence. The two aspects of seeing and seen have substantial entity; the transformed graspings of self and phenomena lack substantial entity. Therefore Sthiramati cited the Laṅkāvatāra: 'The defiled minds and mental factors of the three realms all have false conceptualization as their intrinsic nature.' Hence we know that the two aspects of seeing and seen in the eight consciousnesses all exist through the false grasping of the imagined nature. Only the single aspect of self-awareness is of other-dependent nature and is truly existent." Second, the Master Nanda established two aspects to constitute consciousness-only. In setting forth his thesis: whenever any mind arises, it invariably possesses the two aspects of seeing and seen. The two aspects of seeing and seen are the cognizing subject condition and the cognized object condition. If there were no aspect of the seen to pull the mind, mental factors would have no way to arise; if there were no aspect of seeing as the cognizing subject, who would know that there is an aspect of the seen as the cognized object? Thus, having both object and mind constitutes consciousness-only. The aspect of seeing is that which transforms, and the aspect of the seen is what is transformed; for subject and object to be established, both aspects must be present. The aspect of seeing and the aspect of the seen are both of other-dependent nature. Sometimes cognizing a solitary shadow-image, they arise from the same seed; sometimes cognizing an object with underlying substance, they arise from distinct seeds; thus they are not the imagined nature. If one does not accept this, the Buddhas should not manifest various reflected images such as bodies and lands. Third, Bodhisattva Dignāga established three aspects. Sthiramati established one aspect, having only entity but lacking function; Nanda established the two aspects of seeing and seen, having only function but lacking entity; both are mutually deficient. As for the establishing logic, it refers to establishing the meaning of the result of valid cognition (pramāṇa-phala). The treatise says: because the means of valid cognition (pramāṇa), the object of valid cognition (prameya), and the result of valid cognition (pramāṇaphala) are distinct, the seen and the seeing must have a substantial entity upon which they rely. The aspect of the seen is the object of valid cognition, and the aspect of seeing is the means of valid cognition; thus one requires the aspect of self-awareness to verify it, which is the result of valid cognition. By analogy, a ruler measuring silk: the silk is the object of measurement, the person with the ruler is the means of measurement, and the knowledge of recording the number is called the result of measurement. Now, that the aspect of seeing cognizes the aspect of the seen without error is entirely because the aspect of self-awareness acts as the result. Now, when the aspect of seeing of the eye consciousness cognizes blue, it definitely does not cognize yellow, like the aspect of seeing cognizing an unseen object. When it suddenly cognizes a yellow object, it definitely does not cognize blue; if there were no aspect of self-awareness, the aspect of seeing would not be able to remember itself. Therefore, we know that three aspects must be established. If there were no aspect of self-awareness, the seen and the seeing would also be nonexistent. If one asserts that there are two aspects, then there must definitively be the aspect of self-awareness. The verse of the Pramāṇasamuccaya states: 'The cognized object resembles the form of the external object; that which grasps the form is self-awareness.' The commentary explains: 'The cognized object resembling the form of the external object' means the aspect of the seen manifests resembling an external object. 'That which grasps the form is self-awareness' means the aspect of seeing can grasp the aspect of the seen. Therefore, self-awareness is precisely the substance. Fourth, Bodhisattva Dharmapāla established four aspects. Setting forth the thesis: if minds and mental factors are finely analyzed, they should possess four aspects. Setting forth the logic: if there were no fourth aspect, what phenomenon would serve as the result of valid cognition for the third aspect? You, Dignāga, established three aspects because the aspect of seeing has the function of acting as the means of valid cognition to discern objects, and you thus took the aspect of self-awareness as the result of valid cognition. Your aspect of self-awareness also possesses the capacity of a means of valid cognition to illuminate objects; therefore, what phenomenon would serve as the result of valid cognition for the aspect of self-awareness as the means of valid cognition? Thus one must take the fourth aspect, awareness of self-awareness, as the result of valid cognition for the third aspect. He cited the Ghanavyūha Sūtra: 'The minds of sentient beings have two natures, all divisions inner and outer (the one inner division is one nature, and the two divisions of seeing and seen are the second nature, which are the inner and outer natures of mind and object), entangled by the grasped and the grasper (the coarse activity of the cognizing subject is the aspect of seeing as the grasper; the grasped is the bondage to the cognized aspect), seeing manifold distinctions (the aspect of seeing encompasses the three kinds of valid cognition, hence it is said to have manifold distinctions).' Now, to be a result of valid cognition, it must be direct perception (pratyakṣa) before it can serve as a result of valid cognition.