金剛般若經疏 1.1

1.1

[...] called ultimate [...] contradict each other. It also contradicts the ultimate single reality of the middle way [...] the Buddha taught three kinds of ultimacy. Doubts are manifold; how are they to be reconciled? Furthermore, relying on the Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra, the Buddha himself reconciled and explained the various teachings that speak of emptiness, [showing that] it is solely relying on the imagined nature that all phenomena are said to be empty. If [...] how could it be that within the Lakṣaṇapratiṣedha school the three natures are all discarded? The remaining points individually present many obstructions; [...] they can be known by adducing them, so one cannot elaborate at length. One should know that when the Successor [Maitreya] expounded the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra, it was [...] to explain all sūtras; do not say that it only explains teachings such as the Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra. Therefore the commentary on that treatise [...] says: 'This treatise is supreme, like a lotus flower, like a treasury of jewels, like the great ocean. It possesses [...] vast meanings, and skillfully explains their texts without omission.' It also says: 'What is the cause for now expounding this treatise? It means that sentient beings, from beginningless time, have been ignorant of the middle-way true reality regarding all dharmas, harbor doubts, delusions, and perverted attachments, up to [...] according to what is appropriate, expediently expounding for them various subtle dharmas, [revealing] the middle [...] marks, causing sentient beings to know that all things, being empty in such and such a way, are therefore not existent, and being existent in such and such a way, are therefore not empty; [...] dharmas are neither empty nor existent; and leaving behind doubts, delusions, and perverted attachments, they practice to extinguish obstructions, realize sambodhi, and realize the bliss of quietude and cessation.' After the Buddha's nirvāṇa, Māra's deeds arose in turmoil, sectarian clingings vied with one another, and many clung to the view of existence. Bodhisattva Nāgārjuna realized the Pramuditā-bhūmi (Ground of Extreme Joy), gathered the teachings of signlessness and emptiness of various meanings, and composed the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā and other works, thoroughly clarifying the true essentials and eliminating those views of existence. Up to great treatise masters such as Āryadeva, who composed the Śataka-śāstra and other works to broadly illuminate the great meaning. Because of this, sentient beings later clung to the view of non-existence. Bodhisattva Asaṅga reached the first ground, realized the Samādhi of Dharma-Light, and attained great supernatural powers. [...] Maitreya, requesting him to expound this treatise. No principle was not exhausted, no phenomenon was not completely addressed, no text was not explained, no meaning was not illustrated, no doubt was not dispelled, no clinging was not broken, no practice was not cultivated, and no fruit was not realized. It was primarily for the sake of bodhisattvas, so that [...] the objects, practices, and fruits of the various vehicles would all be skillfully mastered, diligently cultivating the Mahāyāna to realize great bodhi, and extensively expounding for sentient beings always without error; and secondarily for the sake of the other vehicles, causing them to rely on their own Dharma to cultivate their own practices and attain their own fruit realizations. Such is a brief explanation of the origin of this treatise. Thus we know that it comprehensively explains all sacred teachings, eliminates the arising of the views of emptiness and existence, and establishes the middle-way practice; how could one say that the Yogācārabhūmi is merely the Dharmalakṣaṇa school? Question: Do not the various sūtras mostly teach dharmalakṣaṇa, or mostly refute marks, or reconcile them? Why should schools not be divided? Answer: According to what has been said, the various teachings do not lack these three meanings. Merely asserting a definitive judgment that such-and-such sūtras and treatises refute that school and subsume this one is inadmissible, all [...]. Therefore, one should say that the subtle principle of the Mahāyāna, whichever sūtra it may be, contains dharmalakṣaṇa, refutation [...], and reconciliation [...]; although there may be one meaning emphasized in many places, in reality these three do not separate from one another, because distinguishing the nature of phenomena, eliminating clinging, and reconciling-and-penetrating are meanings that pervade everywhere. Question: If so, why within the Mahāyāna are there the central school and the extreme school, with Bhāviveka and Dharmapāla, signless and dharmalakṣaṇa, the schools being distinct from one another? Answer: It is merely because the commentators' compositions differed; they stated different schools according to the intention of the one able to explain, not because the Buddha's words fell into extremes, establishing separate schools from the outset. Therefore, it should be said: within the Mahāyāna, the schools are divided into two. First, the school of 'ultimate truth is entirely empty'—like the Yuktivāda-Pariniṣpanna School—namely Bodhisattva Nāgārjuna down to Treatise Master Bhāviveka; relying on the signless teachings, they say that within ultimate truth all is empty, while conventional truth is existent. The Karatalaratna verses