御注金剛般若波羅蜜經宣演 2

English (machine translation) 2

Language: English

2.1

Compiled by Daoyin, Śramaṇa who lectures by imperial command following the retinue.

The Sūtra [states]: "Subhūti, patience ... up to ... explains it as no perfection of patience." / Exposition: Ninth, in order to abandon the hindrance of the inability to endure suffering, which corresponds to the tenth dedicating across the limitless dharmadhātu, and the thirteenth dwelling place of enduring suffering. Formerly, hoping for future merit to cultivate superior causes, though encouragement was achieved, one must still be able to endure suffering. If, when cultivating the path, one cannot bear injury by others, cannot peacefully accept the sufferings of cold, heat, exhaustion, birth, old age, and so forth, then although one diligently cultivates the path, one will abandon sentient beings. Furthermore, there will be no karmic fruit of merit, nor will it last long; one would then be identical with the two vehicles and prematurely enter cessation. If one lacks the patience of thoroughly examining phenomena, one cannot realize and awaken to the signless principle. Neither would there be the preceding two [patiences], because thoroughly examining phenomena serves as the support for the preceding two patiences. Furthermore, if one cannot endure the suffering of transmigration, one will take delight in nirvāṇa and not generate the great aspiration. If one cannot endure the suffering of opposition from sentient beings, one will generate resentment and be unable to gather and convert them; nor will one possess the marks and characteristics, or all the retinues of the four assemblies and eight classes [of beings]. If one cannot bear the suffering of lacking material necessities, one cannot be vigorous; time and again regression and defeat will arise—how then could the unexcelled fruit be attained? Now, to counteract this, this passage arises. Inability to endure is hatred, laxity, and ignorance, which are subsumed under both hindrances. Ability to endure is non-hatred, vigor, and discerning wisdom. The three kinds of enduring the suffering of transmigration and of lacking material necessities are all [due to] vigor, and are excellent aids in cultivating the causes of superior merit. The previous [discussion] was framed around the capacity to endure and termed the dwelling of enduring suffering; the present one is framed around severing hindrances and abandoning the inability to endure suffering. In accordance with the previous comprehensive explanation, that treatise aims to sever the doubt that the eighth [portion of the] sūtra produces a suffering result. The treatise states: "Previously it was said that that body was suffering; because of the fruit of that suffering body of renouncing the body, that merit was inferior. If so, then relying on this Dharma gate to uphold and explain it, the bodhisattvas practicing those austerities—practicing those austerities is itself a suffering result. Why then does this Dharma gate not become a suffering result?" / Exposition: Previously it was said that with a suffering body, because a suffering result is obtained, the merit is inferior; relying on the sūtra, austerities are also a suffering result. If so, this sūtra should become a suffering result; how could its merit be superior? The intent of the text below is to say: previously, renouncing body and life involved the notions of self and phenomena, or there was hatred and an inability to endure suffering; because there was fatigue and laxity, it induced [further] saṃsāra, and hence the merit was inferior. Now, possessing the perfection of patience as well as loving-kindness and compassion, one is able to advance toward bodhi, and therefore the merit is superior. Presenting that correct practice of counteracting impatience answers the previous doubt and does not link [further to other sections] of this treatise. According to the analysis of the text in this treatise, there are four [parts]: first, that which is able to endure, which is the essence of patience; second, clarifying the characteristic of patience and the place where patience arises; third, the distinctions corresponding to patience, which are the varieties of patience; fourth, the causes and conditions for counteracting impatience. This is the first. / The treatise states: "What is that which is able to endure? It means realizing the selflessness of phenomena." This treatise's question is brief, meaning: what is that which is able to endure corresponding to the realized realm? It means that the essence of that which is able to endure corresponding to the true realm realized by it is non-hatred, vigor, and wisdom. Non-hatred, vigor, and wisdom correspond to the realm of the principle of the selflessness of phenomena realized by them, and only then can they endure. Since the realm is selfless, how could the patient mind possess a self? Therefore, non-hatred and so forth attain that selflessness corresponding to the realm. Another interpretation: the patient practice corresponding to the confronted realm—contemplating that which is practiced is called that which is confronted, and all the realms are called that which is capable; that is, the practitioner's practice of patience corresponding to the confronted realm is the essence of patience. The sūtra stating, "explains the perfection of patience," directly clarifies this essence. Furthermore, stating "is no perfection," and so forth, is because one has no notions of a self and so forth, does not grasp at the notion of a perfection, and does not abide in the notion of non-existence regarding non-perfections. Practicing patience in this way establishes the ultimate truth; hence it is called "no perfection." The Zhenguan [reign-period version] concludes: "Therefore the Tathāgata says it is called the perfection of patience." The other versions lack this. That treatise's verse states:

2.3

"Able to endure in austere practice, / because austere practice has virtue, / that merit is immeasurable; / such is quiescent and supreme meaning. / Free from notions of self and resentment, / there is truly no affliction; / in suffering and joy there are loving-kindness and compassion: / such is the fruit of austere practice."

