大乘起信論廣釋卷第三．四．五 3.33

3.33

論。復次不覺至相應不離　釋曰。次明枝末於有二。先明細相。後顯麁相。初中亦二。總標。別釋。此初也。無明為體本。三細為相末。不相離故名為相應。非謂王所相應之義。是不相應三染心故。無明起妄。妄起無明。是故名為相應不離。此及六麁先作二釋然後消文義方明著。一約喻顯意。二就識明相。初說意者。本覺真如其猶淨眼。熱翳之氣如本無明。翳與眼合動彼靜眼。業識亦爾。由淨眼動故病眼生。能見相亦爾。病眼外視即有空花。境界相亦爾。以有花境分別好惡。智相亦爾。由此分別堅執不改。相續相亦爾。領順違相起愛憎心。執取相亦爾。隨其苦樂立名計著。名字相亦爾。既生貪嗔爭而相擊。起業相亦爾。被捉送官有所囚繫。業繫苦相亦爾。長眠生死而不能脫。皆由根本無明力也。約識辨相。略敘三釋。有義。染心是前七識。此屬七識有通有別。通謂九相皆屬七識故初業相即自體分。其能見相即諸見分。第三現相即是相分。緣境執法故名智相。執相常流名相續相。依法執我名執取相。由執起名名計名字相。依起惑業名起業相。由業招報名業繫苦相。別而言之。業屬第七。依無明動成妄念故。轉屬第六。依第七根轉緣外故。現屬五識。隨其五塵對至現故。智識即是邪智故。相續即是諸識。我執多執常故。執取相者即是諸識。領納受蘊。計名字相即是諸識。取像想蘊。起業相者即是諸識。思數行蘊。業繫苦相是五趣。果即是色蘊。故此麁細九種妄心是前七識。今知九相非是黎耶。有二證故知唯七識。一由二和方名黎耶。此中生滅是前七識。其不生滅是如來藏。融同一體是黎耶識。既此九種是唯生滅。非二和合故非黎耶。二以阿黎耶識說有無明。不覺而起。能見現能取境界起念相續說為意等。既依黎耶說有無明。不覺而起方是業等故。業識等是前七識。有義。前說不應正理。乖此論等諸教理故。經說真現分別事識。即應經有重言失故。論說現識一切時起。若是前七。應間斷故。說阿賴耶現一切境。現屬七識。違諸教故。所現境用既屬七識。賴耶應無現境義故。識三細相名不相應。若是七識染相應故。又應業識非佛地斷。許是七識菩薩知故。更有諸過。不能廣舉。故知九相通顯八識。謂前三細定屬梨耶。後有三分故說三細相。義如下說。若爾黎耶應唯生滅。業等唯是生滅心故。答。實由二義方成梨耶。義如前說。此偏舉故。以彼六麁是七識故。故說境緣復生六相。亦即經說。於藏識海境風所動七識。波浪轉。於中智相是末那識。經說。六識及心法智如是七法剎那不住以住。以此末那創有惠數執我我所得此名。故其相續相即是意識。論自說云。言意識者即相續識。依諸凡夫取著轉深名意識故。餘是四蘊。義如前說。若爾末那應緣外境。便與經論所說相違。答。許緣六塵不違教理。金鼓經說。眼根受色乃至意根分別諸法。大乘意。根即是末那。能緣諸境。不違經故。如對法論十分別中相顯現分別者謂六識身及意於器世界所受用義所取相中而顯現故。意通緣境。亦不違論意。是意識不共所依。如眼與識得同緣境。由是此中應作比量。意根必與意識同境。是立宗言。以是不共所依必與能依同境如眼等五根。是隨同品言。謂若不同境者必非不共所依如次第滅意根。是隨遠離言。既此比量於理無違。末那遍緣理善成立。不可難言。同能依識緣自體故有自見遍。諸心心所皆證自體。於一心中有諸分故。是故不廢同一所緣。而諸教說不緣外者。以所現境不離現識。末那雖緣不計為外。不妨內緣六塵境相。有義。此說理教相違。唯說末那內緣執我。以是微劣任運一類無窮。別起我所見故。不爾何異第六意識非計內外可令相別。尚非我計我亦非外計外。故說心法智。即此智相是末那者亦非證成。末那心所非唯惠故。惠於心所非初勝故。非自所許四相法故。以諸心所助成心事名心法智。總為第七。非即末那名為智相。不爾本識既未有智。何不說為非心法智。意根分別一切法者。此中意根非末那識。意謂思量。此分別故。即說意識名為意根。意識亦名分別根故。如說眼根能受諸色。豈受相應能受色耶。經說境緣七識浪轉。論兼說意顯現分別。言總意別亦不相違。依本識見而起末那。依本識相別起五識。意識通緣見相而生。不爾諸識便無差別。既所引教不順所宗故。所立理依似比量。宗有二過。一違正教。多處唯言有我見故。二違比量。乖不遍緣正比量故。因有二過。一有決定相違過失。違後施設正比量故。二有異品一分轉過。諸共所依亦同境故。由是此中正比量云。有漏意根必不遍緣。自所餘境不共。所依六根之中隨一攝故。如彼有漏意根應不能發無漏意識。理不相應故。又令末那與五色根等無差別。便成大過。使前所說理教相違。故知末那非謂智相。不能分別愛不愛故。應知六麁皆屬事識。下五意中廣顯其義。何故不說末那識者。有二義故略不說之。一義准有故前說賴耶三種細相必有執我末那俱起。故唯識云。隨彼所生彼地所繫。又瑜伽說。賴耶識起必二識相應。又由意識緣外境時。必依末那為根方起。故說六麁分別事識必有末那。義准有故。故麁細中略不說也。二義不便故。無明住地動本淨心令起和合成黎耶識。末那既無此和合義。故三細中而不說之。又由外境牽起事識。末那既無緣外境義故。六麁中亦略不說。由此義故經中但說真識現識分別事識。餘義同前。委如下說。

Treatise: "Furthermore, based on non-awakening... are associated and not separated." Commentary: Next, in explaining the branch [aspects, the text] has two [parts]: first, it explains the subtle characteristics; later, it reveals the coarse characteristics. The first part also has two: a general presentation and an individual explanation. This is the first. Ignorance is the essential root; the three subtle [characteristics] are the branch marks. Because they are not separated, they are called "associated." This does not mean the association between the primary mind and mental factors, for these are the three defiled states of mind that are non-associated. Ignorance gives rise to delusion, and delusion gives rise to ignorance; therefore, they are termed "associated and not separated." Regarding these [subtle characteristics] and the six coarse [characteristics], we first offer two explanations and then elucidate the text so that the meaning becomes clearly evident. The first is to reveal the import in terms of a metaphor; the second is to explain the characteristics based on consciousness. As for the import of the first explanation: original awakening and tathatā are like a clear eye; the vapor of a cataract's heat is like fundamental ignorance. When the cataract joins with the eye, it agitates that still eye; the karmic consciousness is also like this. Because the clear eye is agitated, a diseased eye arises; the characteristic of active seeing is also like this. When the diseased eye looks outward, there are sky-flowers; the characteristic of the objective realm is also like this. Because there is the realm of flowers, one discriminates good and bad; the characteristic of cognition is also like this. Due to this discrimination, one stubbornly grasps without changing; the characteristic of continuity is also like this. Experiencing agreeable and disagreeable marks, one generates minds of love and hate; the characteristic of grasping is also like this. Following their suffering and pleasure, one establishes names and conceptualizes attachment; the characteristic of attachment to names is also like this. Once greed and anger have arisen, beings dispute and strike one another; the characteristic of producing karma is also like this. Being captured and sent to the magistrate, one is imprisoned; the characteristic of suffering bound to karma is also like this. Sleeping long in saṃsāra without being