唯識三十論要釋 1.31

1.31

The commentary explains: This answers the preceding question and reveals the meaning of consciousness-only (vijñapti-mātra). "These consciousnesses" refers to the three transformative consciousnesses (pariṇāma) and their mental factors (caitta) explained above, all of which are able to transform and resemble the two divisions: the nimittabhāga and the darśanabhāga; hence the name "transformation" is established. The transformed darśanabhāga is called "discrimination" (vikalpa), because it is capable of grasping images. The transformed nimittabhāga is called "what is discriminated" (vikalpita), because it is grasped by the darśana[bhāga]. By this correct reasoning, those real selves (ātman) and real dharmas apart from what is transformed by consciousness are certainly non-existent, because apart from the grasper and the grasped there are no distinct entities, and because no real entities exist apart from the two graspings. Therefore, all conditioned and unconditioned [dharmas], whether real or provisional, are not apart from consciousness. The word "only" excludes real entities apart from consciousness; it does not exclude mental factors and so forth that are not apart from consciousness.
By what teachings and reasoning is the meaning of consciousness-only established? As a sutra says: "The triple realm is mind-only." It also says: "Objects of cognition are only manifestations of consciousness." It also says: "All dharmas are not apart from mind." It also says: "Sentient beings are defiled or purified in accordance with mind." It also says: "Bodhisattvas who accomplish the four knowledges can subsequently awaken to and enter consciousness-only without external objects. First is the knowledge of conflicting consciousness-images: that is, in a single place, hungry ghosts, humans, gods, and others see differently according to their distinct karma. If the object were truly existent, how could this be established? Second is the knowledge of consciousness lacking an object of cognition: that is, consciousness takes non-existent objects such as past and future, dreams, and mirror-images, yet consciousness is manifestly apprehended; since those objects are non-existent, the rest should be likewise. Third is the knowledge that [ordinary beings] should naturally be non-deluded: that is, if the knowledge of fools grasped real objects, they would naturally become non-deluded and attain liberation without effort. Fourth is the knowledge of conforming to the three knowledges: 1. The knowledge of conforming to the knowledge of one who has attained mastery: when one who has realized mental mastery wishes to transform earth and so forth, it is accomplished according to their wish; if the object were truly existent, how could this be accomplished? 2. The knowledge of conforming to the knowledge of the contemplator: for one who has attained superior samādhi and cultivates various contemplations, when contemplating a single object, numerous aspects appear before them; if the object were truly existent, how could it conform to the mind's transformation? 3. The knowledge of conforming to non-discriminative knowledge: when non-discriminative knowledge that realizes reality arises, all objective images fail to appear; if the object were truly existent, how could it be permissible that it does not appear? Bodhisattvas who accomplish these four knowledges definitely awaken to and enter the principle of consciousness-only." Such sacred teachings provide verified evidence not once [but many times].
[By reasoning:] Any one of the five commonly recognized consciousnesses such as the eye[-consciousness], like the others, does not directly cognize colors and so forth apart from itself; the remaining consciousnesses, because they are consciousnesses, like the eye-consciousness and others, also do not directly cognize dharmas apart from themselves. This direct object of cognition is definitely not apart from this [consciousness], because it is one of the two [aspects of consciousness], just like that grasper. Because it is a cognized dharma, like an associated dharma, it is definitely not apart from mind and mental factors. Such correct reasoning provides verified evidence not once [but many times]. Therefore, one should deeply believe and accept consciousness-only.
If it is only internal consciousness arising resembling external objects, why do we see sentient and insentient entities in the world functioning with fixed or unfixed places, times, bodies, and functions, just like dream objects? This doubt should be explained: when dreaming and not yet awake, one cannot know it oneself; one must wait until awakening to retrospectively realize it. One should know that the objects and colors when awake are also like this: in the state prior to true awakening, one cannot know it oneself; when reaching true awakening, one is then able to retrospectively realize it. Not yet having attained true awakening, one constantly dwells in a dream; therefore the Buddha called it the long night of saṃsāra. For this reason, one has not yet realized that visible objects are consciousness-only.