2.4

The commentary states: "Although this austere practice is identical to a suffering result, yet in this austere practice there is no fatigue. Because it possesses the perfection of patience, it is termed the foremost. 'The other shore' has two meanings: first, the essence of the pure wholesome roots of pāra[mitā]; second, that the virtues of the other shore are immeasurable. As the sūtra says, 'is therefore no perfection'—as for 'no perfection,' it is because no one knows the shore of that virtue." / Exposition: The sūtra stating "the Tathāgata explains the perfection of patience" is because it possesses the essence of pure wholesome roots. Furthermore, saying "is no" is because it is immeasurable. On account of these two meanings it is called foremost. The rest of the meaning may be known.

2.5

The Sūtra [states]: "Why is this?" / Exposition: From here below, the second [part] clarifies the characteristic of patience and the place where patience arises. First it queries, and afterwards it explains. This is the first: in what kind of place is patience able to arise? Moreover, practicing the perfection of patience and yet again saying "is no"—what is the reason for this?

2.6

The Sūtra [states]: "Subhūti, ... up to ... dismembered my body." / Exposition: The explanation below is divided into two: first, clarifying the place where patience arises; second, directly clarifying the characteristic of patience. This is the first. That is to say, this place of others, the perfection of patience, non-perfection, and all other phenomena serve as the places of arising. Namely, regarding the place of others, one gives rise to the patience of bearing injury, which is non-hatred; regarding the perfection of patience and all phenomena, one does not give rise to notions of existence and non-existence, which is the patience of thoroughly examining phenomena, being discerning wisdom; therefore, the place of arising for the patience of peacefully accepting suffering is omitted. This, then, is the place of arising for the patience of bearing injury. As for the word "Kali," here it is translated as "patient under injury," because he was able to endure peacefully when acts of injury were committed, hence he was named "Patient under Injury." The Record of the Western Regions says King of Strife (Kali-rāja); the pronunciation differs in other versions, but the name is not different. The account of these causes and conditions is extensive as in other places.

2.7

The Sūtra [states]: "I at that time ... up to ... had no notion of a living being." / Exposition: Directly clarifying the characteristic of patience has two [parts]: first, an direct explanation; afterwards, a counter-demonstration. The direct explanation has three: first, injury by others without anger, lacking the notions of a person or a self; second, diligently practicing patience without grasping at the notion of existence; third, regarding non-perfections and so forth, not grasping at the notion of non-existence. The first is bearing injury; the latter two are thoroughly examining phenomena. The patience of peacefully accepting suffering is omitted; or perhaps, not being superior, it is not distinguished; or it is subsumed in the first. This is the beginning of the text. / The treatise states: "How should the characteristic of patience be known? When others generate evil and so forth toward oneself, because one is free from the notion of a self and so forth, one does not generate the notion of anger." The Bodhisattvabhūmi states: "If one encounters injury by others, one should reflect thus: 'This is my own past karma; it is fitting that I be injured by others. If now I do not endure it, I will further increase the causes of suffering, which would not be loving myself and would result in my own bondage to suffering. Furthermore, the natures of both self and other are suffering in conditioning. He, through lack of knowledge, increases harm to my body; since I possess knowledge, how could I increase his suffering? Even the two vehicles pursuing their own benefit do not bring suffering to others; since I benefit others, I should endure injury by others.' Having reflected thus, one should cultivate five notions: first, the notion of kinship and goodness; second, the notion of phenomena only; third, the notion of impermanence; fourth, the notion of having suffering; fifth, the notion of gathering and receiving." This absence of generating the notion of a self upon injury by others is precisely the notion of phenomena only among the five notions. Because one cultivates the selflessness of phenomena only, one does not retaliate against that enemy, giving rise to the first patience. Only for this [patience is the cause stated]; the other patiences ought to have causes of arising, but being abridged, they are not distinguished. / Another interpretation: the previous dismemberment and the patience of bearing injury are the places where the other two kinds arise, not departing from this. Because of this, the Zhenguan [version states]: "I at that time had no notion whatsoever, nor did I have no notion." In this present version of the sūtra, this text is missing. According to the treatise's commentary, one also does not give rise to the notion of existence regarding the kṣānti-pāramitā, nor does one give rise to the notion of non-existence regarding what is not a pāramitā. / Exposition: that is, the other two notions: in the perfection of patience, one does not grasp at the existence of phenomena, and in non-patience, one does not give rise to the grasping at non-existence, but constantly cultivates practice; combined, this is the notion of the patience of thoroughly examining phenomena. If one grasps at the non-existence of phenomena, entirely denying essence, one neither severs nor cultivates, neither rejoices nor feels revulsion, and does not desire to benefit or bring joy. Therefore, it further causes one not to abide in the notion of non-existence. The Vimalakīrti Sūtra states: "Only eliminate the sickness, but do not eliminate the phenomenon." Furthermore, "non-perfection" is precisely the previous "no perfection of patience"; there is no separate phenomenon. That treatise states: "This austere practice is superior to that renouncing of the body, all the more so because it is free from the mark of a self and the notion of resentment. Furthermore, this practice is free from suffering; not only is it free from suffering, it also possesses joy, because it possesses loving-kindness and compassion. As the sūtra states: 'I at that time had no notion of a self ... up to ... had no notion, nor was there no mark.' This clarifies that because it is associated with a mind of loving-kindness and compassion, it is stated thus." / Exposition: "Free from the mark of a self and the mark of resentment" explains the sūtra's "no notion of a self," and so forth. Furthermore, "this practice is free from suffering," and so forth, explains the sūtra's "no mark": although it was an austere practice, he did not perceive any mark of suffering. "Not only is it free from suffering, it also possesses joy," and so forth, explains the sūtra's "nor was there no mark": because it is conjoined with loving-kindness and compassion sharing joy, it differs from this treatise. / Another interpretation: that text states "no notion" because one does not generate the notion of suffering regarding the perfection of patience; one does not give rise to the notion of non-existence regarding sentient beings outside the pāramitā, neither rescuing nor converting them. Because one sees the suffering of sentient beings, one carries out their rescue and accords with the notion of bestowing joy, giving rise to loving-kindness and compassion, which is stated as "not no notion." This is completely identical to this. Furthermore, these three notions in sequence can generate those three kinds of patience: "no mark" is the patience of peacefully accepting suffering, because by not perceiving suffering, one has no notion of suffering regarding cold, heat, and so forth. Furthermore, among these three notions, the first is free from ātmagrāha; the latter two are free from dharmagrāha's distinction between existence and non-existence; hence it causes both to be abandoned. It is not that entirely grasping at non-existence is true patience; therefore it states "nor was there no notion."

