大乘起信論廣釋卷第三．四．五 3.58

3.58

The treatise says: "Third is called [the manifesting consciousness], because [it manifests all sense objects] ... because it is constantly present before [the other consciousnesses]."

Exposition: This passage has three parts, namely the statement of the doctrine, the analogy, and the synthesis. "What is meant by..." is the statement of the doctrine. "Like a mirror..." is the statement of the analogy. That is to say, when this mental substance is perfumed and confronted by avidyā, it manifests various objects, just as a mirror manifests various reflections because it confronts distinct objects; the manifesting consciousness is also like this. Afterward, it explains the synthesis of the doctrine. Its first two lines precisely synthesize with the preceding analogy.

Avidyā perfuming suchness naturally has two kinds: first, primary avidyā, which unites with the mind, obscurely perfuming the tranquil mind to form the three subtle consciousnesses; second, secondary avidyā, which is distinct from the mind, confronting and perfuming the agitated mind to produce the objects of the six sense fields. Secondary avidyā refers to the various afflictions initiating karma and perfuming consciousness to generate the objects of the five destinies. Therefore, when it says that "confronting the sense fields, they immediately manifest," it does not mean that only when confronting the five sense fields does the manifesting consciousness first arise.

As to the breadth or narrowness of the objects manifested here, what is stated in the various sacred teachings differs. The ten-fascicle sūtra says: "The ālayavijñāna is known as the mark of consciousness; the substance and marks of the known are like hairs revolving in empty space, objects induced by marks that abide in impurity." There is also a passage stating: "Why is the ālayavijñāna manifesting distinct objects—such as one's own body, necessities of life, and the container world—known simultaneously?" etc. The Yogācārabhūmi states: "This consciousness evolves because it can cognize two kinds of objects: first, internal; second, external. Internal has three kinds: the five material sense faculties, the loci upon which the faculties depend, and the seeds that are held in store. If born in the formless realm, it cognizes only seeds. External means being able to cognize the marks of the container world." Treatises such as the Vijñaptimātratā are all identical with this.

The older Madhyāntavibhāga says that this [consciousness] can cognize four kinds of objects, and hence its verse states: "Faculties, sense fields, self, and consciousness—the fundamental consciousness arises resembling them." Why are these various teachings like this? They vary according to the translators; it is not that the original sūtras and treatises themselves had this divergence. In the four-fascicle and seven-fascicle editions of the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra, they only agree with the latter text and completely lack the former phrasing. These are merely cases where translators erroneously added to the sūtra text or missed the original meaning; hence they cannot be relied upon. The newer Madhyāntavibhāga does not say that the ālaya takes self and consciousness as objects; hence its verse states: "Consciousness arises transforming to resemble objects, sentient beings, self, and cognitions." The word "consciousness" extends to three, namely the eighth, seventh, and sixth. When these three arise, they appropriately transform to resemble the three kinds of objective meanings of faculties, self, and cognition. The verse of the older Madhyāntavibhāga erroneously added the word "fundamental," and its prose commentary is still mistaken; it also cannot be relied upon. Therefore, one should take the Yogācārabhūmi alone as correct, as it conforms to the three original texts of the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra.

Moreover, since this consciousness cannot deliberate, it cannot take self and consciousness as objects. When the treatise states that it manifests "all objects," it refers to all internal and external objects. Some maintain: this explanation is not yet theoretically complete, because it cannot reconcile the various sūtras and treatises. If one claims that the fundamental consciousness does not take the self as an object, it should not be called false discrimination. If not realizing reality is called "false," is that not necessarily due to grasping that fails to realize reality? If because it lacks deliberation it does not grasp, what difference is there between it and the cognition that realizes reality? Since one allows that this has discrimination of intrinsic nature, why not allow that it has grasping of intrinsic nature? Otherwise, how could the Yogācārabhūmi say that it takes the seeds of the imagined intrinsic nature as an object? If because it does not say "only" there is no grasping, does it say that it only takes non-grasping seeds as an object? If conditioned goodness, though not realizing reality, is also free from grasping, this is not an error; for the manas and the six consciousnesses serve as the defiled and pure roots, and provide the conditioned-defiled nature for conditioned goodness. Therefore, with reference to the coarse marks produced by unwholesome, veiled avidyā, it is said to lack a grasping mind; what prevents it from also giving rise to the mark of self produced by non-veiled, indeterminate subtle avidyā? Since allowing this grasping of self does not contradict principle, by this it can also transform to resemble consciousness and so forth.

If the transformations of this consciousness must possess real function and thus can transform into the marks of the various consciousnesses, then the real functions of the various consciousnesses would be completely identical, because they are genuinely transformed by the fundamental consciousness. If one claims that the real functions possessed by the various consciousnesses arise separately from the seeds of this consciousness, then the external container could also simply arise from seeds, and the fundamental consciousness should not separately transform into the container and so forth. If one claims that the container and so forth are merely the objective aspect and that consciousness cannot be transformed into an objective aspect, [we reply that] the manas is the uncommon basis of mental consciousness: just as with the five material faculties, what error is there in transforming and taking it as an object? If because the mind in the objective aspect lacks the function of being an active cognizer it is said that this consciousness does not transform mind, then it should also not take the seeds of the various consciousnesses as objects, because the nature and marks of seeds and active manifestations are the same. If one claims that because seeds lack the function of an active cognizer, the fundamental consciousness taking consciousness as an object is not inverted, then seeds and active manifestations—as fundamental and derivative, cause and effect, nature, realm-binding, and plane—should all be different. Deducing subtly like this, one knows that this consciousness taking the various consciousnesses as objects is thoroughly without error in principle. Therefore the sūtra states: "It is known as the mark of consciousness, the sphere of activity of cognition that abides in impurity."

If so, how does one reconcile the various teachings? Answer: What the various teachings state is not contradictory either, because they do not say that it takes *only* such dharmas as objects, nor do they say that other dharmas are *not* objects. Although there is no contradiction, there are differences. May we hear the rationale behind these differences? The rationales for the differences each have their reasons. The Madhyāntavibhāga and sūtras explain that actively arisen dharmas are all transformations of consciousness, and speak only of active manifestations; the marks of karmic impressions and seeds do not appear, and are not distinct from consciousness, so they are omitted and not stated. The Yogācārabhūmi, in order to reveal that marks do not exist apart from the subjective aspect, states that what lies outside consciousness is what is cognized; since the various minds and mental factors are not established apart from consciousness, their meaning is self-evident, so it states this. Yet in truth this consciousness generally takes all as objects, because it possesses objects according to the division between self and other.

When the treatise synthesizes below with "it can manifest all [sense objects]," it speaks only of manifesting the five sense fields, merely citing the coarse and prominent to correspond to the mirror analogy; therefore the preceding and following passages are not in conflict either.

Its subsequent three lines distinguish it from the other consciousnesses. "Because at all times..." distinguishes it from mental consciousness. The conditions upon which this [manifesting consciousness] relies are never absent at any time; therefore at all times it arises spontaneously. The conditions upon which that [mental consciousness] relies are mostly absent, and in the five states, etc., it evolves with interruption. "Constantly present before" distinguishes it from the manas. Although the manas constantly arises spontaneously, it is not the root of the various consciousnesses, and hence is not prior. Now, this ālayavijñāna is the root of the various consciousnesses; being the root of the various consciousnesses, it is prior to the various consciousnesses; hence it is said to be "constantly present before." It does not mean that the five consciousnesses, confronting the five sense fields, manifest and are constantly prior to mental consciousness. The five consciousnesses cannot manifest all objects, and do not arise spontaneously at all times; merely confronting the causes of delusion and karma regarding the five sense fields, the manifested sense fields have no before or after.