able to escape is entirely due to the power of fundamental ignorance. In distinguishing the characteristics in terms of consciousness, three explanations are briefly presented. One position holds: The defiled mind comprises the prior seven consciousnesses. This affiliation with the seven consciousnesses has both a general and a specific [application]. The general means that all nine characteristics belong to the seven consciousnesses: thus, the initial characteristic of karma is the self-substance division; its characteristic of active seeing is the various seeing divisions; the third, the characteristic of appearance, is the objective-image division. Grasping phenomena by cognizing the realm is called the characteristic of cognition. Grasping marks in constant flow is called the characteristic of continuity. Grasping the self based on phenomena is called the characteristic of grasping. Arising names based on grasping is called the characteristic of attachment to names. Arising afflictions and karma based [on this] is called the characteristic of producing karma. Bringing about retribution through karma is called the characteristic of suffering bound to karma. Speaking specifically, karma belongs to the seventh [consciousness], because it forms delusional thoughts based on the agitation of ignorance. Manifestation belongs to the sixth [consciousness], because based on the seventh faculty, it shifts to cognize the external. Appearance belongs to the five consciousnesses, because it manifests in accordance with the confrontation with their five sensory objects. The cognitive consciousness is wrong cognition. Continuity is the [sense] consciousnesses, because grasping the self mostly grasps permanency. Grasping is the [sense] consciousnesses: it is the sensation aggregate that receives. The characteristic of attachment to names is the [sense] consciousnesses: it is the conception aggregate that takes marks. The characteristic of producing karma is the [sense] consciousnesses: it is the volition mental factor, the formation aggregate. The characteristic of suffering bound to karma is the fruit of the five destinies, which is the form aggregate. Hence these nine kinds of coarse and subtle deluded minds are the prior seven consciousnesses. We now know that the nine characteristics are not the ālayavijñāna, because there are two proofs showing they are solely the seven consciousnesses: First, only through the harmony of two [factors] is it called the ālayavijñāna. Here, arising and ceasing is the prior seven consciousnesses; the non-arising and non-ceasing is the tathāgatagarbha; fused into a single substance, they are the ālayavijñāna. Since these nine kinds are solely arising and ceasing and not the harmonious union of the two, they are not the ālayavijñāna. Second, it is based on the ālayavijñāna that ignorance is spoken of; arising unawakened, being able to see, appearing, being able to grasp the objective realm, and giving rise to continuous thoughts are spoken of as manas and so forth. Since it is based on the ālayavijñāna that ignorance is spoken of, and only arising unawakened constitutes karma and the rest, the karmic consciousness and the rest are the prior seven consciousnesses. Another position holds: The previous explanation does not accord with the correct principle, because it contradicts the doctrines and principles of this treatise and others. The sūtra speaks of the true [consciousness], the manifesting [consciousness], and the phenomenal consciousness of discrimination; thus the sūtra would incur the fault of redundant phrasing. The treatise states that the manifesting consciousness arises at all times; if it were the prior seven, it would have to be interrupted. It says that the ālayavijñāna manifests all objective realms; if manifesting belonged to the seven consciousnesses, it would contradict various scriptures. Since the function of manifesting the realm would belong to the seven consciousnesses, the ālayavijñāna would lack the meaning of manifesting the realm. The three subtle characteristics of consciousness are called non-associated; if they were the seven consciousnesses, they would be defiled and associated. Moreover, it would imply that the karmic consciousness is not severed at the stage of Buddhahood, because if it were granted to be the seven consciousnesses, it would be known by bodhisattvas. There are further errors that cannot be listed in full. Therefore, we know that the nine characteristics broadly explain the eight consciousnesses: that is, the former three subtle [characteristics] definitely belong to the ālayavijñāna. Because later there are three divisions, three subtle characteristics are spoken of; the meaning is as explained below. [Question:] If so, the ālayavijñāna would be solely arising and ceasing, because karma and the rest are solely arising and ceasing minds. Answer: In truth, it is only through two meanings that the ālayavijñāna is formed, as explained before. This is a one-sided mention. Because those six coarse ones are the seven consciousnesses, it says that conditions of the objective realm further produce the six characteristics. This is also what the sūtra says: 'On the ocean of the storehouse consciousness, stirred by the winds of external realms, the waves of the seven consciousnesses roll.' Among them, the characteristic of cognition is the manas consciousness. The sūtra states: 'The six consciousnesses and the mental-phenomenon cognition—such seven phenomena do not abide for an instant.' Because this manas initiates the mental factor of discernment to grasp self and what belongs to self, it receives this name. Its characteristic of continuity is the mental consciousness. The treatise itself says: 'What is called the mental consciousness is the continuing consciousness, because based on ordinary beings grasping more deeply, it is called the mental consciousness.' The rest are the four aggregates, whose meaning is as explained before. [Question:] If so, manas would cognize external objects, which would contradict what is stated in the sūtras and treatises. Answer: Conceding that it cognizes the six sensory dusts does not contradict teaching or logic. The Suvarṇaprabhāsa Sūtra says: 'The eye faculty receives form... up to the mind faculty discriminates phenomena.' In the Mahāyāna, the mind faculty is precisely manas; that it can cognize realms does not contradict the sūtra. As the Abhidharma-samuccaya says regarding the ten discriminations, among which the discrimination that manifests marks means that which appears within the grasped marks of what is experienced in the vessel world by the collection of the six consciousnesses and the mind faculty; thus the mind faculty comprehensively cognizes realms, which also does not contradict the treatise. The mind faculty is the uncommon support of the mental consciousness; just as the eye and [visual] consciousness can cognize the same realm. Therefore, here an inference should be made: 'The mind faculty necessarily shares the same realm with the mental consciousness' is the thesis statement; 'because it is the uncommon support that necessarily shares the same realm with what is supported, like the five faculties of the eye and so forth' is the statement of positive agreement. That 'if it does not share the same realm, it is definitely not an uncommon support, like the immediately preceding destroyed mind faculty' is the statement of negative agreement. Since this inference does not contradict logic, manas's cognizing everywhere is well established in reason. One cannot object that because it shares with the supported consciousness the cognition of its own substance, there would be a personal view everywhere; for all minds and mental factors bear witness to their own substance, and within a single mind there are various divisions. Therefore, sharing the same cognitive object is not ruled out. And where various scriptures say it does not cognize external objects, it is because the manifested realm is not separated from the manifesting consciousness; though manas cognizes it, it does not conceptualize it as external; this does not preclude it from internally cognizing the marks of the six sensory realms. Another position holds: This explanation contradicts both logic and doctrine. It is solely stated that manas cognizes internally and grasps self, because it is subtle, weak, spontaneous, of a single uniform kind, and incessantly gives rise separately to the view of what belongs to self. Otherwise, how would it differ from the sixth mental consciousness, since neither conceptualizing inside nor outside would distinguish them? It does not even grasp self as self, nor external as external. Therefore, regarding the 'mental-phenomenon cognition', saying that this characteristic of cognition is manas is also not established. The mental factors of manas are not solely discernment; discernment among mental factors is not the foremost; nor is it the four-characterised phenomenon accepted by [the opponent] himself. Because various mental factors assist in completing the work of the mind, they are called 'mental-phenomenon cognition', which collectively constitutes the seventh; it is not that manas itself is called the characteristic of cognition. Otherwise, since the fundamental consciousness does not yet possess cognition, why is it not called the non-mental-phenomenon cognition? As for the mind faculty discriminating all phenomena, the mind faculty here is not the manas consciousness. 