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華嚴經疏 1.16

English (machine translation) 1.16

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1.16

From here below is the second [section], individually revealing the subtle characteristics, which has two [parts]: the first two lines explain the common characteristic, and the subsequent six lines explain the uncommon characteristics. In these two characteristics, three gates are briefly established: first, determining the text; second, distinguishing the characteristics; third, explaining the text. First, determining the text: someone explains that since these are precisely the two kinds of nirvāṇa—namely, the naturally pure and the adventitiously pure through expedients—one knows that the preceding subtlety and these characteristics collectively explain the fruit dharmas, whereas one desires to explain the ground dharmas. Why explain the fruit to distinguish profound depth? Because the position of the fruit is manifest, it is adduced to display the profound meaning of the ten grounds. Between cause and fruit there is no difference of high and low; how could their characteristics be manifest? However, although there are differences in high and low according to the person, the essence of the Dharma is without distinction—just as empty space is differentiated according to feet and inches, yet the difference is itself space. The dharmas of the grounds are like this. Now, this explanation of the characteristics is entirely regarding the cognition of the grounds. The Śāstra's commentary states: "The characteristic of cognition has two kinds," and so forth; cognition is precisely the cognition of the grounds, hence it does not admit of other interpretations. If it is cognition, it belongs to the causal position; how could it possess the two nirvāṇas? The explanation is that this is the fruit-division on which the grounds rely, as a subsequent text states: "Just as relying on the great ocean there are ten jewel mountains, so relying on the Buddha's cognition there are ten grounds," and so forth. Just as beneath each mountain there is the great ocean, so within each ground there is the Buddha-fruit. If according to the Three Vehicles, the Buddha-fruit is only after the ten grounds; if according to the Perfect Teaching, the Buddha-fruit is present throughout each and every ground. Therefore, one ground subsumes all grounds. Question: If so, having realized and attained one ground, one has already attained the Buddha-fruit; why is it necessary to speak of ten? Answer: It is to guide capacities of gradual progress; therefore, the ten grounds are mostly explained according to the differentiated positions of the Three Vehicles. Question: If according to the Three Vehicles, then there is no fruit dharma [in the grounds]? Answer: Because the ten grounds of the Three Vehicles are spoken with reference to the ten grounds of the One Vehicle, there is this purport. In explaining the text, within the common characteristic, the words "originally empty from the very beginning" collectively explain the common characteristic. In the Śāstra, it first explains the characteristic and then explains the commonality. Under the former, to "what characteristic is it?", the question means: the emptiness of dharmas such as form is called the common characteristic; now when speaking of "characteristic", what kind of characteristic is it? To the answer, "Because it is the characteristic of that cognition," now what is spoken here is the characteristic of the cognition of the grounds. Quoting the verse's "its own essence is empty," it is because cognition is itself empty, not the empty characteristic of other dharmas such as form. Furthermore, this is the essential characteristic (svabhāva-lakṣaṇa), not an indicative sign (nimitta). Below, in explaining the commonality, to "why is it called the common characteristic?", the question means: since it is exclusively restricted to the characteristic of cognition, why is it called "common"? The answer states: "Because all dharmas, as explained, are empty in their own essence"—because this true emptiness pervades all dharmas, it is called "common". The words "eliminating all afflictions" individually display the common characteristic. Afflictions are due to the wrongly grasped emptiness. Wrongly grasped emptiness is due to a mind confused about emptiness. Relying on the Ratnagotravibhāga, a mind confused about emptiness has three kinds of faults. That treatise says: "Conceiving such a thought: dharmas truly exist, and having been annihilated, afterwards one attains nirvāṇa. Moreover, there are people who take emptiness to be an existing thing, [thinking:] 'I ought to attain emptiness.' Moreover, generating such a thought: separate from dharmas such as form, there is apart from them another emptiness, [and] 'I ought to practice so as to attain that emptiness.'" The explanation is: now in this sūtra, "originally empty from the very beginning" is free from these three kinds of confused mental afflictions; hence it is said to "eliminate" them. In the Śāstra's sūtra text, it is called "existing, non-dual, and inexhaustible"; the words differ but the meaning is the same. "Inexhaustible" means free from the annihilation of form; "non-dual" means free from being outside of form; "existing" means free from taking emptiness to be an existing thing. What does this mean? Because if one falsely takes emptiness to be an existing thing, it causes true emptiness not to exist here. If true emptiness exists, sentimental existence is