金剛般若經疏 1.1

1.1

名為究竟□□□□□□□□□相乖違。亦違究竟一實中道□佛說三種究竟。猶豫多端。若為證會。又依深密佛自會釋諸說空教。唯依遍計說諸法空。如□可寧破相宗中三性俱遣。餘一一義有多妨礙□舉可知不能繁廣。當知瑜伽補處宣說乃□解釋一切諸經。勿謂但釋深密等教故。彼論釋□□□云。此論殊勝。若蓮華猶如寶藏如大海。具□諸□廣大義。善釋其文無有遺。又云。今說此論所因云何。謂諸有情。無始時來。於一切法處中實相無知。疑惑顛倒僻執。乃至□□□□□隨其所宜方便為說種種妙法處□□相令諸有情知一切如是如是空故非有。如是如是有故非空。□□□法非空非有。遠離疑惑顛倒僻執修行滅障證三菩提證寂滅樂。佛涅槃後。魔事紛起部執競起多著有見。龍猛菩薩證極喜地。採集眾義無相空教造中論等。究暢真要除彼有見。暨提婆等諸大論師。造百論等弘闡大義。由是眾生後著無見。無著菩薩位登初地。證法光定得大神通。□□慈尊請說此論。理無不窮。事無不盡。文無不釋。義無不諭。疑無不遣。執無不破。行無不修。果無不證。正為菩薩令□諸乘境行果等。皆得善巧勤修大乘證大菩提。廣為有情常無倒說。兼為餘乘令依自法修自分行得自果證。如是略說此論所由。故知通釋一切聖教。除空有見起。處中行寧說瑜伽唯法相宗。問。豈不諸經多說法相或多破相或復融會寧不分宗。答。准言諸教無此三義。但說定判如是如是經之與論破彼宗攝即為不可皆□。是故是故應說大乘妙理隨何等經皆有法相破□□會□有偏明一義多處理實此三不相捨離。以辨法體除執會通義皆遍故。問。若爾何故於大乘中中宗邊宗。清辨護法無相法相諸宗各別。答。但由釋者製作不同。隨能釋意說宗有異。非是佛語墮諸邊故。先別立宗。由此應說。於大乘中宗分有二。一勝義皆空如應理圓實宗即是龍猛菩薩。下至清辨論師。依無相教說勝義中。一切皆空世俗是有。掌珍頌云。真證有為空。如幻緣生故。無為無有實。不起似空花。乃至不立三性唯識等。後宗即是慈是如來。乃至護法菩薩。依深密等顯了言教說勝義諦非空非不空。辨中邊論慈尊頌曰。虛妄分別有。於此二都無。此中唯有空。於彼亦有此。故說一切法。非空非不空。有無及有故。是即契中道。三性之中。遍計性無。依圓是有故二乘別。問。所言勝義及世俗諦。其相如何。答。還依二宗所說有異。且勝空宗勝義諦一切教都空。世俗諦中可有色心修斷等法。如經說云。凡所有相皆是虛妄。此世俗諦諸相非相。則見如來此勝義諦四生三界所有眾生是世俗諦。實無眾生得滅度者是勝義諦。應理宗說真俗二諦二義不同。一依人辨諦。二約法辨諦。二種二諦俱通空有。且依人者。涅槃經云。上智所知名勝義。中智所知名世俗。二智所知皆通有。故知二諦空有俱通。言依法者。法有勝劣互相形待而為真俗。此有四重。一虛實二諦。瓶軍林等虛為世俗蘊處界等實為勝義　二理事二諦。蘊等事法麁為世俗四諦道理細為勝義。三淺深二諦。四諦安立淺為世俗二空真如深為勝義。四詮旨二諦。二空真如帶詮世俗一真法界之詮勝義。總有五法。初軍林等俗而非真。後一真法界真而非俗。中間三法亦真亦俗互相形故。廣如唯識第九顯揚第六大論等說。然初一種世間共執以為實有我法性故。空而非有。餘之四法通。是依他圓成性故。有而非空故。說二諦體通空有。非如前說。勝義皆空。既知二宗所說二諦。次應徵問。空有所由勝空者曰大經說云。設有一法過盤者我亦說為如幻如化。般若心云。色即是空空即是色。受相行識亦復如是。此經亦云。般若波羅蜜。即非般若波羅蜜。乃至無法可說等。准此等教。諸法皆空。又五蘊云。法若有體自可能生。既藉眾緣。明知非有。如結手巾為兔等像。無兔等性。應理者曰。即准此經福聚無量。如何非有。又說。如來有五眼等。又發阿耨菩提者。於法不說斷滅相等。又復經云。有為無為名為有。我及我所名為無。又云。無我無造無受者。善惡之法亦不亡等。雖說藉緣是幻化體都無所有。由應理者。亦以幻化喻依他故。星翳燈幻喻有為故。又說眾生我皆令入無餘滅度。若皆空者何。假令空花而□於涅槃勝空者。云此等諸法文。皆據俗諦非真空中有造修等應理。難曰。如之俗諦與勝義諦為一為異。若言一者有空相違。不見苦樂及冷熱等間為一故。若言異者二諦本俱。如何一有而一非有。彼答。二諦其體無別。俗諦體有可苦樂等非體通。二諦相對妄情是有真理皆空。今隨妄情說俗諦有。就實而談俗諦亦空。難曰。世俗妄故。令捨俗諦入真空者。是無諸法斷滅相過。答。體既是無。無可斷滅故。言不說法斷滅相。此與應理解釋全別。問曰。依勝空說妄有真無二諦體一。未審應理所說二諦為一為異。答。應理所說非一非異。何以故。義用別故非一。無別體故非異。即如瓶軍林等。五法相望展轉皆爾。既非一異。翻此即說或異或一。皆無有妨。仁王經云。有無本自二。譬如牛二角。照見解無二。二諦常不即。解心見無二。求二不可得。非謂二諦一。非二何可得。於解當自一。於諦當自二。通達此無二。入真第一義。頌意真如為勝義諦。依他遍計為世俗諦。二智境故名為諦。異唯約真智即稱解或一異或皆無有違。唯識亦云。故此與依他非異非不異。如無常等性非不見此彼。瑜伽七十五云。於大乘中。或有一類惡取空故。作如是言。由世俗故。一切皆有。由勝義故。一切皆無　應告彼言。何者世俗何者勝義。彼若本言義。一切法皆無自性。是名勝義。若於諸法無自性中自性可得。是名世俗。何以無所有中建立世俗經假設名言而起說故。應告彼曰。汝何所欲名言世俗為從因有自性可得。為唯名言世俗說有。若名言世俗從因有者。名言世俗從因而生而非是有。不應道理。又應告言。長老何緣諸可得者此無自性（此難俗有勝義即無）彼答言。顛倒事故（謂心顛倒於無謂有如見空花）復應告言。汝何所欲此顛倒事為有為無。若言有者。說一切法由勝義故皆無自性。不應道理。若言無者。顛倒事故。諸可得者此無自性。不應道理。空者者曰。大菩薩藏經第二卷云。空與菩薩性無有二。由無二故不可言說。又云。遠離取執。勝義諦中。無法可得。由性無故。說名為空。由此說空為□了義應理者此亦非證。謂依瞬若遍計無故。與覺無二。又瞬若多空性真如與覺無二。不言菩提體即空無。若實皆空何空何覺。若云隨破妄情空覺無二。據勝義諦無覺無空。即應分別兔角長短。此既不爾。彼云何。又云。遠離取執。勝義諦中無法可得。不言非執。勝義諦中亦空無法。又若二諦體性是一而非有者。應無凡聖染淨作業人天五趣。即無三惡悲所度生菩薩德自行於勤苦。以空無故。誰為誰說何法何求。不應智者。為除幻敵求石女兒用為軍旅。又凡夫妄倒可有世俗色心等法。諸佛如來妄倒已斷。何有色身淨妙土等。若言以佛悲心為眾生故。未現身土眾生妄倒。若已斷盡諸佛身土亦不立者。勝義既空悲智之心亦應非有。誰為能度眾生之本。故言空者。是密意說。教理既然。故與前說掌珍比量作聖教相違過。以違法教不空義故。唯識亦云。彼特違害前所引經。勝空者曰。我亦有教引前所說大般若等為證成故。應理者曰。教有顯了及不可義違顯了教故汝為過。謂深密經說第二時以隱密相轉正法輪說一切空非真了義。又云。相生勝義無自性。如是我皆已顯不。若不知佛此密意失壞正道不能往。經既自說諸法無性。無量隱密相非真了義。今判說空為第一說是故為過。問曰。龍猛無著俱登極喜同證法性智見不殊。因何二宗所說有異。答。據其至理平等無差。佛對根宜顯密異說。菩薩亦爾。對根宜聞所弘各異。由著有見。龍猛菩薩密弘於空。空見若生亦成其病故。須雙說非有非空遠離二邊契會中道。如向瑜伽釋論等說。又復大乘無相空教。依真智境遣一切相密說皆空。諸大菩薩對著有病弘斯密教非於中道。而不證悟未□不悟廣與乖淨。豈菩薩有所相違。上通辨宗。隨其勝空及應理者。所弘二諦並此經明如功德論咸歸通二宗。解智者當悉。別明宗者。題名般若故即為宗。般若有三實相觀照及與文字。慈恩三藏依諸經論更加二種。謂即境界及以眷屬。通有五法。一般若性。二般若相。三般若因。四般若境。五般若伴。刻性相從俱名般若。有義此經觀照為宗說能斷故。如大經說。六度之中。其般若度為州為諸為遵為首為燈炬等故。此唯以惠相為宗。即無分別本後二智通生法空。或取加行。亦不違理。由十八住通攝地上位故。有義亦以實相般若為經所宗。能斷性故。真理為本智方生故。金寶亦喻如來藏。故經中廣明無相真理法身極果。是無相智正所觀故。若辨如體諸釋不同。如淨業障經疏述。問。何不取文字等三。答。非經正明彼□末故。此二本故。菩提涅槃二為體故。即五法性攝三身故。能緣所緣能依所依。若性若相功德本故。第三門訖。第四所被根宜者。初辨根性。後以教被□初根性差別不同。一乘五性自古紛諍。今略敘之三說不同。一云。眾生皆有佛性。決定無有定性二乘及無性者。涅槃經第二十七云。師子吼者。是決定說一切眾生悉有佛性。又云。一切眾生悉皆有心。凡有心者悉皆當得阿耨菩提。是故我說一切眾生悉有佛性。又第三十七云。為非佛性說於佛性。非佛性者。所謂牆壁瓦石無情之物。離如是等無情之物。是名佛性。准此經文。非是准理。有情五蘊不被簡故亦非少分。離無情物是佛性故。豈可為作非佛性說。於佛性之中有非佛性。如說離有為法說於無為。無為之中有為耶。又涅槃云。一切眾生皆有三定。謂上中下。上者佛性。中者初禪。下者大地。中定非是少分。故知如上定亦是一切同一文故。既云是定故非准理。說首楞嚴定為佛性故。法華經云。一大事因緣出現世。於欲令眾生開佛知見使得清淨等。又云。十方佛土中唯有一乘位。無二亦無三。除佛方便說。但以假名字引導於眾生。佛性論云。二空真如名應得因以應得佛果故名應得知故。有理性者定有行果。理既一切皆有行果故非少分。若謂法華二乘無滅悉當成佛。此說不同。定二乘非是定性者。不然不定亦成佛教起初轉法輪令說與等說。若同何為慇懃三請許說增上慢人起誑驚怖舍利弗等疑佛為魔。良由今昔懸殊有斯疑訪故。經云所以未曾說說時未生故。令正是其時決定說大乘故知合說非先說也。

