維摩經疏卷第三．第六 6.48

6.48

Third, regarding the explanation of the text: The text is divided into three sections: 1. Explaining the correct contemplation; 2. Being reborn without being born; 3. Demonstrating supernatural powers. In the first section, there are three parts: first, the question; next, the answer; and finally, the conclusion. The Tathāgata's question is asked in order to cause Vimalakīrti to reveal the true vision of the Buddha. Vimalakīrti says: 'As I contemplate the dharmatā of my own body, contemplating the Buddha is also like this.' Because he contemplates the cause to infer the fruit, he says 'as I [contemplate] my own.' Because he contemplates others as identical to himself, he says 'also like this.' 'The dharmatā of the body' refers to expressing the tathatā of the two kinds of selflessness, being far removed from all marks; its nature is not deceptive, hence it is called dharmatā. This is the dharmakāya Buddha. The Mūlamadhyamakakārikā says: 'Within the dharmatā of all phenomena, mental activities and paths of speech are severed; there is neither production nor cessation; it is tranquil and extinguished like nirvāṇa.' There are three ways of contemplating the Buddha: 1. Contemplating the transformation body (nirmāṇakāya), which is provisional response and manifestation. 2. Contemplating the retribution body (saṃbhogakāya), which consists of the true, permanent five aggregates. 3. Contemplating the dharmakāya, which is the tathatā of the two kinds of selflessness. What Pure Name [Vimalakīrti] sees now is precisely this third body of the dharma-nature, not the former two. Thus it says 'seeing the dharmatā.' This sentence is the general contemplation. Beginning from 'I contemplate the Tathāgata as not coming from the past,' it is the specific [contemplation]. Within the specific [contemplation], there are one hundred and two phrases, divided into eight contemplations: 1. Contemplating the Tathāgata as not subsumed within the three times. 2. Contemplating the Tathāgata as free from the phenomena of causes and conditions. 3. Contemplating the Tathāgata as not being in the three realms. 4. Contemplating the Tathāgata as free from the marks of existence and non-existence. 5. Contemplating [the Tathāgata] as neither present nor absent. 6. Explaining that the Tathāgata is beyond the reach of knowledge and consciousness. 7. Being identical with the true nature. 8. Being equal with all dharmas. First, it says: 'He does not come from the past and does not abide in the future.' Master Zhuang says: 'The dharmakāya is unproduced; it does not come from the future. The dharmakāya is without cessation; it does not depart from the past. Since it neither comes nor goes, it also does not abide in the present. The Buddha has neither coming nor going, and is not subsumed within the three times.' Sengzhao says: 'The dharmakāya transcends the three times, and is not subsumed under the aggregates, realms, or sense bases. One cannot contemplate the Buddha in terms of arising, abiding, departing, or coming.' In the second contemplation of the dharmakāya being free from causes and conditions, first it contemplates the substance of the dharmakāya as not being the five aggregates; next, it contemplates it as not being the four great elements; finally, it contemplates it as not being the twelve sense bases. These three dharma-gates are all false and deceptive, not corresponding to the true dharmakāya. Therefore, it is free from all of them. In the first, regarding 'not contemplating form': An old saying says: 'Form has distinct marks such as long and short. In the dharmakāya these do not exist, therefore he does not contemplate it.' Regarding 'the tathatā of form': the tathatā of form is emptiness itself. The dharmakāya has a substance, therefore it is not identical. Regarding 'not contemplating the nature of form': the nature of form is obstructiveness, impermanence, and decay. The nature of the dharmakāya is permanent, which is not identical to this, hence it is not contemplated. The remaining four aggregates are understood in the same manner. 'Not contemplating' means not seeing the Buddha. Kuiji says: 'Not contemplating form means not seeing the Buddha's body as existing in the same way as form. Not contemplating the tathatā of form means not seeing the Buddha's body as non-existing in the same way as form. Not contemplating the nature of form means not seeing the Buddha's body as both existing and non-existing in the same way as that nature of form.' Since nothing is seen among the three, this constitutes seeing reality; taking the vision of reality as vision is truly seeing the Buddha. Since it is so for one aggregate, the remaining four are analogously so. Since it is not produced from the five aggregates, neither does it arise from the four great elements, just like space does not arise from the four great elements. Therefore, the Ratnakūṭa Sūtra says: 'Correctly seeing the dharmakāya, one still does not see the Buddha, how much less his physical form.' Furthermore, the Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra says: 'If one sees me by form, or seeks me by sound, this person practices a deviant path and cannot see the Tathāgata.' Regarding 'there is no accumulation of the six sense bases, the body and mind have transcended': the six sense bases are produced from causes and conditions and have no intrinsic nature. Having no intrinsic nature, they are emptiness; they do not constitute the dharmakāya. It also says: The dharmakāya Tathāgata does not use an accumulation of the six sense bases to form a body. Why is there no accumulation? It explains that the Buddha's dharmakāya has already transcended the six sense bases. Hongfu says: 'Here there are two meanings: 1. The Tathāgata's dharmakāya is like empty space, hence it is not produced from the accumulation of the six sense bases. 2. The six sense bases of the dharmakāya are unlike derived form, which is formed by the accumulation of eight, nine, or ten subtle particles (paramāṇu)—hence it is called without accumulation of the six sense bases.' The Saṃyuktābhidharmahṛdaya says: 'Subtle particles in the four sense faculties are to be known as ten kinds; in the body faculty there are nine, and in the others eight, meaning these are the subtle particles of odor and earth.' Regarding 'the body and mind have transcended': because they surpass the six sense bases, it is called 'transcended.' In the third, contemplating the dharmakāya as having transcended the three realms: The substance and nature of the tathatā-dharmakāya are permanently abiding, not subsumed within the three realms; therefore, it says 'not being in the three realms.' Why? Because it is free from the three defilements. Since it transcends the defilements of the three realms, it does not receive a body of the three realms. 'Having already abandoned the three defilements' explains why it is not there. The three defilements, according to the Saṃyuktābhidharmahṛdaya, are precisely the ninety-eight latent afflictions (anuśaya). In the desire realm, there are thirty-six for seeing and cultivation. In the two higher realms, there are thirty-one each for seeing and cultivation, because anger is excluded. The treatise says: 'Under suffering, all are complete; two practices abandon three views; the path removes two views; in the higher realms, anger does not operate.' Since the dharmakāya transcends the bodies of the three realms, how could it have the defilements of the three realms? Therefore it says 'already abandoned, according with the three gates of liberation.' Regarding 'clear knowledge and ignorance are equal': it explains the reason for leaving behind defilement. The dharmakāya Tathāgata is not different from emptiness and signlessness, which is called 'according with.' Therefore an earlier chapter says: 'Dharmas follow tathatā, having nothing to follow.' Truly, because the substance of the dharmakāya accords with the three liberations, it possesses the three kinds of clear knowledge (vidyā). The three kinds of clear knowledge are: 1. Clear knowledge of the divine eye; 2. Clear knowledge of past lives; 3. Clear knowledge of the exhaustion of outflows. Or alternatively, according to the Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra: 1. Bodhisattva-knowledge, which is prajñā-wisdom; 2. Buddha-knowledge, which is the Buddha-eye illuminating and seeing the Buddha-nature; 3. Non-knowledge knowledge, which refers to the eleven kinds of emptiness. Emptiness is not [itself] knowledge, but it can give birth to the light of wisdom, so it is also called knowledge. These three kinds of clear knowledge—the true-nature dharmakāya is endowed with the three kinds of clear knowledge. The nature of emptiness is not different from the true nature of ignorance; therefore it says 'are equal.' Because of this equality, it is far removed from all marks; therefore it can leave behind defilements. Fourth, regarding being free from the marks of existence and non-existence: An old saying says: 'Because its dharmakāya is endowed with all virtues, it does not have a single mark; because it has no separate substance, it does not have distinct marks. Because there is no self, it does not have its own mark; because there is no what-belongs-to-self, it does not have the mark of another. The myriad virtues, like pearls of varied colors, are not without marks; because the substance of virtue is empty, it does not have apprehendable marks.' Kuiji says: 'Both oneness and difference are cut off, hence it says neither a single mark nor distinct marks. Because its own substance is empty, it does not have its own mark. Apart from the self there is no other, hence it has no other mark. Signlessness is also non-existent, hence it says not without marks. Marks belong to conditions, and there are no marks to be grasped, hence it says not apprehending marks.' Because its dharmakāya is free from all marks, the Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra says: 'All that possesses marks is false and deceptive. If one sees that all marks are non-marks, one sees the Tathāgata.' Fifth, contemplating neither presence nor absence: Regarding 'neither on this shore, nor on the other shore, nor in midstream': Because its dharmakāya is not saṃsāra, it is not on this shore. Because it is not nirvāṇa, it is not on the other shore. Because it is not the noble path, it is not in midstream. It also says: Because it does not abandon nirvāṇa, it is not on this shore. Because it always dwells in saṃsāra, it is not on the other shore. Since it is not at either the near or far extremes, neither does it dwell in midstream. Regarding 'teaching and transforming sentient beings': the dharmakāya is not in the three places, appearing as though it does not transform sentient beings; yet now, with great compassion transforming beings, there is nowhere it is not present. Regarding 'contemplating tranquility and extinction, yet not entering ultimate extinction': since it is said to transform sentient beings, it appears again as though it perceives marks of sentient beings. Thus, although the dharmakāya transforms, it is constantly tranquil and hence nowhere present. Regarding 'yet not entering ultimate extinction': constantly transforming sentient beings, it is also nowhere absent. Regarding 'neither this nor that': being identical with the ultimate truth, it is not this; being identical with the conventional truth, it is not that. It also says: 'This' and 'that' belong to conditions, being phenomena of names and marks; the dharmakāya is free from marks, hence there is neither this nor that. Or alternatively: because it does not dwell in saṃsāra, it is not this; because it does not realize nirvāṇa, it is not that. Regarding 'not by this and not by that': since it says 'not this,' this itself is not this, so one does not take this as this. 'Not by that': since it says 'not that,' that itself is not that, so one does not take that as that. Therefore it says 'not by this and not by that.' Sixth, explaining that it is beyond the reach of knowledge and consciousness: The first two lines open the section, and the subsequent twenty lines re-explain the meaning above. In opening the section, regarding 'cannot be known by knowledge, cannot be cognized by consciousness': the ten knowledges of the two vehicles do not know it, and the eight consciousnesses of ordinary beings do not cognize it. The knowledge and consciousness of ordinary beings and Hīnayānists arise within names and marks; because the dharmakāya is without marks, knowledge and consciousness do not reach it. If viewed in terms of the bodhisattva's pṛṣṭhalabdha-jñāna, it conditions the conventional and also does not directly realize the real; hence it says neither known nor cognized. If viewed in terms of mūla-jñāna, although it directly witnesses and sees the dharmakāya, because it is free from the conceptual discrimination of grasper and grasped, it also does not know or cognize it. Regarding 'without darkness': An old saying says: 'The dharmakāya illuminates brightly.' This completes the earlier 'cannot be cognized by consciousness.' 'Without light': it illuminates while remaining constantly tranquil. This completes the earlier 'cannot be known by knowledge.' As this pair is thus, the nineteen pairs below follow the same pattern and should be understood accordingly. Sengzhao says: 'Its brightness surpasses the three celestial lights; who could call it dark? Its obscurity exceeds a dark room; who could call it bright? That which can be dark and can be bright—how could it be capable of brightness and darkness?' Kuiji says: 'Not being delusion, it is without darkness; not being knowledge, it is without light.' Regarding 'without name and without mark': An old saying says: 'The dharmakāya's name is emptiness, termed without name; its supreme virtue is constantly tranquil, termed without mark.' Sengzhao says: 'It cannot be named by names; it cannot be marked by marks.' Regarding 'neither strong nor weak': Kuiji says: 'Utmost gentleness has no opposition; who could call it strong? Firmness subdues everything; who could call it weak? Furthermore, moving heaven and earth is not its strength; responding to the end of impermanence is also not its weakness. Strength and weakness follow conditions and have no intrinsic nature, hence they are empty. Being empty, there is neither strong nor weak.' An old saying says: 'Without name and without mark, hence it is called not strong; not lacking name and mark, it is called not weak.' It also says: 'Empty and selfless, hence it is called not strong; its substance fully endowed with the true self, it is called not weak.' Regarding 'neither pure nor defiled': The dharmakāya is empty by nature and fundamentally without defilement; since marks of defilement do not exist, relative to what could it be called pure? With neither purity nor defilement, it is therefore called the true Buddha. Hence an earlier chapter says: 'Seeing the true nature of defilement, there are no marks of purity.' Regarding 'neither in a direction nor apart from a direction': Sengzhao says: 'The dharmakāya is nowhere present yet nowhere absent. Because it is nowhere present, it is not in a direction. Because it is nowhere absent, it is not apart from a direction.' An old saying says: 'Because the dharmakāya is not form, it is not in a direction; yet it is still the nature of form, hence it is not apart from a direction.' Regarding 'neither conditioned nor unconditioned': Sengzhao says: 'If one wishes to call it conditioned, it is without name and without mark; if one wishes to call it unconditioned, it responds and embodies myriad forms.' It also says: 'Its substance has neither arising nor ceasing, hence it is not conditioned; since it is not conditioned, relative to what could one speak of the unconditioned?' Regarding 'without manifestation and without explanation': Kuiji says: 'Because it is without marks, it cannot be manifested; because it is without name, it cannot be explained.' Sengzhao says: 'It is not reached by the six senses; how could one explain it to show people?' Regarding 'neither giving nor stingy, neither truthful nor deceitful': Because the six perfections are empty, there is nothing to be truthful about; the six hindrances are also empty, hence neither is there deceit. This explains that one cannot consider it good by goodness, nor consider it evil by evil. Regarding 'neither coming nor going': An old saying says: 'It does not come from the past, nor does it perish into the past.' Sengzhao says: 'Tranquilly it goes, placidly it comes, showing there is no mark of movement.' Regarding 'neither emerging nor entering': It neither emerges from saṃsāra nor enters into nirvāṇa. Regarding 'the path of language is cut off': This explains being free from the four propositions and cutting off the hundred negations. Regarding 'neither a field of merit nor not a field of merit': The markless substance—no one sees its boundaries; it is beyond the reach of words. How could there be a field or non-field? Or alternatively: because it is not existent, it is not a field of merit; because it is not non-existent, it is not not a field of merit. It also says: because its nature is empty, it is not a field; being endowed with virtues as numerous as the sands of the Ganges, it is not not a field. Regarding 'neither worthy of offerings nor not worthy of offerings': Because it is not a field, one cannot say it is worthy of offerings; because it is not not a field, one cannot say it is not worthy of offerings. Regarding 'neither grasping nor abandoning': Because it is not a field, there is no grasping; because it is not not a field, there is no abandoning. Regarding 'neither having marks nor lacking marks': Because it is not a field, it does not have marks; because it is not not a field, it is not without marks. Or alternatively: the dharmakāya is equal; because it is not existent, it does not have marks; because it is not non-existent, it is not without marks. In the seventh, being identical with the true and equal nature: The first two phrases state it generally, and the phrases beginning from 'incomparable' re-explain it. In the first, 'identical with the true': the dharmakāya takes tathatā as its substance; tathatā is not different, hence it is called 'identical with the true.' The substance of the nature does not differ, which is called 'equal nature.' In the re-explanation below, regarding 'cannot be weighed or measured': the dharmakāya is without marks; it cannot be spoken of by words, nor measured by knowledge. Why? Because it transcends the realm of all weighing and measuring. Regarding 'neither large nor small': entering subtly without interval, hence it is called 'not large'; its measure is equal to empty space, so it cannot be called 'small.' Small and large follow conditions and inherently lack substantiality. Why? Because it is identical with the true nature. Regarding 'neither seen, heard, sensed, nor known': because it is not form, it is not seen; because it is not sound, it is not heard; because it is not smell, taste, or tangibility, it is not sensed; because it is not mental phenomena, it is not known. Thus the Saṃyuktābhidharmahṛdaya says: 'The eye element accordingly gives rise to seeing; the ear element accordingly gives rise to hearing; the three elements accordingly give rise to sensing; the mind element accordingly gives rise to knowing.' Regarding 'free from all bonds and fetters': since there is no seeing, hearing, sensing, or knowing, its nature is inherently liberated and does not give rise to bonds and fetters. Eighth, regarding being equal with all dharmas: Because the dharmakāya is equal, when in knowledge it is like knowledge, and when in sentient beings it is identical with sentient beings. Undifferentiated and boundless, it is no different from dharma-nature. Therefore, it does not transcend the various knowledges, nor is it different from the multitude of sentient beings; hence it says 'equal to all knowledges, identical to sentient beings.' Regarding 'without discrimination toward all dharmas': the dharmakāya is without marks, identical to the emptiness of all dharmas; hence it has no discriminating thoughts. Regarding 'in all things without loss and without affliction': the nature of emptiness is equal, hence there is nothing to gain; having nothing to gain, there is nothing to lose. Being without loss, the mind is without turbidity; without turbidity, there is no [afflictive] nature. Regarding 'without making and without arising': where there is turbidity and affliction, karma is made; where painful retribution is produced, being without turbidity and affliction, there is neither making nor arising. Regarding 'without arising and without ceasing': when painful fruits are produced, there is the wisdom of arising and ceasing; because there is no making and no arising, there is neither arising nor ceasing. Regarding 'without fear, without sorrow, without joy, and without aversion': if there were arising and ceasing, it would be a fearful dharma, and one would delight in life and grieve over death. Since sorrow and joy are already absent, there is no aversion. Regarding 'having no past existence and no future existence': since sorrow and joy are absent, one no longer receives any existence. 'Having no past existence' means not receiving a body of the past. 'Having no future existence' means not receiving a body of the future. 'Having no present existence' means not receiving a body of the present. Regarding 'cannot be shown by any speech': this explains that the dharmakāya is free from language and cannot be revealed through the discrimination of words. Therefore, the Viśeṣacintā-brahma-paripṛcchā Sūtra says: 'Dharmatā is not as expressed by words.'