2.8

The Sūtra [states]: "Why is this? ... up to ... would have generated anger and resentment." / Exposition: This is the counter-demonstration. First it queries, and afterwards it explains. For what reason is it known that at that time there was no notion of a self and so forth? The query asks comprehensively about the notions, but the explanation only displays the first, by way of ellipsis. Anger arises from the view of a self; if there were a view of a self, one would generate anger and resentment. Resentment is established based on anger; harboring malice without letting go and forming enmity is its nature, which is a secondary affliction. Since anger and resentment were absent, it is clear that there was no notion of a self. For this reason, when practicing the perfection of patience, there is no notion of a self and so forth.

2.9

The Sūtra [states]: "Subhūti, I also recall ... up to ... had no mark of a living being." / Exposition: Third, clarifying the distinctions corresponding to patience, which are the varieties of patience. The treatise states: "What are the varieties of patience? They are the patience of extreme suffering and the patience of continuous suffering." The meaning of this is: the patience of extreme suffering refers to the dismemberment of the body; continuous patience refers to being an ascetic of patience for five hundred lifetimes, and so forth. It is not called a distinction merely on account of a single patience; constantly practicing life after life, with prior and subsequent being similar, is called the varieties of patience. In the treatise, wishing to distinguish the differences of patience, it again raises dismemberment; in principle it actually belongs to the preceding. As for the "ascetic of patience," he is a person of loving-kindness and compassion.

2.10

Sūtra: Therefore, Subhūti, [...] the mind of sambodhi. / Commentary: Fourth, showing the antidotes to the causes and conditions of [inability to] endure, which arise from three conceptions: first, dwelling on the conception of the suffering of saṃsāra (saṃsāra-pravṛtti); second, dwelling on the conception of the suffering of contradiction by sentient beings (sattva-vipratipatti); third, dwelling on the conception of the suffering of the lack of requisites for enjoyment (bhoga-vaihālya). Due to the first conception, one does not give rise to the bodhi-mind; that is, one cannot endure the flow of birth and death, and does not give rise to the patience of willingly accepting suffering (duḥkhādhivāsana-kṣānti) or the patience of carefully examining phenomena (dharma-pravicaya-kṣānti). Because of dwelling on the conception of contradiction by sentient beings, one sees the suffering of harm from enemies and does not give rise to the patience of enduring harm (parāpakāra-marṣaṇa-kṣānti). Dwelling on the conception of the lack of requisites for enjoyment, one also cannot give rise to the patience of willingly accepting suffering, because one cannot endure cold, heat, hunger, scarcity, and the like. Now, to counter these three conceptions, [the sūtra] causes superior patience to arise. The first—the suffering of saṃsāra—pervades the three realms; it is the suffering of conditioned existence (saṃskāra-duḥkhatā). The latter two sufferings pertain only to the desire realm, for above the form realm there is no cold, heat, scarcity, or the like. However, according to their predominant characteristics, contradiction by sentient beings is the suffering of suffering (duḥkha-duḥkhatā), and lack of requisites for enjoyment is the suffering of change (vipariṇāma-duḥkhatā). Moreover, saṃsāra subsumes five sufferings, namely the sufferings of birth, old age, sickness, death, and the five aggregates of grasping. Contradiction by sentient beings subsumes the suffering of association with the disliked and separation from the beloved. Lack of requisites for enjoyment subsumes the suffering of not getting what one seeks. In the previous explanation of the marks of patience, the treatise explained two: enduring harm and careful examination. Now, in explaining the antidote to the causes and conditions of non-endurance, it only then explains the patience of willingly accepting suffering. Alternatively, although in the first case of the suffering of saṃsāra one also cannot give rise to the patience of accepting suffering, the present intention is that one does not give rise to the patience of carefully examining phenomena: because of not carefully examining the principle of the two emptinesses, one dwells on the conception of saṃsāra; either one solely seeks extinction for oneself out of revulsion, or, because of attachment, the suffering of saṃsāra arises—both obstructing bodhi. Therefore, the direct antidote causes one not to dwell or attach. This is because, in the third [section] below, the antidote regarding the causes of enjoyment is specifically explained through the patience of willingly accepting suffering. Question: According to the treatise's subsequent explanation of the metaphor of light and dark, it designates 'lack of requisites for enjoyment' solely based on the future fruition, and there is no mark of the patience of willingly accepting suffering either; how can this be said to be the patience of willingly accepting suffering? Answer: Below, there are two meanings: first, to cause the future fruition not to be lacking; second, even if there is a lack of enjoyment, no suffering arises, because one does not dwell on marks. Therefore, the treatise speaks of it as the antidote that subsumes dwelling in enduring suffering. These three make three sections. In the first—the causes and conditions countering the suffering of saṃsāra—there are four parts: first, a general statement; second, a specific explanation; third, a restatement for confirmation; fourth, a concluding exhortation. This is the first. The treatise states: 'Regarding generating the bodhi-mind: because of the conceptions of the three kinds of suffering, one does not wish to generate the mind; therefore it says that one should be free from all marks, etc.' Here, 'all conceptions' indicates such conceptions of the three sufferings. The Commentary says: To generate the great aspiration, one must give rise to compassion to rescue sentient beings and contemplate the emptiness of all dharmas, understanding suffering as without suffering; only then can one, throughout the long duration of birth and death, rescue them and together realize bodhi, forever emerging from saṃsāra. If, seeing the three sufferings, one gives rise to the conception of oppression, it is like when a person is afraid, non-humans take advantage. In the same way, because a bodhisattva fears birth and death, the six sensory objects take advantage, and he himself undergoes saṃsāra; how could he rescue others? Or, seeing the conception of suffering, he seeks nirvāṇa for himself and cannot put an end to others' suffering of saṃsāra. Or, seeing the marks of suffering, he is deeply bound by the bondage of marks and further increases heavy dross. Or, completely negating through wrong views and wandering lost in the flow, he constantly remains in birth and death, unable to put an end to his own suffering of saṃsāra. Therefore, generating the mind and not giving rise to the three conceptions, thereby escaping saṃsāra, is called the antidote. Not generating the mind is the cause and condition of the suffering of saṃsāra. Question: Here it is said that the marks of the three sufferings obstruct the generation of the great aspiration, and one is exhorted to be free from the three marks and generate the bodhi-mind; if so, this should be the antidote to the three sufferings; why is it only said to be the antidote to the causes and conditions of the suffering of saṃsāra? Answer: In truth, generating the mind can counter the three sufferings. Because one who generates the mind gives rise to three wondrous contemplations: first, revulsion toward birth and death eliminates saṃsāra; second, pity for sentient beings eliminates contradiction; third, seeking bodhi eliminates the lack of requisites for enjoyment. Furthermore, this is spoken of as freeing oneself from the three conceptions, so it should counter the three sufferings. That it is said to only counter the suffering of saṃsāra is due to the difference between general and specific: generating the mind is the general abandonment of all marks, while the other two are specific abandonments of their respective marks. What is countered is also like this: saṃsāra is general, and the other two sufferings are specific; using the general to eliminate the specific involves no contradiction. Question: What is the intrinsic nature of the obstacle to generating the mind? Answer: It takes dharma-grasping, the three conceptions, and all of the two obstacles such as delusion, greed, and so forth as its intrinsic nature. The proximate cause of saṃsāra is precisely ignorance: with ignorance as condition, formations arise, and thus one undergoes saṃsāra. The root of delusion is precisely the cognitive obstacle; the mind with the three marks is it. Because of being free from marks and generating the bodhi-mind, delusion and the like naturally cease; because ignorance ceases, aging and death likewise cease, and saṃsāra naturally comes to an end. Therefore, that treatise states: 'If there are bodhisattvas who are not free from the conception of a self, etc., those bodhisattvas, seeing suffering and the suffering of conditioned existence, also wish to abandon the bodhi-mind. For their sake, it is said that one should be free from all marks and generate the mind, etc.' The verse says:

2.11

"In order that the mind that has arisen is not abandoned, / [and for] practice and firmness, / [and] for the perfection of patience, / one cultivates that mind capable of training."

2.12

The Commentary says: According to the prose commentary, the first two lines are questions and the lower two lines are answers. First, it asks: for what purpose does the mind not abandon the mark of bodhi? Second, it asks: for what purpose does one give rise to the marks of practice and cultivate? The lower two lines answer: 'For patience, etc.' means that with the absence of marks such as a self, one generates the mind and cultivates practice. However, according to that treatise, from the first ground onward, one realizes the ultimate truth; the perfection of patience obtained is called the non-abiding mind. Citing this as proof, it exhorts: bodhisattvas before the grounds, when generating the mind, should also be free from all marks; hence it says that those who have not generated the foremost bodhi-mind have such faults, and to guard against these faults, etc.

2.13

Sūtra: One should not dwell in form [...] or dwell in sound, smell, taste, touch, or dharmas to give rise to the mind. / Commentary: Second, specifically explaining non-dwelling. Regarding marks, it causes one to be free from the bondage of marks and the bondage of heavy dross. Because of grasping at marks, one is hindered by the marks of objects and gives rise to the bondage of heavy dross in birth and death. The bondage of heavy dross is the nature of being uneasy, unpliant, incapable, and weary and exhausted in body and mind. A sūtra verse states: 'Sentient beings are bound by the bondage of marks / and also by the bondage of heavy dross; / only by skillfully cultivating both calming and insight / do they attain liberation.' Just as when watching theatrical plays, one's mind is captured by the marks and indulges in them; unable to stop, weariness arises, and only after resting does one perceive fatigue. The mind being bound by these conceptions and giving rise to exhaustion is just like this. This bondage of marks inherently pervades all [dharmas of] the three times and the three natures, generated by defiled objective marks. Heavy dross also pervades all defiled natures; therefore it is said that the three realms are all the suffering of conditioned existence. Alternatively, the meaning of this passage is: by grasping at form and the like as real entities, one gives rise to seeking, yearning, clinging, and stinginess; regarding the suffering of saṃsāra, one further increases fatigue, remaining forever in birth and death. How could one generate the mind? To prevent such things, one is exhorted not to dwell in form and the like to give rise to the mind. The treatise states: 'If one is attached to form and the like, then in the suffering of saṃsāra one becomes weary, and thus the bodhi-mind does not arise.' The explanation of the text is as before in the explanation of the aspiration for a pure land. The treatise says: 'Not dwelling in non-dharmas means the non-self of non-dharmas; because one dwells neither in non-dharmas nor in the non-self of dharmas.' The Commentary says: The Zhenguan [version] has 'not dwelling in the six sensory objects nor in the non-six sensory objects.' The Liang version and this treatise only have 'not dwelling in the former five sensory objects,' without 'not dwelling in the non-five sensory objects.' As for dharmas and non-dharmas, one does not dwell in either; therefore the treatise addresses the difficulty by first explaining 'non-dharmas'. However, according to the treatise's meaning, when the sūtra says 'dharmas,' it means the non-self of dharmas; when it says 'non-dharmas,' it means the non-self of non-dharmas, which is the self of dharmas. Therefore it concludes in summary: 'Because one dwells neither in non-dharmas nor in the non-self of dharmas,' which means that one dwells neither in the non-self of dharmas nor in the non-self of non-dharmas.

2.14

Sūtra: One should give rise to a mind that does not dwell anywhere. / Commentary: Third, restatement for confirmation. The treatise states: 'To accomplish those various instances of non-dwelling, it speaks of precluding other things, as the sūtra says: "One should give rise to a mind that does not dwell anywhere. Why? If the mind has a dwelling, that is not a dwelling," and so forth.' Here, 'precluding other things' means precluding the mind having any dwelling. The text is divided into two: first, direct confirmation; second, inverse preclusion. This is the first. Above, it was said that one should not dwell in form, non-form, self, non-self, and so forth to give rise to the mind; to accomplish this meaning, dwelling neither in emptiness nor in existence is appropriate. Therefore it says, 'One should give rise to a mind that does not dwell anywhere.'

2.15

Sūtra: If the mind has a dwelling, that is non-dwelling. / Commentary: The inverse preclusion. Other versions first inquire into the reason for non-dwelling: if the mind has a dwelling, it is attachment, not true dwelling, because in the principle of tathatā there is nowhere to dwell. In generating the mind, one should also accord with the principle of non-dwelling and thus dwell. The Vimalakīrtinirdeśa Sūtra states: 'Non-dwelling is the absence of root; from the root of non-dwelling all dharmas are established.' That treatise states: 'In order to show the meaning of generating the mind without dwelling: if the mind dwells in dharmas such as form, that mind does not dwell in the Buddha's bodhi.' 'The Buddha's bodhi' is the true principle.

2.16

Sūtra: Therefore the Buddha says [...] should not dwell in form to practice giving. / Commentary: Fourth, concluding exhortation. Citing what was previously spoken—that the minds of bodhisattvas do not dwell [in form] when giving. Here and in the Wei translation, form is briefly cited; the Zhenguan [version] states that one does not dwell in any of the six sensory objects. This cites the expedient means of generating practice with a non-dwelling mind found early in the sūtra to exhort long-time practitioners. Or, it cites the expedient means of true practice of the ten grounds—not dwelling in giving—to exhort those before the grounds to cultivate without dwelling, just like exhorting them to be free from marks when generating the bodhi-mind. Question: Why is giving cited to prove patience and exhort the generation of the mind? Answer: That treatise explains: 'Because the perfection of giving subsumes the six perfections.'

2.17

Sūtra: Subhūti, a bodhisattva [...] should give like this. / Commentary: Second, countering and eliminating the causes and conditions of the suffering of contradiction by sentient beings. Although one has generated the mind and does not dwell in saṃsāra, when contradicted by sentient beings, one becomes weary, unable to rescue them, and gives rise to regression. Therefore, this is to eliminate that. Question: According to this, one should say 'the antidote to the causes and conditions of the suffering of saṃsāra,' or 'the antidote to the causes and conditions of non-endurance of the suffering of saṃsāra'; why does the treatise say 'the antidote to the causes and conditions of enduring the suffering of saṃsāra,' and even 'the antidote to the causes and conditions of enduring the suffering of the lack of requisites for enjoyment,' given that patience is not what is countered? Furthermore, the treatise's second part says: 'Revealing the patience countering the suffering of contradiction by sentient beings,' which seems to treat patience as what is countered; what is its meaning? Answer: The treatise speaks generally: this is to counter the causes and conditions of non-endurance, not that patience is what is countered. Rather, in a general formulation, it means countering within the causes and conditions of this patience; that is, because one cannot endure in the face of these various causes and conditions of patience, one counters and eliminates [that inability]. The text is divided into two: first, directly countering and eliminating to bring about faith and acceptance; second, removing attachment. The first further has two parts: first, a general statement of countering and eliminating; second, a specific explanation of the reasons. This is the first. The treatise states: 'Since one practices renunciation for the sake of all sentient beings, how could anger arise toward them?' Renunciation is giving. A bodhisattva's generating the mind, practicing giving, and so forth are originally for the sake of sentient beings; since they are for their benefit and joy, one should thus not dwell on the conception of the suffering of contradiction by sentient beings, but practice giving without giving rise to anger. That treatise raises a doubt: 'How can one cultivate practice for the benefit of sentient beings without it being called dwelling in the affairs of sentient beings?' The meaning of the doubt is: if one cultivates practice to benefit sentient beings, one should dwell on the conception of sentient beings; how can one not dwell? The verse says:

2.18

"Cultivating practice to benefit sentient beings, / such causes should be recognized; / sentient beings and the marks of their affairs, / being far removed [from them], should also be known."

2.19

The Commentary says: The first two lines are what is done in cultivating the cause; the lower two lines cause the elimination of grasping at self and dharmas. The meaning there is simply that because of not dwelling, one can benefit sentient beings; therefore one eliminates the two graspings. When contradicted by sentient beings, one is then able to endure it. This is exactly the same as here; the intricate doubt raised there belongs to the eighth subsumption and is not opened separately.

2.20

Sūtra: "The Tathāgata says [...] are not sentient beings." / Exposition: This distinctively explains the reason. First [it explains] the selflessness of dharmas, and later the selflessness of persons. The treatise says: "Because one is unable to be free from the notion of sentient beings, through this cause and condition, when sentient beings are antagonistic, weariness and exhaustion arise. Therefore, [the sūtra] reveals the selflessness of persons and the selflessness of dharmas." The meaning here is: since there are neither real dharmas nor real sentient beings, why falsely give rise to a notion of existence regarding what is non-existent and practice giving? Furthermore, one also should not give rise to notions of antagonism and produce weariness; hence, one should practice giving without abiding. The Wei version says: "All marks of sentient beings are precisely non-marks; all sentient beings are precisely not sentient beings." The Liang, Sui, Tang, and Zhou versions all have "notion of sentient beings" first, followed simply by "sentient beings." Only in this version is there initially no "sentient beings," stating merely that "notions are precisely non-marks." The verse of that treatise says:

2.21

"Metaphorical designations and the phenomena of the skandhas: / The Tathāgata is free from their marks. / The Buddhas are devoid of both, / Because they see real dharmas."

2.22

Exposition: Following the sense of that commentary, the phenomena of sentient beings are twofold: first, the name "sentient being"; second, the phenomena of the five skandhas. The nominal marks that serve as signifiers for those sentient beings are not real essential marks, because names are arbitrary and have no real entity. For this reason, "all marks of sentient beings are precisely non-marks," because the nominal marks of sentient beings have no real essential mark. Thus the nominal signifier establishes the selflessness of dharmas. Other versions say: regarding "notion," names are posited based on notions, which reveals nominal marks. Furthermore, "sentient being" is a metaphorical designation based on the five skandhas; within the five skandhas, there is no entity of a sentient being, because there is no reality. For this reason, "all sentient beings are precisely not sentient beings," which clarifies the selflessness of persons. Therefore the treatise concludes: "In this way it clarifies the selflessness of dharmas and the selflessness of persons." If one follows this sūtra, having dharmas first and persons later, the text is even clearer. In the two versions of Liang and Zhou, below this it says, "Why? Because all Buddhas, the Tathāgatas, are far removed from all marks." The other versions all lack this. Judging by its citation in that treatise, it ought to be present. The treatise says: "This phrase clarifies that those two marks are unreal. If those two were real existents, all Buddhas, the Tathāgatas, would possess those two marks. Why? Because all Buddhas, the Tathāgatas, perceive reality." Exposition: This shows that the Buddha's speaking of non-existence stems from his own internal realization; he speaks in accordance with what he has realized. Or, the Buddha has personally realized and reached the preceding two kinds of non-existence, and has caused them to be spoken for you to encourage you: when generating the mind and practicing, should sentient beings be antagonistic, contemplate the non-existence of the two selves and do not give rise to anger or resentment.