[...] called ultimate [...] contradict each other. It also contradicts the ultimate single reality of the middle way [...] the Buddha taught three kinds of ultimacy. Doubts are manifold; how are they to be reconciled? Furthermore, relying on the Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra, the Buddha himself reconciled and explained the various teachings that speak of emptiness, [showing that] it is solely relying on the imagined nature that all phenomena are said to be empty. If [...] how could it be that within the Lakṣaṇapratiṣedha school the three natures are all discarded? The remaining points individually present many obstructions; [...] they can be known by adducing them, so one cannot elaborate at length. One should know that when the Successor [Maitreya] expounded the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra, it was [...] to explain all sūtras; do not say that it only explains teachings such as the Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra. Therefore the commentary on that treatise [...] says: 'This treatise is supreme, like a lotus flower, like a treasury of jewels, like the great ocean. It possesses [...] vast meanings, and skillfully explains their texts without omission.' It also says: 'What is the cause for now expounding this treatise? It means that sentient beings, from beginningless time, have been ignorant of the middle-way true reality regarding all dharmas, harbor doubts, delusions, and perverted attachments, up to [...] according to what is appropriate, expediently expounding for them various subtle dharmas, [revealing] the middle [...] marks, causing sentient beings to know that all things, being empty in such and such a way, are therefore not existent, and being existent in such and such a way, are therefore not empty; [...] dharmas are neither empty nor existent; and leaving behind doubts, delusions, and perverted attachments, they practice to extinguish obstructions, realize sambodhi, and realize the bliss of quietude and cessation.' After the Buddha's nirvāṇa, Māra's deeds arose in turmoil, sectarian clingings vied with one another, and many clung to the view of existence. Bodhisattva Nāgārjuna realized the Pramuditā-bhūmi (Ground of Extreme Joy), gathered the teachings of signlessness and emptiness of various meanings, and composed the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā and other works, thoroughly clarifying the true essentials and eliminating those views of existence. Up to great treatise masters such as Āryadeva, who composed the Śataka-śāstra and other works to broadly illuminate the great meaning. Because of this, sentient beings later clung to the view of non-existence. Bodhisattva Asaṅga reached the first ground, realized the Samādhi of Dharma-Light, and attained great supernatural powers. [...] Maitreya, requesting him to expound this treatise. No principle was not exhausted, no phenomenon was not completely addressed, no text was not explained, no meaning was not illustrated, no doubt was not dispelled, no clinging was not broken, no practice was not cultivated, and no fruit was not realized. It was primarily for the sake of bodhisattvas, so that [...] the objects, practices, and fruits of the various vehicles would all be skillfully mastered, diligently cultivating the Mahāyāna to realize great bodhi, and extensively expounding for sentient beings always without error; and secondarily for the sake of the other vehicles, causing them to rely on their own Dharma to cultivate their own practices and attain their own fruit realizations. Such is a brief explanation of the origin of this treatise. Thus we know that it comprehensively explains all sacred teachings, eliminates the arising of the views of emptiness and existence, and establishes the middle-way practice; how could one say that the Yogācārabhūmi is merely the Dharmalakṣaṇa school? Question: Do not the various sūtras mostly teach dharmalakṣaṇa, or mostly refute marks, or reconcile them? Why should schools not be divided? Answer: According to what has been said, the various teachings do not lack these three meanings. Merely asserting a definitive judgment that such-and-such sūtras and treatises refute that school and subsume this one is inadmissible, all [...]