大乘百法明門論開宗義決 1.17

1.17

Regarding "distinctly existing when the characteristics of rūpa, vedanā, saṃjñā, saṃskāra, and vijñāna become manifest," and so forth: they say this: if there were no self, when the consciousness perceiving rūpa arises, only a consciousness having the characteristic of rūpa should arise; a distinct consciousness having the characteristic of a self should not arise. The consciousnesses of vedanā, saṃjñā, and the rest should likewise be understood in this way. Since one does not first give rise to a cognitive thought of the five items, but only gives rise to five kinds of consciousness having the characteristic of a self, therefore one definitively knows that there is truly a self. One should ask them: does the consciousness that grasps a self take an object of direct perception (pratyakṣa) or an object of inference (anumāna)? If it takes direct perception, why say only the aggregates such as rūpa are direct perception? If it takes inference, like the foolish, infant, and so on who cannot deliberate, it should not abruptly give rise to a consciousness of a self. Moreover, is the grasped self wholesome or unwholesome? If it is wholesome, why do extremely evil and foolish people deeply give rise to the view of self and thereby increase all evil faults? If the grasped self is unwholesome, it should not be correctly spoken of or non-inverted. Since it is not wholesome, it is precisely erroneous and inverted; clinging to the self as a real entity is unreasonable.