2.23

Sūtra: "Subhūti, the Tathāgata [...] does not speak differently." / Exposition: Next, [the sūtra] causes them to faithfully accept this and practice forbearance. Even worldly good and worthy persons are free from all deceit, how much more so the Great Sage? When guiding gods and dragons with the words of the four truths, would he make deceptive statements? The treatise says: "'Speaker of the true' is to reveal the characteristics of conventional truth. 'Speaker of the real' is to reveal that the practice of conventional truth has the characteristics of defilement and purity; in this, 'real' refers to this practice being defilement and that practice being purity. 'Speaker of the such' is to reveal the characteristics of paramārtha-satya. 'Speaker of the not-different' is to reveal that the practice of paramārtha-satya has the characteristics of defilement and purity." Exposition: First, it speaks generally of conventional truth. Second, it speaks distinctively of conventional truth. Third, it speaks generally of ultimate truth. Fourth, it speaks distinctively of ultimate truth. In the distinctive explanation of the conventional: this saṃskṛta practice is defiled, and that saṃskṛta practice is pure; or, this practice generates defilements, such as practicing for the sake of fame and gain, while that practice increases purity, such as practicing having renounced fame and gain. In the distinctive explanation of the ultimate: practicing based on the ultimate, there are defilements to be severed, and there is the purity of being able to sever them; or, when practicing based on ultimate truth, this practice generates defilements, such as giving with an abiding mind, while that practice increases purity, such as giving with an unabiding mind. Now, it encourages bodhisattvas to practice based on ultimate truth, and that they should believe and generate forbearance. "Speaker of the not-deceitful" belongs to the not-different; with respect to speech it is called deceitful, and with respect to mind it is called different. From here onward, that treatise aims to sever the ninth doubt, that the path is not the cause [of the fruit]. The treatise says: "Here there is a doubt: within the realized fruit there is no path; how can that path act as a cause for the fruit?" The verse says:

2.24

"Although the fruit does not abide in the path, / Yet the path is able to act as a cause; / Because of the real speech of all Buddhas, / That wisdom is of four kinds."

2.25

There are two explanations here. The first says: it is said that all noble ones are distinguished by unconditioned dharmas; thus, since there is no noble path, how can one contemplate the two kinds of selflessness? How can the path of benefiting sentient beings act as a cause for that [fruit]? To shatter this doubt, he speaks the four statements. Because the Buddha's true wisdom realizes the principle beyond words, subsequent [cognition] raises verbal expressions in accord with the realization: in the ultimate, there is truly nothing to be grasped, while the conventional truth is free from falsity; through the causes and conditions of skillful means, cultivating the two kinds of selflessness does not fail to act as the cause for attaining the Buddha-fruit. To reveal that the Buddha is able to know that that path acts as the cause, he speaks the four statements. In order to sever emotional doubt and cause them to produce faith, to follow and cultivate the causal path of the selfless fruit, and to generate forbearance, it is identical with this. The second says: when realizing the unconditioned, one only uses true wisdom, not the path of verbal expression. Thus one might think that the Buddha's statement that the merit of upholding the sūtra is the cause of the dharmakāya is false; therefore, he speaks the four statements to eliminate that doubt and disparagement. In the former explanation, doubt arises from forbearance; in the latter explanation, doubt arises from the sūtra. Observing the intent of that treatise, the latter explanation is superior. This is because there being four objects, there are four wisdoms; because there are four wisdoms, the four statements are uttered. The verse says:

2.26

"Real wisdom and the Hīnayāna, / Speaking the teaching of the Mahāyāna, / And all the prophesies— / Because they are not spoken falsely."

2.27

First is real wisdom, namely bodhi; second is the Hīnayāna; third is the Mahāyāna; fourth is prophesy. These four objects in sequence are all not spoken falsely, matching the four statements. Outside of these, there are hypothetical expressions: in the Hīnayāna and so on, he teaches the truth of suffering and so forth; in the Mahāyāna, he teaches the selflessness of dharmas; as for prophesy, it refers to speaking of the events of the three times, which are definitely without error. Because he speaks according to their meaning and without inversion, now he speaks of bodhi and the Mahāyāna to encourage faith in the Buddha's words.

2.28

Sūtra: "Subhūti, [...] is neither real nor false." / Exposition: Next, it dispels attachment. The treatise says: "Having spoken these 'true words' and so forth, regarding this, one gives rise to attachment to the nature of verbal expression. In order to dispel this, the sūtra says that in the Dharma that the Tathāgata has fully awakened to and taught, there is neither reality nor falsity. 'Neither real': because the nature of verbal expression does not exist. 'Nor false': because its own-nature does not exist in the manner of verbal expression." The meaning here is: seeing that the Buddha has realized the principle of the two kinds of selflessness and spoken the words of the two truths, one then clings to this verbal signifier, attaching to that dharma as having a definitely real mark; therefore, it now shatters it. Because that dharma which can be spoken of is non-existent, it is called 'neither real'; because the realization of wisdom free from language cannot be named a dharma and yet exists, it is called 'nor false.' The Wei version says, 'the dharma attained and the dharma spoken.' The Zhenguan version has two: that which is realized and that which is spoken; the wisdom of what is contemplated is what is realized, while what is signified by words is what the mind thinks and reflects upon. Here, it generally says 'what is attained'; that is, the attained dharma is named 'this dharma.' The verse of that treatise says:

2.29

"Conforming to that real wisdom, / He speaks of neither real nor false; / Grasping realization as one hears the sound: / To counteract this, it is spoken thus."

2.30

Exposition: The upper two lines directly explain the text of the sūtra. The lower two lines clarify the dispelling of attachment. According to that commentary: because the expounded dharma cannot attain that realized dharma, it is "without reality"; because the expounded dharma conforms to that realized dharma, it is "without falsity." The meaning of saying this is: one should not grasp the realized dharma in the manner of the sound one hears, nor should one seek the realized dharma apart from the expounded dharma, because of its conformity.

