大乘百法明門論開宗義記 1.20.3

1.20.3

由稱量等起慢等故。 小十麁猛此微劣故。 追悔睡眠非五法故。 尋伺是意不共法故。 此隨因中三性位說。 若在果位皆無漏善。 與二十一心所相應。 遍行別境及善十一。 與一切心恒相應故。 常樂證知所觀境故。 於所觀境恒印持故。 於曾受境恒明記故。 世尊無有不定心故。 於一切法常決擇故。 極淨信等常相應故。 無染污故無散動故。 非不定等心所相應。 既隨此等心所相應。 於所緣境亦有寬狹。 因中五識唯緣色等五塵假實。 如下所明。 而五識緣有其二說。 有說五識但緣實境。 由任運而起不待名言。 及待此餘根境起故。 其長短等諸餘假色。 要待名言及餘所起。 是故不緣長等假色。 有說五識亦緣假境。 以長短等亦色處收。 故眼識緣不違於理。 然緣假時心緣於實。 緣實之時不緣於假。 實不依假。 假依實故。 第六意識緣一切境。 具三七等一切分別。 了別識中最為勝故。 若第七識唯緣第八見分為我。 不緣相分。 識中種子及相應法以為我所。 我我所執不俱起故。 以此識俱薩迦耶見任運一類恒相續生。 無容別起我所執故。 有處說執我我所者。 以執此識是我之我。 故於一見義說二言。 其第八識雖微細故所緣行相俱不可知。 由因緣力自體生時。 內變執受種子色根。 外變所依器世界相。 即以所變為自所緣行相。 仗之而得起故。 若有色界具三所緣。 無色界中唯緣種子不變心等為所緣者。 有漏識變略有二種。 一隨因緣勢力故變。 二隨分別勢力故變。 初必有用。 後但為境。 異熟識變但隨因緣所變色等必有實用。 若變心等便為無用。 相分心等不能緣故。 須彼實用別從此生。 是故第八不緣心等。 若以此識緣七識種。 攝末歸本亦得名緣。 但依現行則無緣義。 此等皆依有漏位說。 若無漏位四智相應。 遍緣真俗一切境界。 不爾佛果非遍知故。 此諸境相皆自心變。 實不離心。 是心分故。 然此心分總有四種。 一者相分。 二者見分。 三者自證分。 四證自證分。 謂有漏識自體生時。 皆似所緣能緣相現。 彼相應法應知亦然。 似所緣相說名相分。 似能緣相說名見分。 若心心所無所緣相。 應不能緣自所緣境。 或應一一能緣一切。 自境如餘。 餘如自故。 若心心所無能緣相。 應不能緣。 如虛空等。 或虛空等亦是能緣。 故知必有相見二分。 相分是所緣。 見分名行相。 相見必有所依自體。 即此自體名自證分。 此若無者無自證分。 應不自憶心心所法。 如不曾受境必不能憶故。 相見應無所依體故。 所量能量無量果故。 故知必有此自證分。 心分既同必合相證。 若無第四誰證第三　故應更有證自證分。 此是第三自證分果。 諸能量者必有果故。 不應見分為第三果。 見分或時非量攝故。 證自體者必現量故。 若爾應更立第五分。 是則復有無窮之失。 答但是第三却證第四。 皆是現量得相證故。 初二是外。 後二是內。 初唯所緣。 後三通二。 非即非離皆不離心。 具所能緣無無窮過。 此有漏識四分皆通。 若無漏心有無不定。 謂正體智見有相無緣。 真之智必有見故。 若無見分應不能緣。 寧可說為緣真如智。 勿真如性亦名能緣故。 應許此定有見分。 雖有見分而無分別。 說無相取不取相故。 雖無相分而可說此。 帶如相起不離如故。 如自證分緣見分時。 不變而緣。 此亦應爾。 變而緣者便非親證。 如後得智有境相故。 若後得智二分皆有。 說此智品有分別故。 說此思唯似真如相。 不見真實真如相故。 分別諸法自共相等。 觀諸有情為說法故。 若後二分二智雖通。 緣用有無則各差別。 謂根本智即不相緣。 若後得智有相緣用。 有相無相二用別故。 是謂略說四分之義。 而前所說諸識境相。 應知即是識之相分。

Because conceit and so forth arise through weighing and estimating; because the ten minor [afflictions] are coarse and fierce, while this [state] is subtle and weak; because remorse and sleep are not dharmas [found in] the five [consciousnesses]; and because vitarka and vicāra are dharmas unique to the mental [consciousness]. This is explained according to the stage of the three natures during the causal [state]. If in the fruitional state, [the consciousnesses] are all anāsrava and kuśala, and are associated with twenty-one caittas: the sarvatraga, the viniyata, and the eleven kuśala. This is because they are always associated with all minds; because they always delight in realizing and knowing the observed objective sphere; because they always hold firm to the observed objective sphere; because they always clearly remember previously experienced objective spheres; because the World-Honoured One has no indeterminate mind; because he always discerns all dharmas; because utmost pure faith and so forth are always associated; and because, being free from defilement and distraction, they are not associated with caittas such as the indeterminate. Since they are associated with these caittas, their observed objective spheres also have breadth and narrowness. In the causal [state], the five consciousnesses cognize only the five dusts—rūpa and so forth—both prajñapti and dravya, as will be clarified below. Now, there are two theories concerning the cognizing of the five consciousnesses: Some say the five consciousnesses cognize only dravya objective spheres, because they arise spontaneously without depending on conventional words, and because they arise depending on other sense faculties and objects. The various other prajñapti forms, such as long and short, necessarily depend on conventional words and on other [factors] to arise; therefore, they do not cognize prajñapti forms like long and short. Others say the five consciousnesses also cognize prajñapti objective spheres, because long and short and so forth are also subsumed within the sense sphere of form (rūpāyatana); hence, for the eye consciousness to cognize them does not contradict reason. However, when cognizing the prajñapti, the mind cognizes the dravya; when cognizing the dravya, it does not cognize the prajñapti. Dravya does not depend on prajñapti, but prajñapti depends on dravya. The sixth mental consciousness cognizes all objective spheres, possessing all the discriminations, such as the three [types] and the seven [types], because it is supreme among the cognizing consciousnesses. As for the seventh consciousness, it cognizes only the darśanabhāga of the eighth [consciousness] as a self, and does not cognize its nimittabhāga, nor does it take the bījas within the consciousness and the associated dharmas to be "mine." This is because graspings of "I" and "mine" do not arise together, and because the satkāyadṛṣṭi associated with this consciousness arises spontaneously, uniformly, and in unbroken continuity, allowing no room for a separate grasping of "mine" to arise. Where it is said elsewhere that it grasps "I" and "mine," it is because it grasps this consciousness as the self's self; hence two words are stated with reference to a single view. As for the eighth consciousness, although because of its subtlety both its ālambana and its ākāra cannot be known, when its own substance arises through the power of causes and conditions, it inwardly transforms into the upātta—the bījas and the physical sense faculties—and outwardly transforms into the appearance of the objective bhājanaloka, which it relies upon. Taking what has been transformed as its own ālambana and ākāra, it is able to arise by leaning upon them. If in the desire and form realms, it possesses all three ālambanas; whereas in the formless realm, it cognizes only bījas, and does not transform the mind and so forth into an ālambana. The transformations of sāsrava consciousness are broadly of two kinds: first, transforming through the power of causes and conditions; second, transforming through the power of discrimination. The former necessarily has practical function; the latter is merely an objective sphere. The transformations of the vipākavijñāna follow only causes and conditions; the forms and so forth transformed necessarily have actual, practical function. If it were to transform the mind and so forth, they would be of no practical function, because the mind and so forth as a nimittabhāga could not cognize. When that actual, practical function is required, it arises separately from this; therefore, the eighth does not cognize the mind and so forth. If one considers this consciousness as cognizing the seeds of the seven consciousnesses, gathering the branches into the root, it may also be called cognizing, but with respect to active manifestations, there is no sense of cognizing. All these are explained in terms of the sāsrava stage. If in the anāsrava stage, it is associated with the four wisdoms and cognizes universally all objective spheres of both paramārtha and saṃvṛti; otherwise, the Buddha-fruit would not be omniscient. All these appearances of objective spheres are transformed from one's own mind and are in reality not separate from the mind, because they are parts of the mind. Now, these parts of the mind are of four kinds altogether: first, the nimittabhāga; second, the darśanabhāga; third, the svasaṃvittibhāga; fourth, the svasaṃvitti-saṃvittibhāga. When the substance of a sāsrava consciousness arises, it appears resembling both the object cognized (ālambana) and the cognizing subject (ālambaka); its associated dharmas should also be known to be likewise. Resembling the aspect of the object cognized is called the nimittabhāga; resembling the aspect of the cognizing subject is called the darśanabhāga. If the mind and caittas had no aspect of the object cognized, they would not be able to cognize their own ālambana, or each and every one would be able to cognize everything, because one's own sphere would be like the rest and the rest like one's own. If the mind and caittas had no aspect of the cognizing subject, they would not be able to cognize, like empty space and so forth; or empty space and so forth would also be cognizers. Therefore, one knows there must be the two parts: nimitta and darśana. The nimittabhāga is the ālambana, and the darśanabhāga is called the ākāra. The nimitta and darśana must have a substance that they rely upon, and this substance is called the svasaṃvittibhāga. If this did not exist, lacking a svasaṃvittibhāga, one would not remember one's own mind and caitta dharmas, just as one certainly cannot remember an objective sphere that has never been experienced; and nimitta and darśana would have no underlying substance to rely upon, and the measured object and measuring instrument would have no measure-result. Therefore, one knows there must be this svasaṃvittibhāga. Since the mental parts are alike, they must mutually verify each other. If there were no fourth, who would verify the third? Therefore, there must further be a svasaṃvitti-saṃvittibhāga. This is the result of the third, the svasaṃvittibhāga. All that act as a measure must have a result. The darśanabhāga should not be the result of the third, because the darśanabhāga is sometimes subsumed under invalid cognition (apramāṇa), whereas that which verifies its own substance is necessarily pratyakṣa. If so, should one further posit a fifth part? That would then entail the fault of infinite regress. The answer is that it is simply the third that in turn verifies the fourth; because both are pratyakṣa, they can verify each other. The first two are external; the latter two are internal. The first is exclusively an ālambana; the latter three are open to both [being cognizer and cognized]. Being neither identical nor separate, none are apart from the mind. Possessing both object and cognizer, there is no fault of infinite regress. This sāsrava consciousness is open to all four parts. In an anāsrava mind, their presence or absence is not fixed: Namely, in the fundamental wisdom (mūlajñāna), darśana exists while nimitta does not, for the wisdom cognizing true reality must have darśana. If it lacked the darśanabhāga, it would not be able to cognize; how could it be called the wisdom that cognizes tathatā? One should not say that the nature of tathatā is also called a cognizer; therefore, one must admit that this definitely has a darśanabhāga. Although it has a darśanabhāga, it has no discrimination, which is why it is said to apprehend without characteristics (animitta), not apprehending appearances. Although it has no nimittabhāga, it can be said to arise bearing the appearance of tathatā, because it is not separate from tathatā. Just as when the svasaṃvittibhāga cognizes the darśanabhāga, it cognizes without transforming [a separate image], here too it should be like that. If it transformed and cognized, it would not be direct realization, just as the subsequently attained wisdom (pṛṣṭhalabdhajñāna) possesses an appearance of the objective sphere. As for the subsequently attained wisdom, both parts are present, because this category of wisdom is said to possess discrimination; because its reflection is said to resemble the appearance of tathatā without seeing the true and real appearance of tathatā; and because it discriminates the particular and common characteristics of dharmas and observes sentient beings to preach the Dharma for them. As for the latter two parts, although common to both wisdoms, the presence or absence of their cognizing function differs: namely, in the fundamental wisdom they do not cognize each other, while in the subsequently attained wisdom there is the function of mutual cognizing, because their two functions—with characteristics and without characteristics—are distinct. This is a brief explanation of the meaning of the four parts. And the objective spheres of the various consciousnesses discussed before should be known to be precisely the nimittabhāga of consciousness.