大乘百法明門論開宗義決 1.17

1.17

起色受相行識顯時別有等者。彼作是言。若無我者。見色覺時。唯應但起色相之覺。不應別起我相之覺。受相等覺應知亦然。既先不起思覺五事。唯起五種我相之覺。是故決定知實有我。應問彼云。計我之覺為取現量境為取比量境。若取現量者。如何唯說色等諸蘊是現量耶。若取比量。如愚稚等不能思度。不應率爾起於我覺。又所執我為善不善。若是善者。何為極惡愚癡之人深起我見而能增長諸惡過失。若所執我是不善者。不應正說及非顛倒。既非是善即是邪倒。計我實有不應道理。

Regarding "distinctly existing when the characteristics of rūpa, vedanā, saṃjñā, saṃskāra, and vijñāna become manifest," and so forth: they say this: if there were no self, when the consciousness perceiving rūpa arises, only a consciousness having the characteristic of rūpa should arise; a distinct consciousness having the characteristic of a self should not arise. The consciousnesses of vedanā, saṃjñā, and the rest should likewise be understood in this way. Since one does not first give rise to a cognitive thought of the five items, but only gives rise to five kinds of consciousness having the characteristic of a self, therefore one definitively knows that there is truly a self. One should ask them: does the consciousness that grasps a self take an object of direct perception (pratyakṣa) or an object of inference (anumāna)? If it takes direct perception, why say only the aggregates such as rūpa are direct perception? If it takes inference, like the foolish, infant, and so on who cannot deliberate, it should not abruptly give rise to a consciousness of a self. Moreover, is the grasped self wholesome or unwholesome? If it is wholesome, why do extremely evil and foolish people deeply give rise to the view of self and thereby increase all evil faults? If the grasped self is unwholesome, it should not be correctly spoken of or non-inverted. Since it is not wholesome, it is precisely erroneous and inverted; clinging to the self as a real entity is unreasonable.