then non-existent. Therefore, the existence in principle remedies sentimental existence. That treatise eliminates [errors] with respect to form, etc.; this treatise explains emptiness with respect to the cognition of the grounds. Below, in explaining the uncommon characteristics, "liberated in its pure characteristic" is the general revelation, meaning that through antidotes it is free from defilement. Within the individual revelation, there are two: first, from what place is one liberated? The question asks about the place of liberation. "All realms" means the six realms. Delusion, karma, and rebirth: afflictions are the condition of the realm, karma is the cause of the realm, and rebirth is the fruit of the realm; the six realms do not go beyond these three, hence being far removed [from them] is called liberation. Second, how is one liberated? The question asks about the essence of liberation; that is, the five lines reveal the essence that can liberate. First, the characteristic of equality: since it is said to be far removed from all destinies, how does one leave them? It means seeing the mundane world as identical to nirvāṇa; such departure is not like that of the Two Vehicles, which have turning away and turning toward; hence it says: "equal to the characteristic of nirvāṇa." "Without a middle and also without an end" is the second, the characteristic of severing delusions. The Śāstra's sūtra text calls it "neither beginning, nor middle, nor end," meaning that only when there is no sense of severance in any of the three times does it truly constitute severance. In explaining this text, there are two gates: first, the gate of reciprocal opposition; second, the gate of continuity. In the first, when the cognition of the ānantaryamārga is directly severing delusion, does the light of cognition arise and delusion subsequently cease? Or does delusion first cease and cognition subsequently arise? Or are they simultaneous? Regarding the delusion and cognition of these three times, each has two faults, and thus severance is not accomplished. Namely, cognition has the fault of becoming uncontaminated by itself and the fault of being unable to extinguish delusion; affliction has the fault of extinguishing by itself and the fault of not obstructing the noble path. Thinking upon this in the three positions, it can be known. Just as a lamp destroying darkness does not destroy it in the three times, this is also like that. As the fourth fascicle of the Samuccaya states: "From what is severance attained? Not from the past, because it has already ceased and is non-existent; not from the future, because it has not yet arisen; not from the present, because the path is not concomitant [with it]; severance is attained from the coarse heaviness (dauṣṭhulya) of the afflictions," and so forth, up to extensive explanations. The sūtra states: "Vipaśyanā cannot destroy afflictions," etc., which are all this meaning; hence it says: "neither beginning, nor middle, nor end." Question: In the ninth fascicle of the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi, when the noble path manifests, the seeds of delusion are necessarily extinguished, like the rising and lowering of the two ends of a balance scale at the same time. If according to this explanation, it is simultaneous; why here are all three times negated? Answer: Roughly speaking it may be so, but fine scrutiny is truly difficult. Why? Because if they are simultaneous, when cognition arises of itself, delusion extinguishes of itself; since the times do not depend on each other, how could it constitute an antidote? It is like a boy being born in the eastern house and a girl dying in the western house; although they are at the same time, because they have no mutual dependence, it does not constitute an antidote. Question: If so, how is it severed? Answer: In these very three times, when one seeks severance and it cannot be found, only then is the meaning of severance accomplished. This is precisely the severance of non-severance. As for "grasped in the beginning, middle, and end," it means that within the three times of beginning, middle, and end, one grasps that which is neither beginning, nor middle, nor end; it is not that apart from the three times one grasps that negation. Just as in things like form one grasps their true emptiness, not apart from form grasping a separate annihilated emptiness; this is also like that, hence the meaning of non-severance. Second, regarding the gate of continuity: the arising and ceasing of the cognition of this ground is continuous; among the three—beginning, middle, and end—at which time can it definitively sever afflictions? The beginning alone cannot sever, because it falls away; the end alone cannot sever, because it has not yet arisen; the middle also cannot sever, because it does not abide. Therefore, in all three times there is no meaning of severance. If so, how is it severed? The Śāstra states: "Like a lamp flame, it is not merely beginning, middle, or end; because it is grasped in the beginning, middle, and end." This means that merely beginning or merely middle, etc., is not possible; only when grasped in the continuity of beginning, middle, and end can there be the meaning of severance. Question: Since taking the three times individually does not accomplish severance, how could severance be accomplished from their combination? Answer: Someone explains that taking the three times separately each fails to accomplish severance; the continuity of the three times is metaphorically designated as