華嚴經疏 1.16

1.16

自下第二別顯微相中二。初二句明同相。後六句不同相。此二相中略作三門。一定其文。二辯相。三釋文。一定其文者。有人釋云。此既即是性淨方便淨二種涅槃。故知前微。此相總明果法欲說地法。何故明果以辨甚深。果位顯故。舉顯十地甚深之義。因之與果高下無殊。云何相顯然。此雖復隨人高下法體不別。其猶虛空。約尺分異。異即是空地法像。此今明此相。總是地智。論釋云。智相有二種等智。即是地智故不通餘釋。若是智即是因位。如何得有二涅槃邪。釋此是地中所依果分如下文云。如因大海有十寶山。因於佛智有十地等。如一一山下悉有大海。一一地內佛果。若約三乘佛果唯在十地後。若就圓教佛果通在一一地中。是故一地攝一切地。問。若爾證得一地已得佛果。何須說十。答。引漸機故。是故十地多就三乘差別位說。問。若就三乘則無果法。答。以三乘十地。就一乘十地說故有斯趣　釋文中同相內言從本已來空者。此總明同相。論中先釋相後釋同。前中云何相者。問。意云色等法空皆名同相。今言相者是何等相。答。彼智相故者。今此所說是地智相。引頌中自體空。是智自空故。非餘色等諸法空相。又此是體相非是標相。下釋同中云何同相者。問。意既唯局在智相。云何名同。答。中一切諸法如說自體空者。以此真空通一切法故名同也。言滅除諸苦惱者。此別顯同相。苦惱者惡取空故。惡取空者。空亂意故。依寶性論。空亂意有三種過。彼論云。起如是心實有法斷滅後時得涅槃。又復有人以空為有物我應得空。又生如是心離色等法。別更有空我應修行令得彼空。解云。今此經中本來空者。離此三種亂意苦惱故云滅除也。論經名有不二不盡者。言別意同。言不盡者離滅色故。不二者離色外故。有者離以空為有故。此義云何。以若妄謂空為有物則令真空於此不有。若真空有情有則無。是故理有治情有也。彼論約色等簡此論。就地智明空下明不同相中。淨相解脫者。是總顯示。謂對治離染故。別顯中二。先何處解脫者。問。所脫之處諸道即六道也。惑業生者。煩惱是道緣。業是道因。生是道果。六道不出此三故。遠離名解脫也。二云何解脫者。問。解脫體即五句顯能脫之體一平等相。既言遠離諸趣。云何離邪。謂見世間即同涅槃。如是遠離非如二乘。有背向故。故云等同涅槃相也。無中亦無後者。第二斷惑相。論經名非初非中非後。謂於三時皆無斷義方為斷也。釋此文有二門。一約相翻門。二約相續門。初中謂無間道智正斷惑時。為智光起惑後滅邪。為或先滅智後生邪。為同時邪。此三時惑智。各有兩失故不成斷。謂智有自成無漏過。不能滅惑過。煩惱有自滅過。不障聖道過。於三位中思之可知。如燈破闇三時不破。此亦如是。如雜集論第四云。從何而得斷邪。不從過去已滅無故。不從未來未生故。不從現在道不俱故。從諸煩惱麁重而得斷。乃至廣說。經云。毘婆舍那不能破煩惱等。皆是此義故云非初非中非後也。問。唯識論第九中。聖道現前惑種必滅。如秤兩頭低昂時等。若據此說即是同時。如何此中三時俱非。答。麁說可爾。細剋實難。何者若同時者。智自生時惑自滅。時不相由故何成對治。如東家男生西家女死。雖亦同時。然無相由不成對治。問。若爾云何斷。答。即此三時。求斷不得方成斷義。此即不斷斷也。前中後取故者。謂於前中後三時之中取彼非初中後非異三時取彼非也。如於色等處取彼真空非異色別取斷空。此亦如是故不斷義。二約相續門者。謂此地智生滅相續。前中後三。何時定能斷煩惱邪。唯前不能斷。以落謝故。唯後不能斷。以未起故。中亦不能斷。以不住故。是故三時皆無斷義。若爾云何斷。論云。如燈炎非唯初中後前中後取故。此則唯初唯中等不可前中後相續取可有斷義問。既三時單取各不成斷。從此和合豈成斷邪。答。有人解云。三時別取各不成斷。三時相續假說為斷故。云前中後取也。此麁說可爾。細剋不然。以別就三時各不成斷。總此三時豈成斷邪。如一沙無油多沙亦無。今釋此言前中後取者。是簡濫之言。何者人謂此智前中後位各不能斷。則謂同於無聖智處惡取空也。故今簡云此於初上取非初中上取。非中後亦爾。不同無智故非惡取故。云非初非中後前中後取故。問。餘處論說聖道初起則能滅惑。何故此中乃云非初。答。依毘曇。一念有燒始終方盡治結周。然依成實。一念不燒相續方盡治結亦爾。若大乘初教。初念亦斷中後亦。然若依終教。如緣起性三時俱不能斷。即由不作緣起方成故不無斷也。言非言辭所說者。第三觀行相。謂此無分別觀智非同世間言說所及故。又不同小乘從聲得悟故也。言出過三世者。第四轉依相。謂此微智依止真如常住法身。以是究竟轉依故。能依所依俱悉常故。出於三世遷動相也。問。所依本有可得。是常能依修智。豈無生滅。答。初教隨相修智生滅。終教已去智如境故。始覺同本覺故亦非無常。論云。非如無常意識者。簡未轉依時妄念意識是無常。即知轉已去真智是常。此簡能緣也。依止無常因緣法者。簡未轉依時所緣境也。修多羅中決定說者。引經證成境智俱常。如處處大乘經中。皆說佛果常住。又如此經十藏品中信藏之內。信佛智無生滅等。具如彼說。言其相如虛空者。第五解脫相。謂如二乘智雖離惑障。猶有法執故。其解脫猶有障礙。此則不爾。二障及習一切皆盡故。云如虛空無障礙也。又此明自體清淨如虛空無染。又論中重結。此五種中後三何故重言者。以後三種皆對妄顯真故。云如是觀觀等。問。詳此五句初句了世間。即涅槃明離而無離。二明三時無斷惑義。即斷而不斷。乃至其相如空。准此等義與上同相何別。答。舉實無別。但約自體處名同相。約智證入處名不同相。若不同彼同相不得成。此不同相也。是故義說有二法體無別。

From here below is the second [section], individually revealing the subtle characteristics, which has two [parts]: the first two lines explain the common characteristic, and the subsequent six lines explain the uncommon characteristics. In these two characteristics, three gates are briefly established: first, determining the text; second, distinguishing the characteristics; third, explaining the text. First, determining the text: someone explains that since these are precisely the two kinds of nirvāṇa—namely, the naturally pure and the adventitiously pure through expedients—one knows that the preceding subtlety and these characteristics collectively explain the fruit dharmas, whereas one desires to explain the ground dharmas. Why explain the fruit to distinguish profound depth? Because the position of the fruit is manifest, it is adduced to display the profound meaning of the ten grounds. Between cause and fruit there is no difference of high and low; how could their characteristics be manifest? However, although there are differences in high and low according to the person, the essence of the Dharma is without distinction—just as empty space is differentiated according to feet and inches, yet the difference is itself space. The dharmas of the grounds are like this. Now, this explanation of the characteristics is entirely regarding the cognition of the grounds. The Śāstra's commentary states: "The characteristic of cognition has two kinds," and so forth; cognition is precisely the cognition of the