English (machine translation)

Language: English
Extent: 27 passages, 19,633 words
Text: complete digital text
Source: pramana-mt · Machine translation by Gemini 3.8 Flash (2026-10-21) of in.bauddha.taisho.2771 · Machine output without human authorship: no copyright is claimed (CC0 1.0). The original text keeps its own…

1 — 27 parts

Text

1.1

[…] discussing his empty room arising […] the ten questions, the seven and the ten will be explained later of themselves. […] The preface section above is concluded. From here down is the main doctrinal section. Regarding the main doctrinal section, […] two [approaches]: putting aside the person to discuss dharmas according to their meaning; and distinguishing the revelation of virtues. Revealing virtues means revealing Vimalakīrti's [virtues]; […] meaning follows the meaning of cause and fruit, subsuming dharmas under persons. In the distinction of revealing virtues: first, the Skillful Means Chapter […] directly praises and reveals his virtues, such as having made offerings to immeasurable Buddhas. The Skillful Means Chapter has not yet used juxtapositions. Generally, when revealing virtues, […] among the revelations of virtue through juxtaposition: first, he is juxtaposed with the śrāvakas to make clear that his virtues surpass those of the śrāvakas; next, he is juxtaposed with the bodhisattvas to reveal that he […] surpasses the bodhisattvas. In the juxtaposition with bodhisattvas: first, juxtaposition with those who are not capable reveals that Vimalakīrti's eloquence is difficult to match, demonstrating [his] wisdom; […] from this point down, it relies on juxtaposing those who are capable to reveal that Vimalakīrti's supernatural transformations are difficult to conceive, [showing] the superiority of his supernormal powers. In this [section] there are six chapters of the sūtra, subsumed into four pairs: first, the Inquiring about the Illness Chapter and the Inconceivable [Chapter form the first pair; the Contemplating Sentient Beings] Chapter is the second pair; The Buddha Path Chapter is the third pair; the Dharma Gate of Nonduality [Chapter is] the fourth pair. In each of these four pairs, what is cultivated is explained first, and next what is […] is explained. […] Accomplishment of acintya practice means accomplishing acintya virtues. Question: Among these four pairs, […] Vimalakīrti cultivates acintya marks in order to […] in the acintya nature, by explaining what is cultivated, there is what is […] What further difference is there among the preceding three pairs? Answer: In the preceding three, […] what is cultivated is explained, and there is what is accomplished. The final pair arises into function relying on tranquility […]. Question: What further difference is there between the first two pairs? Answer: In the first two pairs, […] accomplished; the latter pair clarifies what is cultivated and what is accomplished in the practice of gathering wholesome qualities. Cultivating and accomplishing […] This is the first: subsuming dharmas under persons. The meaning of distinguishing the revelation of virtues lies herein. Second, putting aside the person to discuss dharmas according to their meaning: 'Dharmas' refers to cause and fruit. The cause refers to the two causes: the dharmakāya and the pure land. The fruit refers to the two fruits: the dharmakāya [and the pure land]. Beginning from the Skillful Means Chapter and running through the Dharma Gate of Nonduality Chapter, the cause and fruit of the dharmakāya are explained. From Gandhahastin [onward, the cause and fruit of] the pure land [are explained]. Within the cause and fruit of the dharmakāya, there are three divisions according to persons: first, the Skillful Means Chapter teaches ordinary persons the dharmakāya cause and fruit; [the Disciples] Chapter teaches śrāvakas the dharmakāya cause and fruit; the Bodhisattva Chapter and below teach bodhisattvas the dharmakāya [cause and fruit]. Within [the section on] bodhisattvas, the text has two parts: the single Bodhisattva Chapter sets forth the substance of cause and fruit; from this point downward, the marks of cultivation and accomplishment are extensively explained. Within these marks of cultivation and accomplishment, they are further distinguished through two gates: first, distinguishing the destruction of marks; second, distinguishing the revelation of virtues. From this point downward through the Dharma Gate of Nonduality Chapter, all the meanings explained are equally these two. They occur, first, in order to destroy marks; second, they arrive in order to [reveal] virtues. Regarding the destruction of marks: not a single dharma can remain. Regarding the revelation of virtues: not a single dharma can be omitted. As for destroying marks: from this point downward through the Contemplating Sentient Beings Chapter, the marks of ordinary persons' attachment to existence are refuted and dispelled. The single Buddha Path Chapter refutes and dispels the marks of the two vehicles' delight in emptiness. The Dharma Gate of Nonduality refutes and dispels the subtle marks of dharmas concerning the two extremes of existence and nonexistence held by bodhisattvas. Such is the destruction of marks. How are virtues revealed? In revealing virtues, it is divided broadly into two: first, from this point downward through The Buddha Path Chapter, it clarifies teaching the bodhisattvas to cultivate the path of teaching in reference to Vimalakīrti's acintya marks; next, the Dharma Gate of Nonduality clarifies teaching the bodhisattvas to cultivate the path of realization in reference to Vimalakīrti's acintya nature. Teaching necessarily relies on realization […]. Subsumed within […] are three pairs: this chapter and the Inconceivable Chapter form the first pair; the Contemplating [Sentient Beings] Chapter is the second pair; The Buddha Path Chapter is the third pair. In these three pairs, each pair again completely [treats this]: first it clarifies what is cultivated, and next it clarifies what is accomplished. As in the first pair: this Inquiring about the Illness Chapter clarifies cultivating wisdom and cultivating compassion, which is what is cultivated; the Inconceivable Chapter shows the mustard seed containing Mount Sumeru and the small room accommodating vastness, revealing acintya virtues, which is what is accomplished. In the second pair: the beginning of the Contemplating Sentient Beings Chapter cultivates the four immeasurables and the twelve gates of contemplation, which is what is cultivated; the room manifesting the heavenly maiden and the eight unprecedented things is what is accomplished. In the third pair: the beginning of The Buddha Path Chapter practices non-paths to penetrate the Buddha path, which is what is cultivated; universally manifesting physical bodies, inquiring about his retinue, and expressing all types of Vimalakīrti's virtues is what is accomplished. Question: What further difference is there among these three pairs? Answer: The first two pairs clarify what is cultivated and accomplished within practices of one's own stage; the latter pair clarifies what is cultivated and accomplished within practices of advancing superiority. Ascending to enter the Buddha path is the text of advancing superiority. Question: What further difference is there between the [first] two pairs? Answer: In the first two pairs, the first pair clarifies what is cultivated and accomplished in abandoning faults […]; the latter pair clarifies what is cultivated and accomplished in gathering wholesome qualities. Such is the revelation of virtues. Combined, this is called the second: putting aside the person to discuss dharmas according to their meaning.

