大乘起信論廣釋卷第三．四．五 3.58

3.58

論。三者名為至常在前故　釋曰。此文有三。謂法喻合。所謂等者。此舉法也。如鏡等者。此舉喻也。謂此心體無明熏對現種種境。如鏡對彼差別質故現種種影。現識亦爾。後明法合。其初二句正合前喻。無明熏真自有二種。一本無明與心和合冥熏靜心成三細識。二末無明與心別異對熏動心起六塵境。末無明者即諸煩惱起業熏識生五趣境故。言塵對至即現。非對五塵方起現識。此所現境寬狹云何。諸聖教中所說有異。十卷經云。阿黎耶識智名識相所知體相虛空中有毛轉等住不淨相所引境界。又有文云。何黎耶識分別現境自身資生器世界等一時知等。瑜伽論說。此識能了二境故轉。一內二外。內有三種。謂五色根根所依處所含藏種。若生無色唯了種子。外謂能了器世界相。唯識等論皆與此同。舊中邊論說此能了四種境界故。彼偈云。根塵我及識本識生似彼。何故如是諸教。隨譯者異。非本經論即此差殊。於四七卷二楞伽經但同後文都無前語。但是譯者妄加經文。或失本意。故不可依。新中邊論不說賴耶緣我及識。故彼頌云。識生變似義。有情我及了。識言通三。謂八七六。此三生時隨應變似。根我了別三種境義。舊中邊偈妄加本字。長行仍謬。亦不可依。由此但就瑜伽為正。順楞伽經三本文故。又既此識不能計度。是故不可緣我及識。而論說現一切境者。所謂內外一切境也。有義。此說其理未圓。不能會通諸經論故。若謂本識不緣我者。不應說為虛妄分別。若不證實名虛妄者。豈不由執不證實耶。若無計度故不執者。與證真智有何差別。既許此有自性分別。何不許有自性執耶。不爾如何瑜伽說此緣計所自性習氣。若不言唯故無執者。豈說唯緣非執種耶。若有漏善雖不證實亦無執者。此不為倒。意與六識為染淨。根與有漏善為漏性。故約無不善有覆無明所起麁相言無執心。何妨亦起無覆無記微細無明所起我相。許此執我理既無違。由是亦能變似識等。若此識變必有實用故能變諸識相者。則應諸識實用都無不是。本識實所變故。若謂諸識所有實用別從此識種子生者。外器亦可但從種生。本識不應別變器等。若謂器等但是相分不可變識為相分者。意是意識不共所依。如五色根變緣何失。若相分心無能緣用故說此識不變心者。亦應不緣諸識種子。種子現行性相同故。若謂種子無能緣用故本識緣識非倒者。則種與現本末因果性繫地等一切應殊。如是推微。故知此識亦緣諸識於理無爽。是故經言。知名識相住不淨智所行境界。若爾如何會通諸教。答。諸教所說亦不相違。不言唯緣如此法故。不說餘法非所緣故。雖無相違而有不同。不同之意叵得聞乎。不同之意各有道理。中邊及經明現起法皆是識變。唯說現行。習氣種子其相不現。與識無異。故略不說。瑜伽為顯相不離見故。除識外是所了別。諸心心所離識不立。其義自顯故說之。而實此識通緣一切。以有隨自他分境故。論言能現一切下合。唯言現五塵者。且舉麁顯以合鏡喻。故前後文亦不乖越。其後三句簡異諸識。以一切時等者。此簡意識。此所藉緣無時不具。故一切時任運而起。彼所藉緣時多不具。於五位等有間轉故。常在前者。對簡末那。末那雖常任運而起。非諸識本故非在先。今此黎耶是諸識本。在諸識本在諸識先。故言常在前也。非謂五識對五塵現而常在於意識。前起五識不能現一切境。非一切時任運起故。但隨五塵惑業因對故。所現塵無前後耳。

The treatise says: "Third is called [the manifesting consciousness], because [it manifests all sense objects] ... because it is constantly present before [the other consciousnesses]."

Exposition: This passage has three parts, namely the statement of the doctrine, the analogy, and the synthesis. "What is meant by..." is the statement of the doctrine. "Like a mirror..." is the statement of the analogy. That is to say, when this mental substance is perfumed and confronted by avidyā, it manifests various objects, just as a mirror manifests various reflections because it confronts distinct objects; the manifesting consciousness is also like this. Afterward, it explains the synthesis of the doctrine. Its first two lines precisely synthesize with the preceding analogy.

Avidyā perfuming suchness naturally has two kinds: first, primary avidyā, which unites with the mind, obscurely perfuming the tranquil mind to form the three subtle consciousnesses; second, secondary avidyā, which is distinct from the mind, confronting and perfuming the agitated mind to produce the objects of the six sense fields. Secondary avidyā refers to the various afflictions initiating karma and perfuming consciousness to generate the objects of the five destinies. Therefore, when it says that "confronting the sense fields, they immediately manifest," it does not mean that only when confronting the five sense fields does the manifesting consciousness first arise.

As to the breadth or narrowness of the objects manifested here, what is stated in the various sacred teachings differs. The ten-fascicle sūtra says: "The ālayavijñāna is known as the mark of consciousness; the substance and marks of the known are like hairs revolving in empty space, objects induced by marks that abide in impurity." There is also a passage stating: "Why is the ālayavijñāna manifesting distinct objects—such as one's own body, necessities of life, and the container world—known simultaneously?" etc. The Yogācārabhūmi states: "This consciousness evolves because it can cognize two kinds of objects: first, internal; second, external. Internal has three kinds: the five material sense faculties, the loci upon which the faculties depend, and the seeds that are held in store. If born in the formless realm, it cognizes only seeds. External means being able to cognize the marks of the container world." Treatises such as the Vijñaptimātratā are all identical with this.

The older Madhyāntavibhāga says that this [consciousness] can cognize four kinds of objects, and hence its verse states: "Faculties, sense fields, self, and consciousness—the fundamental consciousness arises resembling them." Why are these various teachings like this? They vary according to the translators; it is not that the original sūtras and treatises themselves had this divergence. In the four-fascicle and seven-fascicle editions of the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra, they only agree with the latter text and completely lack the former phrasing. These are merely cases where translators erroneously added to the sūtra text or missed the original meaning; hence they cannot be relied upon. The newer Madhyāntavibhāga does not say that the ālaya takes self and consciousness as objects; hence its verse states: "Consciousness arises transforming to resemble objects, sentient beings, self, and cognitions." The word "consciousness" extends to three, namely the eighth, seventh, and sixth. When these three arise, they appropriately transform to resemble the three kinds of objective meanings of faculties, self, and cognition. The verse of the older Madhyāntavibhāga erroneously added the word "fundamental," and its prose commentary is still mistaken; it also cannot be relied upon. Therefore, one should take the Yogācārabhūmi alone as correct, as it conforms to the three original texts of the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra.

Moreover, since this consciousness cannot deliberate, it cannot take self and consciousness as objects. When the treatise states that it manifests "all objects," it refers to all internal and external objects. Some maintain: this explanation is not yet theoretically complete, because it cannot reconcile the various sūtras and treatises. If one claims that the fundamental consciousness does not take the self as an object, it should not be called false discrimination. If not realizing reality is called "false," is that not necessarily due to grasping that fails to realize reality? If because it lacks deliberation it does not grasp, what difference is there between it and the cognition that realizes reality? Since one allows that this has discrimination of intrinsic nature, why not allow that it has grasping of intrinsic nature? Otherwise, how could the Yogācārabhūmi say that it takes the seeds of the imagined intrinsic nature as an object? If because it does not say "only" there is no grasping, does it say that it only takes non-grasping seeds as an object? If conditioned goodness, though not realizing reality, is also free from grasping, this is not an error; for the manas and the six consciousnesses serve as the defiled and pure roots, and provide the conditioned-defiled nature for conditioned goodness. Therefore, with reference to the coarse marks produced by unwholesome, veiled avidyā, it is said to lack a grasping mind; what prevents it from also giving rise to the mark of self produced by non-veiled, indeterminate subtle avidyā? Since allowing this grasping of self does not contradict principle, by this it can also transform to resemble consciousness and so forth.

If the transformations of this consciousness must possess real function and thus can transform into the marks of the various consciousnesses, then the real functions of the various consciousnesses would be completely identical, because they are genuinely transformed by the fundamental consciousness. If one claims that the real functions possessed by the various consciousnesses arise separately from the seeds of this consciousness, then the external container could also simply arise from seeds, and the fundamental consciousness should not separately transform into the container and so forth. If one claims that the container and so forth are merely the objective aspect and that consciousness cannot be transformed into an objective aspect, [we reply that] the manas is the uncommon basis of mental consciousness: just as with the five material faculties, what error is there in transforming and taking it as an object? If because the mind in the objective aspect lacks the function of being an active cognizer it is said that this consciousness does not transform mind, then it should also not take the seeds of the various consciousnesses as objects, because the nature and marks of seeds and active manifestations are the same. If one claims that because seeds lack the function of an active cognizer, the fundamental consciousness taking consciousness as an object is not inverted, then seeds and active manifestations—as fundamental and derivative, cause and effect, nature, realm-binding, and plane—should all be different. Deducing subtly like this, one knows that this consciousness taking the various consciousnesses as objects is thoroughly without error in principle. Therefore the sūtra states: "It is known as the mark of consciousness, the sphere of activity of cognition that abides in impurity."

If so, how does one reconcile the various teachings? Answer: What the various teachings state is not contradictory either, because they do not say that it takes *only* such dharmas as objects, nor do they say that other dharmas are *not* objects. Although there is no contradiction, there are differences. May we hear the rationale behind these differences? The rationales for the differences each have their reasons. The Madhyāntavibhāga and sūtras explain that actively arisen dharmas are all transformations of consciousness, and speak only of active manifestations; the marks of karmic impressions and seeds do not appear, and are not distinct from consciousness, so they are omitted and not stated. The Yogācārabhūmi, in order to reveal that marks do not exist apart from the subjective aspect, states that what lies outside consciousness is what is cognized; since the various minds and mental factors are not established apart from consciousness, their meaning is self-evident, so it states this. Yet in truth this consciousness generally takes all as objects, because it possesses objects according to the division between self and other.

When the treatise synthesizes below with "it can manifest all [sense objects]," it speaks only of manifesting the five sense fields, merely citing the coarse and prominent to correspond to the mirror analogy; therefore the preceding and following passages are not in conflict either.

Its subsequent three lines distinguish it from the other consciousnesses. "Because at all times..." distinguishes it from mental consciousness. The conditions upon which this [manifesting consciousness] relies are never absent at any time; therefore at all times it arises spontaneously. The conditions upon which that [mental consciousness] relies are mostly absent, and in the five states, etc., it evolves with interruption. "Constantly present before" distinguishes it from the manas. Although the manas constantly arises spontaneously, it is not the root of the various consciousnesses, and hence is not prior. Now, this ālayavijñāna is the root of the various consciousnesses; being the root of the various consciousnesses, it is prior to the various consciousnesses; hence it is said to be "constantly present before." It does not mean that the five consciousnesses, confronting the five sense fields, manifest and are constantly prior to mental consciousness. The five consciousnesses cannot manifest all objects, and do not arise spontaneously at all times; merely confronting the causes of delusion and karma regarding the five sense fields, the manifested sense fields have no before or after.