四分戒本疏卷第一．第二．第三 3

English (machine translation) 3

Language: English

"Venerable sirs, these ninety prāyaścittika dharmas come forth in the half-monthly recitation of the Prātimokṣa Sūtra." This explains the third category [of offenses]. First, the protocol of recitation is indicated; next, the root precepts are set forth; and finally, purity is inquired into. This is the introductory text. First, it is analyzed in general through seven gateways, and afterward explained specifically according to the text. As for the general analysis: first, distinguishing bodily and vocal [karma]; second, the two karmas of self and other; third, discerning proscriptive versus intrinsically evil [offenses]; fourth, concerning observance and violation; fifth, according to differences in transgressing prohibitions; sixth, commonalities and differences between the two assemblies [monks and nuns]; seventh, concerning spontaneous [commission] among lower assemblies. First, regarding bodily and vocal, there are three categories: 1. Twenty precepts where the offense is accomplished by vocal karma. 2. Thirty-one precepts where the offense is accomplished by bodily karma. 3. Thirty-nine precepts where bodily and vocal [actions] combine to commit the offense. The twenty vocal ones are: lying, reviling, divisive speech, reciting together, speaking coarse words, speaking of having attained the path in reality, expounding Dharma exceeding five or six [sentences], complaining and scolding, instructing without authorization, mocking instruction, ten days, evening, frightening, doubting, stinginess, generating disputes, speaking desires, not hindering, refusing admonition, urging study, disparaging the Vinaya, participating in a karmavācanā and regretting, regretting after giving consent, groundless slander, and so forth. As for the thirty-one bodily karma precepts: two nights, forcefully spreading a mat, shedding and wearing, covering, making robes for a nun, sitting with a nun, receiving beyond [limit], separate assembly, three bowls, ten [days], non-proper time, leftover food, remaining overnight, not receiving, giving food to non-Buddhists, medicines, invitations, three [monks], sitting before [an elder], two [monks going to an] army camp, ten [days], such as non-proper time eating where each swallow is an offense—is this not collectively named bodily karma? Since this one is so, the rest can be known by analogy. Third: army camp, drinking alcohol, playing in water, excessive bathing, striking, wandering, having natural color, three robes, two [kinds of] following, beating, wrestling, barging into a room, one [night], and so forth. As for the thirty-nine combining bodily and vocal to commit an offense, they are divided into three: First, there are two precepts where the primary karma of body and voice combines with the body to violate: namely, the two [precepts on] mats in the open and hidden places. If one spreads it oneself, it is bodily action; if one instructs another to spread it, it is vocal action. When leaving, if one does not retrieve it oneself, it is primary bodily action; if one does not instruct another to retrieve it, it is primary vocal action; when passing beyond the boundary of the gate, an offense is incurred. Is this not an offense combining with the body? Second, there are seven precepts where the primary action of speech combines with the body to commit an offense: namely, concealing a coarse offense—examined in the treatises, it is an offense of body and mind; seeing and hearing constitute offenses of commission. These are collectively called bodily karma, yet they do not immediately constitute an offense: if confessed, there is no fault; because through speech one does not openly confess, and the mind conceals it overnight, an offense is incurred. This is called relying on primary vocal action to combine with the body to commit an offense. There are six other precepts that all possess vocal procedures: originally they are without fault, but because speech ceases [to follow the procedure], the body performing the prior act incurs the offense. Namely: all being invited, eating when satisfied, two [precepts on] entering a village, wearing [robes] without authorization, and not giving consent. These are relying on primary vocal action to combine with the body to commit an offense. Third, there are thirty precepts where vocal action combines with the body to commit an offense. Internally there are four divisions: 1. There are nineteen precepts where one's own vocal action relies on another's body. Therein, if discussed as personal performance, it is an offense only of body and mind; here it is spoken of provisionally from the perspective of instructing another. For instance, instructing to damage the ground: though the words are clear, a prāyaścittika is not yet incurred; it requires relying on the other person's bodily action of damaging the ground for the instructor to commit the offense. This is called one's own vocal action relying on another's body to commit an offense. The rest are all analogous: instructing another to destroy living beings, dig the ground, pull another out of a room, use water with insects, kindle a fire without cause, hide another's robe and bowl, kill animals, expel another from a village, drink water with insects, send an envoy carrying one's own robe to give to a nun, grasp precious things, high beds, and below, the seventh precept—these precepts are of this kind. 2. There are four precepts where one's own body relies on another's speech: namely, praising food, receiving ordination under age, not restraining the ears to listen, and eavesdropping in private. These are such as the precept against a nun praising food: if the nun does not praise it and one merely eats directly, originally there is no offense; it relies on the nun's vocal praise of the food for the offense to be accomplished. In receiving ordination under age, the upādhyāya incurs a prāyaścittika upon the completion of the karmavācanā. The rest can be understood accordingly. 3. There are five precepts where one's own body and speech rely on another's body: such as the four time-periods, and soliciting fine food. 4. There are two precepts where one's own body and speech rely on another's speech: relying on contrary speech to cause annoyance, where the two karmas of body and speech rely on the Saṅgha making a proclamation (jñapti) and moreover requiring calling and questioning; thus relying on another's speech. Not accepting private admonition: the acts performed extend to the seven categories; are they not bodily and vocal? It must rely on another's admonition for an offense to be incurred. Second, regarding the two karmas of doing oneself and instructing another: The single precept on urging satisfaction is solely instructing another's karma; the single precept on eating when satisfied is solely one's own karma; the two karmas of self and other are divided into two precepts. There are twenty-one precepts where instructing another shares the offense, yet the distinction between self and other is not separately established. Knowing this principle, they are divided into four: 1. Solely instructing another: namely, urging satisfaction. 2. Eleven precepts where self and other both commit the offense: namely, digging the ground, destroying living beings, pulling [someone] out, two [precepts on] insect-containing water, frightening, kindling a fire, hiding robes and bowls, killing animals, groundless slander, and grasping precious things. Among these, digging, destroying, and grasping precious things—these three are greatly protective of the Buddha's Dharma; as for the rest, because the object as a whole is grave, merely instructing another results in identical offenses for all. 3. Ten precepts where instructing another is either the same or not the same: namely, the two [precepts on] mats in the open and hidden places, giving robes to a nun, high beds, and the seven below that instruct another to make—these bring benefit to oneself, hence the offense is identical; if one simply instructs another without benefit to oneself, one merely incurs a minor offense. 4. Among the remaining sixty-eight, sixty-seven precepts are grave for oneself and minor for instructing; the single precept on eating when satisfied is solely one's own action. Third, distinguishing proscriptions from intrinsic evils: thirty are intrinsic evils, and the rest are all minor proscriptive offenses. The thirty are: lying, reviling, divisive speech, coarse [words], contrary [speech], complaining, forcefully [spreading a mat], pulling out, using [insect water], mocking, expelling, [resisting] admonition, frightening, killing, drinking [alcohol], doubting, concealing, raising [disputes], speaking [desires], following [a suspended monk], refusing, disparaging, participating [in a karmavācanā], regretting [consent], eavesdropping, striking, wrestling, and slandering. These are intrinsically evil; the rest are all proscriptive faults. Fourth, regarding observance and violation: there are thirteen precepts that possess both observance and violation: namely, five pairs and three single items. For instance, obtaining a karmavācanā: one pair of speaking coarse words and instructing nuns; receiving the robe of merits (kaṭhina) also has a pair that is not an offense; [receiving food in] separate houses and entering a village; performing the ritual of remaining food allows eating without being satisfied; urging satisfaction, seven days, and lifelong oral procedures of reception make it no offense; leftover food, not receiving, and pure donation (kappiya); asking the owner avoids the fault of unauthorized action; confessing coarse [offenses], and giving consent in Saṅgha affairs. These again are three single items, combining into thirteen precepts. Because the Sage permitted performing their oral procedures, if one accords with the Sage's teaching and completes the oral procedure, performing these thirteen incurs no offense, which is called observance through performance. Observance through cessation is not performing the procedure, yet bodily performing the deed incurs a transgression, called an offense of omission; from the perspective of performing the deed, it is also called an offense of commission. In these two kinds of offenses of cessation and performance, the essence of the karmic volition is one, but the names are different. If one ceases the procedure and ceases the deed, it is called observance through cessation; the names and essences of observance through performance and observance through cessation are each distinct. Alternatively, performing the procedure and performing the deed, viewed from the perspective of performing the procedure, is indeed observance through performance; because of performing the procedure, even if one performs the aforementioned deed, there is no offense of commission, turning back the offense of commission—is this not observance through cessation? This is also identical in essence but different in name. Among the remaining seventy-seven single observances and violations, not restraining the ears is one case of observance through performance being an offense of omission; the rest are observance through cessation being offenses of commission. As in the explanation: not restraining the ears is solely observance through performance being an offense of omission; thirteen are partially observance through performance being an offense of omission; the remaining seventy-seven and parts of the thirteen, generally discussed, make eighty-nine cases of observance through cessation being offenses of commission. The specific classes of violation have already been analyzed above. Fifth, differences in transgressing prohibitions: contrary speech, speaking desires, and the two following [monks] transgress the Saṅgha's regulations; the rest transgress the Buddha's regulations. Generally speaking, all are the Buddha's regulations; however, all karmavācanās must be conducted by the Saṅgha, and if this karmavācanā procedure is not carried out, doing so transgresses nothing; therefore it is said that transgressing the Saṅgha's regulations incurs an offense. Sixth, commonalities and differences between the two assemblies: there are three kinds of differences: 1. Three precepts differ in presence or absence: namely, instructing without authorization, evening, and mocking instruction of the precept preceptor; the bhikṣus have them while the bhikṣuṇīs do not, as is known. 2. Thirteen precepts differ in gravity: namely, three on food, five on robes, one on sitting, three on walking, and needle cases of bone and horn; for the bhikṣus they are heavy, while for the bhikṣuṇī assembly they are all light. This is mostly because they occur frequently among bhikṣus, hence they are heavy; they are rare among bhikṣuṇīs, hence light. Namely: praising food, urging satisfaction, soliciting fine [food], three [precepts on] giving robes to a nun, and making [robes] beyond measurement are the five on robes. 3. Five precepts have identical offenses but different conditions: namely, all being invited and eating when satisfied have identical offenses but different conditions of exemption; or they may differ in division and combination. Giving food to non-Buddhists is an offense: although identical in giving, the conditions differ. Ordination under age has identical conditions without exceeding the measure. Bathing robes incurring offenses have identical conditions or different conditions; or their names may differ. These all incur prāyaścittika offenses, termed identical offenses with differing conditions. Below, the bhikṣuṇī Vinaya states: the meaning of different special prohibitions will be explained in the text. As for the rest, because they are identical, in the bhikṣuṇī section the Prātimokṣa is simply listed. As for detailed analysis in this category: such as concealing [offenses] being broader for monks and narrower for nuns, or having bounded spheres; inverted according to the meaning there are differences. Such as divisive speech, reviling, two nights, exceeding five or six words, etc., which can be understood by stating them in reverse. Seventh, regarding spontaneous [commission]: in the previous four categories of self and other, among the twenty-one precepts of instructing another in the second and third categories, excluding the two [precepts on] mats in the open and hidden places, the remaining nineteen precepts admit of spontaneous commission; the rest cannot yet be known. Below, they are explained individually according to the text.

3.3

The first precept: intentional lying. 1. The intention behind the prohibition: Those who have left household life ought in principle to speak in accordance with truth. They would rather forfeit life than allow falsehood. Yet now, running contrary to one's heart and betraying one's thoughts, one deceives the other person, causing them false understanding while oneself losing correct benefit—this is an extreme fault. Therefore the Sage established the prohibition. 2. Explaining the name: Speech that does not accord with truth is called false (wang). Expressing it through the mouth is called speech (yu). Because without intention there is no offense, it is called the precept of intentional lying. 3. Complete conditions: General conditions are as above. Specific conditions are six: 1. A human being. 2. Perceiving them as a human being. 3. Speaking with the intention to dispatch [untruth]. 4. Speaking knowing that it contradicts one's perception. 5. Clear vocal words. 6. The other person hears and understands. 4. Deficient conditions: These can be understood by analogy. The *Vibhāṣā* (多論) sets forth a tetralemma regarding lying, divisive speech, and harsh speech: (1) There may be what is a lie, but not divisive speech nor harsh speech: when conveying another's words, because it is untrue it is a lie; because there is no divisive mind it is not divisive speech; because it is spoken in gentle words it is not harsh speech. (2) It is a lie and divisive speech, but not harsh speech: because it is untrue it is a lie; because of a divisive mind it is divisive speech; because it is spoken in gentle words it is not harsh speech. (3) It is a lie and harsh speech, but not divisive speech. (4) Possessing all three. Below, the procedures for reviling and divisive speech also have a tetralemma, which can be understood analogously. Below, the root [story] is properly explained. This precept was occasioned by the monk Hastikāśyapa (象力), who was skilled in debate; when discussing with a non-Buddhist, his earlier and later statements contradicted each other. The parivrājaka mocked and criticized him; the monks pointed out the fault, and the Buddha thereupon formulated the precept.

3.4

"If a bhikṣu knowingly speaks falsely, it is a prāyaścittika." This complete precept text has three clauses: first, the person committing the offense; second, deliberate false speech; third, the determination of the offense for transgressing the rule. The first clause is self-evident. Second, as for "knowingly speaks falsely," the text comprises three parts: first, explaining the objects of false speech; second, distinguishing the meaning of the offense of deceiving others; third, the quantity of prior and subsequent preparatory stages. As for the objects of false speech, there are eight kinds: 1) saying one did not see what one saw; 2) saying one did not hear what one heard; 3) saying one did not touch what one touched; 4) saying one did not know what one knew; the remaining four are the reverse of the above and may be understood accordingly. These are the objects of false speech. Second, as for the words of the offense: what is seen by the eye refers to what consciousness can see and know, extending to what the mind can know. What is unseen excludes the eye-consciousness, and the remaining five consciousnesses are analogous in reverse. Third, as for the quantity of preparatory stages, there are four variations: First, having the intention during all three times—originally making false speech, remembering it is false speech while conceiving it, and knowing it is false speech having spoken it. In the second and third [variations], each has two permutations: having intention at two times and lacking intention at one time. In the fourth, one permutation lacks intention at all three times. Third, as for "prāyaścittika": this is the name of the offense. If one speaks falsely having intention at all three times, all incur the fundamental prāyaścittika offense. Next are two permutations: having intention at two times and lacking intention at one time—in the latter permutation, having intention at the fundamental [moment] and lacking intention before and after, these four [combinations] also incur a prāyaścittika; having intention before and after but lacking it at the fundamental [moment], having intention at the first and lacking it at the latter two, or having intention at the last and lacking it at the former two—these three incur a duṣkṛta, as broadly explained in the Vinaya. In the fourth permutation, lacking intention at all three times, none constitute an offense at all. Furthermore, the Vinaya states: "what is seen is different, what is endured is different, what is desired is different, what is touched is different, what is ideated is different, what is minded is different; all such matters are false speech." "What is seen is different" means that in one's active mind one sees a tiger or wolf, yet says one saw a Buddha image. "What is endured is different" means that receiving an adverse sensory object and settling one's mind upon painful feeling is called "endurance"; stating it to be different from that originally endured by contrasting it with another's pleasurable feeling is called "what is endured is different." "What is desired" means that being oriented toward wealth or sex and longing for it is called desire; saying that one desires to hear the Dharma is thus called "what is desired is different." "What is touched is different" means that while practicing sitting meditation one actually experiences a sensation of cold, yet says one experiences a sensation of heat; this is called "heat sensation is different." "What is ideated is different" means that without conceiving of an enemy one says one has friendly ideation; hence it is so stated. "What is minded is different" means that the active mind is oriented toward this benefit, yet one says it is oriented toward that; hence it is said "what is minded is different." All incur a prāyaścittika offense. Furthermore, the Vinaya states: "During the recitation of the precepts, up to three inquiries are made; if one remembers having an offense and does not disclose it, one commits a duṣkṛta of silence-based false speech." The Mahāsāṃghika Vinaya states: If a butcher or the like chases an animal and asks, "Did you see it or not?" one must not speak falsely, nor may one say [one saw it]. At that point one should inquire about other matters, or even look at one's own fingernails, and by expedient means divert them so the animal gets far away; using such expedients constitutes no offense. The Sarvāstivāda Vinaya states: If one tells a person of noble birth that they are of low birth, one commits a fall (prāyaścittika). If one tells a person with two eyes, "You are like one with one eye," one incurs a prāyaścittika of false speech, and also incurs a prāyaścittika for slighting and distressing a bhikṣu. If one tells a one-eyed person, "You are a blind person," one incurs an offense of slighting and distressing another. It also explains five kinds of false speech, ranging from pārājika to duṣkṛta. Now, regarding this precept, there are three types of cause and effect: if one gives rise to the intention to deceive another person, one incurs a duṣkṛta of reproof; if one utters the words but the other person has not understood, one incurs a face-to-face duṣkṛta; if the words are clear and the other person understands, one directly incurs a prāyaścittika offense. Under non-offenses, the Vinaya states: if one speaks only matching one's ideation—saying one saw when one saw, saying one did not see when one did not see, up to the eight kinds such as knowing, all are likewise. If in one's mind there is the ideation of seeing and one then speaks, none constitute an offense.

3.5

The second precept: reviling. 1. Purpose of formulation: The rule for human beings should be to utter wholesome words, mutually praising each other to make others rejoice and energetically advance in cultivating the path. To turn around and disparage another person with base and degrading words makes them feel ashamed and abandon their practice of the correct work, wounding the novice's mind more severely than a cut from a sword. Because the distress caused is not light, the Sage formulated the rule. The specific conditions are six: 1) a fully ordained bhikṣu—the Sarvāstivāda and Mahīśāsaka Vinayas state that reviling the lower four groups of disciples all incurs a duṣkṛta; 2) it is reviling speech; 3) knowing it is reviling speech; 4) having the intention to humiliate; 5) the phraseology is distinct; 6) the other person hears and understands. This reviling speech also has four permutations, which may be understood by comparison with the preceding. Below is the direct explanation of the root precept text. This precept arose because the group of six bhikṣus, when settling affairs, reviled others by class, causing them to lose their presence of mind and remain silent in shame. The bhikṣus reported the fault, and the Buddha cited the ancient ox as an analogy to an animal being reviled and unable to exert effort, whereupon he formulated this precept.

3.6

"If a bhikṣu speaks words of reviling by class, it is a prāyaścittika." This complete precept text has three clauses: first, the offender; second, reviling words; third, the determination of the offense. The first clause is self-evident. As for "words of reviling by class," there are two parts: first, citing the six bad dharmas; next, clarifying the matters of abuse. The six bad ones are the classes stated in the Vinaya: 1) low caste; 2) low lineage; 3) low occupation; 4) low appearance; 5) low through committing offenses; 6) low through defilements. "Low caste" means saying, "You were born into a low family." "Low lineage" means saying, "You are a person of low clan name." "Low occupation" means saying, "You are a performer or craftsman." "Low appearance" means saying, "You are a blind person," and so on. "Low through committing offenses" means saying, "You are a person who commits offenses." "Low through defilements" means saying, "You are a person with many defilements." Second, the matters of abuse are of three kinds: 1) face-to-face abuse; 2) metaphorical abuse; 3) abuse by self-comparison. "Face-to-face abuse" means saying, "You were born into a scavenger family," and so forth. "Metaphorical abuse" means saying, "You are like a scavenger class," and so forth. "Abuse by self-comparison" means saying, "I am not of a scavenger class," up to, "I am not a peddler, a slaughterer of cattle and sheep, a cripple," and so forth. Furthermore, abuse using wholesome dharmas also has three kinds. Face-to-face abuse means saying, "You are an araṇya dweller, a meditator," and so forth; the other two are understood analogously. The third clause, "it is a prāyaścittika," is the text determining the offense. In terms of light and heavy, there are two: 1) abusing a bhikṣu with the six kinds of bad dharmas all incurs a prāyaścittika offense; 2) abusing with the three kinds of wholesome dharmas all commits a duṣkṛta. Within abuse with bad dharmas: abusing a bhikṣu or one's parents incurs a prāyaścittika offense; abusing one's upādhyāya or ācārya incurs a sthūlātyaya; abusing kin, friends, fellow students, and the like incurs a duṣkṛta. The Vinaya states: In addition to metaphorical abuse, saying "Among these there is such a person" also constitutes an offense; that is, when a bhikṣu of a lower clan lives together with those of higher clans, saying "Among these there is a bhikṣu of a lower clan." Under non-offenses, the Vinaya states: if spoken for the sake of mutual benefit, for the sake of the Dharma, for the sake of the Vinaya, for the sake of instruction, for the sake of kin and friends, or in jest, or in the course of speaking, or by a slip of the tongue, or when provoked, or spoken by mistake—none constitute an offense.

3.7

The third precept: divisive speech. Purpose of formulation: When those who have left home dwell together, they have no intention of creating divisions. Exclusively plotting in secret and private, relaying words between parties, causes disputes to arise in the Saṅgha where there were none, and makes disputes that already exist impossible to extinguish. Hearing this brings disturbance to the monastic assembly, and the harboring of distress is severe; therefore the Sage formulated the rule. The specific conditions are six: 1) a good, fully ordained bhikṣu—excluding the remaining assemblies, schismatic accomplices, and the like; 2) speaking of base and evil matters; 3) transmitting them between parties; 4) having the intention to divide; 5) the phraseology is distinct; 6) the other person hears and understands. The treatise states: Causing dissension among fully ordained bhikṣus is a prāyaścittika; for the remaining assemblies the offense is light. Because causing dissension among bhikṣus allows for the possibility of separate factions and the arising of schism, it is severe on this account. There are also four permutations, which may be understood by comparative explanation. Below is the direct explanation of the root precept text. This precept arose because the group of six transmitted words between parties, causing the assembly to engage in disputes that could not be extinguished. The bhikṣus reported the fault, and the Buddha cited the jackal causing dissension between two beasts, how much more so among human beings, whereupon he formulated the precept.

3.8

"If a bhikṣu speaks divisive words, it is a prāyaścittika." This complete precept text has three clauses: first, the offender; second, divisive speech; third, the determination of the offense. The first clause is self-evident. Second, as for "speaks divisive words": it means causing dissension between both sides to make others break apart. Therefore the Vinaya states: causing dissension among the ten assemblies—the five home-leaving assemblies, and the householders are likewise. Third, as for "it is a prāyaścittika": this is the text determining the offense. The Vinaya states: If one causes dissension among bhikṣus, one commits a prāyaścittika; for the remaining nine, all are light. The Mahāsāṃghika Vinaya states: Informing [someone] with bad dharmas, saying, "So-and-so says you have no superior, middling, or inferior dharmas," intending to cause them to separate—whether they separate or do not separate, all are a fall. The Sarvāstivāda-vinaya-vibhāṣā states that repeating what was said is a fall. If one does not transmit words between both sides, but merely speaks on both sides urging separation, all incur a duṣkṛta. Under non-offenses, the Vinaya states: If one breaks up bad acquaintances, evil factions, upādhyāyas, fellow teachers, kin, and acquaintances who cause harm to the Saṅgha's stūpas and temples, desiring through expedients to stop their harmful acts—breaking up such persons constitutes no offense whatsoever.

3.9

The fourth precept: lodging in the same room with a woman. Purpose of formulation: Men and women differ in physical form, and in principle should not live together. When their domains mingle, defilement can easily arise. Furthermore, it invites ugly disparagement, and being unable to extricate oneself, the burden of trouble is not light; therefore the Sage formulated the rule. The specific conditions are five: 1) it is a human female; 2) the characteristics of a room are complete; 3) lodging together in the same room; 4) knowing that one is lodging together; 5) the offense is determined according to lying down and tossing and turning. As for "human female": the Four-Part and Five-Part Vinayas restrictively take human females, excluding other females and distinguishing them from males, etc. As long as she is a human female, regardless of monastic or lay, close or distant, old or young—the Mahīśāsaka Vinaya extends even to a newborn, entirely excluding dead females. The Mahāsāṃghika Vinaya states: The two Vinayas apply generally to females of the three destinies; that is, the Mahāsāṃghika says mothers, daughters, sisters, elder and younger, monastics and laypersons are all objects of the offense. The Sarvāstivāda Vinaya states: Lodging together with females of the three destinies all constitutes an offense—whether camels, horses, cattle, sheep, whether lying or standing, etc.; geese, hawks, peacocks, sparrowhawks, etc., if standing on one foot and resting the head on top, it is called the offense of lodging; even if in another's house there is a woman, lodging where a guest cat is also constitutes an offense. 4) "Knowing that one is lodging together": merely knowing that one is lodging commits the offense; unlike committing two sexual acts, one does not need mutual agreement before committing the offense. The Mahīśāsaka Vinaya states: If mother, daughter, sister, or close relative is ill, or if there is an attendant within the boundary who does not sleep, none constitute an offense. This Vinaya below allows that if one is ill oneself, it is not an offense; facing this exception for illness, conditions should also be established. Below is the direct explanation of the root precept text. This precept arose because Aniruddha, while traveling, lodged at the house of a courtesan and was harassed by the woman. The Venerable One rose into empty space, and she felt ashamed and repented; he preached the Dharma and she attained the path. The bhikṣus reported the fault, and the Buddha then formulated the precept.

3.10

"If a bhikṣu lodges in the same room with a woman, it is a prāyaścittika." This complete Prātimokṣa text contains four phrases: first, the person who commits the offense; second, the woman; third, lodging in the same room; fourth, declaring the offense. The first phrase is obvious. Regarding the second phrase, "with a woman": the Vinaya states, "A human woman who has conscious awareness and whose life faculty is not severed." Regarding the third phrase, "lodging in a room": there are four kinds of rooms: 1. It is obstructed on all four sides and covered above. That is, being together within one hall; if there is a partition within it, according to the treatises, it is not considered [the same room]. 2. The front is open without a wall; that is, beneath the eaves of a long row of rooms where both ends are obstructed. 3. Though covered, it is not completely covered; that is, in the same courtyard sharing a single gate, it is entirely covered above but open in the center. 4. Though completely covered, there are openings; that is, the entire covering and obstruction has a small opening for light. Regarding "lodging": in these four kinds of rooms, the precept against a bhikṣu lodging together with a woman applies whether the woman arrives later, or the bhikṣu arrives later, or the two arrive together. If one lies down and turns from side to side, with each and every turn one commits an offense. Regarding the fourth phrase, "prāyaścittika": this is the phrase designating the offense. Within this there are two [aspects]: if one lodges in the same room with a woman, with each turn from side to side one commits a prāyaścittika. If one lodges together with a female animal, a human paṇḍaka, or a person with both sexual organs, it is a duṣkṛta. If the bhikṣu lies down all day and the woman stands, it is a duṣkṛta; if the woman sits, one commits a falling offense (prāyaścittika) for [being in] a secluded place. According to both treatises, the Sarvāstivāda-vinaya-vibhāṣā and the Samantapāsādikā, if they gather altogether in a hall within the same enclosure, even if they enter and exit, they commit offenses. In the Sarvāstivāda Vinaya, if one sits throughout the night in the room, one does not commit an offense; this must be in a place with many people together where there is light and one does not sleep. The Mahāsāṃghika Vinaya says that if there is one room with separate doors and a partition, there is no offense. If during a great assembly one preaches the Dharma through the night, and in the open air there is wind, rain, cold, or snow, and one wishes to enter inside a room, one should sit upright. If one is old or sick and unable to sit, one should set up a partition; one must not use coarse material; it must be as high as the shoulders and armpits, and go down to the ground so that not even a kitten can pass through. If there is no partition, and the woman is trustworthy, one should tell the woman: "You sleep first; I will sit." When the bhikṣu wishes to sleep, he tells her to get up: "I wish to sleep; you must not sleep. If you sleep, you will have no meritorious practice." The Sarvāstivāda-vinaya-vibhāṣā says that lodging with ten women brings ten falling offenses; with each and every turn, one incurs ten falling offenses each time. In a layperson's house, if one's room is adjacent to a woman's and the door is not closed, it is a duṣkṛta. Among the non-offenses, the Vinaya states: if one previously did not know there was a woman lodging inside the room; if it does not constitute the characteristics of a room; if one is sitting, walking, or sick; if one is thrown in by superior force; if one is bound by someone; or if for the sake of life, the brahma-practice, and so on—in all such cases there is no offense.

3.11

Precept 5: Lodging in the same room with an unordained person beyond the limit. Regarding the intention behind the formulation: In general, the paths of monastics and laypersons diverge, and their sentiments and affairs are contrary. For those beginning training who are not yet restrained, matters frequently cause mutual annoyance, and intimacy breeds disrespect, throwing the path into disorder and neglecting practice. Therefore, it is appropriate to stay in separate places to preserve the path and foster respect; for this reason, it had to be formulated. However, for a person who has left home, the dwelling of the mind is not fixed, and activities require traveling about, taking shelter with others to lodge to preserve the body and sustain life. Furthermore, a śrāmaṇera has left the secular world and relies on support in this place; having nothing else to depend on, it is necessary to receive and look after him. For this reason, permission is granted with a limit of two nights. Thus, prohibition prevents their faults, while permission allows their benefit; the suitability of permission and prohibition is naturally what reason dictates. The specific conditions comprise five: 1. An unordained male person, excluding women, because the Buddha did not permit lodging in the same room with a woman; in the first place, two nights are not permitted, so how could there be the fault of exceeding three? Hence the Mātṛkā states: "If one lodges two nights with a śrāmaṇera and on the third night lodges with a woman, one incurs two prāyaścittika offenses." 2. The characteristics of a room are fulfilled. 3. Being together in the same room. 4. Knowing that they are in the same room. 5. Incurring a prāyaścittika when exceeding three nights. Below, the Prātimokṣa text is properly explained. This precept text has three parts: first, a phrase with a brief prohibition; second, reiterating the prohibition followed by the permission for two nights and three nights; third, the comprehensive formulation. Regarding the brief prohibition: it was because the group of six monks lodged in the same room with householders; among them was a bhikṣu whose mind was disturbed during sleep so that his body was exposed, and he was mocked by them; the Buddha formulated that lodging together was not permitted. Regarding reiteration followed by permission: next, on account of Rāhula, permission was granted for two or three nights. Question: Since the Buddha did not permit lodging with unordained persons, driving Rāhula out should have conformed to the teaching; why was there a rebuke, saying: "Foolish men, you have no compassion and do not protect my intention"? Answer: When a disciple has an affair, reason requires that he consult and report. The Buddha granted permission because of the situation; driving him out so rashly contravened the decorum of a disciple and was utterly lacking in compassion. Therefore the Buddha rebuked them: "Foolish men, you have no compassion. Even toward the Buddha's own son you have no compassionate thought, how much less could you have kindness and pity toward other people?" In the Mahīśāsaka Vinaya, the Buddha rebuked the foolish men, saying: "How can jackals drive away a lion?" He praised the keeping of precepts, and consequently permitted lodging with unordained persons for two nights. Regarding the third, the comprehensive formulation: that is what is explained below.

3.12

"If a bhikṣu lodges together with a person who has not received the upasampadā precepts beyond two nights, up to three nights, it is a prāyaścittika." This complete Prātimokṣa text contains four phrases: first, the person who commits the offense; second, the unordained person; third, lodging together beyond the limit; fourth, declaring the offense. The first phrase is obvious. Regarding the second phrase, "unordained person": except for bhikṣus and bhikṣuṇīs, other persons who have not received the great precepts are this. Regarding the third phrase, "lodging together": the Vinaya states that lodging in the same room has four kinds, as explained previously. Among them there are four permutations: 1. the two persons are the same, but the room is different; 2. the room is the same, but one person is different; 3. both the persons and the room are the same; 4. both the persons and the room are different. All of these are included under lodging together. Regarding "beyond two nights, up to three nights": this is the limit of the permission. The Vinaya states that when lodging together up to the third night, before the break of dawn appears, one should get up and leave to avoid it. If it reaches the fourth night, whether one leaves oneself or sends the other away, if one does not avoid the break of dawn and with the conception that dawn has broken it reaches the dawn of the fourth day, one immediately commits one prāyaścittika. If one avoids the break of dawn, at dawn there is no offense yet; but on the fourth night, with each turn from side to side while lodging, each is a prāyaścittika offense. Now, in the Prātimokṣa text, it is formulated directly against the single side of transgressing the Dharma by not avoiding the break of dawn; hence it says: "exceeding two nights up to three nights is a prāyaścittika." If one avoids the break of dawn, after exceeding three nights one has not committed an offense until the fourth night. The Mahāsāṃghika Vinaya states: "If after three nights one has committed the offense and has not yet repented, there is no permission for two nights; the offense is declared according to the person with whom one lodges. If one has finished repenting, one receives permission for two nights." The Sarvāstivāda Vinaya states: "If one sits throughout the night, or if there is illness, one is permitted to exceed the nights of lodging with a śrāmaṇera; permission is granted for a sick person to lie down, but the remaining, non-sick bhikṣus should not lie down." Regarding the fourth phrase, "prāyaścittika": this is the name of the offense. The Vinayamātṛkā states: "If it reaches the third night and the bhikṣu has nowhere to go, he should not lie down, but sit until the break of dawn appears. If it reaches the fourth night and again he has nowhere to go, when the break of dawn is about to appear, he should either leave himself or send the other away. If not, in all cases he commits a prāyaścittika offense. If he exceeds three nights lodging with a male non-human or animal, all are duṣkṛtas." The remaining conditions for non-offense are all identical to the previous precept.

3.13

Precept 6: Reciting together with an unordained person. Regarding the intention behind the formulation: The Sarvāstivāda-vinaya-vibhāṣā states that the Buddha formulated this precept on account of four meanings: 1. to distinguish from the non-Buddhists; 2. because the stations of master and disciple are distinct; 3. to distinguish and make the spoken words clear; 4. to rely on the actual meaning and not value mere vocal sound. The specific conditions comprise five: 1. It is the Dharma spoken by the Buddha. 2. Words, phrases, and syllables. 3. An unordained person. 4. Chanting together in unison. 5. As soon as the spoken words are distinct, one commits the offense. Below, the Prātimokṣa text is explained. This precept arose because the group of six monks were in the lecture hall with various householders, reciting the words of the sūtras aloud in unison, disturbing the bhikṣus who were sitting in meditation; the Buddha then formulated the precept.

3.14

"If a bhikṣu recites together with a person who has not received the upasampadā precepts, it is a prāyaścittika." This complete Prātimokṣa text contains four phrases: first, the person who commits the offense; second, the unordained person; third, reciting together; fourth, declaring the offense. The first two phrases are obvious. Regarding the third phrase, "reciting the Dharma together": "reciting" means reciting words and sentences simultaneously, neither before nor after. In the extracts of the precepts, reciting either before or after is also called reciting together. As for the word "Dharma": that spoken by the Buddha, that spoken by śrāvakas, that spoken by ṛṣis, and that spoken by the devas are all the true Dharma. Regarding the fourth phrase, "prāyaścittika": this is the offense of transgression. Hence the Vinaya states: "If spoken by śrāvaka disciples or other persons, and endorsed by the Buddha, it is named the Dharma." If one speaks this Dharma either ahead of or behind [the other], in both cases one commits a prāyaścittika offense. Therefore the Vinaya states: "Reciting together refers to reciting phrase-meanings, phrase-syllables, and word-meanings; it is also like this for non-phrase-meanings." Regarding "phrase-meaning": two persons chant in unison with identical voices, the phrases expressing the three kinds of practice and the principle being identical; this is called "phrase-meaning," and one commits a prāyaścittika. The Sarvāstivāda Vinaya states: "If the voices are in unison but the phrases differ, it is a duṣkṛta." Regarding "non-phrase-meaning": the first person says, "Refrain from all evil," and before he finishes, the second person cuts in ahead, saying, "Refrain from all evil," causing the first person's verbal teaching expressing correct practice not to be complete; therefore it is called "non-phrase-meaning," and one also commits a prāyaścittika offense, because the phrases are joined with identical voices. Regarding "phrase-syllable": a phrase expresses the principle of impermanence, perfectly endowed with the benefit of nourishing the spirit; this is called "phrase-syllable." Cutting in and seizing the preceding words fails to express the principle completely and has no function of nourishing the spirit; therefore it is called "non-phrase-meaning." Regarding "word-meaning": chanting in unison expresses the name and essence, with the principle being complete; this is called "word-meaning." Cutting in and seizing the preceding words leaves the name and essence incomplete; therefore it is called "non-word-meaning." The Samantapāsādikā states: "All the Vinayapiṭaka, Abhidharma, and Sūtras were spoken by the Buddha, and later compiled by the five hundred arhats; reciting this Dharma together all incurs prāyaścittika offenses." The Sarvāstivāda Vinaya states that for each and every chapter, section, and passage, one incurs a prāyaścittika offense respectively. If one compiles written compositions from one's own ideas, down to secular books, because they are not spoken by the Buddha, there is no offense. Among the non-offenses, the Vinaya states: one should say, "When I have finished speaking, you speak"; if one person finishes reciting and the other writes; if two persons have the same occupation and recite together; or if there is an error in speaking by one or the other—in all such cases there is no offense.

3.15

Precept 7: Speaking of another's grave offenses to an unordained person. Regarding the intention behind the formulation: The monastic Saṃgha ought in principle to be pure and prominent, so that its good reputation serves as an external barrier to generate faith in the teaching among people. If one speaks of these coarse and evil matters of a bhikṣu to laypersons, when the other person hears of it, their sentiments toward the Saṃgha jewel will become slight and indifferent, losing their sense of respect, faith, and veneration, causing profound damage. Therefore, it required holy formulation. The specific conditions comprise seven: 1. A bhikṣu or bhikṣuṇī. 2. Having committed offenses of the first two sections. 3. Knowing that a grave offense was committed. 4. Without permission through a legal act of the Saṃgha. 5. Speaking to an unordained person. 6. The words are distinct. 7. The other person hears and understands. Below, the Prātimokṣa text is properly explained. This precept arose because the group of six monks spoke to laypersons of a bhikṣu's fault of committing a saṃghāvaśeṣa; when the offender heard the report, he was ashamed; the other bhikṣus reported it to the Buddha, and the Buddha then formulated the precept.

3.16

"If a bhikṣu, knowing that another bhikṣu has committed a grave evil offense, speaks of it to a person who has not received the upasampadā precepts, except by a legal act of the Saṃgha, it is a prāyaścittika." This complete Prātimokṣa text contains five phrases: first, the person who commits the offense; second, knowing the grave offense; third, speaking to an unordained person; fourth, except by a legal act of the Saṃgha; fifth, declaring the offense. The first phrase is obvious. Regarding the second phrase, "knowing that another committed a grave offense": the Vinaya states that committing [offenses of] the first two sections is called a grave evil offense. Regarding the third phrase, "speaking to a person who has not received the precepts": the Vinaya states that this refers to other persons, excluding bhikṣus and bhikṣuṇīs. Regarding the fourth phrase, "except by a legal act of the Saṃgha": this is the text of permission. Regarding the fifth phrase, "prāyaścittika": this is the offense of transgression. Hence the Sarvāstivāda-vinaya-vibhāṣā states: "Better to destroy a stūpa and smash an image than to speak of another's grave offense. If one destroys a Buddha stūpa, the offense is limited; but speaking of another's grave offense destroys the Dharmakāya, an offense equivalent to the five heinous crimes." Therefore the Vinaya states: regardless of whether the other person is guilty or not, if the Saṃgha has not performed a legal act and one speaks to others, in each case it is a falling offense. The Mahīśāsaka Vinaya states: if a bhikṣuṇī speaks to laypersons of the Saṃgha's general, petty offenses, in all cases it is a falling offense. The Mahāsāṃghika Vinaya states: if someone asks whether a certain bhikṣu has committed sexual misconduct or drunk alcohol, and one answers, "He should know that himself," except for the top two sections, speaking of other offenses incurs a duṣkṛta in each case. Furthermore, if one reveals the name, clan, robes, dwelling, or appearance, in all cases one commits a prāyaścittika offense; speaking of the lower three sections incurs a duṣkṛta. If one speaks of one's own grave offenses, one also commits a duṣkṛta. Regarding non-offenses: if one does not know; if one is appointed by the Saṃgha; if one does not think it is grave; or if the layperson has already heard of it beforehand—in all such cases there is no offense, though it is not without minor fault.

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Linked texts (1)

四分戒本疏卷第一．第二．第三 — Classical Chinese