大乘起信論廣釋卷第三．四．五 3.64

3.64

論。以一切法至無相可得　釋曰。此答也。文有七句。總分三節。即初三句正答前問。以業相等皆因心起。緣彼無明妄念熏生。既五種識不離於心。故離一心無六塵也。或可。境界皆是此心。隨熏所起更無異體。由汝妄念而生異相。故楞伽云。身資生住持如夢中生。若有能取所取相者。夢中所見應有二相。如夢中無二相也。既因此答轉起。疑云。念不孤起。託境方生。若無異境。何所分別。故此二句釋此難言。一切分別非外分別。如依於面自見其面。夢中所見自見其心。是故經云。無有少法能取少法。即其義也。故言分別分別自心。若爾便成能見所見。何故前言無二相耶。故後二句遣此疑云。為遣塵執說見自心。實非以心而見心也。心尚不起。何有見乎。以本真心無見相故。問。如集量論說諸心心所皆證自體名為現量。不爾於自心應不能境故。何故今說心不見心。答。二意異故亦不相違。彼約俗諦安立道理。於其妄心開為諸分。故說自證能見見分。此約真實證會道理。說本真心元非動念。既無見故非能所見。若唯俗諦所顯亦殊。此顯見分不能自見故。以指刀為同法喻。彼說自證能見見分故。以燈焰為同法喻。設唯就真所顯亦別。彼說智如能所證別有見可證。以心見心。此說理智既無別體。無見可證。心不見心。此真俗舉體通融。說無不當於無故不壞於有。說有不當於有故不乖於無。無不乖有故宛然有而即無。有不妨無故宛然無而即有。由是二論不相違也。即由此中心不見心無相義。故楞伽頌云。非他非自緣。分別分別事。五法及二心。寂靜無如是。即前二句依識遣塵明唯識觀。今此二句依真遣識明真如觀。法門雖二所證是同。但一觀成則證外觀。故瑜伽論問此義言。諸觀行者見遍計所執無相時。當言入何等性。應言入圓成實。若入圓成實性時。當言遣何等性。應言遣依他起。舊中邊論亦顯此義。由依唯識故境無體義成。以塵無有故。本識即不生。故唯識成即無有識。以識無故便證真如。故知二觀同所證也。

[Treatise:] Because all phenomena are produced from the mind and arise from false thought. All differentiation is differentiating one's own mind. The mind does not see the mind, for there is no characteristic to be grasped.
[Commentary:] This is the answer. The text has seven phrases, divided in general into three clauses. The first three phrases directly answer the previous question: because the characteristic of karma and so forth all arise due to the mind, and are perfumed and produced by conditions of that avidyā and false thought; since the five kinds of consciousness are not separate from the mind, therefore apart from the one mind there are no six sense fields. Alternatively, it may be said: the objective fields are entirely this mind, arising following perfuming without any different substance; it is due to your false thoughts that different characteristics arise. Therefore the Laṅkāvatāra says: the body, provisions, and sustaining abode are produced as in a dream; if there were characteristics of the grasping and the grasped, then what is seen in a dream would have two characteristics, just as in a dream there are no two characteristics. Since, following this answer, a doubt arises in turn, saying: a thought does not arise in isolation, but only arises depending on an object; if there is no different object, what is differentiated? Therefore these two phrases resolve this objection, saying: all differentiation is not differentiation of what is external; just as, relying on a face, one sees one's own face, what is seen in a dream is seeing one's own mind. Therefore the sutra says: "There is not the slightest dharma that can grasp the slightest dharma"—that is its meaning. Therefore it says: "differentiation is differentiating one's own mind." If so, then that would constitute a seer and a seen; why did the previous [text] say there are no two characteristics? Therefore the latter two phrases eliminate this doubt, saying: to eliminate attachment to sense fields, it is said that one sees one's own mind; in reality, it is not that the mind sees the mind. The mind does not even arise; how could there be seeing? Because the original true mind has no characteristic of seeing. Question: As the Pramāṇasamuccaya says, all minds and cetasikas apprehend their own substance, which is called direct perception (pratyakṣa); otherwise, they would not be able to take their own mind as an object. Why is it now said that the mind does not see the mind? Answer: Because the two intentions are different, they are also not contradictory. That [text] is based on conventional truth, establishing the principle, dividing the false mind into several aspects; thus it says that self-awareness (svasaṃvedana) can see the seeing aspect (darśanabhāga). This [text] is based on the principle of ultimate realization, stating that the original true mind is fundamentally without moving thoughts; since there is no seeing, there is neither grasping nor grasped seeing. Even if based solely on conventional truth, what is revealed is also distinct: this reveals that the seeing aspect cannot see itself, using a finger [not touching itself] or a knife [not cutting itself] as a parallel example; that [text] says that self-awareness can see the seeing aspect, using a lamp flame as a parallel example. Even if based solely on the ultimate, what is revealed is also distinct: that [text] says that the cognition and tathatā are distinct as that which realizes and that which is realized, so there is seeing to be realized, taking the mind to see the mind; this [text] says that principle and cognition have no different substance, with no seeing to be realized, so the mind does not see the mind. Here, ultimate and conventional are entirely interfused: speaking of non-existence does not fall into [mere] non-existence, hence it does not destroy existence; speaking of existence does not fall into [mere] existence, hence it does not contradict non-existence. Because non-existence does not contradict existence, it is distinctly existent and yet immediately non-existent; because existence does not obstruct non-existence, it is distinctly non-existent and yet immediately existent. Therefore the two treatises do not contradict each other. Thus, from this principle that the mind does not see the mind and has no characteristics, the Laṅkāvatāra verse says: "Not conditioned by other nor by self; differentiation differentiates things; the five dharmas and two minds are tranquil and devoid of such." The preceding two phrases, relying on consciousness to eliminate sense fields, elucidate the contemplation of mere-consciousness. The present two phrases, relying on tathatā to eliminate consciousness, elucidate the contemplation of tathatā. Although the dharma gates are two, that which is realized is the same: when one contemplation is perfected, the other contemplation is realized. Therefore the Yogācārabhūmi asks about this meaning, saying: when practitioners of contemplation see that the conceptually constructed nature (parikalpita) is without characteristics, into what nature should it be said that they enter? It should be answered that they enter the perfected nature (pariniṣpanna). When entering the perfected nature, what nature should be said to be eliminated? It should be answered that the dependent nature (paratantra) is eliminated. The old Madhyāntavibhāga also reveals this meaning: relying on mere-consciousness, the principle that objects have no substance is established; because sense fields do not exist, the fundamental consciousness does not arise. Therefore, when mere-consciousness is established, there is no consciousness; because consciousness is absent, one then realizes tathatā. Thus we know that the two contemplations share the same realization.