維摩經疏 1.9

1.9

Below, Mañjuśrī sets forth two objections. First, Mañjuśrī clings to principle to challenge phenomena, and Vimalakīrti adduces phenomena to reveal principle in his answer; second, Mañjuśrī clings to principle to press upon the verbal expression, and Vimalakīrti sweeps away verbal expression to reveal principle in his answer. First, he clarifies the first objection, clinging to principle to challenge phenomena. He also asks, 'What need is there for emptiness to be empty?' 'Also asks, "emptiness"' clings to principle; 'what need is there for emptiness?' challenges phenomena: 'If the substance of principle were not empty, it could be permitted to remove things to produce the emptiness of phenomena. Since the substance of principle in this room is naturally empty, why is there a need to remove the things in the room?' Below, he clarifies the answer adducing phenomena to reveal principle: 'He answered, "It is empty through nonconceptual emptiness." "Through nonconceptual emptiness" means that sentient beings do not understand the emptiness of principle. Saying "empty through nonconceptual emptiness" means intentionally producing the emptiness of phenomena in order to reveal the emptiness of principle, causing those sentient beings to follow phenomena and awaken to principle. Furthermore, the emptiness of principle is obscure and difficult to know; unless verbally expressed it cannot be revealed, and so taking the emptiness of phenomena as a snare reveals the emptiness of principle. Therefore, the things in the room are removed to produce the emptiness of phenomena.' Below is the second objection, clinging to principle to press upon the verbal expression, and Vimalakīrti sweeps away verbal expression to reveal principle in his answer. First, it clarifies clinging to principle to press upon the verbal expression: 'He also asked, "Can emptiness be conceptualised?"' 'Also asked, "emptiness"' clings to principle; 'can it be conceptualised?' presses upon the verbal expression. He also asks: 'Can the emptiness of principle be conceptualised through the emptiness of phenomena? If there were an emptiness of phenomena outside the emptiness of principle, it could be permitted to use phenomena to conceptualise the emptiness of principle. Originally there are no phenomena outside the emptiness of principle; how can one use phenomena to reveal the emptiness of principle?' Below, he sweeps away the verbal expression to reveal principle: 'He answered, "Conceptualisation is also empty." The emptiness of phenomena that is able to conceptualise is also the emptiness of principle. When sentient beings have not yet understood the emptiness of principle, they make that emptiness of phenomena to conceptualise the emptiness of principle. If they then understand that emptiness of principle, they immediately know that conceptualisation is also the emptiness of principle.' The above concludes the objections.