1.2

Now, within the text, throughout this chapter, what is cultivated is explained; the Inconceivable Chapter explains what is accomplished. Within what is cultivated, there are again two parts: first, directly clarifying the question and answer that clear away the marks of coming and going; second, from 'Let us set this aside' downward, clarifying the question and answer discussing dharmas. Why is it necessary to clear away the marks of coming and going? There are multiple explanations: First, because coming and going veil the real, they must be cleared away. Second, in order to […] they must be cleared away. Third, to provide the reason for what is spoken below, they must be cleared away. Fourth, to reveal the Middle Way, they must be cleared away. Fifth, to reveal real wisdom and skillful means, they must be cleared away. Sixth, when great persons meet, the Dharma entails speaking great words, so they are cleared away. Such is the import of the treatise. How is it in the text? First Vimalakīrti speaks, and Mañjuśrī relates afterward. 'Vimalakīrti said, "Welcome, Mañjuśrī!"': He rejoices at the goodness of his coming, hence he says 'Welcome.' It can also mean: Mañjuśrī, traveling on the road, came; asking whether he was well and at peace, he therefore says 'Welcome.' Below, he clears away its marks: 'Coming without the mark of coming, and seeing without [the mark of seeing].' There are multiple explanations, which can be briefly framed in four gates: 1. Interpreting in terms of phenomena having no nature; 2. Explaining in terms of principle having no nature; 3. The two truths of ultimate and conventional; 4. The two bodies of true and responsive. First, in terms of phenomena having no nature: relying on the three times, the mark of coming is refuted. Now when speaking of 'coming': is it called coming when coming is already finished? Is coming spoken of when it has not yet come? Or is coming spoken of at the very time of coming? Seeking the mark of coming across these three times is impossible; therefore know that coming is itself non-coming, hence it is said 'without the mark of coming.' This refutes the mark of coming. 'And yet coming' refutes the mark of non-coming. Originally speaking of non-coming was to refute coming; since coming does not exist, non-coming also does not exist; hence it is said 'and yet coming.' Furthermore, non-coming is the non-coming belonging to coming; since it is the non-coming belonging to coming, how could there be a fixed non-coming? Therefore the mark of non-coming cannot be found. Coming is the coming belonging to non-coming; since it is the coming of non-coming, how could there be a fixed coming? Therefore the mark of coming also cannot be found. Second, in terms of principle having no nature: because conditions harmonize, it exists, and therefore 'coming' is spoken of; because it lacks intrinsic nature, it is empty, and therefore 'non-coming' is spoken of. That is, dharmas do not come from themselves, nor do they come from another, nor do they come from a combined cause, nor do they come from [no cause]. Their mutual refutation is as explained above. Third, distinguishing by the two truths of ultimate and conventional: the ultimate truth is tranquil and [immutable], hence 'non-coming' is spoken of; the conventional truth accords with transformation, and therefore 'coming' is spoken of. However, the non-coming of the ultimate truth is the non-coming belonging to the coming of the conventional truth; the coming of the conventional truth is the coming belonging to the non-coming of the ultimate truth. Therefore know that in both the ultimate and conventional truths, coming and non-coming are equally unattainable. Fourth, distinguishing by the two bodies of true and responsive: the true body is impartial and cannot be spoken of as coming or non-coming; the responsive body accords with beings, demonstrating going and coming. This concludes describing Mañjuśrī. 'Seeing without the mark of seeing': this describes Mañjuśrī entering the room and seeing emptiness. Mañjuśrī seeing the emptiness within my room is itself non-seeing. Since seeing is itself non-seeing, seeing emptiness is also non-emptiness. To explain this at length would not differ from what was said above regarding coming and non-coming. This concludes Vimalakīrti's prior statement above.

1.3

From here down, Mañjuśrī relates in response afterward. Within his relating there are two parts: first, directly relating; below 'the reason why', explaining. Within the direct relating: previously, Vimalakīrti only spoke of coming; now, Mañjuśrī additionally attaches going. Why is it like this? Because their perspectives differ. Vimalakīrti, looking toward Mañjuśrī, only sees Mañjuśrī coming toward his house, hence he speaks only of coming. Mañjuśrī, looking toward Vimalakīrti, comes toward Vimalakīrti's house on the one hand, and on the other leaves the Āmrapālī [grove] behind, hence he also speaks of going. 'Mañjuśrī said, "So it is, householder. If one has already come, one does not come again; if one has already gone, one does not go again"': this responds to the above. Previously, Vimalakīrti first spoke of non-coming and later spoke of coming; now, Mañjuśrī first speaks of coming and later speaks of non-coming. What is the intention behind this? One explanation says: this merely follows the ease of speech and has no fixed reason. A second meaning is: Vimalakīrti represents the secular, while Mañjuśrī represents the path. Because Vimalakīrti represents the secular, he reveals identity with the real to elucidate the secular; therefore he first speaks of non-coming and later speaks of coming. Because Mañjuśrī represents the path, he wishes to explain subsuming the secular to return to the real; therefore he first speaks of coming and later speaks of non-coming. Furthermore, Vimalakīrti first speaks of non-coming and later clarifies coming because he wishes to elucidate the coming of non-coming; Mañjuśrī first speaks of coming and later of non-coming because he wishes to elucidate the non-coming of coming. Therefore know that coming and non-coming are both signless; going is also like this. The explanation here does not differ from the previous four gates. From here down is the explanation: 'Why is this?' is an inquiry. I see Mañjuśrī leaving the Āmrapālī [grove] behind and coming toward Vimalakīrti's house; for what reason is it said 'coming is non-coming and going is non-going'? From here down, he explains in response to the inquiry: 'One who comes comes from nowhere; one who goes goes nowhere.' Because the prior limit is empty, coming has no origin; because the subsequent limit is empty, going has no destination. Furthermore, because the Āmrapālī grove is empty, coming has no origin; because Vimalakīrti's room is empty, going has no destination. This concludes relating the above coming. 'What can be seen cannot be seen again': this relates the seeing above. Now regarding seeing: for the eye to see forms, it must possess five conditions: 1. The sense organ is not impaired; 2. Consciousness is not absent; 3. There is an object that can be seen; 4. There is no obstruction; 5. Initial and sustained application arise. Only when possessing these five conditions can one see forms; if a single condition of the five is lacking, forms cannot be seen. Now investigating this: in which condition does this seeing abide? If it is present in any single condition, it should not rely on the other four. If the five conditions each lack seeing and only when combined are they able to see, then five blind people, who do not see form, should be able to see when combined. If each of the five possesses seeing, how could five self-natures arise in a single instant? Therefore know that what is seen cannot be seen again. The remaining meanings are as above. This concludes the question and answer clearing away the marks of coming and going.

1.4

From here down is the second [section]: question and answer discussing dharmas. First he sets aside the previous words; next [he inquires about] the illness. 'Let us set this matter aside': setting aside the previous words. Question: Why is it necessary to set aside the previous words? Answer: The World-Honoured One dispatched him to come wishing to inquire about the illness; before proclaiming the Buddha's teaching, engaging in other words runs contrary to propriety; therefore it must be set aside. Furthermore, regarding such meanings as these: investigating them through words can never be exhausted; only those who realize in accordance with this can fully know them; therefore it must be set aside.

1.5

Below, it directly clarifies inquiring about the illness to reveal the Dharma. Everything that is explained in terms of the marks of dharmas from here on down without exception takes manifesting illness and the empty room as its point of departure. Discussing the empty room gives rise to the ten subsequent matters; discussing manifesting illness gives rise to the ten subsequent questions. The ten [questions concerning] manifesting illness are explained according to the text: (1) 'Householder, is this illness bearable?'; (2) 'Is medical treatment diminishing it and not increasing it?'; (3) 'From what cause did it arise?'; (4) 'How long ago was it born?'; (5) 'How should it be eliminated?'; (6) 'What kind of mark does this illness have?'; (7) 'Do body and mind combine?'; (8) 'Among the four great elements, which element's illness is it?'; (9) 'How are [beings] consoled?'; and (10) 'How are [they] subdued?' These ten questions all arise due to manifesting illness. The ten concerning the empty room are as in the sūtra text: (1) 'Why is this room empty?'; (2) 'Why are there no attendants?'; (3) Śāriputra thinking of seats; (4) the heavenly maiden in the room; (5) the eight unprecedented things; (6) universally manifesting bodily forms to ask about the various retinue; (7) Śāriputra thinking of food; (the commentator only mentions these seven matters, but now three more are added); (8) Vimalakīrti bidding the assembly to take food; (9) magically transforming a bodhisattva; and (10) magically transforming nine million lion seats. These latter three matters also arise due to the empty room. Therefore, the empty room gives rise to these ten matters.

1.6

Now, within the text, collectively inquiring about manifesting illness and the empty room entails twelve questions. As for the sequence: previously there are two questions in one place, which are the questions of the World-Honoured One; later there are ten questions, which are Mañjuśrī's own questions. First, it clarifies Mañjuśrī conveying the World-Honoured One's two questions. 'Householder, is this illness bearable?'—this is the first question, asking about the gravity of the illness. 'Is medical treatment diminishing it and not increasing it?'—this is the second question, [asking if] the illness is recovering or worsening, the World-Honoured One earnestly conveying the inquiry. 'Immeasurable' conveys the person inquiring. Below, Mañjuśrī inquires on his own. In his questioning there are ten [queries]: the first eight questions inquire into Vimalakīrti's own person […]; the latter two questions inquire into the sentient beings transformed by Vimalakīrti. Question: 'Mañjuśrī's intention in coming was merely to inquire into Vimalakīrti's illness; why does he not directly inquire into Vimalakīrti's personal matter, but rather asks about sentient beings?' Answer: 'Because Vimalakīrti states, "From ignorance and craving, my illness is born; because sentient beings are ill, I manifest illness," therefore Mañjuśrī asks Vimalakīrti, on behalf of the one who manifests illness, how the minds of truly ill sentient beings are consoled, and how their illness is subdued.' Within the preceding eight questions, they are divided into three distinctions: the first three questions clarify his great compassion and skillful means; the middle two questions clarify that upon which his great compassion relies—because compassion is accomplished relying on emptiness, he asks about the room's emptiness, and because compassion is completed relying on existence, he asks about the lack of attendants; the final three questions directly clarify that the responsive illness is not real. Furthermore, the first three questions clarify only skillful means; the middle two questions clarify both real wisdom and skillful means—asking about the room's emptiness is real wisdom, and asking about the lack of attendants is skillful means; the final three questions clarify only real wisdom.

1.7

Among the first three questions, it first clarifies Mañjuśrī's question, and next clarifies Vimalakīrti's answer. Asking, 'Householder, from what cause did this illness arise?' is the first question, asking about the cause of his illness. 'How long ago was it born?' is the second question, asking whether the illness is longstanding or recent. 'How should it be eliminated?' is the third question, asking about the method of treating the illness. Below, it clarifies Vimalakīrti's answer. In the answer, he first answers the latter two questions, and from '[He] also said' onward, he answers the first question in reverse. In the preceding two answers, the text specifically has four [parts]: first, the direct answer; second, from 'For what reason' onward, the explanation of the answer; third, from 'For example' onward, the simile; and fourth, from 'Bodhisattvas are like this' onward, the application of the simile. In the direct answer above, he first answers 'How long ago was it born?'; from 'If all sentient beings...' onward, he answers 'How should it be eliminated?' When Vimalakīrti says, 'From ignorance there is craving, and thus my illness is born': 'ignorance' refers to the defilements abandoned through the path of seeing within the [three] realms, which are the delusions that initiate karma; 'craving' refers to the defilements abandoned through the path of cultivation within the [three] realms, which are the delusions that moisten rebirth. Why are only these two brought up? These two kinds of defilements—initiating karma and moistening rebirth—subsume all delusions within the realms without remainder; therefore, they are brought up. Vimalakīrti means: ever since all sentient beings have had the defilements of ignorance and craving, my great compassion has constantly manifested illness to teach the Dharma and transform them. Therefore, he says, 'From ignorance there is craving, and thus my illness is born.' Question: 'Since when have sentient beings had ignorance and craving?' Answer: 'They have had them since beginningless time.' If that is so, sentient beings' defilements of ignorance and craving have existed from beginningless time, whereas Vimalakīrti's great compassion was attained only upon reaching the first bhūmi; why then does he say that ever since there have been the defilements of ignorance and craving, Vimalakīrti's great compassion has constantly manifested illness? Answer: 'This is discussed in terms of individual portions of sentient beings. For instance, when there are sentient beings who, due to ignorance and craving, create various evil karmas and incur birth and death, Vimalakīrti's great compassion immediately follows them, manifesting illness to teach the Dharma and transform them according to their portion. Therefore, he says, "From having craving, my illness is born." Sentient beings' illnesses are of three kinds: first, the cause of illness—the defilements of ignorance and craving; second, the effect of illness—the recompense body of the five aggregates; and third, the fact of illness—headaches and stomachaches. A bodhisattva's illness also has three: first, the cause of illness—namely, great compassion; second, the effect of illness—the transformation bodies across the six destinies; and third, the fact of illness—likewise having headaches and stomachaches. Now, saying "From ignorance there is craving" means that because those sentient beings have this cause of illness, they are able to incur the effect of illness and the fact of illness. "Thus my illness is born" means that the bodhisattva's great compassion manifests the effect of illness and the fact of illness to teach and transform them. "Because all sentient beings are ill, therefore I am ill" has the meaning as explained above. The above concludes answering the second question, "How long ago was it born?" Below, he answers the third question, "How should it be eliminated?" "If all sentient beings' illnesses are eliminated, then my illness [is eliminated]" is the direct answer. If all sentient beings sever the cause of illness, which is ignorance, and no longer produce the effect of illness and the fact of illness, Vimalakīrti's great compassion will no longer manifest illness; therefore, he says, "then my illness is eliminated." Question: 'When can sentient beings' illnesses be eliminated?' Answer: 'If considered according to the Hīnayāna, when one attains the Dharma forbearance of suffering, one gradually severs the causes of illness, and only upon reaching the stage of non-learning are they completely exhausted. Once the causes of illness are exhausted, the effects also do not arise. If considered according to the Mahāyāna, at the initial mind of the ten understandings one severs the delusions that initiate karma, and when about to enter the first bhūmi one severs the delusions that moisten rebirth. At this time the causes of illness are permanently eliminated and do not arise. The causes having been permanently eliminated, the effects will never arise again. In terms of this portion of sentient beings' illness being eliminated, the bodhisattva's great compassion no longer follows them to manifest illness for their sake; therefore, he says, "then my illness is eliminated." This is discussed provisionally in terms of portioned [birth and death]; transformational [birth and death] should be understood by analogy.' The above concludes the direct answer. Below, the explanation, simile, and application of the simile are easily understood in their textual form, all of them first clarifying the arising of illness and later clarifying the elimination of illness. First clarifying the arising of illness answers the above question 'How long ago was it born?'; later clarifying the elimination of illness answers the above question 'How should it be eliminated?' Furthermore, the statement 'From what cause did this illness arise?' answers the first question in reverse. Because it is somewhat distant from the phrasing of the question, Vimalakīrti reiterates it anew, taking up Mañjuśrī's words above, 'Householder, from what cause did this illness arise?' to inquire into its cause. Below, he provides the answer: 'The bodhisattva's illness arises from great compassion.' This provides the clear answer: taking great compassion as the cause, he therefore manifests illness. The three questions above reveal Vimalakīrti's great compassion and skillful means.

1.8

The two questions below reveal that upon which Vimalakīrti's great compassion relies: because compassion is accomplished relying on emptiness, he asks about the room's emptiness; because compassion arises in accordance with existence, he asks about the lack of attendants. Alternatively, the three questions above purely clarify skillful means, whereas the two questions below clarify both real wisdom and skillful means—asking about the room's emptiness reveals real wisdom, while the lack of attendants reveals skillful means. In the text, it first clarifies Mañjuśrī's inquiry, and second, Vimalakīrti's answer. Mañjuśrī saying, 'Householder, why is this room empty and without attendants?' is the question. 'Why is it empty?' is one question, inquiring about the room's emptiness; 'Why are there no attendants?' is two questions, inquiring about the lack of attendants. Below, Vimalakīrti answers […], first answering the room's emptiness and later answering the lack of attendants. Vimalakīrti says, 'The Buddha-lands of the various Buddhas are also all empty'—this is the direct answer. All the Buddha-lands of the ten directions are entirely empty; this room of mine is of the same kind as those lands, and is therefore also empty. Below, Mañjuśrī advances a question and Vimalakīrti answers again. Also asking, 'With what is it empty?' is Mañjuśrī advancing his question. Emptiness is of two kinds: first, the emptiness of principle; second, the emptiness of phenomena. The emptiness of principle means that the essential substance of the principle of the dharmadhātu and tathatā is itself empty. The emptiness of phenomena means removing what exists to produce emptiness amidst phenomena. He asks, 'Householder, is the room's emptiness the emptiness of principle, or the emptiness of phenomena?'; therefore, he says, 'With what is it empty?' Below, Vimalakīrti answers: 'Empty with emptiness.' 'My room's present emptiness is the emptiness of principle. The substance of the principle is not one, yet pervades all places; therefore, it is said to be "empty with emptiness." Furthermore, the emptiness of principle empties out the emptiness of phenomena; therefore, it is said to be "empty with emptiness." Moreover, within the emptiness of principle there are two kinds: first, the emptiness of persons; second, the emptiness of dharmas. Because there are two kinds of emptiness, it is said to be "empty with emptiness." Furthermore, within principle, the substance of emptiness is itself unobtainable; emptiness is also empty, therefore it is said to be "empty with emptiness."'

1.9

Below, Mañjuśrī sets forth two objections. First, Mañjuśrī clings to principle to challenge phenomena, and Vimalakīrti adduces phenomena to reveal principle in his answer; second, Mañjuśrī clings to principle to press upon the verbal expression, and Vimalakīrti sweeps away verbal expression to reveal principle in his answer. First, he clarifies the first objection, clinging to principle to challenge phenomena. He also asks, 'What need is there for emptiness to be empty?' 'Also asks, "emptiness"' clings to principle; 'what need is there for emptiness?' challenges phenomena: 'If the substance of principle were not empty, it could be permitted to remove things to produce the emptiness of phenomena. Since the substance of principle in this room is naturally empty, why is there a need to remove the things in the room?' Below, he clarifies the answer adducing phenomena to reveal principle: 'He answered, "It is empty through nonconceptual emptiness." "Through nonconceptual emptiness" means that sentient beings do not understand the emptiness of principle. Saying "empty through nonconceptual emptiness" means intentionally producing the emptiness of phenomena in order to reveal the emptiness of principle, causing those sentient beings to follow phenomena and awaken to principle. Furthermore, the emptiness of principle is obscure and difficult to know; unless verbally expressed it cannot be revealed, and so taking the emptiness of phenomena as a snare reveals the emptiness of principle. Therefore, the things in the room are removed to produce the emptiness of phenomena.' Below is the second objection, clinging to principle to press upon the verbal expression, and Vimalakīrti sweeps away verbal expression to reveal principle in his answer. First, it clarifies clinging to principle to press upon the verbal expression: 'He also asked, "Can emptiness be conceptualised?"' 'Also asked, "emptiness"' clings to principle; 'can it be conceptualised?' presses upon the verbal expression. He also asks: 'Can the emptiness of principle be conceptualised through the emptiness of phenomena? If there were an emptiness of phenomena outside the emptiness of principle, it could be permitted to use phenomena to conceptualise the emptiness of principle. Originally there are no phenomena outside the emptiness of principle; how can one use phenomena to reveal the emptiness of principle?' Below, he sweeps away the verbal expression to reveal principle: 'He answered, "Conceptualisation is also empty." The emptiness of phenomena that is able to conceptualise is also the emptiness of principle. When sentient beings have not yet understood the emptiness of principle, they make that emptiness of phenomena to conceptualise the emptiness of principle. If they then understand that emptiness of principle, they immediately know that conceptualisation is also the emptiness of principle.' The above concludes the objections.

