大乘起信論廣釋卷第三．四．五 3.33

3.33

Treatise: "Furthermore, based on non-awakening... are associated and not separated." Commentary: Next, in explaining the branch [aspects, the text] has two [parts]: first, it explains the subtle characteristics; later, it reveals the coarse characteristics. The first part also has two: a general presentation and an individual explanation. This is the first. Ignorance is the essential root; the three subtle [characteristics] are the branch marks. Because they are not separated, they are called "associated." This does not mean the association between the primary mind and mental factors, for these are the three defiled states of mind that are non-associated. Ignorance gives rise to delusion, and delusion gives rise to ignorance; therefore, they are termed "associated and not separated." Regarding these [subtle characteristics] and the six coarse [characteristics], we first offer two explanations and then elucidate the text so that the meaning becomes clearly evident. The first is to reveal the import in terms of a metaphor; the second is to explain the characteristics based on consciousness. As for the import of the first explanation: original awakening and tathatā are like a clear eye; the vapor of a cataract's heat is like fundamental ignorance. When the cataract joins with the eye, it agitates that still eye; the karmic consciousness is also like this. Because the clear eye is agitated, a diseased eye arises; the characteristic of active seeing is also like this. When the diseased eye looks outward, there are sky-flowers; the characteristic of the objective realm is also like this. Because there is the realm of flowers, one discriminates good and bad; the characteristic of cognition is also like this. Due to this discrimination, one stubbornly grasps without changing; the characteristic of continuity is also like this. Experiencing agreeable and disagreeable marks, one generates minds of love and hate; the characteristic of grasping is also like this. Following their suffering and pleasure, one establishes names and conceptualizes attachment; the characteristic of attachment to names is also like this. Once greed and anger have arisen, beings dispute and strike one another; the characteristic of producing karma is also like this. Being captured and sent to the magistrate, one is imprisoned; the characteristic of suffering bound to karma is also like this. Sleeping long in saṃsāra without being able to escape is entirely due to the power of fundamental ignorance. In distinguishing the characteristics in terms of consciousness, three explanations are briefly presented. One position holds: The defiled mind comprises the prior seven consciousnesses. This affiliation with the seven consciousnesses has both a general and a specific [application]. The general means that all nine characteristics belong to the seven consciousnesses: thus, the initial characteristic of karma is the self-substance division; its characteristic of active seeing is the various seeing divisions; the third, the characteristic of appearance, is the objective-image division. Grasping phenomena by cognizing the realm is called the characteristic of cognition. Grasping marks in constant flow is called the characteristic of continuity. Grasping the self based on phenomena is called the characteristic of grasping. Arising names based on grasping is called the characteristic of attachment to names. Arising afflictions and karma based [on this] is called the characteristic of producing karma. Bringing about retribution through karma is called the characteristic of suffering bound to karma. Speaking specifically, karma belongs to the seventh [consciousness], because it forms delusional thoughts based on the agitation of ignorance. Manifestation belongs to the sixth [consciousness], because based on the seventh faculty, it shifts to cognize the external. Appearance belongs to the five consciousnesses, because it manifests in accordance with the confrontation with their five sensory objects. The cognitive consciousness is wrong cognition. Continuity is the [sense] consciousnesses, because grasping the self mostly grasps permanency. Grasping is the [sense] consciousnesses: it is the sensation aggregate that receives. The characteristic of attachment to names is the [sense] consciousnesses: it is the conception aggregate that takes marks. The characteristic of producing karma is the [sense] consciousnesses: it is the volition mental factor, the formation aggregate. The characteristic of suffering bound to karma is the fruit of the five destinies, which is the form aggregate. Hence these nine kinds of coarse and subtle deluded minds are the prior seven consciousnesses. We now know that the nine characteristics are not the ālayavijñāna, because there are two proofs showing they are solely the seven consciousnesses: First, only through the harmony of two [factors] is it called the ālayavijñāna. Here, arising and ceasing is the prior seven consciousnesses; the non-arising and non-ceasing is the tathāgatagarbha; fused into a single substance, they are the ālayavijñāna. Since these nine kinds are solely arising and ceasing and not the harmonious union of the two, they are not the ālayavijñāna. Second, it is based on the ālayavijñāna that ignorance is spoken