大乘百法明門論開宗義記 1.20

The treatise says: "First, eye-consciousness; second, ear-consciousness; third, nose-consciousness; fourth, tongue-consciousness; fifth, body-consciousness; sixth, mental consciousness; seventh, manas-consciousness; eighth, ālayavijñāna."
Revealing [the text], it is said: This is differentiating and enumerating them. Now, these eight consciousnesses are the great pillar of the holy teachings. Former virtuous masters all had chapter divisions explaining them at length. In the present work, revealing [the doctrine] in a brief treatise, the text should not be complicated. To address the essentials, they are explained through ten gates:
First, explaining the names and revealing the substances.
Second, association with caittas.
Third, cognitive objects and spheres.
Fourth, the ākāras of the various bhāgas.
Fifth, identity and difference among the pramāṇas.
Sixth, the presence and absence of the sensations (vedanās).
Seventh, the number of bases (āśraya).
Eighth, presence and absence of cognitive objects (ālambana).
Ninth, differences in being that which perfurmes (bhavaka) and that which is perfumed (bhāvya).
Tenth, distinctions of permanence and impermanence of the substance.
Although these ten doctrinal gates are discussed in various treatises, the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi-śāstra discusses them completely and clearly. Here, we mostly rely on the text of the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi to explain them.
First, revealing the names and substances further comprises four propositions.
First, some teachings state distinct names within the common [names]. Although all eight are commonly named citta, manas, and vijñāna, their distinction into citta, manas, and vijñāna is stated according to the predominance of their characteristics. The eighth is named citta, because it gathers the seeds of all dharmas and produces all dharmas. The seventh is named manas, because its nature is to deliberate continuously, taking [the eighth] as the characteristic of a self. The first six are named vijñāna, because they cognize coarse objective characteristics, surpassing the other consciousnesses. This shows these distinct names within the common [designation].
Second, some teachings state distinct names within the distinct [names]. Furthermore, although the first six consciousnesses are distinctly named vijñāna, three names are established for each according to faculty (indriya), object (viṣaya), and function:
Names established according to faculty are called "eye-consciousness" and so on. Because it is the "consciousness of the eye," these are all tatpuruṣa compounds.
Names established according to object are called "color-form consciousness" and so on. Because the consciousness has color-form [as its object], these are all bahuvrīhi compounds.
Names established according to function are called "seeing-consciousness" and so on. Because seeing is the consciousness itself, these are all karmadhāraya compounds.
Now, why this treatise states names established according to faculty rather than according to object is that naming according to faculty possesses five reasons. The five are: basing upon, issuing from, belonging to, aiding, and being like the faculty.
First, because it is consciousness based on the eye, it is called eye-consciousness. An intact faculty is required for consciousness to arise based on the eye; even if color-form appears before [the eye], a blind person cannot see.
Second, because it is consciousness issued from the eye, it is called eye-consciousness. As when disease damages the eye and the consciousness sees everything as yellow; this false seeing of the consciousness is not due to the destruction of color-form.
Third, because it is consciousness belonging to the eye, it is called eye-consciousness. The seed of the eye-consciousness arises following the seed of the eye; eye-consciousness does not arise following the seed of color-form.
Fourth, because it is consciousness aiding the eye, it is called eye-consciousness. Due to the consciousness uniting with the faculty, there is experience; the damage or benefit to the faculty is not caused by color-form.
Fifth, because it is consciousness like the eye, it is called eye-consciousness. Just as the faculty can illuminate and definitely belongs to a sentient being, whereas color-form is not determinate in this respect.
The eye-consciousness being such, the other consciousnesses are to be inferred accordingly.
Naming according to the object, though in accord with the meaning of vijñāna, is only stated according to the five faculties when they have not attained mastery. If in the state of mastery the various faculties are used interchangeably, and one faculty issues consciousness that cognizes all objects, this would lead to the error of confusion among the six consciousnesses. One should know that naming according to function is also like this. Only naming according to the based faculty is free from the fault of mutual confusion.
Furthermore, for the sixth consciousness, in the Laṅkāvatārasūtra another distinct name is established: "object-discriminating consciousness" (vastuprativikalpavijñāna), because it discriminates various internal and external affairs. In the Awakening of Faith it is named "separating consciousness," because it separately relies on the six faculties to grasp the six objects.
As for the seventh consciousness having the distinct name manas within the common [designation]: this is translated as "intention/thought" (manas), because constant and deliberate cogitation is its essential characteristic. How does this name differ from the "mental consciousness" (manovijñāna) of the sixth? This is a karmadhāraya compound, like the name "storehouse-consciousness" (ālayavijñāna)—consciousness itself is manas. The latter is a tatpuruṣa compound, like the name "eye-consciousness"—consciousness is distinct from manas.
This manas further has three distinct names:
First, associated with the view of a personal self (pudgaladṛṣṭi), it is named "defiled manas" (kliṣṭamanas).
Second, associated with the view of a dharma-self, it is named "veiled manas" (nivṛtamanas).
Third, associated with the wisdom of equality (samatājñāna), it is named "pure manas".
The first occurs throughout the continuity of all ordinary beings, the trainees of the two vehicles, and the sāsrava mental states of the category of bodhisattvas prior to the seventh ground. They cognize the ālayavijñāna and generate the view of a personal self.
The second occurs throughout the continuity of all ordinary beings, śrāvakas, and pratyekabuddhas, and states in which the fruition of wisdom of dharma-emptiness does not manifest in all bodhisattvas. They cognize the vipākavijñāna and generate the view of a dharma-self.
The third occurs throughout the continuity of all Tathāgatas, and states in which the fruition of wisdom of dharma-emptiness manifests in the path of seeing and the path of cultivation of bodhisattvas. They cognize the immaculate consciousness (amalavijñāna) and so forth, generating the wisdom of equality.
As for the differentiated names of the eighth consciousness: it has three names according to stages:
First, it is named ālaya, translated as "storehouse" (garbha/kośa), because it has the meanings of that which stores, that which is stored, and that which is grasped as stored. That is, the preceding seven consciousnesses all arise from seeds; cause and fruit, substance and characteristic, cannot be determinately distinct. These seeds are gathered as the eighth consciousness; the seven consciousnesses are all subsumed by this consciousness. Gathering and storing all dharmas within its own substance, it is therefore called "that which stores". The seeds of the various consciousnesses are perfumed by the seven consciousnesses; they are the energy-components (vāsanā) of those [consciousnesses] and are not separate from the seven consciousnesses. Since the seeds are gathered as the eighth consciousness, and the seeds are subsumed by the preceding seven consciousnesses, storing its own substance within all dharmas, it is therefore called "that which is stored". Continuing spontaneously from beginningless time, resembling unity and permanence with the characteristic of a real self, it is therefore constantly grasped as a self by the seventh consciousness; being subsumed by the view of self, it is therefore called "that which is grasped as stored". Storing is the function; consciousness is the substance. "Storing is itself consciousness" is a karmadhāraya compound. This name exists only in ordinary beings and trainees; it does not exist in the stage of non-trainees or non-retrogressing bodhisattvas, because it has the meaning of being grasped and stored as defiled dharmas. Therefore, the name ālaya is stated based on "that which is grasped as stored", since the preceding two meanings extend to subsequent stages. Because of this, the fault of this name is the heaviest; being abandoned first, it is specifically stated here.
Second, it is named vipāka; this is named "retribution-consciousness" (vipākavijñāna). That is, the substance of this consciousness is purely indeterminate (avyākṛta), and is the very substance of the fruit of saṃsāra, such as the realms, destinies, and modes of birth, led by wholesome and unwholesome karma. That which is called vipāka means: maturing at a different time, maturing through transformation, and maturing into a different category. Possessing these three meanings, it is therefore called vipāka. If it is called vipāka according to the first two meanings, the preceding seven consciousnesses and so forth also obtain this name, because the time of the cause is different from the fruit, and the fruit matures only through the transformation of the cause, these meanings being universal. If it is called vipāka according to the latter single meaning, only the eighth consciousness uniquely obtains this name, because wholesome and unwholesome causes induce an indeterminate fruit, and the meaning of maturing into a different category does not belong to the other consciousnesses. The meaning of "different" (vi-) applies to the cause; "maturation" (-pāka) is exclusively in the fruit. Fruit-maturation has two: seed and active manifestation. If "different" belongs to the cause, it is the maturation of the different (tatpuruṣa). If "different" belongs to the fruit, different is itself maturation (karmadhāraya). "Different-maturation is itself consciousness" means maturation belongs to active manifestation; "consciousness of different-maturation" means maturation belongs to seeds. Therefore, the other evolving consciousnesses (pravṛttivijñāna) do not obtain this name. This name exists only in the stages of ordinary beings, the two vehicles, and the various bodhisattvas; it does not exist in the stage of the Tathāgata, because there are still no indeterminate dharmas of retribution [in buddhahood].
Third, it is named amala; this is named "immaculate consciousness" (amalavijñāna).

