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大乘起信論廣釋卷第三.四.五 3.36

English (machine translation) 3.36

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3.36

[Treatise:] Third is the object-field [… down to …] then there is no object-field.
[Commentary:] 'Characteristic of the object-field' is the characteristic of appearance. Depending on the preceding characteristic of manifestation, it is able to manifest object-fields; hence it says: 'Because it relies on the active seeing, object-fields falsely appear.' If there is no discrimination, then there is no object-field; hence it says: 'Separated from seeing, then there is no object-field.' This conversely reveals that the object-field necessarily relies on [seeing]. According to this meaning it says: 'Just as a bright mirror retains various physical images, the manifesting consciousness manifesting in place is also like this.' Below, in explaining the manifesting consciousness, this treatise says: 'What is called being able to manifest all object-fields is like a bright mirror manifesting physical images; the manifesting consciousness is also like this, because at all times it arises spontaneously and is constantly present in front,' and so forth. All are stated based on the characteristic of appearance of the fundamental consciousness. This characteristic of appearance is still within the fundamental consciousness; how much more are karma and manifestation subtler than this, so how could they instead be said to be within the seven consciousnesses?
Question: Does this characteristic of the object-field refer directly to the object, or does it bring up the object to reveal the mind that is able to manifest it?
One position holds: It only speaks of the manifested object-field, because it says that 'relying on the active seeing, object-fields falsely appear.' Furthermore, it says: 'Separated from seeing, then there is no object-field,' and there is no distinct mind that is what is separated from. Moreover, depending on the evolving consciousness, it is spoken of as an object-field, because apart from the evolving [consciousness] there is no distinct mind that grasps objects. Furthermore, it says: 'Not knowing what is manifested by the evolving consciousness,' and does not say that a distinct mind is the active manifester. These three are indeed the meaning of the three aspects of consciousness: the one immediately preceding is the seeing-[aspect], and this is the image-aspect. Therefore, among the five intentions below, that which is named 'manifesting consciousness' takes its name from consciousness based on what is manifested by consciousness. Just as it is said that the image-aspect is also named 'mind', this also should be so; hence they do not conflict.
Another position holds: This is not correct, because it contradicts the treatise's text. This characteristic of the object-field is precisely the manifesting consciousness below; it should not be said to be the manifested object. Since it says that the manifesting consciousness manifests all object-fields, it should not be that the object-field again manifests object-fields. It says that it is 'like a bright mirror manifesting physical images'; if it were only the manifested, the metaphor would not correspond. Furthermore, it says: 'Facing them, it immediately manifests the five sense-objects'; it is not that the object faces other things and actively arises. Moreover, the third characteristic attains the name 'intention' (manas); an object has no basis of support and does not have the meaning of intention. A sūtra says: 'Object-fields manifest in the place of the manifesting consciousness,' because the manifested and the active manifester, mind and object, are distinct. Where texts before and after say that 'depending on the evolving consciousness there are object-fields', this is stated based on the substance of consciousness, just as saying 'separated from karma, there is no characteristic of seeing'; this also should be so, hence they do not conflict. What is designated here by the characteristic of the object-field is an elliptical reciprocal indication of seeing and image across the text. That is to say, the mind and mental factors are composed of four aspects: the characteristic of karma is precisely the self-witnessing aspect, because it is the subtlest and hardest-to-know mind; the characteristic of manifestation is the consciousness's own substance aspect, because it is the active cogniser seeing inwardly; the characteristic of appearance is the consciousness's seeing-aspect, because it is able to manifest object-fields, seeing outwardly; the manifested object-field is the image-aspect, because it is the image of the external object that is manifested and grasped. The first two are internal; because they are distinctions of the consciousness's own substance and its support, they are opened into two. The latter two are external; because they are the functioning of consciousness that arises in mutual dependence, they are combined into one. Therefore, before and after, seeing and image are reciprocally indicated; it does not mean that the third is solely the object-field. All of these arise from fundamental avidyā moving the quiet mind to form the stage of the ālayavijñāna. If so, phenomenal consciousness should also speak of these three, because all eight consciousnesses possess the various mental aspects. In principle this is indeed so; however, in the subtle consciousness, attachment to identity and difference is refuted, whereas coarse consciousness is easy to know, so by principle it has them. Just as in phenomenal consciousness it only speaks of association, could the fundamental consciousness be entirely without the meaning of association? The text of the treatise skillfully employs mutual implication to reveal them.

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