grounds, hence it does not admit of other interpretations. If it is cognition, it belongs to the causal position; how could it possess the two nirvāṇas? The explanation is that this is the fruit-division on which the grounds rely, as a subsequent text states: "Just as relying on the great ocean there are ten jewel mountains, so relying on the Buddha's cognition there are ten grounds," and so forth. Just as beneath each mountain there is the great ocean, so within each ground there is the Buddha-fruit. If according to the Three Vehicles, the Buddha-fruit is only after the ten grounds; if according to the Perfect Teaching, the Buddha-fruit is present throughout each and every ground. Therefore, one ground subsumes all grounds. Question: If so, having realized and attained one ground, one has already attained the Buddha-fruit; why is it necessary to speak of ten? Answer: It is to guide capacities of gradual progress; therefore, the ten grounds are mostly explained according to the differentiated positions of the Three Vehicles. Question: If according to the Three Vehicles, then there is no fruit dharma [in the grounds]? Answer: Because the ten grounds of the Three Vehicles are spoken with reference to the ten grounds of the One Vehicle, there is this purport. In explaining the text, within the common characteristic, the words "originally empty from the very beginning" collectively explain the common characteristic. In the Śāstra, it first explains the characteristic and then explains the commonality. Under the former, to "what characteristic is it?", the question means: the emptiness of dharmas such as form is called the common characteristic; now when speaking of "characteristic", what kind of characteristic is it? To the answer, "Because it is the characteristic of that cognition," now what is spoken here is the characteristic of the cognition of the grounds. Quoting the verse's "its own essence is empty," it is because cognition is itself empty, not the empty characteristic of other dharmas such as form. Furthermore, this is the essential characteristic (svabhāva-lakṣaṇa), not an indicative sign (nimitta). Below, in explaining the commonality, to "why is it called the common characteristic?", the question means: since it is exclusively restricted to the characteristic of cognition, why is it called "common"? The answer states: "Because all dharmas, as explained, are empty in their own essence"—because this true emptiness pervades all dharmas, it is called "common". The words "eliminating all afflictions" individually display the common characteristic. Afflictions are due to the wrongly grasped emptiness. Wrongly grasped emptiness is due to a mind confused about emptiness. Relying on the Ratnagotravibhāga, a mind confused about emptiness has three kinds of faults. That treatise says: "Conceiving such a thought: dharmas truly exist, and having been annihilated, afterwards one attains nirvāṇa. Moreover, there are people who take emptiness to be an existing thing, [thinking:] 'I ought to attain emptiness.' Moreover, generating such a thought: separate from dharmas such as form, there is apart from them another emptiness, [and] 'I ought to practice so as to attain that emptiness.'" The explanation is: now in this sūtra, "originally empty from the very beginning" is free from these three kinds of confused mental afflictions; hence it is said to "eliminate" them. In the Śāstra's sūtra text, it is called "existing, non-dual, and inexhaustible"; the words differ but the meaning is the same. "Inexhaustible" means free from the annihilation of form; "non-dual" means free from being outside of form; "existing" means free from taking emptiness to be an existing thing. What does this mean? Because if one