唯識三十論要釋 1.27

1.27

Explanation: This reveals the characteristics of the sixth category, the indeterminate [caittas]. In the text there are three clauses. Stating "the indeterminate" cites the name of the indeterminate. Stating "remorse, sleep, etc." cites the characteristics of the indeterminate. Stating "the two are each twofold" reveals the meaning of indeterminate. Remorse, sleep, initial inquiry, and investigation are indeterminate with respect to the wholesome, defiled, etc.; they are not like contact (sparśa) and the rest, which are determinately pervasive through all minds, nor are they like desire (chanda) and the rest, which are determinately pervasive through all bhūmis; hence they are established as indeterminate.
"Remorse" (kaukṛtya) is regret over what has been done: its nature is regretting actions one dislikes, and its activity is obstructing mental calm (śamatha). This is metonymically applying the name of the cause to the fruit, because one first dislikes an action done and only afterwards feels regret. Regretting what was not previously done is also subsumed under remorse, as in the regretful statement: "I did not do such a deed before; this is my remorse."
"Sleep" (middha): its nature is causing [the body and mind] to lack self-mastery, being dim and abbreviated; its activity is obstructing insight (vipaśyanā). When one sleeps, the body lacks self-mastery and the mind is extremely dark and feeble, functioning through a single sense-door. "Dim" excludes being in meditative concentration; "abbreviated" distinguishes it from the waking state. This shows that sleep is not without real substance and function. In states lacking mind it is metaphorically designated by this name. Like the other hindrances and fetters, it is associated with the mind.
"Initial inquiry" (vitarka) means searching: its nature is causing the mind to hurry and operate coarsely regarding conceptual objects.
"Investigation" (vicāra) means examining: its nature is causing the mind to hurry and operate subtly regarding conceptual objects.
Both of these take the support for states of peaceful or unpeaceful dwelling of body and mind as their nature, and both use a part of volition (cetanā) and discernment (prajñā) as their substance. They are differentiated by their categories of meaning: not deeply deliberating versus deeply deliberating regarding conceptual objects. Apart from volition and discernment, a distinct substance or category for initial inquiry and investigation cannot be found.
"The two are each twofold" reveals two pairs of two: the first is remorse and sleep; the second is initial inquiry and investigation. Because these two pairs of two have distinct varieties, the words "each twofold" reveal two sets of two. These two are each twofold, meaning defiled and non-defiled; they are not like the wholesome or defiled, each of which is exclusively one. Alternatively, these words are spoken solely to exclude defilement, because some also say they are secondary afflictions. To reveal the meaning of indeterminate, the phrase "the two are each twofold" is stated; hence placing these words is profoundly useful. All four do not associate with the seventh and eighth [consciousnesses]; they can arise together with the sixth consciousness, because they are not dharmas associated with the five consciousnesses. Further distinctions through various approaches are as explained in the extensive treatise; to take the essentials, they are as in the Commentary on the Hundred Dharmas.
Are these caitta dharmas in the six categories possessing distinct intrinsic natures apart from the substance of the mind, or are they simply differential states of the mind? If they possess distinct intrinsic natures apart from the substance of the mind, how does the sacred teaching state that there is consciousness-only (vijñapti-mātra)? And how is the verse in the Mahāyāna-sūtrālaṅkāra to be resolved:
"Mind is admitted to manifest resembling the two;
Likewise, it resembles greed and the rest,
Or resembles faith and the rest:
There are no separate defiled and wholesome dharmas."
If they are simply differential states of the mind, how does the sacred teaching speak of association with the mind (citta-saṃprayukta)? For association occurs with what has a different nature, not with its own nature. Furthermore, how is it said that mind and mental factors arise simultaneously like the sun and its radiance? And how is the verse in the Yogācārabhūmi to be resolved:
"Fivefold nature would not be established;
There would be the fault of differential states;
Because causes and conditions would have no distinction,
It would contradict the sacred teaching."
It should be said that there are distinct caittas apart from the mind. Because the mind is principal, the texts speak of consciousness-only and so forth. Caittas rely on the mind, which is the master in power and influence; hence it is said that they manifest resembling it, not that they are that very mind. Furthermore, the words "consciousness" and "mind" also subsume the caittas, because they are constantly associated. Therefore, terms such as consciousness-only and manifestation resembling it are both without fault. This is based on conventional truth; if based on ultimate truth, mind and caittas are neither identical nor separate. Mutually regarded, the consciousnesses should be understood likewise. This is called the wondrous principle of the Mahāyāna's ultimate and conventional [truths].
The nine verses and seven approaches of the third transformation (pariṇāma) are subsumed into three sections. Preceding investigations have already analyzed the six approaches and two meanings; next follows the third: states of actual arising. The treatise states in introduction: The association of the six consciousnesses and their caittas has already been explained. How should their states of actual arising be known? The verse says: