大乘起信論廣釋卷第三．四．五 3.36

3.36

論。三者境界至則無境界　釋曰。境界相者即是現相。依前轉相能現境界。故云依能見故境界妄現。若無分別則無境界。故云離見即無境界。反顯境界必。依此義云。譬如明鏡持諸色像。現識處現亦復如是。此論下釋現識中云。所謂能現一切境界猶如明鏡現於色像現識亦爾以一切時任運而起常在前等。並依本識現相而說。此之現相尚在本識。何況業轉微細於此而反說在七識中乎。問。此境界相為即是境為是舉境顯能現心。有義。但是所現境界說。依能見境妄現故。又說。離見即無境界。非有別心是所離故。又依轉識說為境界。離轉無別取境心故。又說。不知轉識所現。不說別心是能現故。此三乃是識三分義。次前是見。此相分。故下五意中名現識者。依識所現從識得名。如說相分亦名為心。此亦應爾。故不相違。有義。不然違論說故。此境界相即下現識。不應說是所現境故。既說現識現一切境。不應境界復現境故。說如明鏡現於色像。若唯所現喻不齊故。又說。對至即現五塵。非境對餘而現起故。又第三相得名為意。境無依止非意義故。經說境界現識處現。所現能現心境別故。前後諸文說依轉識為境界者。依識體說如說離業即無見相。此亦應爾。故不相違。此文所標境界相者。前後影略互舉見相。謂心心所四分合成業相即是證分。是最微細難知心故。轉相即是識自體分。以是能緣向內見故。現相即是識之見分。能現境界向外見故。所現境界即是相分。所現所取外境相故。前二是內。是識自體依持別故。開之為二。後二是外。是識之用相帶而起合之為一故。於前後互舉見相。非謂第三唯是境界。此等並由根本無明動靜心起成黎耶位。若爾事識應說此三。八識皆有諸心分故。道理實如是。但於細識破一異執。麁識易知義准有故。如於事識但說相應本識。豈都無相應義。論文巧約影互顯耳。

[Treatise:] Third is the object-field [… down to …] then there is no object-field.
[Commentary:] 'Characteristic of the object-field' is the characteristic of appearance. Depending on the preceding characteristic of manifestation, it is able to manifest object-fields; hence it says: 'Because it relies on the active seeing, object-fields falsely appear.' If there is no discrimination, then there is no object-field; hence it says: 'Separated from seeing, then there is no object-field.' This conversely reveals that the object-field necessarily relies on [seeing]. According to this meaning it says: 'Just as a bright mirror retains various physical images, the manifesting consciousness manifesting in place is also like this.' Below, in explaining the manifesting consciousness, this treatise says: 'What is called being able to manifest all object-fields is like a bright mirror manifesting physical images; the manifesting consciousness is also like this, because at all times it arises spontaneously and is constantly present in front,' and so forth. All are stated based on the characteristic of appearance of the fundamental consciousness. This characteristic of appearance is still within the fundamental consciousness; how much more are karma and manifestation subtler than this, so how could they instead be said to be within the seven consciousnesses?
Question: Does this characteristic of the object-field refer directly to the object, or does it bring up the object to reveal the mind that is able to manifest it?
One position holds: It only speaks of the manifested object-field, because it says that 'relying on the active seeing, object-fields falsely appear.' Furthermore, it says: 'Separated from seeing, then there is no object-field,' and there is no distinct mind that is what is separated from. Moreover, depending on the evolving consciousness, it is spoken of as an object-field, because apart from the evolving [consciousness] there is no distinct mind that grasps objects. Furthermore, it says: 'Not knowing what is manifested by the evolving consciousness,' and does not say that a distinct mind is the active manifester. These three are indeed the meaning of the three aspects of consciousness: the one immediately preceding is the seeing-[aspect], and this is the image-aspect. Therefore, among the five intentions below, that which is named 'manifesting consciousness' takes its name from consciousness based on what is manifested by consciousness. Just as it is said that the image-aspect is also named 'mind', this also should be so; hence they do not conflict.
Another position holds: This is not correct, because it contradicts the treatise's text. This characteristic of the object-field is precisely the manifesting consciousness below; it should not be said to be the manifested object. Since it says that the manifesting consciousness manifests all object-fields, it should not be that the object-field again manifests object-fields. It says that it is 'like a bright mirror manifesting physical images'; if it were only the manifested, the metaphor would not correspond. Furthermore, it says: 'Facing them, it immediately manifests the five sense-objects'; it is not that the object faces other things and actively arises. Moreover, the third characteristic attains the name 'intention' (manas); an object has no basis of support and does not have the meaning of intention. A sūtra says: 'Object-fields manifest in the place of the manifesting consciousness,' because the manifested and the active manifester, mind and object, are distinct. Where texts before and after say that 'depending on the evolving consciousness there are object-fields', this is stated based on the substance of consciousness, just as saying 'separated from karma, there is no characteristic of seeing'; this also should be so, hence they do not conflict. What is designated here by the characteristic of the object-field is an elliptical reciprocal indication of seeing and image across the text. That is to say, the mind and mental factors are composed of four aspects: the characteristic of karma is precisely the self-witnessing aspect, because it is the subtlest and hardest-to-know mind; the characteristic of manifestation is the consciousness's own substance aspect, because it is the active cogniser seeing inwardly; the characteristic of appearance is the consciousness's seeing-aspect, because it is able to manifest object-fields, seeing outwardly; the manifested object-field is the image-aspect, because it is the image of the external object that is manifested and grasped. The first two are internal; because they are distinctions of the consciousness's own substance and its support, they are opened into two. The latter two are external; because they are the functioning of consciousness that arises in mutual dependence, they are combined into one. Therefore, before and after, seeing and image are reciprocally indicated; it does not mean that the third is solely the object-field. All of these arise from fundamental avidyā moving the quiet mind to form the stage of the ālayavijñāna. If so, phenomenal consciousness should also speak of these three, because all eight consciousnesses possess the various mental aspects. In principle this is indeed so; however, in the subtle consciousness, attachment to identity and difference is refuted, whereas coarse consciousness is easy to know, so by principle it has them. Just as in phenomenal consciousness it only speaks of association, could the fundamental consciousness be entirely without the meaning of association? The text of the treatise skillfully employs mutual implication to reveal them.