falsely takes emptiness to be an existing thing, it causes true emptiness not to exist here. If true emptiness exists, sentimental existence is then non-existent. Therefore, the existence in principle remedies sentimental existence. That treatise eliminates [errors] with respect to form, etc.; this treatise explains emptiness with respect to the cognition of the grounds. Below, in explaining the uncommon characteristics, "liberated in its pure characteristic" is the general revelation, meaning that through antidotes it is free from defilement. Within the individual revelation, there are two: first, from what place is one liberated? The question asks about the place of liberation. "All realms" means the six realms. Delusion, karma, and rebirth: afflictions are the condition of the realm, karma is the cause of the realm, and rebirth is the fruit of the realm; the six realms do not go beyond these three, hence being far removed [from them] is called liberation. Second, how is one liberated? The question asks about the essence of liberation; that is, the five lines reveal the essence that can liberate. First, the characteristic of equality: since it is said to be far removed from all destinies, how does one leave them? It means seeing the mundane world as identical to nirvāṇa; such departure is not like that of the Two Vehicles, which have turning away and turning toward; hence it says: "equal to the characteristic of nirvāṇa." "Without a middle and also without an end" is the second, the characteristic of severing delusions. The Śāstra's sūtra text calls it "neither beginning, nor middle, nor end," meaning that only when there is no sense of severance in any of the three times does it truly constitute severance. In explaining this text, there are two gates: first, the gate of reciprocal opposition; second, the gate of continuity. In the first, when the cognition of the ānantaryamārga is directly severing delusion, does the light of cognition arise and delusion subsequently cease? Or does delusion first cease and cognition subsequently arise? Or are they simultaneous? Regarding the delusion and cognition of these three times, each has two faults, and thus severance is not accomplished. Namely, cognition has the fault of becoming uncontaminated by itself and the fault of being unable to extinguish delusion; affliction has the fault of extinguishing by itself and the fault of not obstructing the noble path. Thinking upon this in the three positions, it can be known. Just as a lamp destroying darkness does not destroy it in the three times, this is also like that. As the fourth fascicle of the Samuccaya states: "From what is severance attained? Not from the past, because it has already ceased and is non-existent; not from the future, because it has not yet arisen; not from the present, because the path is not concomitant [with it]; severance is attained from the coarse heaviness (dauṣṭhulya) of the afflictions," and so forth, up to extensive explanations. The sūtra states: "Vipaśyanā cannot destroy afflictions," etc., which are all this meaning; hence it says: "neither beginning, nor middle, nor end." Question: In the ninth fascicle of the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi, when the noble path manifests, the seeds of delusion are necessarily extinguished, like the rising and lowering of the two ends of a balance scale at the same time. If according to this explanation, it is simultaneous; why here are all three times negated? Answer: Roughly speaking it may be so, but fine scrutiny is truly difficult. Why? Because if they are simultaneous, when cognition arises of itself, delusion extinguishes of itself; since the times do not depend on each other, how could it constitute an antidote? It is like a boy being born in the eastern house and a girl dying in the western house; although they are at the same time, because they have no mutual dependence, it does not constitute an antidote. Question: If so, how is it severed? Answer: In these very three times, when one seeks severance and it cannot be found, only then is the meaning of severance accomplished. This is precisely the severance of non-severance. As for "grasped in the beginning, middle, and end," it means that within the three times of beginning, middle, and end, one grasps that which is neither beginning, nor middle, nor end; it is not that apart from the three times one grasps that negation. Just as in things like form one grasps their true emptiness, not apart from form grasping a separate annihilated emptiness; this is also like that, hence the meaning of non-severance. Second, regarding the gate of continuity: the arising and ceasing of the cognition of this ground is continuous; among the three—beginning, middle, and end—at which time can it definitively sever afflictions? The beginning alone cannot sever, because it falls away; the end alone cannot sever, because it has not yet arisen; the middle also cannot sever, because it does not abide. Therefore, in all three times there is no meaning of severance. If so, how is it severed? The Śāstra states: "Like a lamp flame, it is not merely beginning, middle, or end; because it is grasped in the beginning, middle, and end." This means that merely beginning or merely middle, etc., is not possible; only when grasped in the continuity of beginning, middle, and end can there be the meaning of severance. Question: Since taking the three times individually does not accomplish severance, how could severance be accomplished from their combination? Answer: Someone explains that taking the three times separately each fails to accomplish severance; the continuity of the three times is metaphorically designated as severance, hence it says "grasped in the beginning, middle, and end." Roughly speaking this may be so, but under fine scrutiny it is not. Because taken separately with respect to the three times each fails to accomplish severance, how could the combination of these three times accomplish it? Just as a single grain of sand contains no oil, so many grains of sand also contain none. Now it is explained: these words "grasped in the beginning, middle, and end" are words distinguishing and preventing confusion. Why? People suppose that because this cognition cannot sever at each position of beginning, middle, and end, they think it is identical to the absence of noble cognition and wrongly grasp emptiness. Therefore, it now distinguishes by saying: this is grasped on the beginning as non-beginning, on the middle as non-middle, and the end is also like this; it is not the same as being without cognition, and hence is not a wrong grasp; thus it says: "neither beginning, nor middle, nor end, because it is grasped in the beginning, middle, and end." Question: Treatises elsewhere explain that when the noble path first arises it can extinguish delusion; why does it say here "neither beginning"? Answer: According to the Abhidharma, a single thought has burning, yet from beginning to end only then is it exhausted and the remedy of fetters is complete. However, according to the Tattvasiddhi, a single thought does not burn, and only through continuity is it exhausted; the remedy of fetters is also like this. If according to the Initial Teaching of the Mahāyāna, the first thought also severs, and the middle and end are also like this. If relying on the Final Teaching, like the nature of dependent origination, none of the three times can sever; precisely because it does not create dependent origination is it accomplished, and therefore it is not without severance. The words "not expressible by words" are the third, the characteristic of contemplative practice; it means that this non-conceptual contemplative cognition is not reached by mundane words and speech; furthermore, it is not like the Small Vehicle gaining awakening from sound. The words "transcending the three times" are the fourth, the characteristic of the fundamental transformation (āśrayaparivṛtti); it means that this subtle cognition relies on the permanently abiding dharmakāya of tathatā, and because it is the ultimate fundamental transformation, both that which relies and that which is relied upon are completely permanent; hence it transcends the fluctuating characteristics of the three times. Question: That which is relied upon is originally existent and can be permanent; how could the cultivated cognition that relies upon it be free from arising and ceasing? Answer: In the Initial Teaching, cultivated cognition follows characteristics and has arising and ceasing; from the Final Teaching onward, because cognition is like the sphere of objects, and initial awakening is identical to original awakening, it is also not impermanent. The Śāstra states: "Not like the impermanent mental consciousness"—this excludes the false thinking mental consciousness before the fundamental transformation as being impermanent, so that one knows that from the transformation onward, true cognition is permanent; this excludes that which cognizes. "Relying on impermanent causal conditioned dharmas" excludes the cognitive objective sphere before the fundamental transformation. "Definitively spoken in the sūtras" adduces sūtras to verify that both sphere and cognition are permanent, as in various Mahāyāna sūtras everywhere, the Buddha-fruit is always spoken of as permanently abiding. Furthermore, like the Store of Faith within the Chapter on the Ten Stores in this sūtra, one has faith that the Buddha's cognition is free from arising and ceasing, etc., fully as explained there. The words "its characteristic is like empty space" are the fifth, the characteristic of liberation; it means that although the cognition of the Two Vehicles is free from the obstruction of afflictions, because there is still attachment to dharmas, their liberation still has obstructions. This is not like that: the two obstructions and their residual impressions are entirely exhausted, hence it says: "like empty space, without obstruction." Furthermore, this explains that its essential nature is pure, unstained like empty space. Moreover, in the Śāstra's recapitulation, why are the latter three of these five kinds repeated? Because the latter three kinds all reveal the true in contrast to the false; hence it says: "contemplating thus, contemplating," and so forth. Question: Examining these five lines: the first line understands the mundane world to be identical to nirvāṇa, explaining departure without departure; the second explains that in the three times there is no meaning of severing delusion, which is severance without severance; up to its characteristic being like empty space. According to these meanings, what difference is there between them and the preceding common characteristic? Answer: In reality there is no difference; it is merely that with respect to the place of its own essence it is called the common characteristic, and with respect to the place of cognition's realization and entry it is called the uncommon characteristics. If they did not share in that common characteristic, these uncommon characteristics could not be established. Therefore, conceptually speaking there are two, but their Dharma-essence is without distinction.