. Therefore, one should say that the subtle principle of the Mahāyāna, whichever sūtra it may be, contains dharmalakṣaṇa, refutation [...], and reconciliation [...]; although there may be one meaning emphasized in many places, in reality these three do not separate from one another, because distinguishing the nature of phenomena, eliminating clinging, and reconciling-and-penetrating are meanings that pervade everywhere. Question: If so, why within the Mahāyāna are there the central school and the extreme school, with Bhāviveka and Dharmapāla, signless and dharmalakṣaṇa, the schools being distinct from one another? Answer: It is merely because the commentators' compositions differed; they stated different schools according to the intention of the one able to explain, not because the Buddha's words fell into extremes, establishing separate schools from the outset. Therefore, it should be said: within the Mahāyāna, the schools are divided into two. First, the school of 'ultimate truth is entirely empty'—like the Yuktivāda-Pariniṣpanna School—namely Bodhisattva Nāgārjuna down to Treatise Master Bhāviveka; relying on the signless teachings, they say that within ultimate truth all is empty, while conventional truth is existent. The Karatalaratna verses say: 'In true realization, the conditioned is empty, / because it arises from conditions like an illusion; / the unconditioned has no reality, / not arising like a sky-flower.' Up to not establishing the three natures, vijñapti-mātra, and so forth. The latter school is Maitreya Tathāgata down to Bodhisattva Dharmapāla; relying on the explicit verbal teachings of the Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra and others, they say that ultimate truth is neither empty nor non-empty. In the Madhyāntavibhāga-śāstra, Maitreya's verse states: 'False discrimination exists; / in it the duality does not exist at all; / herein there is only emptiness, / and in that [emptiness] this also exists. / Therefore all dharmas are said / to be neither empty nor non-empty: / because of existence, non-existence, and existence; / this accords with the middle way.' Among the three natures, the imagined nature is non-existent, while the other-dependent and consummated natures are existent; therefore the two vehicles differ. Question: What are the characteristics of the so-called ultimate truth and conventional truth? Answer: Again, relying on the two schools, what is taught differs. First, according to the Śūnyavāda school, in ultimate truth all teachings are completely empty; within conventional truth, there can be form, mind, cultivation, abandonment, and other dharmas. As the sūtra says: 'Whatever has marks is all illusory'—this is conventional truth; 'When all marks are seen as non-marks, then one sees the Tathāgata'—this is ultimate truth. All sentient beings of the four kinds of birth and the three realms are conventional truth; that there are truly no sentient beings who attain extinction is ultimate truth. The Yuktivāda school teaches that regarding the two truths, ultimate and conventional, there are two different meanings: first, distinguishing the truths based on the person; second, distinguishing the truths in terms of phenomena. Both kinds of the two truths apply to both emptiness and existence. First, based on the person: the Nirvāṇa Sūtra says that what superior wisdom knows is called ultimate, and what middling wisdom knows is called conventional. What the two wisdoms know both apply to existence; therefore we know that both truths apply to both emptiness and existence. In terms of phenomena: phenomena have superior and inferior qualities, mutually contrasted to form the ultimate and conventional. This has four tiers: 1. The two truths of false and real: vases, armies, forests, and the like, being false, are conventional; the aggregates, sense fields, and realms, being real, are ultimate. 