because it is the basis for all pristine, vast, and supreme uncorrupted dharmas. 'Immaculate' is consciousness itself, [interpreted as] a karmadhāraya compound. This designation exists solely on the Tathāgata stage. In the stages of bodhisattvas, the two vehicles, and ordinary beings, possessing corrupted seeds, they can receive perfuming, because they have not yet attained the well-purified eighth consciousness. These are all specific names within the specific.

Alternatively, some teachings establish common names within the specific. The first six consciousnesses are commonly called 'experiencing', because they experience the six sense-objects and produce results of suffering. In the Abhidharmasamuccaya they are called 'arising consciousnesses', because they repeatedly arise from the basic consciousness. When including the seventh, they are commonly called 'transforming consciousnesses', because they undergo interruption and change in the path of seeing and elsewhere. As for the eighth consciousness, it shares the previous three designations, and in all stages it possesses four kinds of names: it is sometimes called the 'root consciousness', because it is the root from which the defiled and pure dharmas of the previous seven consciousnesses arise; it is sometimes called the 'ādānavijñāna', because it appropriates and holds the seeds and the material sense faculties, keeping them from perishing; it is sometimes called the 'basis of the knowable', because it can serve as the support for all defiled and pure knowable dharmas; and it is sometimes called the 'seed consciousness', because it can universally sustain all mundane and supramundane seeds. These are all common names within the specific.