of; arising unawakened, being able to see, appearing, being able to grasp the objective realm, and giving rise to continuous thoughts are spoken of as manas and so forth. Since it is based on the ālayavijñāna that ignorance is spoken of, and only arising unawakened constitutes karma and the rest, the karmic consciousness and the rest are the prior seven consciousnesses. Another position holds: The previous explanation does not accord with the correct principle, because it contradicts the doctrines and principles of this treatise and others. The sūtra speaks of the true [consciousness], the manifesting [consciousness], and the phenomenal consciousness of discrimination; thus the sūtra would incur the fault of redundant phrasing. The treatise states that the manifesting consciousness arises at all times; if it were the prior seven, it would have to be interrupted. It says that the ālayavijñāna manifests all objective realms; if manifesting belonged to the seven consciousnesses, it would contradict various scriptures. Since the function of manifesting the realm would belong to the seven consciousnesses, the ālayavijñāna would lack the meaning of manifesting the realm. The three subtle characteristics of consciousness are called non-associated; if they were the seven consciousnesses, they would be defiled and associated. Moreover, it would imply that the karmic consciousness is not severed at the stage of Buddhahood, because if it were granted to be the seven consciousnesses, it would be known by bodhisattvas. There are further errors that cannot be listed in full. Therefore, we know that the nine characteristics broadly explain the eight consciousnesses: that is, the former three subtle [characteristics] definitely belong to the ālayavijñāna. Because later there are three divisions, three subtle characteristics are spoken of; the meaning is as explained below. [Question:] If so, the ālayavijñāna would be solely arising and ceasing, because karma and the rest are solely arising and ceasing minds. Answer: In truth, it is only through two meanings that the ālayavijñāna is formed, as explained before. This is a one-sided mention. Because those six coarse ones are the seven consciousnesses, it says that conditions of the objective realm further produce the six characteristics. This is also what the sūtra says: 'On the ocean of the storehouse consciousness, stirred by the winds of external realms, the waves of the seven consciousnesses roll.' Among them, the characteristic of cognition is the manas consciousness. The sūtra states: 'The six consciousnesses and the mental-phenomenon cognition—such seven phenomena do not abide for an instant.' Because this manas initiates the mental factor of discernment to grasp self and what belongs to self, it receives this name. Its characteristic of continuity is the mental consciousness. The treatise itself says: 'What is called the mental consciousness is the continuing consciousness, because based on ordinary beings grasping more deeply, it is called the mental consciousness.' The rest are the four aggregates, whose meaning is as explained before. [Question:] If so, manas would cognize external objects, which would contradict what is stated in the sūtras and treatises. Answer: Conceding that it cognizes the six sensory dusts does not contradict teaching or logic. The Suvarṇaprabhāsa Sūtra says: 'The eye faculty receives form... up to the mind faculty discriminates phenomena.' In the Mahāyāna, the mind faculty is precisely manas; that it can cognize realms does not contradict the sūtra. As the Abhidharma-samuccaya says regarding the ten discriminations, among which the discrimination that manifests marks means that which appears within the grasped marks of what is experienced in the vessel world by the collection of the six consciousnesses and the mind faculty; thus the mind faculty comprehensively cognizes realms, which also does not contradict the treatise. The mind faculty is the uncommon support of the mental consciousness; just as the eye and [visual] consciousness can cognize the same realm. Therefore, here an inference should be made: 'The mind faculty necessarily shares the same realm with the mental consciousness' is the thesis statement; 'because it is the uncommon support that necessarily shares the same realm with what is supported, like the five faculties of the eye and so forth' is the statement of positive agreement. That 'if it does not share the same realm, it is definitely not an uncommon support, like the immediately preceding destroyed mind faculty' is the statement of negative agreement. Since this inference does not contradict logic, manas's cognizing everywhere is well established in reason. One cannot object that because it shares with the supported consciousness the cognition of its own substance, there would be a personal view everywhere; for all minds and mental factors bear witness to their own substance, and within a single mind there are various divisions. Therefore, sharing the same cognitive object is not ruled out. And where various scriptures say it does not cognize external objects, it is because the manifested realm is not separated from the manifesting consciousness; though manas cognizes it, it does not conceptualize it as external; this does not preclude it from internally