1.10

From here below, [Mañjuśrī] seeks out the locus of that emptiness. When he "further asked: 'Where should emptiness be sought?'" he asks: "In what place should this principle be sought and realized?" When [Vimalakīrti] "answered: 'It should be sought among the sixty-two views'", [the explanation is that] the sixty-two views confuse the real, and therefore arise. By pursuing those [views] which are capable of confusing, one finds that which they confuse; hence one seeks its emptiness among the views. Furthermore, the very substance of the sixty-two views is emptiness, because it is by not departing from the real and delusion that the real is discerned. The rest can be understood by analogy with this. When [Vimalakīrti said,] "Furthermore, [in regards to] what the benevolent one asked: 'Why are there no attendants?'", this answers the previous second question about the absence of attendants. Because it is far removed from the question, he repeats and brings it forward again. Below, he clarifies the words of the answer: "All the māras and all the non-Buddhists are my attendants." This is a direct answer. From here below, [the text] raises a question and explains it. "Why is that?" is a question. The attendants of a bodhisattva ought to be great young prince devas; why then does he say that māras and non-Buddhists are his attendants? Below, he clarifies the explanation: "Māras delight in saṃsāra, yet the bodhisattva does not abandon saṃsāra. Non-Buddhists delight in all views, yet the bodhisattva remains unperturbed among all views." There are two meanings in the explanation. The first meaning: As for the principle of attendants, they wait upon and nourish teachers and monks to make the teacher's physical body healthy and comfortable—this is the meaning. The reason why the bodhisattva's dharmakāya is healthy and thriving is precisely due to these heavenly māras and all the non-Buddhists. Truly it is because the bodhisattva generates great compassion and benevolence to transform these māras and non-Buddhists, causing them to sever evil and practice good. The bodhisattva's practice of great compassion is thereby completed, and because great compassion is completed, the dharmakāya is at ease and peaceful. Therefore he says that all the māras and all the non-Buddhists are his attendants. The second meaning: As for attendants, following after the teacher and monks without departing is the meaning. Now these māras and non-Buddhists are constantly taken as objects and transformed by the bodhisattva's great compassionate and benevolent mind, without ever separating from each other; therefore they are spoken of as attendants. Question: The bodhisattva's great compassion takes as its object all sentient beings of the six destinies; why does he speak only of heavenly māras and non-Buddhists? Answer: There are two meanings in the explanation. The first meaning: As the Nirvāṇa Sūtra says, for instance, a householder raises seven sons, and among the seven sons, one son falls ill. Although the householder is not unequal toward his sons, his mind leans especially toward pitying the sick one. The bodhisattva is like this: benevolently minding sentient beings equally like his sons, his great compassion is especially directed toward those who commit many transgressions. None commit more transgressions than these two; therefore they are spoken of as attendants. The second meaning: Now, speaking of māras and non-Buddhists, it does not only refer to those specific heavenly māras and specific non-Buddhists, but addresses all sentient beings generally. If all ordinary persons are subsumed according to their delusions, there are none beyond two kinds: first, attachment; second, views. Those with abundant delusions of attachment are subsumed under heavenly māras; those with abundant delusions of views are subsumed under non-Buddhists. Therefore, speaking of these heavenly māras and non-Buddhists subsumes all those sentient beings without exception. Hence this text says, "Māras delight in saṃsāra, non-Buddhists delight in all views"; it should be based on this meaning. "Not abandoning" means not abandoning saṃsāra and constantly following [them] to teach and transform. "Unperturbed" means the compassionate mind is firm, hence he says "unperturbed". The preceding two exchanges of questions and answers reveal that on which Vimalakīrti's great compassion relies, and also jointly clarify real wisdom and skillful means.

1.11

From here below, three questions reveal that Vimalakīrti's illness is an adaptation and not real. It may also be said that they solely clarify real wisdom. In the text, he first inquires about the characteristics of the illness, next inquires about its location, and finally inquires about the substance of the illness. "Mañjuśrī said: 'What are the characteristics of the householder's illness?'" is the question. What is the physical appearance of the householder's illness? Hence he asks: "What are its characteristics?" From here below, Vimalakīrti answered: "My illness has no form and cannot be seen." There are two meanings in the explanation. First, if indicating that the illness is an adaptation: he means, "I originally have no illness, but for the sake of sentient beings, I provisionally manifest having an illness. What form or characteristic could an illness of provisional illness have?" Second, if indicating that the illness is truly non-existent: he means, "My illness is originally empty; what characteristic could be seen?" From here below, Mañjuśrī inquires about the location of the illness: "He further asked: 'Is this illness connected with the body, or is it connected with the mind?'" Is it physical pain or mental pain? Question: Vimalakīrti has already said: "My illness has no form and cannot be seen." Why is it necessary to further ask about its connection with the body or the mind? Answer: Although those of sharp faculties understand, those of dull faculties have not yet awakened. Moreover, even though it is said to have no form, how could that prevent it from being connected with the body or the mind? Therefore he must ask further. The following should be understood by analogy. Vimalakīrti answered: "It is not connected with the body, because the characteristics of the body are dissociated; nor is it connected with the mind, because the mind is like an illusion." "Dissociated" means empty: the characteristics of the body are originally empty, so how could there be an illness connected with it? This answers by means of the signless nature. The mind originally does not exist, but arises like an illusion, so how could there be an illness connected with it? This answers by means of the dependent nature. The preceding statement of "characteristics are dissociated" and the following statement of "like an illusion" are complementary phrasing. It may also be that the body is the discriminated nature, and therefore is spoken of as completely dissociated; the mind is the dependent nature, and therefore is said to be like an illusion. Thus the Mahāyānasaṃgraha says: "Illusion and so forth reveal the dependent; absence of non-existence reveals the discriminated." This then indicates that the illness is truly non-existent. Furthermore, it also clarifies that the illness is an adaptation. "It is not connected with the body, because the characteristics of the body are dissociated": the characteristics of the body are empty in principle, while the substance of the illness is an adaptation, and therefore it is not connected with the body. "Nor is it connected with the mind, because the mind is like an illusion": the mind is non-existent like an illusion, while the illness is an adaptation, and therefore it is not connected with the mind. This indicates that the illness exists. From here below, he asks about the substance of the illness: "He further asked: 'Among the four great elements—the earth element, water element, fire element, and wind element—of which great element is this illness?'" From here below, Vimalakīrti answered: "It is not the earth element, yet it is not separate from the earth element. The water, fire, and wind elements are also like this." Explained in terms of the principle of having no nature: "It is not the earth element" clarifies that within the element there is no illness; "yet it is not separate from the earth element" clarifies that apart from the element there is also no illness. Explained in terms of it being an adaptation: "It is not the earth element" clarifies that the illness is truly non-existent; "yet it is not separate from the earth element" reveals that the illness is an adaptation. The water, fire, and wind elements are also like this. "Yet the illnesses of sentient beings arise from the four great elements; because they have illness, therefore I am ill." The explanation also has two [aspects]. Explained in terms of non-existence in principle: The illnesses of sentient beings arise from the four great elements; because sentient beings are ill, therefore I manifest illness. Because my illness is an adaptation, it does not exist within the elements, nor does it exist apart from the elements. Explained in terms of it being an adaptation: The illnesses of sentient beings arise from the four great elements; for the sake of sentient beings I manifest illness, therefore I am ill. It is also not separate from the elements. The eight questions inquiring about matters concerning Vimalakīrti's person are concluded above.

1.12

From here below, two questions inquire about the sentient beings transformed by Vimalakīrti. The former asks about consoling; the latter asks about subduing. Question: What is the difference between these two questions? Answer: The former question about consoling inquires about those bodhisattvas who are below the ten faiths and who have truly contracted illness from being accomplished in impure perfuming through hearing; since Vimalakīrti, out of great compassion, manifests illness for their sake, how does he console their minds and cause them to cultivate the path and eliminate illness? The latter question about subduing inquires about those truly ill bodhisattvas from the initial mind of the ten understandings up to the final mind of dedication, as well as inquiring about those bodhisattvas from the first bhūmi on up to the vajra[-like samādhi]. How does he subdue their births, sever evil, cultivate good, and practice the bodhisattva path? In principle, Vimalakīrti's manifestation of illness is only for the sake of teaching and transforming ill bodhisattvas prior to the stages; from the first bhūmi on up, there is no need to manifest illness. Now, speaking in terms of subduing, it is therefore spoken of generally. The former consoling is precisely the "well entrusting the bodhisattvas" in the Prajñā Sūtra; the latter subduing is precisely the "well minding and protecting the bodhisattvas" in the Prajñā Sūtra. Question: The meaning of the distinction should be like this.