Alternatively, some teachings state common names within the common; that is, the aforementioned common names within the specific are further commonly designated as citta, manas, and vijñāna. The reason that the aforementioned common meaning is universally called citta is that perceiving and gathering-and-arising are common to all consciousnesses. Therefore, the preceding heading stated: 'The dharmas of mind are eight.' Or, universally through all these senses, they are all called manas, because they all possess the meaning of being an originative support; therefore, within the gateway of the āyatanas, they are commonly called the manāyatana. Or, in all these senses, they are commonly called vijñāna, because they can all cognize the marks of various objects; therefore, within the five aggregates, they are all subsumed under the consciousness aggregate. In the enumeration of the treatise, however, they are all called vijñāna. The Hīnayāna, generally relying on the eyes and so forth across the three periods of time, calls the future citta, because of the meaning of accumulation; entering the present it is called vijñāna, because it can cognize; and in the past it is called manas, because it is the equal-and-immediate support.

When mind arises, it necessarily has caittas associated with it; according to the nature and category of the mind, they arise together with it. That is, the natures of the eight consciousnesses comprise wholesome, unwholesome, obscured-unspecified, and unobscured-unspecified. Being able to benefit adaptively both in this world and in other worlds is called 'wholesome'. Although the pleasant fruits of gods and humans can provide benefit in this world, they do not do so in other worlds, and thus are not called wholesome. Being detrimental and injurious both in this world and in other worlds is called 'unwholesome'. Although the painful fruits of the wretched destinies are detrimental in this world, they are not so in other worlds, and thus are not unwholesome. What cannot be determined as having the characteristics of benefit or detriment among the wholesome and unwholesome is called 'unspecified'. If its nature is defiled and can veil the mind, obstructing the noble path, it is called 'obscured'. If it is non-defiled, cannot veil the mind, and does not obstruct the noble path, it is called 'unobscured'.

The eighth is solely unobscured-unspecified, because this consciousness is of the nature of karmic maturation. If karmic maturation were wholesome or defiled, saṃsāric wandering and its pacification could not be established. Furthermore, because this consciousness is the support for the wholesome and the defiled, if it were wholesome or defiled, they would mutually conflict, and it could not serve as the support for both. Furthermore, because this consciousness is of a nature that receives perfuming, if it were wholesome or defiled, like extreme fragrance or stench it would not receive perfuming; having nothing to perfume, the causes and fruits of defilement and purity would both fail to be established. Since faith, greed, and the like are exclusively wholesome or defiled, they are definitely not associated with this consciousness. Regret and the other three [indeterminates], being intermittent and of an unspecified or object-determining nature, are likewise not associated with it.

The five object-determining [caittas] take specific, distinct objects: aspiration operates by desiring a pleasing matter, whereas this consciousness operates spontaneously without aspiration; resolve operates by holding decisively onto a matter, whereas this consciousness is obscure and holds no conviction; mindfulness operates solely by distinctly remembering things previously experienced, whereas this consciousness is dim and inferior, incapable of distinct remembrance; concentration can make the mind focus on a single object, whereas this consciousness operates spontaneously, taking distinct objects from moment to moment; discernment operates solely by selecting and investigating qualities and the like, whereas this consciousness is subtle and dim, incapable of investigation. Therefore, this [eighth consciousness] is not associated with the object-determining [caittas].

As for the five—contact, attention, sensation, perception, and volition—because they are universal caittas, if these five are absent, mind definitely does not arise; without contact, sensation, and the rest, it cannot be called mind. Their universal characteristics will be explained in detail later.

The seventh is solely obscured-unspecified. Its nature is defiled, obstructing the noble path and veiling one's own mind, and hence it is called 'obscured'. Its unvarying inner clinging does not initiate benefit or detriment in this world or other worlds, and hence it is called 'unspecified'. Therefore, it is associated with only eighteen caittas: the five universals; discernment from among the object-determining; self-delusion, self-view, self-conceit, and self-love; and the eight secondary afflictions of the greater category. Because the manas is definitely associated with the universals; because one who grasps at self and dharmas necessarily has discernment; because one is foolish regarding the marks of a self and deluded about selflessness; because one falsely conceptualizes what is non-self as dharmas; because one relies on the grasped self to produce haughtiness; because one deeply indulges in and clings to the grasped self; and because the eight secondary afflictions of the greater category universally defile the mind.

Why is this consciousness without the remaining caittas? Because self-view is constantly active and there are no other views; because in a single mind there cannot be two discernments; because discernment and self-view differ in meaning and function; because through view there is decisive certainty without hesitation; because one loves the grasped self and harbors no hatred; because it constantly perceives a conjoined object and has no aspiration; because it constantly perceives a determined matter without conviction; because it constantly perceives a present object without memory; because it perceives distinctly from moment to moment without single-pointed concentration; because the wholesome is exclusively pure, whereas this is defiled; because the ten minor [secondary afflictions] are coarse and violent, whereas this is subtle and scrutinizing; because the two medium [secondary afflictions] are unwholesome, whereas this is unspecified; because it constantly perceives a fixed object and does not regret the past; because sleep relies on external conditions, whereas this arises inwardly; and because vitarka and vicāra are coarse and fine, whereas this is uniform in type. Therefore, it is associated with only eighteen caittas.