cognizing the marks of the six sensory realms. Another position holds: This explanation contradicts both logic and doctrine. It is solely stated that manas cognizes internally and grasps self, because it is subtle, weak, spontaneous, of a single uniform kind, and incessantly gives rise separately to the view of what belongs to self. Otherwise, how would it differ from the sixth mental consciousness, since neither conceptualizing inside nor outside would distinguish them? It does not even grasp self as self, nor external as external. Therefore, regarding the 'mental-phenomenon cognition', saying that this characteristic of cognition is manas is also not established. The mental factors of manas are not solely discernment; discernment among mental factors is not the foremost; nor is it the four-characterised phenomenon accepted by [the opponent] himself. Because various mental factors assist in completing the work of the mind, they are called 'mental-phenomenon cognition', which collectively constitutes the seventh; it is not that manas itself is called the characteristic of cognition. Otherwise, since the fundamental consciousness does not yet possess cognition, why is it not called the non-mental-phenomenon cognition? As for the mind faculty discriminating all phenomena, the mind faculty here is not the manas consciousness. 'Mind' means deliberation; because of this discrimination, the mental consciousness is spoken of as the mind faculty, for the mental consciousness is also called the discriminating faculty. Just as it is said that the eye faculty can receive forms—can feeling, which is associated [with it], receive forms? The sūtra says that conditioned by realms, the seven consciousnesses roll like waves; the treatise also speaks of the mind faculty manifesting discrimination: the words are general but the referents are distinct, so they do not contradict each other. Dependent on the seeing [division] of the fundamental consciousness, manas arises; dependent on the objective [division] of the fundamental consciousness, the five consciousnesses separately arise; the mental consciousness arises by comprehensively cognizing both seeing and objective [divisions]. Otherwise, the consciousnesses would have no distinction. Since the citations of teaching do not accord with the thesis, the reasoned argument established relies on a pseudo-inference. The thesis has two faults: First, it contradicts correct teaching, for many places only state that it has the view of self. Second, it contradicts inference, departing from the correct inference of non-universal cognizing. The reason has two faults: First, it has the fallacy of being decisively contradictory, contradicting the subsequent formulation of the correct inference. Second, it has the fallacy of partially occurring in dissimilar instances, because common supports also share the same realm. Therefore, the correct inference here states: 'The defiled mind faculty definitely does not cognize everywhere the remaining realms other than its own object; thesis. Because it is subsumed under any one among the uncommon supports of the six faculties; reason. Like the eye and other faculties; example.' If it were like that, the defiled mind faculty would be unable to generate the undefiled mental consciousness, for the logic is incompatible. Moreover, making manas no different from the five material faculties would be a great error, causing the previous explanation to contradict both logic and teaching. Hence we know that manas is not the characteristic of cognition, because it cannot discriminate agreeable from disagreeable [objects]. One should know that the six coarse [characteristics] all belong to the phenomenal consciousness. Below, among the five kinds of manas, their meaning is broadly revealed. Why is the manas consciousness not mentioned? It is omitted because of two reasons: First, its existence is implied by the meaning: the three subtle characteristics of the ālayavijñāna mentioned earlier necessarily arise together with the self-grasping manas. Hence the Vijñaptimātratā says: 'Depending on wherever [a being] is born, it is bound to that stage.' Also the Yogācāra says that when the ālayavijñāna arises, it necessarily associates with two consciousnesses. Furthermore, when the mental consciousness cognizes external realms, it necessarily relies on manas as its faculty to arise. Therefore, when the six coarse characteristics of the discriminating phenomenal consciousness are spoken of, manas is necessarily present; its existence being implied by the meaning, it is briefly omitted among the coarse and subtle. Second, it is inconvenient in meaning: the latent stage of ignorance agitates the fundamentally pure mind, causing it to arise in harmony to become the ālayavijñāna; since manas lacks this harmonious union, it is not mentioned among the three subtle [characteristics]. Moreover, because external realms draw forth the phenomenal consciousness, and manas lacks the function of cognizing external realms, it is also briefly omitted among the six coarse [characteristics]. Due to this meaning, the sūtras only speak of the true consciousness, the manifesting consciousness, and the discriminating phenomenal consciousness. The remaining meanings are the same as before, detailed as explained below.