say: 'In true realization, the conditioned is empty, / because it arises from conditions like an illusion; / the unconditioned has no reality, / not arising like a sky-flower.' Up to not establishing the three natures, vijñapti-mātra, and so forth. The latter school is Maitreya Tathāgata down to Bodhisattva Dharmapāla; relying on the explicit verbal teachings of the Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra and others, they say that ultimate truth is neither empty nor non-empty. In the Madhyāntavibhāga-śāstra, Maitreya's verse states: 'False discrimination exists; / in it the duality does not exist at all; / herein there is only emptiness, / and in that [emptiness] this also exists. / Therefore all dharmas are said / to be neither empty nor non-empty: / because of existence, non-existence, and existence; / this accords with the middle way.' Among the three natures, the imagined nature is non-existent, while the other-dependent and consummated natures are existent; therefore the two vehicles differ. Question: What are the characteristics of the so-called ultimate truth and conventional truth? Answer: Again, relying on the two schools, what is taught differs. First, according to the Śūnyavāda school, in ultimate truth all teachings are completely empty; within conventional truth, there can be form, mind, cultivation, abandonment, and other dharmas. As the sūtra says: 'Whatever has marks is all illusory'—this is conventional truth; 'When all marks are seen as non-marks, then one sees the Tathāgata'—this is ultimate truth. All sentient beings of the four kinds of birth and the three realms are conventional truth; that there are truly no sentient beings who attain extinction is ultimate truth. The Yuktivāda school teaches that regarding the two truths, ultimate and conventional, there are two different meanings: first, distinguishing the truths based on the person; second, distinguishing the truths in terms of phenomena. Both kinds of the two truths apply to both emptiness and existence. First, based on the person: the Nirvāṇa Sūtra says that what superior wisdom knows is called ultimate, and what middling wisdom knows is called conventional. What the two wisdoms know both apply to existence; therefore we know that both truths apply to both emptiness and existence. In terms of phenomena: phenomena have superior and inferior qualities, mutually contrasted to form the ultimate and conventional. This has four tiers: 1. The two truths of false and real: vases, armies, forests, and the like, being false, are conventional; the aggregates, sense fields, and realms, being real, are ultimate. 2. The two truths of principle and phenomena: phenomenal things such as the aggregates, being coarse, are conventional; the principles of the four noble truths, being subtle, are ultimate. 3. The two truths of shallow and profound: the established setup of the four truths, being shallow, is conventional; the tathatā of twofold emptiness, being profound, is ultimate. 4. The two truths of expression and signified meaning: the tathatā of twofold emptiness with expression is conventional; the expression of the single true dharmadhātu is ultimate. Altogether there are five dharmas: the first, armies, forests, and so on, is conventional and not ultimate; the last, the single true dharmadhātu, is ultimate and not conventional; the intermediate three dharmas are both ultimate and conventional, because they are mutually contrasted. This is extensively explained as in the ninth fascicle of Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi, the sixth fascicle of Prakaraṇāryavācā, the Great Treatise (Yogācārabhūmi), and others. However, the first category is mutually grasped by the worldly as truly existent self-and-dharma natures; therefore it is empty and not existent. The remaining four dharmas universally belong to the other-dependent and consummated natures; therefore they are existent and not empty. Hence it is said that the substance of the two truths encompasses both emptiness and existence, not as previously stated that ultimate truth is entirely empty. Having understood the two truths taught by the two schools, one should next inquire into the reasons for emptiness and existence. The proponent of emptiness says: The Great Sūtra says, 'Even if there were a dharma surpassing nirvāṇa, I would still say it is like an illusion, like a transformation.' The Prajñāhṛdaya says: 'Form is emptiness, emptiness is form; sensation, perception, volition, and consciousness are also like this.' This sūtra also says: 'Prajñāpāramitā is just not prajñāpāramitā,' up to 'there is no dharma that can be spoken,' and so forth. Relying on these teachings, all dharmas are empty. Furthermore, the Pañcaskandhaka says: 'If a dharma had substance, it could arise by itself; since it relies on multiple conditions, it clearly is known to be non-existent, just as knotting a handkerchief into the shape of a rabbit or the like lacks the nature of a rabbit.' The proponent of Yuktivāda says: Relying precisely on this sūtra, 'the accumulation of merit is immeasurable'—how could it be non-existent? It also teaches that the Tathāgata has five eyes, and so forth. Furthermore, 'one who arouses anuttarabodhi does not speak of the mark of annihilation regarding dharmas,' and so forth. Furthermore, a sūtra says: 'Conditioned and unconditioned are called existent; the self and what belongs to the self are called non-existent.' It also says: 'There is no self, no maker, and no experiencer, yet wholesome and unwholesome