'Mind' means deliberation; because of this discrimination, the mental consciousness is spoken of as the mind faculty, for the mental consciousness is also called the discriminating faculty. Just as it is said that the eye faculty can receive forms—can feeling, which is associated [with it], receive forms? The sūtra says that conditioned by realms, the seven consciousnesses roll like waves; the treatise also speaks of the mind faculty manifesting discrimination: the words are general but the referents are distinct, so they do not contradict each other. Dependent on the seeing [division] of the fundamental consciousness, manas arises; dependent on the objective [division] of the fundamental consciousness, the five consciousnesses separately arise; the mental consciousness arises by comprehensively cognizing both seeing and objective [divisions]. Otherwise, the consciousnesses would have no distinction. Since the citations of teaching do not accord with the thesis, the reasoned argument established relies on a pseudo-inference. The thesis has two faults: First, it contradicts correct teaching, for many places only state that it has the view of self. Second, it contradicts inference, departing from the correct inference of non-universal cognizing. The reason has two faults: First, it has the fallacy of being decisively contradictory, contradicting the subsequent formulation of the correct inference. Second, it has the fallacy of partially occurring in dissimilar instances, because common supports also share the same realm. Therefore, the correct inference here states: 'The defiled mind faculty definitely does not cognize everywhere the remaining realms other than its own object; thesis. Because it is subsumed under any one among the uncommon supports of the six faculties; reason. Like the eye and other faculties; example.' If it were like that, the defiled mind faculty would be unable to generate the undefiled mental consciousness, for the logic is incompatible. Moreover, making manas no different from the five material faculties would be a great error, causing the previous explanation to contradict both logic and teaching. Hence we know that manas is not the characteristic of cognition, because it cannot discriminate agreeable from disagreeable [objects]. One should know that the six coarse [characteristics] all belong to the phenomenal consciousness. Below, among the five kinds of manas, their meaning is broadly revealed. Why is the manas consciousness not mentioned? It is omitted because of two reasons: First, its existence is implied by the meaning: the three subtle characteristics of the ālayavijñāna mentioned earlier necessarily arise together with the self-grasping manas. Hence the Vijñaptimātratā says: 'Depending on wherever [a being] is born, it is bound to that stage.' Also the Yogācāra says that when the ālayavijñāna arises, it necessarily associates with two consciousnesses. Furthermore, when the mental consciousness cognizes external realms, it necessarily relies on manas as its faculty to arise. Therefore, when the six coarse characteristics of the discriminating phenomenal consciousness are spoken of, manas is necessarily present; its existence being implied by the meaning, it is briefly omitted among the coarse and subtle. Second, it is inconvenient in meaning: the latent stage of ignorance agitates the fundamentally pure mind, causing it to arise in harmony to become the ālayavijñāna; since manas lacks this harmonious union, it is not mentioned among the three subtle [characteristics]. Moreover, because external realms draw forth the phenomenal consciousness, and manas lacks the function of cognizing external realms, it is also briefly omitted among the six coarse [characteristics]. Due to this meaning, the sūtras only speak of the true consciousness, the manifesting consciousness, and the discriminating phenomenal consciousness. The remaining meanings are the same as before, detailed as explained below.