The sixth mental consciousness pervades all natures; it possesses all conceptualizations, operates through both internal and external gateways, and can be determined in both beneficial and detrimental natures. Although the defilements it produces may be suppressed by concentration, their nature is non-detrimental, yet they obstruct the noble path. The mind that is the maturation fruit brought about by completing karma is non-defiled in nature, because it does not obstruct the path. Therefore, it admits association with all caittas. Although not all arise together at one time, according as any of the three natures arises, it is associated with them.

The five consciousnesses of the eye and so forth, operating through the external gateway, also share the four natures with the mental consciousness. Because they lack conceptualization by deliberation and conceptualization by recollection, they are associated with only thirty-four caittas: the five universals and the five object-determining; eleven wholesome dharmas; three root afflictions; and the two medium and eight greater secondary afflictions, totaling ten secondary afflictions. This is because contact and the rest universally associate with mind; because they can subtly and feebly perceive specific, distinct objects; because they also have the various wholesome dharmas that counter defilement; because they possess the unwholesome roots of greed, anger, and delusion; because shamelessness and unconscionableness pervade the unwholesome; and because restlessness and the other seven universally defile the mind. Why are the remaining caittas not associated?

Because conceit and so forth arise through weighing and estimating; because the ten minor [afflictions] are coarse and fierce, while this [state] is subtle and weak; because remorse and sleep are not dharmas [found in] the five [consciousnesses]; and because vitarka and vicāra are dharmas unique to the mental [consciousness]. This is explained according to the stage of the three natures during the causal [state]. If in the fruitional state, [the consciousnesses] are all anāsrava and kuśala, and are associated with twenty-one caittas: the sarvatraga, the viniyata, and the eleven kuśala. This is because they are always associated with all minds; because they always delight in realizing and knowing the observed objective sphere; because they always hold firm to the observed objective sphere; because they always clearly remember previously experienced objective spheres; because the World-Honoured One has no indeterminate mind; because he always discerns all dharmas; because utmost pure faith and so forth are always associated; and because, being free from defilement and distraction, they are not associated with caittas such as the indeterminate. Since they are associated with these caittas, their observed objective spheres also have breadth and narrowness. In the causal [state], the five consciousnesses cognize only the five dusts—rūpa and so forth—both prajñapti and dravya, as will be clarified below. Now, there are two theories concerning the cognizing of the five consciousnesses: Some say the five consciousnesses cognize only dravya objective spheres, because they arise spontaneously without depending on conventional words, and because they arise depending on other sense faculties and objects. The various other prajñapti forms, such as long and short, necessarily depend on conventional words and on other [factors] to arise; therefore, they do not cognize prajñapti forms like long and short. Others say the five consciousnesses also cognize prajñapti objective spheres, because long and short and so forth are also subsumed within the sense sphere of form (rūpāyatana); hence, for the eye consciousness to cognize them does not contradict reason. However, when cognizing the prajñapti, the mind cognizes the dravya; when cognizing the dravya, it does not cognize the prajñapti. Dravya does not depend on prajñapti, but prajñapti depends on dravya. The sixth mental consciousness cognizes all objective spheres, possessing all the discriminations, such as the three [types] and the seven [types], because it is supreme among the cognizing consciousnesses. As for the seventh consciousness, it cognizes only the darśanabhāga of the eighth [consciousness] as a self, and does not cognize its nimittabhāga, nor does it take the bījas within the consciousness and the associated dharmas to be "mine." This is because graspings of "I" and "mine" do not arise together, and because the satkāyadṛṣṭi associated with this consciousness arises spontaneously, uniformly, and in unbroken continuity, allowing no room for a separate grasping of "mine" to arise. Where it is said elsewhere that it grasps "I" and "mine," it is because it grasps this consciousness as the self's self; hence two words are stated with reference to a single view. As for the eighth consciousness, although because of its subtlety both its ālambana and its ākāra cannot be known, when its own substance arises through the power of causes and conditions, it inwardly transforms into the upātta—the bījas and the physical sense faculties—and outwardly transforms into the appearance of the objective bhājanaloka, which it relies upon. Taking what has been transformed as its own ālambana and ākāra, it is able to arise by leaning upon them. If in the desire and form realms, it possesses all three ālambanas; whereas in the formless realm, it cognizes only bījas, and does not transform the mind and so forth into an ālambana. The transformations of sāsrava consciousness are broadly of two kinds: first, transforming through the power of causes and conditions; second, transforming through the power of discrimination. The former necessarily has practical function; the latter is merely an objective sphere. The transformations of the vipākavijñāna follow only causes and conditions; the forms and so forth transformed necessarily have actual, practical function. If it were to transform the mind and so forth, they would be of no practical function, because the mind and so forth as a nimittabhāga could not cognize. When that actual, practical function is required, it arises separately from this; therefore, the eighth does not cognize the mind and so forth. If one considers this consciousness as cognizing the seeds of the seven consciousnesses, gathering the branches into the root, it may also be called cognizing, but with respect to active manifestations, there is no sense of cognizing. All these are explained in terms of the sāsrava stage. If in the anāsrava stage, it is associated with the four wisdoms and cognizes universally all objective spheres of both paramārtha and saṃvṛti; otherwise, the Buddha-fruit would not be omniscient. All these appearances of objective spheres are transformed from one's own mind and are in reality not separate from the mind, because they are parts of the mind. Now, these parts of the mind are of four kinds altogether: first, the nimittabhāga; second, the darśanabhāga; third, the svasaṃvittibhāga; fourth, the svasaṃvitti-saṃvittibhāga. When the substance of a sāsrava consciousness arises, it appears resembling both the object cognized (ālambana) and the cognizing subject (ālambaka); its associated dharmas should also be known to be likewise. Resembling the aspect of the object cognized is called the nimittabhāga; resembling the aspect of the cognizing subject is called the darśanabhāga. If the mind and caittas had no aspect of the object cognized, they would not be able to cognize their own ālambana, or each and every one would be able to cognize everything, because one's own sphere would be like the rest and the rest like one's own. If the mind and caittas had no aspect of the cognizing subject, they would not be able to cognize, like empty space and so forth; or empty space and so forth would also be cognizers. Therefore, one knows there must be the two parts: nimitta and darśana. The nimittabhāga is the ālambana, and the darśanabhāga is called the ākāra. The nimitta and darśana must have a substance that they rely upon, and this substance is called the svasaṃvittibhāga. If this did not exist, lacking a svasaṃvittibhāga, one would not remember one's own mind and caitta dharmas, just as one certainly cannot remember an objective sphere that has never been experienced; and nimitta and darśana would have no underlying substance to rely upon, and the measured object and measuring instrument would have no measure-result. Therefore, one knows there must be this svasaṃvittibhāga. Since the mental parts are alike, they must mutually verify each other. If there were no fourth, who would verify the third? Therefore, there must further be a svasaṃvitti-saṃvittibhāga. This is the result of the third, the svasaṃvittibhāga. All that act as a measure must have a result. The darśanabhāga should not be the result of the third, because the darśanabhāga is sometimes subsumed under invalid cognition (apramāṇa), whereas that which verifies its own substance is necessarily pratyakṣa. If so, should one further posit a fifth part? That would then entail the fault of infinite regress. The answer is that it is simply the third that in turn verifies the fourth; because both are pratyakṣa, they can verify each other. The first two are external; the latter two are internal. The first is exclusively an ālambana; the latter three are open to both [being cognizer and cognized]. Being neither identical nor separate, none are apart from the mind. Possessing both object and cognizer, there is no fault of infinite regress. This sāsrava consciousness is open to all four parts. In an anāsrava mind, their presence or absence is not fixed: Namely, in the fundamental wisdom (mūlajñāna), darśana exists while nimitta does not, for the wisdom cognizing true reality must have darśana. If it lacked the darśanabhāga, it would not be able to cognize; how could it be called the wisdom that cognizes tathatā? One should not say that the nature of tathatā is also called a cognizer; therefore, one must admit that this definitely has a darśanabhāga. Although it has a darśanabhāga, it has no discrimination, which is why it is said to apprehend without characteristics (animitta), not apprehending appearances. Although it has no nimittabhāga, it can be said to arise bearing the appearance of tathatā, because it is not separate from tathatā. Just as when the svasaṃvittibhāga cognizes the darśanabhāga, it cognizes without transforming [a separate image], here too it should be like that. If it transformed and cognized, it would not be direct realization, just as the subsequently attained wisdom (pṛṣṭhalabdhajñāna) possesses an appearance of the objective sphere. As for the subsequently attained wisdom, both parts are present, because this category of wisdom is said to possess discrimination; because its reflection is said to resemble the appearance of tathatā without seeing the true and real appearance of tathatā; and because it discriminates the particular and common characteristics of dharmas and observes sentient beings to preach the Dharma for them. As for the latter two parts, although common to both wisdoms, the presence or absence of their cognizing function differs: namely, in the fundamental wisdom they do not cognize each other, while in the subsequently attained wisdom there is the function of mutual cognizing, because their two functions—with characteristics and without characteristics—are distinct. This is a brief explanation of the meaning of the four parts. And the objective spheres of the various consciousnesses discussed before should be known to be precisely the nimittabhāga of consciousness.

Because they are parts of the mind, they are neither identical to nor separate from the mind. Aside from the mind, the caittas also all possess the four parts. Yet there are differences in the cognizing pramāṇa of objects. That is to say, the pramāṇas of the eight consciousnesses are generally threefold. The first is direct perception (pratyakṣa). "Direct" means present before [one]; "perception" (pramāṇa) means measuring. That is, one clearly cognizes rūpa and so forth present before oneself without mistaking their characteristics. It is free from all verbal and conceptual categorizations, clearly illumining like a mirror; hence it is named "direct perception". "Direct" is itself "perception"—this is a karmadhāraya compound. The second is inference (anumāna). "Infer" means to analogize or deduce; the meaning of "measure" is the same as before. That is, regarding rūpa and so forth that are not present before [oneself], by relying on various signs a correct cognition arises regarding the object under observation, understanding that it is great, impermanent, or the like; this is named "inference". "Infer" is itself "measure"—this is also a karmadhāraya compound. The third is non-pramāṇa (apramāṇa). That is, when there is an object that cannot be directly known and clearly illumined, nor can it be inferred through various conditions—the substantial entity of the object being non-existent, it cannot be measured—and yet one gives rise to a mental measurement concerning this non-pramāṇa object, it is therefore named non-pramāṇa. Hence it is not one of the six compound types. However, these three pramāṇas are all discussed with reference to the mind; they are not stated with reference to the object, because [objects] are not the cognizing [faculties]. Therefore, among the eight consciousnesses, the two consciousnesses of the five and the eighth are exclusively direct perception. Because they lack calculating (vikalpa) and recollective conceptualizations, they merely operate spontaneously regarding the objective realm. As for the manas consciousness, it is exclusively non-pramāṇa: cognizing the eighth consciousness, it grasps it as self and dharma, falsely calculating that which is not self or dharma. As for the sixth consciousness, it encompasses all three pramāṇas, as it possesses all conceptualizations, such as svabhāva-vikalpa, and can comprehensively cognize all objects. Therefore, among the four parts, the first part, the nimittabhāga, is exclusively the object to be measured (prameya). The latter three encompass two [functions]. The next, the darśanabhāga, encompasses the three pramāṇas. The latter two parts are exclusively direct perception, because that which experiences its own entity must be direct perception. This is stated according to the eight consciousnesses in the causal stage. If based on the fruition stage, there are also distinctions: the fundamental wisdom (mūlajñāna) is entirely direct perception; if it is the subsequently attained wisdom (pṛṣṭhalabdhajñāna), it also encompasses the three pramāṇas, because it cognizes all objects, both specific and common characteristics. Since [the mind] measures the characteristics of objects, it should experience what is agreeable or disagreeable. These characteristics of feeling (vedanā) are briefly threefold: experiencing disagreeable object-characteristics that afflict body and mind is called painful feeling (duḥkhavedanā); experiencing agreeable object-characteristics that delight body and mind is called pleasant feeling (sukhavedanā); experiencing neutral object-characteristics that neither afflict nor delight body and mind is called neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling (aduḥkhāsukhavedanā). Within pain and pleasure, each is further divided into two, because suffering (duḥkha), grief (daurmanasya), joy (saumanasya), and pleasure (sukha) are distinct; because the characteristics of afflicting and delighting the body and mind are distinct; because of being non-conceptual or conceptual; and because there are differences of extreme severity and slightness. That neither-painful-nor-pleasant is not divided into two is because the characteristics of neither pleasing nor delighting have no distinction, are non-conceptual, and operate with equanimity. All delightful feelings associated with the five consciousnesses are always called pleasure; those associated with the mental consciousness are called joy or pleasure. If in the desire realm or the threshold concentration of the first two dhyānas, they are called joy, because they merely delight the mind. If in the fundamental absorption of the first two dhyānas, they are called pleasure and joy, because they delight both body and mind. In the fundamental absorption of the third dhyāna, it is called pleasure, because it is tranquil, extremely deep, and non-conceptual. All afflicting feelings associated with the five consciousnesses are always called pain; those associated with the mental consciousness are called grief or pain. Among humans and devas, they are always called grief, because they are conceptual and not extremely severe. In the realms of animals and hungry ghosts, they are called grief and pain, because mixed feeling and pure feeling have lightness and severity. In the hells (naraka), it is exclusively called pain, because pure feeling is extremely severe and non-conceptual. Outside these, in other states, neither-painful-nor-pleasant is called equanimity (upekṣā) whether in body or in mind. Or, in the threshold and fundamental absorption of the fourth dhyāna and above, all are called equanimity, because they operate with equality, are in an unmoving stage free from altered feelings, and possess no distinct characteristics whether in body or mind. Thus we know that the six consciousnesses can accommodate the three feelings together. In the stage of attainment of mastery, there are only joy, pleasure, and equanimity, because the Buddhas have already severed pain and grief. As for the seventh consciousness, from beginningless time it operates spontaneously in a single mode, cognizing the internal and grasping it as a self, constantly without alteration, because it does not arise together with altered feelings. The eighth consciousness is extremely unclear and cannot differentiate agreeable and disagreeable object-characteristics, operating subtly, in a single mode, and continuously; therefore both are associated exclusively with equanimity feeling. Even in the fruition stage, it is still exclusively equanimity feeling, because it operates spontaneously, constantly, and with equality. Although these various meanings depend on the mind and caittas, the mind and caittas all possess bases (āśraya). Yet their bases are generally threefold. First, the condition-as-cause basis (hetupratyaya-āśraya), which refers to one's own seeds. All conditioned dharmas rely on this basis, because without their own causal conditions they will certainly not arise. However, seeds of the same class do not exist simultaneously as cause and effect, [whereas] the mutual production between seeds and active dharmas definitely exists simultaneously, just as a bundle of reeds supports one another and stands. Thus the eight consciousnesses and all caittas definitely each have a separate seed-basis. Second, the condition-as-predominance basis (adhipatipratyaya-āśraya), which refers to the six internal āyatanas. All minds and caittas rely on this basis, because without a simultaneous faculty (sahabhū-indriya) they will certainly not operate. Among them, the five consciousnesses have four bases, namely the five physical faculties and the sixth, seventh, and eighth consciousnesses, because if any one is lacking, they will definitely not arise, and because their bases—sharing the same object, conceptualizing, defiled-or-pure, and fundamental—are distinct. The simultaneous bases of the sixth mental consciousness are only of two kinds, namely the seventh and eighth consciousnesses, because if either one is lacking, it will definitely not arise, and because its uncommon and fundamental bases are distinct. As for the manas consciousness, its simultaneous basis is of only one kind, namely the ālaya, because if the storehouse consciousness did not exist, it would definitely not operate. The simultaneous basis of the ālayavijñāna is also of only one kind, namely the manas consciousness, because if the defiled manas did not exist, it would definitely not operate. As for the statement that the visual consciousness and so forth have ten conditions and so on, this is stated by mixing the meanings of "support" (āśrita) and "basis" (āśraya). "Support" means that all dharmas having arising and ceasing arise and abide by leaning on causes and relying on conditions; all that is leaned on and relied upon is called support, just as a king and his ministers rely on each other. If a dharma definitely possesses an object and acts as the master, enabling the mind and caittas to grasp their own ālambana, that is a "basis" (āśraya), namely the six internal āyatanas. This is only like the king, not like the ministers and so forth; hence the simultaneous bases are only this many. Third, the condition-as-immediate-contiguity basis (samanantarapratyaya-āśraya), which refers to the preceding ceased manas. All minds and caittas rely on this basis, because without an opening-and-guiding faculty (samanantara-indriya) they will definitely not arise. There must be a dharma possessing an object that acts as the master and can serve as the condition-as-immediate-contiguity; this clears the way and guides the subsequently arising minds and caitta dharmas. This belongs only to the mind, not to caittas and so forth. If this and that do not have the meaning of simultaneous arising, this is said to have the opening-and-guiding power for that. Since the eight consciousnesses within one person can arise simultaneously, only those of the same class serve as their opening-and-guiding basis. The Hīnayāna does not accept that the six consciousnesses arise together: whenever one arises, it is called "consciousness"; as it arises and ceases, it is called "manas".

Therefore, they are allowed to mutually serve as the equal-and-immediate condition. Hence, the Mahāyāna school accepts only those of the same category, because those of the same category definitely cannot arise together. Although the mind and mental factors arise together as different categories, they correspond to each other and harmonize as if they were one; they definitely arise and cease together, and their activities are necessarily identical. When one opens the way and guides, the others also open the way and guide. Although they can open the way and guide, they are not called bases, because they have no master-like function with respect to what is induced and produced. Where this differs from the four conditions is as follows: First is the cause condition (hetupratyaya). It directly produces its own fruit for conditioned dharmas. Its substance is of two kinds: first, seeds; second, actual states. As for seeds: they refer to the differentiated capacities of wholesome, defiled, and indeterminate natures across the various realms, stages, and so forth within the fundamental consciousness; they are able to induce subsequent capacities of their own category and give rise to simultaneous actual fruits of their own category. These are of the nature of the cause condition solely in relation to those [fruits]. This corresponds to the meaning of the first base among the three bases: in relation to the actual consciousness, it is the seed-basis; here it additionally includes subsequent seeds as being of the nature of the cause condition. As for actual states: they refer to the seven evolving consciousnesses and their associated [mental factors], their transformed objective and subjective aspects, natures, realms, stages, and so forth, excluding the wholesome [states] of the fruit of buddhahood and the extremely weak indeterminate [states]; the rest perfume the fundamental consciousness, producing seeds of their own category. These are of the nature of the cause condition solely in relation to those [seeds]. Among the three bases, this meaning is completely absent. Actual states of the same category, mutually viewed in succession, are none of them cause conditions, because each is produced from its own seed. Second is the equal-and-immediate condition (samanantarapratyaya). It refers to the eight actual consciousnesses and their mental factors: the prior aggregation opens the way equally and immediately for its own subsequent category, causing it to definitely arise, because many seeds of the same category operate at the same time. One knows that non-associated [dharmas] are not included in this condition. The very last thought-moment upon entering [the nirvāṇa] without remainder is excluded because it is extremely faint and weak, and also because there is no equal-and-immediate dharma that is to arise; hence, it is not this condition. As for the rest of the eight consciousness aggregations across the three realms and nine stages, higher and lower, dying and being reborn, sāsrava and anāsrava—they mutually open the way and guide according to what is appropriate; hence, all can serve as the equal-and-immediate condition. This corresponds to the meaning of the opening-and-guiding basis among the three bases. Third is the object-condition (ālambanapratyaya). That is, if a dharma bears its own image, and is that which is cogitated and relied upon by the mind or its associated [factors]. Its substance is of two kinds: first, direct; second, indirect. If it is not separated from the substance of that which cognizes, being that which is inwardly cogitated and relied upon by the subjective aspect and so forth, one should know that it is the direct object-condition. If, although separated in substance from that which cognizes, it serves as the archetype able to give rise to that which is inwardly cogitated and relied upon, one should know that it is the indirect object-condition. The direct object-condition is present in all that cognize, because separated from that which is inwardly cogitated and relied upon, [cognition] definitely does not arise. The indirect object-condition may or may not be present in that which cognizes, because even separated from that which is outwardly cogitated and relied upon, [cognition] can still arise. Thus, the eight consciousnesses and all mental factors each definitely possess a direct object-condition, whereas whether they have an indirect object-condition is not fixed. The first five consciousnesses, being coarse, dull, and weak, and the seventh consciousness, being innate, definitely rely upon external archetypes prior to the state of having overturned the basis; hence, they definitely possess an indirect object-condition. The sixth consciousness, having sharp and vigorous operational modes, operates freely in all states. As for the physical body and lands transformed by the eighth consciousness, they can be mutually experienced and mutually serve as archetypes; but the sense faculties and seeds it transforms cannot reasonably be experienced by other sentient beings, so they do not mutually serve as archetypes. In the states where the five [sensory] and seventh consciousnesses have overturned the basis, the external archetypes upon which they rely may or may not be present, so whether they possess an indirect object-condition is not fixed. This is spoken with respect to the intrinsic substance of the consciousnesses; as for whether it exists when considering their mutual relations, it is not fixed, and fearing excessive proliferation of text, I omit it and do not explain. Among the three bases, this meaning is completely absent. Fourth is the sovereign condition (adhipatipratyaya). That is, if a dharma has superior power and function, able to be either concordant with or contrary to other dharmas. Although the prior three conditions are also sovereign, the fourth here excludes them and takes the remainder, in order to show that the conditions have distinctions. This concordant and contrary aspect operates in four places, because the four matters of arising, abiding, completing, and obtaining are distinct. Although sovereign functions are many according to circumstances, those that are superior and manifest are only twenty-two; one should know that these are precisely the twenty-two faculties (indriyas). This subsumes the meaning of the coexistent basis among the three bases, because this meaning is broader. Therefore, the eight consciousnesses mutually serve as conditions for one another, because the meanings of having power and lacking power both apply universally. As for the meaning of seeds within the first cause condition: 'seed' is simply another name for 'habit-energy' (vāsanā). Habit-energy definitely exists by virtue of perfuming. Based on what meaning is the term 'perfuming' established? That which perfumes and that which is perfumed each possess four characteristics; because they cause seeds to be produced and grow, it is called 'perfuming'. What are called the four characteristics of that which perfumes? First, having arising and ceasing: if a dharma is impermanent and capable of having activity that generates and nurtures habit-energy, then it is that which perfumes. This excludes unconditioned dharmas: because they are unchanging before and after, having no activity of generating and nurturing, they are not that which perfumes. Second, having superior function: if it has arising and ceasing and its power is flourishing, able to induce habit-energy, then it is that which perfumes. This excludes ripely maturated mind, mental factors, and so forth, because their power is feeble and weak, so they are not that which perfumes. Third, having increase and decrease: if it has superior function and can be increased or decreased, cultivating and retaining habit-energy, then it is that which perfumes. This excludes the fruit of buddhahood: its fully perfected wholesome dharmas neither increase nor decrease, so they are not that which perfumes; if they were that which perfumes, they would not be fully perfected, and there would be superiority and inferiority between earlier and later fruits of buddhahood. Fourth, operating in harmony with that which is perfumed: if it is simultaneous and co-local with that which is perfumed, neither identical nor separate, then it is that which perfumes. This excludes other persons: between moments before and after there is no meaning of harmonious combination, so they are not that which perfumes. Only the seven evolving consciousnesses and their mental factors that possess superior power and undergo increase and decrease, possessing these four characteristics, can be that which perfumes. What are called the four characteristics of that which is perfumed? First, having a stable nature: if a dharma continues as one uniform type from beginning to end, able to receive habit-energy, then it is that which is perfumed. This excludes the evolving consciousnesses, sound, wind, and so forth: because their nature is not stable, they are not that which is perfumed. Second, having an indeterminate nature: if a dharma is impartial and unopposed, able to accommodate habit-energy, then it is that which is perfumed. This excludes wholesome and defiled [dharmas]: because their power is strong and forceful, having nothing they can accommodate, they are not that which is perfumed. On this account, the Tathāgata's eighth pure consciousness only carries old seeds and does not newly receive perfuming. Third, having a perfumable nature: if a dharma is autonomous and its nature is not solid and dense, able to receive habit-energy, then it is that which is perfumed. This excludes mental factors and unconditioned dharmas: because they are dependent on others or solid and dense, they are not that which is perfumed. Fourth, having a nature that is in harmonious combination with that which perfumes: if it is simultaneous and co-local with that which perfumes, neither identical nor separate, then it is that which is perfumed. This excludes other persons: between moments before and after there is no meaning of harmonious combination, so they are not that which is perfumed. Only the ripely maturated consciousness possesses these four characteristics and can be that which is perfumed, not the mental factors and so forth. If so, by what are the seeds of the eighth consciousness perfumed, since the eighth is solely the consciousness that is perfumed? Answer: They are perfumed and produced by the preceding seven consciousnesses.