維摩經疏卷第三．第六 6.48

6.48

三釋文者。文判為三。一明正觀。二不生而生。三示神通。前中有三。初問次答後結。如來問者。欲使維摩顯真見佛故為問也。維摩詰言如自觀身實相觀佛亦然者。觀因類果故云如自。觀他同己故曰亦然。身實相者。所謂表二空真如遠離眾相性非虛妄名曰實相。即是法身佛。中論云。諸法實相中。心行言語斷。無生亦無滅。寂滅如涅槃。觀佛有三。一觀化身。權應變現。二觀報身。真常五陰。三觀法身。二空真如。淨名今所見者即是第三法性之身。不同前二。故云見實相也。此句總觀。我觀如來前際下別。別中文有一百二句。分為八觀。一觀如來非三世攝。二觀如來離因緣法。三觀如來不在三界。四觀如來離有無相。五觀無在無不在。六明如來智識所不及。七同真性。八與一切法平等。初云前不來後不住者。莊云。法身不生不從未來來。法身無滅不從過去去。既無來去亦不住現在。佛無來去非三世攝也。肇云。法身超絕三世。非陰界入所攝。不可以生住去來而觀佛也。二觀法身離因緣中。初觀法身體非五陰。次觀非四大。後觀非十二入。此三法門皆是虛妄不與真實法身相應。故並離也。初中不觀色者。諺云。色有形相長短等異。法身中無故不觀也。色如者色如即空。法身有體故不同也。不觀色性者。色性質礙無常敗壞。法身性常即不同。此故不觀也。餘之四陰准義同前。不觀者謂不見佛也。滿云。不觀色者。不見佛身同色有也。不觀色如者。不見佛身同色無也。不觀色性者。不見佛身同彼色性亦有亦無也。三中既無所見。乃為見實。以實見為見。是真見佛。一陰既無。然餘四類爾。既非五陰所生。亦非四大所起。猶如虛空不從四大成也。故寶積經云。正見法身尚不見佛。何況形色。又般若經云。若以色見我以音聲求我。是人行邪道不能見如來。六入無積身心已過者。六入因緣所生無有自性。無性即空。不成法身也。又云。法身如來不以六入積聚成身。何故無積。明佛法身已過六入也。弘福云。此有二義。一如來法身由如虛空故。不從六入積或而生。二法身六入不同造色。八微九微十微積聚以成名六入無積。雜心論云。極微在四根。十種應當知。身根九餘八。謂是為香地。身心已過者。超過六入故名過也。三觀法身出三界者。真如法身體性常住。非三界所攝。故云不在三界。何故。不在離三垢故。既越三界垢。所以不受三界身也。三垢已離者。明不在。所以三垢依雜心論即是九十八使。欲界見修有三十六。上二界見修各三十一。除嗔故。論云。苦下具一切。二行離三見。道除於二見。上界不行恚。法身既越三界之身。安得有三界垢也。故言已離順三脫門。明與無明等者。辯離垢所由。法身如來與空無相不異。名之為順。故上經云。法隨於如無所隨也。良由法身體順三脫即有三明。言三明者。一天眼明。二宿命明。三漏盡明。或可。依涅槃經。一菩薩明。謂般若惠二佛明。謂佛眼照見佛性。三無明明。謂十一空。空非是明能生智明亦名明也。此之三明真性法身具三明。性空與無明真性不異故言等也。由其平等遠離眾相。所以能離垢也。四離有無相者。諺云。以其法身具眾德故不一相。無別體故不異相。以無我故不自相。無我所故不他相。萬德珠斑非無相。德體空故非取相。滿云。一異俱絕故云不一相不異相。自體空故不自相。離自無他故無他相。無相亦無故曰非無相。相屬於緣無相可取。故言非取相。以其法身離一切相故。般若經云。凡所有相皆是虛妄。若見諸相非相即見如來。五觀無在無不在。不此岸不彼岸不中流者。以其法身非生死故不此岸。非涅槃故不彼岸。非聖道故不中流也。又云。不捨涅槃故不此岸。常處生死故不彼岸。既不在彼此二邊亦不處中流也。教化眾生者。法身不在三處似若不化眾生。今大悲化物亦無不在。觀於寂滅而不永滅者。既云化生。復似見眾生相。所以法身雖化。常寂則無在也。而不永滅者。常化眾生亦無不在也。不此不彼者。同真諦故不此。同俗諦故不彼。又云。此彼屬緣名相之法。法身離相故無彼此也。或可。不處生死故不此。不證涅槃故不彼也。不以此不以彼者。既云。不此。此自非此。不以此而為此。不以彼者。既云不彼。彼自非彼。不以彼而為彼。故言不以此不以彼也。六明知識所不及者。初兩句開章門下二十句重釋上義。開章門中不可智知不可識識者。二乘十智不知。凡夫八識不識。凡小知識生於名相之內。法身無相故知識不及。若約菩薩後得智。緣俗亦不證真故言不知識也。若約正體知雖復證見法身。以離能取所取分別亦不知識也。無晦者。諺云。法身朗照也。成上不可以識識。無明者照而常寂也。成上不可以智知。此對既爾。下十九對例然宜准之也。肇云。明逾三光。誰謂之晦。闇逾冥室。誰謂之明。能闇能明者豈明闇之所能也。滿云。非癡故無晦。非智故無明。無名無相者。諺云。法身名空稱曰無名。勝德常寂名為無相也。肇云。不可以名名。不可以相相也。無強無弱者。滿云。至柔無逆。誰謂之強。剛無不伏。誰謂之弱。又運動天地非其強。應盡無常亦非弱。強弱從緣無性故空。空故無強弱也。諺云。無名無相故曰無強。非無名相稱為無弱。又云。空無我故名為不強。體具真我稱為不弱也。無淨穢者。法身性空本來無穢。穢相既無對誰稱淨。無淨無穢。故云真佛也。故上經云。見垢實性即無淨相也。不在方不離方者。肇云。法身無在而無不在。無在故不在方。無不在故不離方也。諺云。法身非色故不在方。仍是色性故不離方也。非有為無為者。肇云。欲言有為無名無相。欲言無為應備萬形也。又云。體無生滅故非有為。既非有為。知復對誰說無為也。無示無說者。滿云。無相故不可示。無名故不可說也。肇云。非六情所及。豈可說以示人也。不施不慳不誠不欺者。六度空故即無可誠。六蔽亦空故欺也。此明不可以善善不可以惡惡也。不來不去者。諺云。不從前際來。亦不滅過去也。肇云。寂然而往。泊爾而來。明無動相也。不出不入者。不出生死不入涅槃也。言語道斷者。明離四句絕百非。非福田非不福田者。無相之體莫覩其畔。言語所不及。豈有田不田哉。或可。非有故非福田。非無故非不福田。又云。性空故非田。具恒沙德非不田也。非應供養非不應供養者。非田故不可言應供。非不田故不可言不應供也。非取非捨者。非田故非取。非不田故非捨。非有相非無相者。非田故非相。非不田故非無相也。或可。法身平等非有故非相非無故非無相也。七同真等性中。初二總舉。不可稱下諸句重釋。初同真者。法身即以真如為體。如如不異故曰同真。性體不殊名為等性。下重釋中。不可稱量者。法身無相不可以言稱。不可以智量。何以故。過諸稱量境界故也。非大小者。細入無間故曰非大。量等虛空不可云小。小大從緣自無體質。何以故。同真性也。非見聞覺知者。非色故非見。非聲故非聞。非香味觸故非覺。非法故非知也。故雜心論云。眼界隨生見。耳界隨生聞。三界隨生覺。意界隨生知也。離眾結縛者。既無見聞覺知。性自解脫不生結縛也。八與一切諸法等者。法身等故在智如智在生同生。渾然無際與法性無別。所以不出於諸智。不異於群生。故云等諸智同眾生也。於諸法無分別者。法身無相同諸法空。故無分別情也。一切無失無惱者。空性平等故無得。無得故無失。無失即心無濁。無濁即無性也。無作無起者。有濁有惱便是作業。起苦報無濁惱故無作無起也。無生無滅者。既起苦果即有生滅之惠。無作無起故無生滅也。無畏無憂無喜無厭者。若有生滅是可畏法。便欣生而憂死矣。憂喜已無。故無厭也。無已有無當有者。既無憂喜。不復受諸有。無已有者不受過去。無當有者不受未來。無今有者不受現在身也。不可以一切言說顯示者。此明法身離言不可以文字分別所顯。故思益經云。實相者不如文字所說也。

Third, regarding the explanation of the text: The text is divided into three sections: 1. Explaining the correct contemplation; 2. Being reborn without being born; 3. Demonstrating supernatural powers. In the first section, there are three parts: first, the question; next, the answer; and finally, the conclusion. The Tathāgata's question is asked in order to cause Vimalakīrti to reveal the true vision of the Buddha. Vimalakīrti says: 'As I contemplate the dharmatā of my own body, contemplating the Buddha is also like this.' Because he contemplates the cause to infer the fruit, he says 'as I [contemplate] my own.' Because he contemplates others as identical to himself, he says 'also like this.' 'The dharmatā of the body' refers to expressing the tathatā of the two kinds of selflessness, being far removed from all marks; its nature is not deceptive, hence it is called dharmatā. This is the dharmakāya Buddha. The Mūlamadhyamakakārikā says: 'Within the dharmatā of all phenomena, mental activities and paths of speech are severed; there is neither production nor cessation; it is tranquil and extinguished like nirvāṇa.' There are three ways of contemplating the Buddha: 1. Contemplating the transformation body (nirmāṇakāya), which is provisional response and manifestation. 2. Contemplating the retribution body (saṃbhogakāya), which consists of the true, permanent five aggregates. 3. Contemplating the dharmakāya, which is the tathatā of the two kinds of selflessness. What Pure Name [Vimalakīrti] sees now is precisely this third body of the dharma-nature, not the former two. Thus it says 'seeing the dharmatā.' This sentence is the general contemplation. Beginning from 'I contemplate the Tathāgata as not coming from the past,' it is the specific [contemplation]. Within the specific [contemplation], there are one hundred and two phrases, divided into eight contemplations: 1. Contemplating the Tathāgata as not subsumed within the three times. 2. Contemplating the Tathāgata as free from the phenomena of causes and conditions. 3. Contemplating the Tathāgata as not being in the three realms. 4. Contemplating the Tathāgata as free from the marks of existence and non-existence. 5. Contemplating [the Tathāgata] as neither present nor absent. 6. Explaining that the Tathāgata is beyond the reach of knowledge and consciousness. 7. Being identical with the true nature. 8. Being equal with all dharmas. First, it says: 'He does not come from the past and does not abide in the future.' Master Zhuang says: 'The dharmakāya is unproduced; it does not come from the future. The dharmakāya is without cessation; it does not depart from the past. Since it neither comes nor goes, it also does not abide in the present. The Buddha has neither coming nor going, and is not subsumed within the three times.' Sengzhao says: 'The dharmakāya transcends the three times, and is not subsumed under the aggregates, realms, or sense bases. One cannot contemplate the Buddha in terms of arising, abiding, departing, or coming.' In the second contemplation of the dharmakāya being free from causes and conditions, first it contemplates the substance of the dharmakāya as not being the five aggregates; next, it contemplates it as not being the four great elements; finally, it contemplates it as not being the twelve sense bases. These three dharma-gates are all false and deceptive, not corresponding to the true dharmakāya. Therefore, it is free from all of them. In the first, regarding 'not contemplating form': An old saying says: 'Form has distinct marks such as long and short. In the dharmakāya these do not exist, therefore he does not contemplate it.' Regarding 'the tathatā of form': the tathatā of form is emptiness itself. The dharmakāya has a substance, therefore it is not identical. Regarding 'not contemplating the nature of form': the nature of form is obstructiveness, impermanence, and decay. The nature of the dharmakāya is permanent, which is not identical to this, hence it is not contemplated. The remaining four aggregates are understood in the same manner. 'Not contemplating' means not seeing the Buddha. Kuiji says: 'Not contemplating form means not seeing the Buddha's body as existing in the same way as form. Not contemplating the tathatā of form means not seeing the Buddha's body as non-existing in the same way as form. Not contemplating the nature of form means not seeing the Buddha's body as both existing and non-existing in the same way as that nature of form.' Since nothing is seen among the three, this constitutes seeing reality; taking the vision of reality as vision is truly seeing the Buddha. Since it is so for one aggregate, the remaining four are analogously so. Since it is not produced from the five aggregates, neither does it arise from the four great elements, just like space does not arise from the four great elements. Therefore, the Ratnakūṭa Sūtra says: 'Correctly seeing the dharmakāya, one still does not see the Buddha, how much less his physical form.' Furthermore, the Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra says: 'If one sees me by form, or seeks me by sound, this person practices a deviant path and cannot see the Tathāgata.' Regarding 'there is no accumulation of the six sense bases, the body and mind have transcended': the six sense bases are produced from causes and conditions and have no intrinsic nature. Having no intrinsic nature, they are emptiness; they do not constitute the dharmakāya. It also says: The dharmakāya Tathāgata does not use an accumulation of the six sense bases to form a body. Why is there no accumulation? It explains that the Buddha's dharmakāya has already transcended the six sense bases. Hongfu says: 'Here there are two meanings: 1. The Tathāgata's dharmakāya is like empty space, hence it is not produced from the accumulation of the six sense bases. 2. The six sense bases of the dharmakāya are unlike derived form, which is formed by the accumulation of eight, nine, or ten subtle particles (paramāṇu)—hence it is called without accumulation of the six sense bases.' The Saṃyuktābhidharmahṛdaya says: 'Subtle particles in the four sense faculties are to be known as ten kinds; in the body faculty there are nine, and in the others eight, meaning these are the subtle particles of odor and earth.' Regarding 'the body and mind have transcended': because they surpass the six sense bases, it is called 'transcended.' In the third, contemplating the dharmakāya as having transcended the three realms: The substance and nature of the tathatā-dharmakāya are permanently abiding, not subsumed within the three realms; therefore, it says 'not being in the three realms.' Why? Because it is free from the three defilements. Since it transcends the defilements of the three realms, it does not receive a body of the three realms. 'Having already abandoned the three defilements' explains why it is not there. The three defilements, according to the Saṃyuktābhidharmahṛdaya, are precisely the ninety-eight latent afflictions (anuśaya). In the desire realm, there are thirty-six for seeing and cultivation. In the two higher realms, there are thirty-one each for seeing and cultivation, because anger is excluded. The treatise says: 'Under suffering, all are complete; two practices abandon three views; the path removes two views; in the higher realms, anger does not operate.' Since the dharmakāya transcends the bodies of the three realms, how could it have the defilements of the three realms? Therefore it says 'already abandoned, according with the three gates of liberation.' Regarding 'clear knowledge and ignorance are equal': it explains the reason for leaving behind defilement. The dharmakāya Tathāgata is not different from emptiness and signlessness, which is called 'according with.' Therefore an earlier chapter says: 'Dharmas follow tathatā, having nothing to follow.' Truly, because the substance of the dharmakāya accords with the three liberations, it possesses the three kinds of clear knowledge (vidyā). The three kinds of clear knowledge are: 1. Clear knowledge of the divine eye; 2. Clear knowledge of past lives; 3. Clear knowledge of the exhaustion of outflows. Or alternatively, according to the Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra: 1. Bodhisattva-knowledge, which is prajñā-wisdom; 2. Buddha-knowledge, which is the Buddha-eye illuminating and seeing the Buddha-nature; 3. Non-knowledge knowledge, which refers to the eleven kinds of emptiness. Emptiness is not [itself] knowledge, but it can give birth to the light of wisdom, so it is also called knowledge. These three kinds of clear knowledge—the true-nature dharmakāya is endowed with the three kinds of clear knowledge. The nature of emptiness is not different from the true nature of ignorance; therefore it says 'are equal.' Because of this equality, it is far removed from all marks; therefore it can leave behind defilements. Fourth, regarding being free from the marks of existence and non-existence: An old saying says: 'Because its dharmakāya is endowed with all virtues, it does not have a single mark; because it has no separate substance, it does not have distinct marks. Because there is no self, it does not have its own mark; because there is no what-belongs-to-self, it does not have the mark of another. The myriad virtues, like pearls of varied colors, are not without marks; because the substance of virtue is empty, it does not have apprehendable marks.' Kuiji says: 'Both oneness and difference are cut off, hence it says neither a single mark nor distinct marks. Because its own substance is empty, it does not have its own mark. Apart from the self there is no other, hence it has no other mark. Signlessness is also non-existent, hence it says not without marks. Marks belong to conditions, and there are no marks to be grasped, hence it says not apprehending marks.' Because its dharmakāya is free from all marks, the Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra says: 'All that possesses marks is false and deceptive. If one sees that all marks are non-marks, one sees the Tathāgata.' Fifth, contemplating neither presence nor absence: Regarding 'neither on this shore, nor on the other shore, nor in midstream': Because its dharmakāya is not saṃsāra, it is not on this shore. Because it is not nirvāṇa, it is not on the other shore. Because it is not the noble path, it is not in midstream. It also says: Because it does not abandon nirvāṇa, it is not on this shore. Because it always dwells in saṃsāra, it is not on the other shore. Since it is not at either the near or far extremes, neither does it dwell in midstream. Regarding 'teaching and transforming sentient beings': the dharmakāya is not in the three places, appearing as though it does not transform sentient beings; yet now, with great compassion transforming beings, there is nowhere it is not present. Regarding 'contemplating tranquility and extinction, yet not entering ultimate extinction': since it is said to transform sentient beings, it appears again as though it perceives marks of sentient beings. Thus, although the dharmakāya transforms, it is constantly tranquil and hence nowhere present. Regarding 'yet not entering ultimate extinction': constantly transforming sentient beings, it is also nowhere absent. Regarding 'neither this nor that': being identical with the ultimate truth, it is not this; being identical with the conventional truth, it is not that. It also says: 'This' and 'that' belong to conditions, being phenomena of names and marks; the dharmakāya is free from marks, hence there is neither this nor that. Or alternatively: because it does not dwell in saṃsāra, it is not this; because it does not realize nirvāṇa, it is not that. Regarding 'not by this and not by that': since it says 'not this,' this itself is not this, so one does not take this as this. 'Not by that': since it says 'not that,' that itself is not that, so one does not take that as that. Therefore it says 'not by this and not by that.' Sixth, explaining that it is beyond the reach of knowledge and consciousness: The first two lines open the section, and the subsequent twenty lines re-explain the meaning above. In opening the section, regarding 'cannot be known by knowledge, cannot be cognized by consciousness': the ten knowledges of the two vehicles do not know it, and the eight consciousnesses of ordinary beings do not cognize it. The knowledge and consciousness of ordinary beings and Hīnayānists arise within names and marks; because the dharmakāya is without marks, knowledge and consciousness do not reach it. If viewed in terms of the bodhisattva's pṛṣṭhalabdha-jñāna, it conditions the conventional and also does not directly realize the real; hence it says neither known nor cognized. If viewed in terms of mūla-jñāna, although it directly witnesses and sees the dharmakāya, because it is free from the conceptual discrimination of grasper and grasped, it also does not know or cognize it. Regarding 'without darkness': An old saying says: 'The dharmakāya illuminates brightly.' This completes the earlier 'cannot be cognized by consciousness.' 'Without light': it illuminates while remaining constantly tranquil. This completes the earlier 'cannot be known by knowledge.' As this pair is thus, the nineteen pairs below follow the same pattern and should be understood accordingly. Sengzhao says: 'Its brightness surpasses the three celestial lights; who could call it dark? Its obscurity exceeds a dark room; who could call it bright? That which can be dark and can be bright—how could it be capable of brightness and darkness?' Kuiji says: 'Not being delusion, it is without darkness; not being knowledge, it is without light.' Regarding 'without name and without mark': An old saying says: 'The dharmakāya's name is emptiness, termed without name; its supreme virtue is constantly tranquil, termed without mark.' Sengzhao says: 'It cannot be named by names; it cannot be marked by marks.' Regarding 'neither strong nor weak': Kuiji says: 'Utmost gentleness has no opposition; who could call it strong? Firmness subdues everything; who could call it weak? Furthermore, moving heaven and earth is not its strength; responding to the end of impermanence is also not its weakness. Strength and weakness follow conditions and have no intrinsic nature, hence they are empty. Being empty, there is neither strong nor weak.' An old saying says: 'Without name and without mark, hence it is called not strong; not lacking name and mark, it is called not weak.' It also says: 'Empty and selfless, hence it is called not strong; its substance fully endowed with the true self, it is called not weak.' Regarding 'neither pure nor defiled': The dharmakāya is empty by nature and fundamentally without defilement; since marks of defilement do not exist, relative to what could it be called pure? With neither purity nor defilement, it is therefore called the true Buddha. Hence an earlier chapter says: 'Seeing the true nature of defilement, there are no marks of purity.' Regarding 'neither in a direction nor apart from a direction': Sengzhao says: 'The dharmakāya is nowhere present yet nowhere absent. Because it is nowhere present, it is not in a direction. Because it is nowhere absent, it is not apart from a direction.' An old saying says: 'Because the dharmakāya is not form, it is not in a direction; yet it is still the nature of form, hence it is not apart from a direction.' Regarding 'neither conditioned nor unconditioned': Sengzhao says: 'If one wishes to call it conditioned, it is without name and without mark; if one wishes to call it unconditioned, it responds and embodies myriad forms.' It also says: 'Its substance has neither arising nor ceasing, hence it is not conditioned; since it is not conditioned, relative to what could one speak of the unconditioned?' Regarding 'without manifestation and without explanation': Kuiji says: 'Because it is without marks, it cannot be manifested; because it is without name, it cannot be explained.' Sengzhao says: 'It is not reached by the six senses; how could one explain it to show people?' Regarding 'neither giving nor stingy, neither truthful nor deceitful': Because the six perfections are empty, there is nothing to be truthful about; the six hindrances are also empty, hence neither is there deceit. This explains that one cannot consider it good by goodness, nor consider it evil by evil. Regarding 'neither coming nor going': An old saying says: 'It does not come from the past, nor does it perish into the past.' Sengzhao says: 'Tranquilly it goes, placidly it comes, showing there is no mark of movement.' Regarding 'neither emerging nor entering': It neither emerges from saṃsāra nor enters into nirvāṇa. Regarding 'the path of language is cut off': This explains being free from the four propositions and cutting off the hundred negations. Regarding 'neither a field of merit nor not a field of merit': The markless substance—no one sees its boundaries; it is beyond the reach of words. How could there be a field or non-field? Or alternatively: because it is not existent, it is not a field of merit; because it is not non-existent, it is not not a field of merit. It also says: because its nature is empty, it is not a field; being endowed with virtues as numerous as the sands of the Ganges, it is not not a field. Regarding 'neither worthy of offerings nor not worthy of offerings': Because it is not a field, one cannot say it is worthy of offerings; because it is not not a field, one cannot say it is not worthy of offerings. Regarding 'neither grasping nor abandoning': Because it is not a field, there is no grasping; because it is not not a field, there is no abandoning. Regarding 'neither having marks nor lacking marks': Because it is not a field, it does not have marks; because it is not not a field, it is not without marks. Or alternatively: the dharmakāya is equal; because it is not existent, it does not have marks; because it is not non-existent, it is not without marks. In the seventh, being identical with the true and equal nature: The first two phrases state it generally, and the phrases beginning from 'incomparable' re-explain it. In the first, 'identical with the true': the dharmakāya takes tathatā as its substance; tathatā is not different, hence it is called 'identical with the true.' The substance of the nature does not differ, which is called 'equal nature.' In the re-explanation below, regarding 'cannot be weighed or measured': the dharmakāya is without marks; it cannot be spoken of by words, nor measured by knowledge. Why? Because it transcends the realm of all weighing and measuring. Regarding 'neither large nor small': entering subtly without interval, hence it is called 'not large'; its measure is equal to empty space, so it cannot be called 'small.' Small and large follow conditions and inherently lack substantiality. Why? Because it is identical with the true nature. Regarding 'neither seen, heard, sensed, nor known': because it is not form, it is not seen; because it is not sound, it is not heard; because it is not smell, taste, or tangibility, it is not sensed; because it is not mental phenomena, it is not known. Thus the Saṃyuktābhidharmahṛdaya says: 'The eye element accordingly gives rise to seeing; the ear element accordingly gives rise to hearing; the three elements accordingly give rise to sensing; the mind element accordingly gives rise to knowing.' Regarding 'free from all bonds and fetters': since there is no seeing, hearing, sensing, or knowing, its nature is inherently liberated and does not give rise to bonds and fetters. Eighth, regarding being equal with all dharmas: Because the dharmakāya is equal, when in knowledge it is like knowledge, and when in sentient beings it is identical with sentient beings. Undifferentiated and boundless, it is no different from dharma-nature. Therefore, it does not transcend the various knowledges, nor is it different from the multitude of sentient beings; hence it says 'equal to all knowledges, identical to sentient beings.' Regarding 'without discrimination toward all dharmas': the dharmakāya is without marks, identical to the emptiness of all dharmas; hence it has no discriminating thoughts. Regarding 'in all things without loss and without affliction': the nature of emptiness is equal, hence there is nothing to gain; having nothing to gain, there is nothing to lose. Being without loss, the mind is without turbidity; without turbidity, there is no [afflictive] nature. Regarding 'without making and without arising': where there is turbidity and affliction, karma is made; where painful retribution is produced, being without turbidity and affliction, there is neither making nor arising. Regarding 'without arising and without ceasing': when painful fruits are produced, there is the wisdom of arising and ceasing; because there is no making and no arising, there is neither arising nor ceasing. Regarding 'without fear, without sorrow, without joy, and without aversion': if there were arising and ceasing, it would be a fearful dharma, and one would delight in life and grieve over death. Since sorrow and joy are already absent, there is no aversion. Regarding 'having no past existence and no future existence': since sorrow and joy are absent, one no longer receives any existence. 'Having no past existence' means not receiving a body of the past. 'Having no future existence' means not receiving a body of the future. 'Having no present existence' means not receiving a body of the present. Regarding 'cannot be shown by any speech': this explains that the dharmakāya is free from language and cannot be revealed through the discrimination of words. Therefore, the Viśeṣacintā-brahma-paripṛcchā Sūtra says: 'Dharmatā is not as expressed by words.'