2. The two truths of principle and phenomena: phenomenal things such as the aggregates, being coarse, are conventional; the principles of the four noble truths, being subtle, are ultimate. 3. The two truths of shallow and profound: the established setup of the four truths, being shallow, is conventional; the tathatā of twofold emptiness, being profound, is ultimate. 4. The two truths of expression and signified meaning: the tathatā of twofold emptiness with expression is conventional; the expression of the single true dharmadhātu is ultimate. Altogether there are five dharmas: the first, armies, forests, and so on, is conventional and not ultimate; the last, the single true dharmadhātu, is ultimate and not conventional; the intermediate three dharmas are both ultimate and conventional, because they are mutually contrasted. This is extensively explained as in the ninth fascicle of Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi, the sixth fascicle of Prakaraṇāryavācā, the Great Treatise (Yogācārabhūmi), and others. However, the first category is mutually grasped by the worldly as truly existent self-and-dharma natures; therefore it is empty and not existent. The remaining four dharmas universally belong to the other-dependent and consummated natures; therefore they are existent and not empty. Hence it is said that the substance of the two truths encompasses both emptiness and existence, not as previously stated that ultimate truth is entirely empty. Having understood the two truths taught by the two schools, one should next inquire into the reasons for emptiness and existence. The proponent of emptiness says: The Great Sūtra says, 'Even if there were a dharma surpassing nirvāṇa, I would still say it is like an illusion, like a transformation.' The Prajñāhṛdaya says: 'Form is emptiness, emptiness is form; sensation, perception, volition, and consciousness are also like this.' This sūtra also says: 'Prajñāpāramitā is just not prajñāpāramitā,' up to 'there is no dharma that can be spoken,' and so forth. Relying on these teachings, all dharmas are empty. Furthermore, the Pañcaskandhaka says: 'If a dharma had substance, it could arise by itself; since it relies on multiple conditions, it clearly is known to be non-existent, just as knotting a handkerchief into the shape of a rabbit or the like lacks the nature of a rabbit.' The proponent of Yuktivāda says: Relying precisely on this sūtra, 'the accumulation of merit is immeasurable'—how could it be non-existent? It also teaches that the Tathāgata has five eyes, and so forth. Furthermore, 'one who arouses anuttarabodhi does not speak of the mark of annihilation regarding dharmas,' and so forth. Furthermore, a sūtra says: 'Conditioned and unconditioned are called existent; the self and what belongs to the self are called non-existent.' It also says: 'There is no self, no maker, and no experiencer, yet wholesome and unwholesome dharmas are not destroyed,' and so forth. Although it is said that relying on conditions is of illusory and transformed nature and completely devoid of existence, this is because the proponent of Yuktivāda also uses illusion and transformation to illustrate the other-dependent, and uses stars, cataracts, lamps, and illusions to illustrate the conditioned. Moreover, it says, 'I shall cause all sentient beings to enter extinction without remainder'—if all were empty, why bother using sky-flowers to [...] into nirvāṇa? The proponent of emptiness says: All these passages on dharmas are based on conventional truth; in true emptiness there is no making, cultivating, and so forth. The proponent of Yuktivāda challenges: Are your conventional truth and ultimate truth one or different? If you say they are one, existence and emptiness would contradict each other, for we never see suffering and pleasure, or cold and heat, being one. If you say they are different, the two truths are originally simultaneous; how could one be existent while the other is non-existent? The other replies: The substance of the two truths is not different; the conventional truth's substance exists, allowing suffering, pleasure, and the like, but the substance does not pervade [both]. The two truths are mutually contrasted: to deluded sentiments, it is existent, while in true principle, all is empty. Now, following deluded sentiments, conventional truth is said to exist; speaking from reality, conventional truth is also empty. The challenge says: If conventionality is deluded, and causing one to abandon conventional truth to enter true emptiness entails the fault of the mark of annihilation of all dharmas? Answer: Since its substance is non-existent, there is nothing that can be annihilated; therefore it is said that one does not speak of the mark of annihilation of dharmas. This differs entirely from the explanation of the Yuktivāda. Question: According to the proponent of emptiness, delusion is existent and truth is non-existent, and the two truths have one substance; I wonder whether the two truths taught by the Yuktivāda are one or different? Answer: What the Yuktivāda teaches is neither one nor different. Why? Because their meanings and functions differ, they are not one; because there is no separate substance, they are not different. Just as with vases, armies, forests, and so on, looking at the five dharmas in relation to one another, it is mutually so everywhere. Since they are neither one nor different, turning this around, to say they are either different or one has no obstruction. The Renwang Jing says: 'Existence and non-existence are originally two, / like the two horns of an ox; / illuminated and seen with understanding, they are non-dual, / yet the two truths are never identical. / The understanding mind sees non-duality, / but seeking duality, it cannot be found; / this does not mean the two truths are one— / if not two, how could they be found? / In understanding they are naturally one; / in truths they are naturally two. / Penetrating this non-duality, / one enters the true primary meaning.' The intent of the verse is that tathatā is ultimate truth, and the other-dependent and imagined are conventional truth. Because they are the objects of the two wisdoms, they are called truths. Difference is solely in terms of true wisdom, which is termed 'understanding'; whether they are one or different, neither contradicts. The Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi also says: 'Therefore, this [tathatā] and the other-dependent are neither different nor non-different, just as the nature of impermanence and so on is not seen without the other.' Fascicle 75 of the Yogācārabhūmi says: 'In the Mahāyāna, there may be a type of person who, due to wrongly grasping emptiness, speaks thus: "By conventionality, all exists; by the ultimate, all is non-existent." One should tell them: "What is conventional and what is ultimate?" If they say: "All dharmas have no inherent nature—this is called ultimate; if within the absence of inherent nature of dharmas an inherent nature is apprehendable, this is called conventional." "Why is conventionality established within non-existence? Because it arises in discourse through provisional designations and conventional speech." One should tell them: "What is your intention? Does conventionality of speech have an apprehendable inherent nature arising from causes, or is it merely conventionality of speech said to exist? If conventionality of speech arises from causes, for conventionality of speech to arise from causes yet not be existent is unreasonable." Furthermore, one should say to them: "Venerable one, for what reason is all that is apprehendable devoid of inherent nature?" (This challenges: conventional is existent, yet ultimate is non-existent.) They reply: "Because of perverted phenomena." (Meaning the mind is perverted, taking non-existence to be existence, like seeing sky-flowers.) One should again say to them: "What is your intention? Are these perverted phenomena existent or non-existent? If you say they are existent, to say that all dharmas by the ultimate are devoid of inherent nature is unreasonable. If you say they are non-existent, then [to say] because of perverted phenomena all that is apprehendable is devoid of inherent nature is unreasonable."' The proponent of emptiness says: Fascicle 2 of the Bodhisattvapiṭaka Sūtra says: 'Emptiness and the nature of a bodhisattva are non-dual; because they are non-dual, they cannot be spoken of.' It also says: 'Far removed from grasping and clinging, in ultimate truth no dharma can be apprehended; because nature is non-existent, it is called empty.' Therefore, teaching emptiness is [...] the definitive meaning. The Yuktivāda says: This also is not proof. It means that relying on the non-existence of the imagined nature, śūnyatā is non-dual with awakening. Moreover, śūnyatā as the emptiness-nature, which is tathatā, is non-dual with awakening; it does not say that the substance of bodhi is empty and non-existent. If in reality all were empty, what emptiness and what awakening would there be? If you say that in accordance with refuting deluded sentiments, emptiness and awakening are non-dual, while based on ultimate truth there is neither awakening nor emptiness, one should then distinguish the length of a rabbit's horns! Since this is not the case, how could that be? Furthermore, it says: 'Far removed from grasping and clinging, in ultimate truth no dharma can be apprehended'—it does not say that what is not clung to is also an empty, non-existent dharma in ultimate truth. Moreover, if the nature of the two truths were one and not existent, there would be no ordinary and noble, defiled and pure, karmic actions, or the five destinies of humans and devas; there would be no three wretched destinies, no sentient beings saved by compassion, and no virtues of bodhisattvas personally practicing in toil and hardship. Since all is empty and non-existent, who would expound what for whom, and what dharma would be sought? A wise person would not, to eliminate an illusory enemy, seek a barren woman's son to serve as an army. Furthermore, for ordinary persons who are deluded and perverted, there may be conventional form, mind, and other dharmas; but the Buddhas and Tathāgatas have already severed delusions and perversions—how could there be a physical body, pure marvelous lands, and so forth? If you say that through the Buddha's compassionate mind, for the sake of sentient beings, he manifests bodies and lands, yet when sentient beings' delusions and perversions are completely severed, the Buddhas' bodies and lands are also not established, then since the ultimate is empty, the mind of compassion and wisdom would also not exist. What would be the basis for saving sentient beings? Therefore, speaking of emptiness is an intentional teaching. Doctrine and reason being thus, it incurs the fault of contradicting sacred teachings regarding the previously stated Karatalaratna inference, because it contradicts the meaning of the non-empty Dharma teaching. The Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi also says: 'That especially contradicts and harms the sūtras cited previously.' The proponent of emptiness says: I also have scriptural teachings, citing the previously stated Great Prajñā and others to prove and establish [my point]. The Yuktivāda says: Scriptural teachings have explicit and inexplicit meanings; because you contradict explicit teachings, you commit a fault. That is, the Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra says that in the second period, turning the wheel of the true Dharma with an esoteric mark and teaching that all is empty is not the truly definitive meaning. It also says: 'The absence of nature in marks, arising, and ultimacy—such I have entirely revealed. If one does not know this intention of the Buddha, one loses the correct path and cannot proceed.' Since the sūtra itself says that the absence of nature of all dharmas is an immeasurable esoteric mark and not the truly definitive meaning, now judging the teaching of emptiness as the foremost teaching is therefore a fault. Question: Nāgārjuna and Asaṅga both ascended to the Pramuditā-bhūmi and equally realized the dharma-nature, their wisdom and vision not differing; why do the teachings of the two schools differ? Answer: According to the supreme principle, it is equal and without distinction. The Buddha, facing the capacities and needs, taught explicitly and esoterically in different ways; bodhisattvas are also like this: facing what capacities are suited to hear, what they propagated differed. Due to clinging to the view of existence, Bodhisattva Nāgārjuna esoterically propagated emptiness. If the view of emptiness arises, it also becomes an illness; therefore, one must dual-explain neither existent nor empty, leaving behind the two extremes and harmonizing with the middle way, as stated in the aforementioned Yogācārabhūmi commentary and other texts. Moreover, the Mahāyāna signless empty teaching, relying on the realm of true wisdom, dispels all marks and esoterically says that all is empty. The great bodhisattvas, facing the illness of clinging to existence, propagated this esoteric teaching, not that they failed to realize the middle way. Not [...] not realizing, broadly contradicting purity—how could bodhisattvas have any contradiction? Above, we have generally distinguished the schools. Depending on the Śūnyavāda or the Yuktivāda, the two truths propagated by them and clarified in this sūtra, as the Guṇaprabha Treatise explains, all converge into the two schools; the wise should understand this thoroughly. Specifying the main theme: because the title is named Prajñā, that is the main theme. Prajñā has three types: real-mark, contemplative illumination, and written words. The Tripiṭaka Master of Ci'en, relying on various sūtras and treatises, added two more types: namely, the objective realm and the retinue. In all, there are five dharmas: 1. nature of prajñā; 2. marks of prajñā; 3. causes of prajñā; 4. objects of prajñā; 5. companions of prajñā. Defining by their nature and taking them together, all are named prajñā. One opinion holds that this sūtra takes contemplative illumination as its theme, because it speaks of that which is able to sever; as the Great Sūtra says, among the six perfections, the perfection of prajñā is the island, the guide, the leader, the foremost, the torch, and so forth. Therefore, this solely takes the mark of wisdom as its theme, which is the non-conceptual fundamental and subsequently attained two wisdoms penetrating the emptiness of persons and dharmas; or taking the preparatory practices is also not contrary to principle, because the eighteen abodes comprehensively subsume the stages on the grounds. Another opinion holds that it also takes real-mark prajñā as the theme of the sūtra, because it is the nature that can sever, and wisdom arises only when true principle is the foundation; gold and jewels also illustrate the tathāgatagarbha; therefore the sūtra extensively clarifies the signless true principle, the ultimate fruit of the dharmakāya, which is precisely the proper object contemplated by signless wisdom. If one distinguishes the substance of suchness, various explanations differ, as narrated in the Commentary on the Sūtra on Purifying Karmic Obstacles. Question: Why not take the three such as written words? Answer: Because they are not what the sūtra directly clarifies, being [...] branch-ends, while these two are the root; because bodhi and nirvāṇa are their two substances; because the nature of the five