1.13

In the text, consoling is explained first. Within the consoling, first there is the question, next the answer, and afterwards the conclusion. "Then Mañjuśrī asked Vimalakīrti, saying, 'How should a bodhisattva console a sick bodhisattva?'" is the question. How should bodhisattvas—great bodhisattvas like Vimalakīrti—console bodhisattvas who are sick? These bodhisattvas who have [sickness] are precisely those bodhisattvas who have actual sickness among the ten abodes. It explains that since Vimalakīrti through great compassion has manifested illness for their sake, how should he explain the Dharma to comfort their minds, cause them to practice, realize the principle, and eliminate their illness? Question: Vimalakīrti's manifestation of illness was generally for the sake of transforming ordinary persons and the small vehicle. Why here does he ask only about bodhisattvas? Answer: The intention of manifesting it was generally for ordinary persons, yet now Vimalakīrti's intention is to lead people to aim toward the Great Vehicle; therefore, at this point it is spoken in terms of the superior. The preceding is the end of Mañjuśrī's question. Below is Vimalakīrti's answer. In the answer, he speaks of the bodhisattva practices to comfort their minds. As for the bodhisattva practices, in their breadth they are boundless, but in essential terms there are only two: first, self-benefit; second, benefiting others. In terms of self-benefit, it is curing one's own sickness; in terms of benefiting others, it is curing the sicknesses of others. Expounding this Dharma causes them to achieve the cessation of defiled hearing-perfuming, blocks rebirth in the four evil destinies, leads to birth in good destinies, and enters into the uncontaminated to ultimately eliminate illness. Such is the meaning of the commentary. In the text, there are three pairs explaining self-benefit and benefiting others. First, there are six questions explaining self-benefit and benefiting others in terms of contemplative understanding. Next, there are two clauses explaining self-benefit and benefiting others in terms of a wholesome mind. Afterwards, there are three clauses explaining self-benefit and benefiting others in terms of active cultivation. Within the first, contemplative understanding, there are first five clauses explaining self-benefit, and the final clause reveals benefiting others. Among the first five clauses, the first four teach contemplating afflictions to show the difference from the śrāvakas, and the fifth clause teaches contemplating karma to show the difference from ordinary persons. Among the first four clauses, the first three teach contemplation of the emptiness of persons, and the latter one teaches contemplation of the emptiness of dharmas. Within the former contemplation of the emptiness of persons, he teaches them to destroy the four inversions regarding the conditioned and also ward off the four inversions regarding the unconditioned. In the text, only three contemplations are raised; the factual contemplation of impurity is omitted and thus not spoken of. "Vimalakīrti said: 'Speak of the body's impermanence, but do not speak of revulsion and detachment from the body'" is the contemplation of impermanence. Speaking of the body's impermanence destroys their inversion of permanence. Not speaking of revulsion and detachment from the body teaches difference from the śrāvakas: although śrāvakas know impermanence, they feel revulsion and detachment from the body; now he teaches bodhisattvas that although they know the body is impermanent, they need not feel revulsion and detachment, which wards off the inversion regarding the unconditioned. The other clauses follow this example. "Speak of the body having suffering, but do not speak of delighting in nirvāṇa" explains the contemplation of suffering. Speaking of the body having suffering destroys their inversion of pleasure. Not speaking of delighting in nirvāṇa differentiates them from śrāvakas: śrāvakas, seeing that the body has suffering, then seek nirvāṇa and are unable to transform external beings; therefore he teaches them to be different from this. "Speak of the body being without self, yet speak of teaching and guiding sentient beings" is the contemplation of no-self. Speaking of the body being without self destroys their inversion of self. Speaking of teaching and guiding sentient beings differentiates them from śrāvakas: śrāvakas, because they know no-self, abandon the transformation of sentient beings; therefore he teaches them to be different from this. The preceding three clauses teaching the contemplation of the emptiness of persons are concluded. "Speak of the body as empty and tranquil, but do not speak of ultimate cessation"—this single clause teaches the contemplation of the emptiness of dharmas. Speaking of the body as empty and tranquil directly clarifies the nonexistence in principle: the substance of the aggregates is not existent, and therefore the body is empty and tranquil. Not speaking of ultimate cessation again differentiates them from the śrāvakas: śrāvakas enter nirvāṇa with their bodies and consider it to be perpetual annihilation; now he teaches bodhisattvas that although they attain nirvāṇa, they do not undergo perpetual cessation, but always follow the three realms of existence to teach and transform sentient beings. The preceding four clauses on contemplating afflictions are concluded. Below, a single clause teaches them to contemplate karma, showing difference from ordinary persons. "Speak of repenting previous transgressions, but do not speak of entering past transgressions": [transgression] is destruction; because it destroys wholesome dharmas, it is called a transgression. Misdeeds already committed are called previous transgressions. Regretting, reforming, and not committing them again is therefore called "speaking of repentance." "Yet speak of entering past [transgressions]" shows difference from ordinary persons: ordinary persons, even when they repent, see the substance of transgressions as falling away into the past; now he teaches them to be different from that, and therefore says "do not speak of entering the past." The preceding was self-benefit. Below, a single clause explains benefiting others. "Taking one's own sickness to feel pity for their sickness" explains benefiting others. This concludes the entire first part explaining consoling in terms of contemplative understanding. Below, the second part explains consoling in terms of a wholesome mind. The text has two clauses: the first explains self-benefit, and the latter explains benefiting others. "One should recognize the suffering of countless eons in past lives" explains self-benefit. "One should be mindful of benefiting all sentient beings" explains benefiting others. Below, the third part explains consoling in terms of active cultivation. In the text there are three clauses: the first two are self-benefit, and the latter one is benefiting others. As for the first two of self-benefit: "Recalling the merit cultivated and being mindful of pure livelihood" are the wholesome deeds already performed; he teaches them to dedicate them and not generate anxiety and distress. "Constantly generating vigorous effort" refers to the wholesome deeds not yet performed; he teaches them to endure suffering and cultivate further. Below, a single clause teaches them to benefit others: "One should act as a king of physicians to cure all illnesses" explains benefiting others. The meaning can be understood. The preceding three pairs of self-benefit and benefiting others are collectively called the second part, the conclusion of Vimalakīrti's answer. Below, the third part concludes with an exhortation to cultivate and train. "A bodhisattva should in this way console a sick bodhisattva, causing them to rejoice": great bodhisattvas such as Vimalakīrti should in this way, relying on what was previously spoken, console those lesser bodhisattvas who have actual sickness, matching their minds and thereby making them rejoice. Consoling above is concluded. This is precisely teaching those bodhisattvas with actual sickness in the stage of the ten faiths, expounding the Dharma for them to cause them to achieve defiled hearing-perfuming, teaching them to learn the two contemplations of the emptiness of persons and the emptiness of dharmas, suppressing the two grasps at selfhood of persons and dharmas, and causing their minds to rejoice; therefore it is called consoling.

First 13 of 28 passages. Read on

English (machine translation)

Contents

Text