2.31

Sūtra: "Subhūti, if a bodhisattva [...] then sees nothing at all." / Exposition: The third major section counteracts the causes and conditions of the suffering of lacking enjoyment and use. Because one gives while clinging to future fruit-phenomena, one's mind has marks; therefore, the fruit is limited, and enjoyment and use will be lacking. Namely, the mind's dwelling and attachment is the cause and condition of lacking enjoyment and use; the enjoyment and use that is lacked belongs to the dominant fruit of external resources and requisites. Relying on the explanation of this treatise, previously giving without abiding in phenomena was the perfection of giving; now, speaking of not relying on future fruits, in that treatise one's own body is called a "phenomenon." Here it speaks of lacking enjoyment and use; if one does not give without abiding, external resources will not be accomplished. If external resources are not accomplished, the lack of cause and fruit can be known by reversing the former; therefore, to counteract and eliminate this, this passage arises. From here onward, that treatise aims to sever the tenth doubt, on realizing tathatā or not realizing it. The treatise says: "If noble ones obtain their name through unconditioned tathatā, that tathatā exists at all times and in all places. How can an unabiding mind attain the Buddha's bodhi, while the Buddha's bodhi is not unabiding? If tathatā really exists at all times and in all places, why are there some who can attain it and some who cannot?" Here, the four characters "attain the Buddha's bodhi" apply to both what precedes and what follows. According to that new treatise, it says: "How is the Buddha-fruit realized only through an unabiding mind and not through an abiding mind?" Here there are two questions: the first asks about there being attainment and non-attainment; the second asks about an unabiding mind attaining while an abiding mind does not attain. It brings up a single verse in summary to answer both doubts, saying:

2.32

"It really exists at all times and places, / Yet one does not attain tathatā; / Being without wisdom, through abiding in dharmas; / Others who possess wisdom attain it."

2.33

The meaning of that commentary says: although tathatā pervades all times and places, those without wisdom abide in dharmas and therefore do not attain it, while those with wisdom do not abide in dharmas and therefore attain it. This answers the first question. Furthermore, when the mind abides in dharmas, because it is not pure, it does not attain it; when it does not abide in dharmas, because it is pure, it attains it. This answers the latter question. It concludes in summary: "For this reason, all Buddhas, the Tathāgatas, obtain their name through pure tathatā; therefore, an abiding mind does not attain the Buddha's bodhi." That [treatise] gives rise to its text by shattering doubting minds, while this [commentary] raises its explanation in terms of practice. Since one attains that tathatā through non-abiding, the future fruit is limitless and does not lack enjoyment and use; the two treatises do not conflict. In the text there are two parts: first, dharmas and similes clarify that those without wisdom do not attain it; later, dharmas and similes clarify that those with wisdom realize and attain it. If one follows this treatise, first it clarifies that giving with marks and clinging to fruition is precisely the cause of lacking enjoyment and use that is to be counteracted; later it clarifies that giving without marks and not clinging to phenomena is precisely the counteracting practice. This is the first part, with dharmas first and similes later. The treatise says: "If one gives for the sake of karmic fruition, one clings to phenomena and practices giving. In different giving, within desire-pleasure and painful feeling, one does not understand how to escape, just like entering darkness and not knowing where one is going. Their longing for desire-pleasure is also like this." Exposition: Desire-pleasure and painful feeling are the future fruit; being at a different time from giving, it is called "different giving." That future desire-pleasure is suffering in the ultimate sense; because all defiled phenomena are suffering, it is called "painful feeling," not the painful feeling among the three kinds of feeling. The sūtra's words "like a person" are a simile: those without wisdom, because they lack wisdom, practice giving while clinging to the fruit, which is called "entering darkness." "Sees nothing at all" is a simile for not seeing the true principle; not seeking renunciation is like being in a dark room and seeing nothing, circling around inside without knowing where to go. Those without wisdom are also like this: because they give while clinging to marks, their future fruit is limited and enjoyment and use are deficient.

2.34

Sūtra: "If a bodhisattva's mind does not abide in dharmas [...] sees all kinds of forms." / Exposition: Those with wisdom realize tathatā and give without clinging to phenomena, which is precisely the counteracting practice. First dharmas, then similes. The treatise says: "When that night of ignorance has passed and the sun of wisdom has arisen, all such nirvāṇas are truly seen." The simile says "like a person," which is one who has wisdom; saying "one with eyes" means the mind accompanied by wisdom and so forth; the bright shining of the sun's light is a simile for wisdom. "All kinds of forms" is a simile for the various principles and phenomena of tathatā and so forth. The eliminated marks of darkness are the former lack of wisdom. Other versions say: "as the night has ended." Because of non-abiding and cutting off [attachments], one attains limitless fruit and enjoyment and use are not lacking. Another explanation: if one abides in phenomena, grasps real objects, does not see faults, and yet enjoys them, generating forbearance therein is like a person entering darkness. If one does not abide in dharmas, does not grasp objects as existent, and practices forbearance therein, it is like having eyes and seeing all kinds of things for oneself. Through seeing faults, knowledge arises; therefore, although lacking, one does not suffer; hence, one is able to counteract the suffering of lacking enjoyment and use, and generate the forbearance that peacefully endures suffering. The former explanation is based on the future fruit's enjoyment and use not being lacking; this explanation is based on not suffering in the present even if lacking. The verse of that treatise says:

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御注金剛般若波羅蜜經宣演 — Classical Chinese