dharmas are not destroyed,' and so forth. Although it is said that relying on conditions is of illusory and transformed nature and completely devoid of existence, this is because the proponent of Yuktivāda also uses illusion and transformation to illustrate the other-dependent, and uses stars, cataracts, lamps, and illusions to illustrate the conditioned. Moreover, it says, 'I shall cause all sentient beings to enter extinction without remainder'—if all were empty, why bother using sky-flowers to [...] into nirvāṇa? The proponent of emptiness says: All these passages on dharmas are based on conventional truth; in true emptiness there is no making, cultivating, and so forth. The proponent of Yuktivāda challenges: Are your conventional truth and ultimate truth one or different? If you say they are one, existence and emptiness would contradict each other, for we never see suffering and pleasure, or cold and heat, being one. If you say they are different, the two truths are originally simultaneous; how could one be existent while the other is non-existent? The other replies: The substance of the two truths is not different; the conventional truth's substance exists, allowing suffering, pleasure, and the like, but the substance does not pervade [both]. The two truths are mutually contrasted: to deluded sentiments, it is existent, while in true principle, all is empty. Now, following deluded sentiments, conventional truth is said to exist; speaking from reality, conventional truth is also empty. The challenge says: If conventionality is deluded, and causing one to abandon conventional truth to enter true emptiness entails the fault of the mark of annihilation of all dharmas? Answer: Since its substance is non-existent, there is nothing that can be annihilated; therefore it is said that one does not speak of the mark of annihilation of dharmas. This differs entirely from the explanation of the Yuktivāda. Question: According to the proponent of emptiness, delusion is existent and truth is non-existent, and the two truths have one substance; I wonder whether the two truths taught by the Yuktivāda are one or different? Answer: What the Yuktivāda teaches is neither one nor different. Why? Because their meanings and functions differ, they are not one; because there is no separate substance, they are not different. Just as with vases, armies, forests, and so on, looking at the five dharmas in relation to one another, it is mutually so everywhere. Since they are neither one nor different, turning this around, to say they are either different or one has no obstruction. The Renwang Jing says: 'Existence and non-existence are originally two, / like the two horns of an ox; / illuminated and seen with understanding, they are non-dual, / yet the two truths are never identical. / The understanding mind sees non-duality, / but seeking duality, it cannot be found; / this does not mean the two truths are one— / if not two, how could they be found? / In understanding they are naturally one; / in truths they are naturally two. / Penetrating this non-duality, / one enters the true primary meaning.' The intent of the verse is that tathatā is ultimate truth, and the other-dependent and imagined are conventional truth. Because they are the objects of the two wisdoms, they are called truths. Difference is solely in terms of true wisdom, which is termed 'understanding'; whether they are one or different, neither contradicts. The Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi also says: 'Therefore, this [tathatā] and the other-dependent are neither different nor non-different, just as the nature of impermanence and so on is not seen without the other.' Fascicle 75 of the Yogācārabhūmi says: 'In the Mahāyāna, there may be a type of person who, due to wrongly grasping emptiness, speaks thus: "By conventionality, all exists; by the ultimate, all is non-existent." One should tell them: "What is conventional and what is ultimate?" If they say: "All dharmas have no inherent nature—this is called ultimate; if within the absence of inherent nature of dharmas an inherent nature is apprehendable, this is called conventional." "Why is conventionality established within non-existence? Because it arises in discourse through provisional designations and conventional speech." One should tell them: "What is your intention? Does conventionality of speech have an apprehendable inherent nature arising from causes, or is it merely conventionality of speech said to exist? If conventionality of speech arises from causes, for conventionality of speech to arise from causes yet not be existent is unreasonable." Furthermore, one should say to them: "Venerable one, for what reason is all that is apprehendable devoid of inherent nature?" (This challenges: conventional is existent, yet ultimate is non-existent.) They reply: "Because of perverted phenomena." (Meaning the mind is perverted, taking non-existence to be existence, like seeing sky-flowers.) One should again say to them: "What is your intention? Are these perverted phenomena existent or non-existent? If you say they are existent, to say that all dharmas by the ultimate are devoid of inherent nature is unreasonable. If you say they are non-existent, then [to say] because of perverted phenomena all that is apprehendable is devoid of inherent nature is unreasonable."' The proponent of emptiness says: Fascicle 2 of the Bodhisattvapiṭaka Sūtra says: 'Emptiness and the nature of a bodhisattva are non-dual; because they are non-dual, they cannot be spoken of.' It