御注金剛般若波羅蜜經宣演 2.10

2.10

Sūtra: Therefore, Subhūti, [...] the mind of sambodhi. / Commentary: Fourth, showing the antidotes to the causes and conditions of [inability to] endure, which arise from three conceptions: first, dwelling on the conception of the suffering of saṃsāra (saṃsāra-pravṛtti); second, dwelling on the conception of the suffering of contradiction by sentient beings (sattva-vipratipatti); third, dwelling on the conception of the suffering of the lack of requisites for enjoyment (bhoga-vaihālya). Due to the first conception, one does not give rise to the bodhi-mind; that is, one cannot endure the flow of birth and death, and does not give rise to the patience of willingly accepting suffering (duḥkhādhivāsana-kṣānti) or the patience of carefully examining phenomena (dharma-pravicaya-kṣānti). Because of dwelling on the conception of contradiction by sentient beings, one sees the suffering of harm from enemies and does not give rise to the patience of enduring harm (parāpakāra-marṣaṇa-kṣānti). Dwelling on the conception of the lack of requisites for enjoyment, one also cannot give rise to the patience of willingly accepting suffering, because one cannot endure cold, heat, hunger, scarcity, and the like. Now, to counter these three conceptions, [the sūtra] causes superior patience to arise. The first—the suffering of saṃsāra—pervades the three realms; it is the suffering of conditioned existence (saṃskāra-duḥkhatā). The latter two sufferings pertain only to the desire realm, for above the form realm there is no cold, heat, scarcity, or the like. However, according to their predominant characteristics, contradiction by sentient beings is the suffering of suffering (duḥkha-duḥkhatā), and lack of requisites for enjoyment is the suffering of change (vipariṇāma-duḥkhatā). Moreover, saṃsāra subsumes five sufferings, namely the sufferings of birth, old age, sickness, death, and the five aggregates of grasping. Contradiction by sentient beings subsumes the suffering of association with the disliked and separation from the beloved. Lack of requisites for enjoyment subsumes the suffering of not getting what one seeks. In the previous explanation of the marks of patience, the treatise explained two: enduring harm and careful examination. Now, in explaining the antidote to the causes and conditions of non-endurance, it only then explains the patience of willingly accepting suffering. Alternatively, although in the first case of the suffering of saṃsāra one also cannot give rise to the patience of accepting suffering, the present intention is that one does not give rise to the patience of carefully examining phenomena: because of not carefully examining the principle of the two emptinesses, one dwells on the conception of saṃsāra; either one solely seeks extinction for oneself out of revulsion, or, because of attachment, the suffering of saṃsāra arises—both obstructing bodhi. Therefore, the direct antidote causes one not to dwell or attach. This is because, in the third [section] below, the antidote regarding the causes of enjoyment is specifically explained through the patience of willingly accepting suffering. Question: According to the treatise's subsequent explanation of the metaphor of light and dark, it designates 'lack of requisites for enjoyment' solely based on the future fruition, and there is no mark of the patience of willingly accepting suffering either; how can this be said to be the patience of willingly accepting suffering? Answer: Below, there are two meanings: first, to cause the future fruition not to be lacking; second, even if there is a lack of enjoyment, no suffering arises, because one does not dwell on marks. Therefore, the treatise speaks of it as the antidote that subsumes dwelling in enduring suffering. These three make three sections. In the first—the causes and conditions countering the suffering of saṃsāra—there are four parts: first, a general statement; second, a specific explanation; third, a restatement for confirmation; fourth, a concluding exhortation. This is the first. The treatise states: 'Regarding generating the bodhi-mind: because of the conceptions of the three kinds of suffering, one does not wish to generate the mind; therefore it says that one should be free from all marks, etc.' Here, 'all conceptions' indicates such conceptions of the three sufferings. The Commentary says: To generate the great aspiration, one must give rise to compassion to rescue sentient beings and contemplate the emptiness of all dharmas, understanding suffering as without suffering; only then can one, throughout the long duration of birth and death, rescue them and together realize bodhi, forever emerging from saṃsāra. If, seeing the three sufferings, one gives rise to the conception of oppression, it is like when a person is afraid, non-humans take advantage. In the same way, because a bodhisattva fears birth and death, the six sensory objects take advantage, and he himself undergoes saṃsāra; how could he rescue others? Or, seeing the conception of suffering, he seeks nirvāṇa for himself and cannot put an end to others' suffering of saṃsāra. Or, seeing the marks of suffering, he is deeply bound by the bondage of marks and further increases heavy dross. Or, completely negating through wrong views and wandering lost in the flow, he constantly remains in birth and death, unable to put an end to his own suffering of saṃsāra. Therefore, generating the mind and not giving rise to the three conceptions, thereby escaping saṃsāra, is called the antidote. Not generating the mind is the cause and condition of the suffering of saṃsāra. Question: Here it is said that the marks of the three sufferings obstruct the generation of the great aspiration, and one is exhorted to be free from the three marks and generate the bodhi-mind; if so, this should be the antidote to the three sufferings; why is it only said to be the antidote to the causes and conditions of the suffering of saṃsāra? Answer: In truth, generating the mind can counter the three sufferings. Because one who generates the mind gives rise to three wondrous contemplations: first, revulsion toward birth and death eliminates saṃsāra; second, pity for sentient beings eliminates contradiction; third, seeking bodhi eliminates the lack of requisites for enjoyment. Furthermore, this is spoken of as freeing oneself from the three conceptions, so it should counter the three sufferings. That it is said to only counter the suffering of saṃsāra is due to the difference between general and specific: generating the mind is the general abandonment of all marks, while the other two are specific abandonments of their respective marks. What is countered is also like this: saṃsāra is general, and the other two sufferings are specific; using the general to eliminate the specific involves no contradiction. Question: What is the intrinsic nature of the obstacle to generating the mind? Answer: It takes dharma-grasping, the three conceptions, and all of the two obstacles such as delusion, greed, and so forth as its intrinsic nature. The proximate cause of saṃsāra is precisely ignorance: with ignorance as condition, formations arise, and thus one undergoes saṃsāra. The root of delusion is precisely the cognitive obstacle; the mind with the three marks is it. Because of being free from marks and generating the bodhi-mind, delusion and the like naturally cease; because ignorance ceases, aging and death likewise cease, and saṃsāra naturally comes to an end. Therefore, that treatise states: 'If there are bodhisattvas who are not free from the conception of a self, etc., those bodhisattvas, seeing suffering and the suffering of conditioned existence, also wish to abandon the bodhi-mind. For their sake, it is said that one should be free from all marks and generate the mind, etc.' The verse says: