四分戒本疏卷第一．第二．第三 3.4

3.4

"If a bhikṣu knowingly speaks falsely, it is a prāyaścittika." This complete precept text has three clauses: first, the person committing the offense; second, deliberate false speech; third, the determination of the offense for transgressing the rule. The first clause is self-evident. Second, as for "knowingly speaks falsely," the text comprises three parts: first, explaining the objects of false speech; second, distinguishing the meaning of the offense of deceiving others; third, the quantity of prior and subsequent preparatory stages. As for the objects of false speech, there are eight kinds: 1) saying one did not see what one saw; 2) saying one did not hear what one heard; 3) saying one did not touch what one touched; 4) saying one did not know what one knew; the remaining four are the reverse of the above and may be understood accordingly. These are the objects of false speech. Second, as for the words of the offense: what is seen by the eye refers to what consciousness can see and know, extending to what the mind can know. What is unseen excludes the eye-consciousness, and the remaining five consciousnesses are analogous in reverse. Third, as for the quantity of preparatory stages, there are four variations: First, having the intention during all three times—originally making false speech, remembering it is false speech while conceiving it, and knowing it is false speech having spoken it. In the second and third [variations], each has two permutations: having intention at two times and lacking intention at one time. In the fourth, one permutation lacks intention at all three times. Third, as for "prāyaścittika": this is the name of the offense. If one speaks falsely having intention at all three times, all incur the fundamental prāyaścittika offense. Next are two permutations: having intention at two times and lacking intention at one time—in the latter permutation, having intention at the fundamental [moment] and lacking intention before and after, these four [combinations] also incur a prāyaścittika; having intention before and after but lacking it at the fundamental [moment], having intention at the first and lacking it at the latter two, or having intention at the last and lacking it at the former two—these three incur a duṣkṛta, as broadly explained in the Vinaya. In the fourth permutation, lacking intention at all three times, none constitute an offense at all. Furthermore, the Vinaya states: "what is seen is different, what is endured is different, what is desired is different, what is touched is different, what is ideated is different, what is minded is different; all such matters are false speech." "What is seen is different" means that in one's active mind one sees a tiger or wolf, yet says one saw a Buddha image. "What is endured is different" means that receiving an adverse sensory object and settling one's mind upon painful feeling is called "endurance"; stating it to be different from that originally endured by contrasting it with another's pleasurable feeling is called "what is endured is different." "What is desired" means that being oriented toward wealth or sex and longing for it is called desire; saying that one desires to hear the Dharma is thus called "what is desired is different." "What is touched is different" means that while practicing sitting meditation one actually experiences a sensation of cold, yet says one experiences a sensation of heat; this is called "heat sensation is different." "What is ideated is different" means that without conceiving of an enemy one says one has friendly ideation; hence it is so stated. "What is minded is different" means that the active mind is oriented toward this benefit, yet one says it is oriented toward that; hence it is said "what is minded is different." All incur a prāyaścittika offense. Furthermore, the Vinaya states: "During the recitation of the precepts, up to three inquiries are made; if one remembers having an offense and does not disclose it, one commits a duṣkṛta of silence-based false speech." The Mahāsāṃghika Vinaya states: If a butcher or the like chases an animal and asks, "Did you see it or not?" one must not speak falsely, nor may one say [one saw it]. At that point one should inquire about other matters, or even look at one's own fingernails, and by expedient means divert them so the animal gets far away; using such expedients constitutes no offense. The Sarvāstivāda Vinaya states: If one tells a person of noble birth that they are of low birth, one commits a fall (prāyaścittika). If one tells a person with two eyes, "You are like one with one eye," one incurs a prāyaścittika of false speech, and also incurs a prāyaścittika for slighting and distressing a bhikṣu. If one tells a one-eyed person, "You are a blind person," one incurs an offense of slighting and distressing another. It also explains five kinds of false speech, ranging from pārājika to duṣkṛta. Now, regarding this precept, there are three types of cause and effect: if one gives rise to the intention to deceive another person, one incurs a duṣkṛta of reproof; if one utters the words but the other person has not understood, one incurs a face-to-face duṣkṛta; if the words are clear and the other person understands, one directly incurs a prāyaścittika offense. Under non-offenses, the Vinaya states: if one speaks only matching one's ideation—saying one saw when one saw, saying one did not see when one did not see, up to the eight kinds such as knowing, all are likewise. If in one's mind there is the ideation of seeing and one then speaks, none constitute an offense.