also says: 'Far removed from grasping and clinging, in ultimate truth no dharma can be apprehended; because nature is non-existent, it is called empty.' Therefore, teaching emptiness is [...] the definitive meaning. The Yuktivāda says: This also is not proof. It means that relying on the non-existence of the imagined nature, śūnyatā is non-dual with awakening. Moreover, śūnyatā as the emptiness-nature, which is tathatā, is non-dual with awakening; it does not say that the substance of bodhi is empty and non-existent. If in reality all were empty, what emptiness and what awakening would there be? If you say that in accordance with refuting deluded sentiments, emptiness and awakening are non-dual, while based on ultimate truth there is neither awakening nor emptiness, one should then distinguish the length of a rabbit's horns! Since this is not the case, how could that be? Furthermore, it says: 'Far removed from grasping and clinging, in ultimate truth no dharma can be apprehended'—it does not say that what is not clung to is also an empty, non-existent dharma in ultimate truth. Moreover, if the nature of the two truths were one and not existent, there would be no ordinary and noble, defiled and pure, karmic actions, or the five destinies of humans and devas; there would be no three wretched destinies, no sentient beings saved by compassion, and no virtues of bodhisattvas personally practicing in toil and hardship. Since all is empty and non-existent, who would expound what for whom, and what dharma would be sought? A wise person would not, to eliminate an illusory enemy, seek a barren woman's son to serve as an army. Furthermore, for ordinary persons who are deluded and perverted, there may be conventional form, mind, and other dharmas; but the Buddhas and Tathāgatas have already severed delusions and perversions—how could there be a physical body, pure marvelous lands, and so forth? If you say that through the Buddha's compassionate mind, for the sake of sentient beings, he manifests bodies and lands, yet when sentient beings' delusions and perversions are completely severed, the Buddhas' bodies and lands are also not established, then since the ultimate is empty, the mind of compassion and wisdom would also not exist. What would be the basis for saving sentient beings? Therefore, speaking of emptiness is an intentional teaching. Doctrine and reason being thus, it incurs the fault of contradicting sacred teachings regarding the previously stated Karatalaratna inference, because it contradicts the meaning of the non-empty Dharma teaching. The Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi also says: 'That especially contradicts and harms the sūtras cited previously.' The proponent of emptiness says: I also have scriptural teachings, citing the previously stated Great Prajñā and others to prove and establish [my point]. The Yuktivāda says: Scriptural teachings have explicit and inexplicit meanings; because you contradict explicit teachings, you commit a fault. That is, the Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra says that in the second period, turning the wheel of the true Dharma with an esoteric mark and teaching that all is empty is not the truly definitive meaning. It also says: 'The absence of nature in marks, arising, and ultimacy—such I have entirely revealed. If one does not know this intention of the Buddha, one loses the correct path and cannot proceed.' Since the sūtra itself says that the absence of nature of all dharmas is an immeasurable esoteric mark and not the truly definitive meaning, now judging the teaching of emptiness as the foremost teaching is therefore a fault. Question: Nāgārjuna and Asaṅga both ascended to the Pramuditā-bhūmi and equally realized the dharma-nature, their wisdom and vision not differing; why do the teachings of the two schools differ? Answer: According to the supreme principle, it is equal and without distinction. The Buddha, facing the capacities and needs, taught explicitly and esoterically in different ways; bodhisattvas are also like this: facing what capacities are suited to hear, what they propagated differed. Due to clinging to the view of existence, Bodhisattva Nāgārjuna esoterically propagated emptiness. If the view of emptiness arises, it also becomes an illness; therefore, one must dual-explain neither existent nor empty, leaving behind the two extremes and harmonizing with the middle way, as stated in the aforementioned Yogācārabhūmi commentary and other texts. Moreover, the Mahāyāna signless empty teaching, relying on the realm of true wisdom, dispels all marks and esoterically says that all is empty. The great bodhisattvas, facing the illness of clinging to existence, propagated this esoteric teaching, not that they failed to realize the middle way. Not [...] not realizing, broadly contradicting purity—how could bodhisattvas have any contradiction? Above, we have generally distinguished the schools. Depending on the Śūnyavāda or the Yuktivāda, the two truths propagated by them and clarified in this sūtra, as the Guṇaprabha Treatise explains, all converge into the two schools; the wise should understand this thoroughly. Specifying the main theme: because the title is named Prajñā, that is the main theme. Prajñā has three types: real-mark, contemplative illumination, and written words. The Tripiṭaka Master of Ci'en, relying on various sūtras and treatises, added two more types: namely, the objective realm and the retinue. In all, there are five dharmas: 1. nature of prajñā; 2. marks of prajñā; 