dharmas subsumes the three bodies; and because they are the grasper and the grasped, the support and the supported, whether nature or mark, being the root of merits. The third gate is concluded. Fourth, the capacities suited to be addressed: first distinguish the natures of the faculties, and then address them with the teaching. [...] First, the difference in the natures of the faculties: the single vehicle and the five natures have been disputed since ancient times. Now briefly summarizing them, there are three differing explanations: One says: Sentient beings all possess Buddha-nature; there are definitively no fixed-nature two vehicles or those lacking nature. Fascicle 27 of the Nirvāṇa Sūtra says: 'The lion's roar is the definitive teaching that all sentient beings universally have Buddha-nature.' It also says: 'All sentient beings all have minds; whoever has a mind will all attain anuttarabodhi; therefore I say that all sentient beings universally have Buddha-nature.' Also fascicle 37 says: 'For the sake of non-Buddha-nature, Buddha-nature is taught; non-Buddha-nature refers to insentient things such as walls, tiles, and stones; separated from such insentient things, it is called Buddha-nature.' Relying on this sūtra passage, it is not according to principle [to restrict it]: the five aggregates of sentient beings are not excluded, nor is it a minor fraction; because being separated from insentient things is Buddha-nature, how could one speak of non-Buddha-nature [among them]? Does Buddha-nature contain non-Buddha-nature, just as speaking of the unconditioned apart from conditioned dharmas means that within the unconditioned there is conditioned? Furthermore, the Nirvāṇa Sūtra says: 'All sentient beings all have three concentrations: superior, middling, and inferior. The superior is Buddha-nature; the middling is the first dhyāna; the inferior is the great earth.' The middling concentration is not a minor fraction, so we know that just as the superior concentration is also for all, belonging to the same text. Since it is called a concentration, it is not according to principle [to take it as mere nature], for the Śūraṅgama Samādhi is said to be Buddha-nature. The Lotus Sūtra says: 'For one great matter as the cause and condition, [Buddhas] appear in the world: desiring to cause sentient beings to open the Buddha's knowledge and vision and cause them to attain purity,' and so forth. It also says: 'In the Buddha-lands of the ten directions, there is only the stage of the One Vehicle; there is neither a second nor a third, except for the Buddha's expedient teachings, merely using provisional names to guide sentient beings.' The Fo Xing Lun (Buddha-Nature Treatise) says: 'The tathatā of twofold emptiness is named the cause of what should be attained; because the Buddha fruit should be attained, it is called what should be attained and known.' Thus those possessing the rational nature definitively possess practice and fruit; since the principle universally exists in all, practice and fruit are therefore not a minor fraction. If it is said that in the Lotus Sūtra the two vehicles have no extinction and will all become Buddhas, this teaching differs; the fixed two vehicles are not those of fixed nature. If not so, the indefinite [lineage] would also become Buddha's teaching, beginning with the first turning of the wheel of Dharma, having them speak on equal terms. If they were the same, why was there the earnest three-fold request before granting the teaching, causing the arrogant to rise in deceit and fright, and Śāriputra and others to suspect the Buddha was Māra? Truly because present and past are vastly disparate, there were these doubts and inquiries. Thus the sūtra says, 'The reason it was never taught before is that the time to speak had not yet arrived; now is precisely the time to definitively teach the Great Vehicle.' Thus we know it was meant to be taught together, not taught previously.