severance, hence it says "grasped in the beginning, middle, and end." Roughly speaking this may be so, but under fine scrutiny it is not. Because taken separately with respect to the three times each fails to accomplish severance, how could the combination of these three times accomplish it? Just as a single grain of sand contains no oil, so many grains of sand also contain none. Now it is explained: these words "grasped in the beginning, middle, and end" are words distinguishing and preventing confusion. Why? People suppose that because this cognition cannot sever at each position of beginning, middle, and end, they think it is identical to the absence of noble cognition and wrongly grasp emptiness. Therefore, it now distinguishes by saying: this is grasped on the beginning as non-beginning, on the middle as non-middle, and the end is also like this; it is not the same as being without cognition, and hence is not a wrong grasp; thus it says: "neither beginning, nor middle, nor end, because it is grasped in the beginning, middle, and end." Question: Treatises elsewhere explain that when the noble path first arises it can extinguish delusion; why does it say here "neither beginning"? Answer: According to the Abhidharma, a single thought has burning, yet from beginning to end only then is it exhausted and the remedy of fetters is complete. However, according to the Tattvasiddhi, a single thought does not burn, and only through continuity is it exhausted; the remedy of fetters is also like this. If according to the Initial Teaching of the Mahāyāna, the first thought also severs, and the middle and end are also like this. If relying on the Final Teaching, like the nature of dependent origination, none of the three times can sever; precisely because it does not create dependent origination is it accomplished, and therefore it is not without severance. The words "not expressible by words" are the third, the characteristic of contemplative practice; it means that this non-conceptual contemplative cognition is not reached by mundane words and speech; furthermore, it is not like the Small Vehicle gaining awakening from sound. The words "transcending the three times" are the fourth, the characteristic of the fundamental transformation (āśrayaparivṛtti); it means that this subtle cognition relies on the permanently abiding dharmakāya of tathatā, and because it is the ultimate fundamental transformation, both that which relies and that which is relied upon are completely permanent; hence it transcends the fluctuating characteristics of the three times. Question: That which is relied upon is originally existent and can be permanent; how could the cultivated cognition that relies upon it be free from arising and ceasing? Answer: In the Initial Teaching, cultivated cognition follows characteristics and has arising and ceasing; from the Final Teaching onward, because cognition is like the sphere of objects, and initial awakening is identical to original awakening, it is also not impermanent. The Śāstra states: "Not like the impermanent mental consciousness"—this excludes the false thinking mental consciousness before the fundamental transformation as being impermanent, so that one knows that from the transformation onward, true cognition is permanent; this excludes that which cognizes. "Relying on impermanent causal conditioned dharmas" excludes the cognitive objective sphere before the fundamental transformation. "Definitively spoken in the sūtras" adduces sūtras to verify that both sphere and cognition are permanent, as in various Mahāyāna sūtras everywhere, the Buddha-fruit is always spoken of as permanently abiding. Furthermore, like the Store of Faith within the Chapter on the Ten Stores in this sūtra, one has faith that the Buddha's cognition is free from arising and ceasing, etc., fully as explained there. The words "its characteristic is like empty space" are the fifth, the characteristic of liberation; it means that although the cognition of the Two Vehicles is free from the obstruction of afflictions, because there is still attachment to dharmas, their liberation still has obstructions. This is not like that: the two obstructions and their residual impressions are entirely exhausted, hence it says: "like empty space, without obstruction." Furthermore, this explains that its essential nature is pure, unstained like empty space. Moreover, in the Śāstra's recapitulation, why are the latter three of these five kinds repeated? Because the latter three kinds all reveal the true in contrast to the false; hence it says: "contemplating thus, contemplating," and so forth. Question: Examining these five lines: the first line understands the mundane world to be identical to nirvāṇa, explaining departure without departure; the second explains that in the three times there is no meaning of severing delusion, which is severance without severance; up to its characteristic being like empty space. According to these meanings, what difference is there between them and the preceding common characteristic? Answer: In reality there is no difference; it is merely that with respect to the place of its own essence it is called the common characteristic, and with respect to the place of cognition's realization and entry it is called the uncommon characteristics. If they did not share in that common characteristic, these uncommon characteristics could not be established. Therefore, conceptually speaking there are two, but their Dharma-essence is without distinction.

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