3. causes of prajñā; 4. objects of prajñā; 5. companions of prajñā. Defining by their nature and taking them together, all are named prajñā. One opinion holds that this sūtra takes contemplative illumination as its theme, because it speaks of that which is able to sever; as the Great Sūtra says, among the six perfections, the perfection of prajñā is the island, the guide, the leader, the foremost, the torch, and so forth. Therefore, this solely takes the mark of wisdom as its theme, which is the non-conceptual fundamental and subsequently attained two wisdoms penetrating the emptiness of persons and dharmas; or taking the preparatory practices is also not contrary to principle, because the eighteen abodes comprehensively subsume the stages on the grounds. Another opinion holds that it also takes real-mark prajñā as the theme of the sūtra, because it is the nature that can sever, and wisdom arises only when true principle is the foundation; gold and jewels also illustrate the tathāgatagarbha; therefore the sūtra extensively clarifies the signless true principle, the ultimate fruit of the dharmakāya, which is precisely the proper object contemplated by signless wisdom. If one distinguishes the substance of suchness, various explanations differ, as narrated in the Commentary on the Sūtra on Purifying Karmic Obstacles. Question: Why not take the three such as written words? Answer: Because they are not what the sūtra directly clarifies, being [...] branch-ends, while these two are the root; because bodhi and nirvāṇa are their two substances; because the nature of the five dharmas subsumes the three bodies; and because they are the grasper and the grasped, the support and the supported, whether nature or mark, being the root of merits. The third gate is concluded. Fourth, the capacities suited to be addressed: first distinguish the natures of the faculties, and then address them with the teaching. [...] First, the difference in the natures of the faculties: the single vehicle and the five natures have been disputed since ancient times. Now briefly summarizing them, there are three differing explanations: One says: Sentient beings all possess Buddha-nature; there are definitively no fixed-nature two vehicles or those lacking nature. Fascicle 27 of the Nirvāṇa Sūtra says: 'The lion's roar is the definitive teaching that all sentient beings universally have Buddha-nature.' It also says: 'All sentient beings all have minds; whoever has a mind will all attain anuttarabodhi; therefore I say that all sentient beings universally have Buddha-nature.' Also fascicle 37 says: 'For the sake of non-Buddha-nature, Buddha-nature is taught; non-Buddha-nature refers to insentient things such as walls, tiles, and stones; separated from such insentient things, it is called Buddha-nature.' Relying on this sūtra passage, it is not according to principle [to restrict it]: the five aggregates of sentient beings are not excluded, nor is it a minor fraction; because being separated from insentient things is Buddha-nature, how could one speak of non-Buddha-nature [among them]? Does Buddha-nature contain non-Buddha-nature, just as speaking of the unconditioned apart from conditioned dharmas means that within the unconditioned there is conditioned? Furthermore, the Nirvāṇa Sūtra says: 'All sentient beings all have three concentrations: superior, middling, and inferior. The superior is Buddha-nature; the middling is the first dhyāna; the inferior is the great earth.' The middling concentration is not a minor fraction, so we know that just as the superior concentration is also for all, belonging to the same text. Since it is called a concentration, it is not according to principle [to take it as mere nature], for the Śūraṅgama Samādhi is said to be Buddha-nature. The Lotus Sūtra says: 'For one great matter as the cause and condition, [Buddhas] appear in the world: desiring to cause sentient beings to open the Buddha's knowledge and vision and cause them to attain purity,' and so forth. It also says: 'In the Buddha-lands of the ten directions, there is only the stage of the One Vehicle; there is neither a second nor a third, except for the Buddha's expedient teachings, merely using provisional names to guide sentient beings.' The Fo Xing Lun (Buddha-Nature Treatise) says: 'The tathatā of twofold emptiness is named the cause of what should be attained; because the Buddha fruit should be attained, it is called what should be attained and known.' Thus those possessing the rational nature definitively possess practice and fruit; since the principle universally exists in all, practice and fruit are therefore not a minor fraction. If it is said that in the Lotus Sūtra the two vehicles have no extinction and will all become Buddhas, this teaching differs; the fixed two vehicles are not those of fixed nature. If not so, the indefinite [lineage] would also become Buddha's teaching, beginning with the first turning of the wheel of Dharma, having them speak on equal terms. If they were the same, why was there the earnest three-fold request before granting the teaching, causing the arrogant to rise in deceit and fright, and Śāriputra and others to suspect the Buddha was Māra? Truly because present and past are vastly disparate, there were these doubts and inquiries. Thus the sūtra says, 'The reason it was never taught before is that the time to speak had not yet arrived; now is precisely the time to definitively teach the Great Vehicle.' Thus we know it was meant to be taught together, not taught previously.