If it is only internal consciousness and there are truly no external objects, why did the World-Honoured One speak of the twelve sense bases (āyatana)? [They are spoken of] based on the transformations of consciousness, not as distinct real existences. To facilitate entry into the emptiness of self (pudgala-nairātmya), he spoke of the six pairs of dharmas, just as to prevent nihilistic views he spoke of the continuous sentient being; to facilitate entry into the emptiness of dharmas (dharma-nairātmya), he further spoke of consciousness-only, causing them to know that external objects are also non-existent.
If that is so, is consciousness-only not then empty? It is not so. Why? Because it is not what is grasped. That is, the false grasping of real dharmas based on the transformations of consciousness is logically untenable; this is called the emptiness of dharmas. It is not called the emptiness of dharmas because the nature of consciousness-only, which is realized by ineffable correct knowledge, is non-existent. If this consciousness did not exist, then conventional truth would not exist; because conventional truth would not exist, ultimate truth would also not exist, since ultimate and conventional are established in mutual dependence. Denying the two truths is a poorly grasped emptiness (durgṛhītā śūnyatā), which the Buddhas declared incurable. One should know that among dharmas there are the empty and the non-empty; therefore the term "consciousness-only" reveals this.
[Objection:] External objects like derived form are clearly experienced in direct perception (pratyakṣa); how can they be denied as non-existent? When direct perception realizes them, it does not grasp them as external; later, mental discrimination falsely produces the notion of externality. Therefore, the object of direct perception is one's own nimittabhāga; being transformed by consciousness, it is also said to exist. What the mental consciousness grasps as external, real form and so forth is falsely conceived as existent, and is therefore said to be non-existent.
[Objection:] If external objects are truly non-existent, it is acceptable that they are not objects of internal consciousness; but another's mind is truly existent, so why would it not be one's own object of cognition? Who said that another's mind is not an object of one's own consciousness? We only say that it is not a direct object of cognition. That is, when consciousness arises, it has no real function: it is not like a hand directly grasping an external object, or the sun shedding light and directly illuminating an external object; it is merely that, like a mirror, appearing to resemble an external object is called "knowing another's mind"—it is not capable of direct knowing. What is directly known is what is transformed by oneself. Hence a sutra says: "There is no dharma whatsoever capable of grasping any dharma; merely when consciousness arises, it appears resembling that image, which is called grasping that object." Just as with cognizing another's mind, color and so forth are also like this.
[Objection:] If there is only consciousness, why are there distinctions in the ten directions between ordinary and noble, high and low, cause and effect? Who speaks to whom? What dharma is sought from what? Who said that consciousness-only means there is only one consciousness? If not so, then how? You should listen attentively: the word "consciousness" collectively indicates that all sentient beings each possess eight consciousnesses, six categories of mental factors, the differentiated states of the transformed nimittabhāga and darśanabhāga, and the tathatā revealed by their empty principle: [1] because they are the intrinsic nature of consciousness; [2] because they are associated with consciousness; [3] because they are transformed by the two; [4] because they are states of the three; [5] because it is the real nature of the four. Such dharmas are all not apart from consciousness; collectively, the name "consciousness" is established. Therefore, the term "consciousness-only" has a profound intent. The word "only" merely excludes the truly existent form and so forth definitively apart from consciousnesses that are grasped by fools. If one truly understands the intent of the teaching of consciousness-only, one will be without delusion, fully prepare the provisions, attain entry into the emptiness of dharmas, realize unsurpassable awakening, and rescue sentient beings from the cycle of saṃsāra. It is not that those who completely deny existence and poorly grasp emptiness, defying the sacred teachings, are able to accomplish this. Therefore, one must definitely believe that all is consciousness-only.
From here below, the third section consists of eight verses explaining and resolving external objections. Herein there are two parts: first, two verses resolve objections contradicting reasoning; second, six verses resolve objections contradicting the scriptures. In the first part, there are two: first, one verse resolves the objection that various discriminations cannot be established; second, one verse resolves the objection that the continuity of saṃsāra cannot be established. The treatise introduces the first objection, saying: "If there is only consciousness and no external conditions whatsoever, from what do the various discriminations arise?" The verse says: