大乘起信論廣釋卷第三．四．五 3.64

3.64

[Treatise:] Because all phenomena are produced from the mind and arise from false thought. All differentiation is differentiating one's own mind. The mind does not see the mind, for there is no characteristic to be grasped.
[Commentary:] This is the answer. The text has seven phrases, divided in general into three clauses. The first three phrases directly answer the previous question: because the characteristic of karma and so forth all arise due to the mind, and are perfumed and produced by conditions of that avidyā and false thought; since the five kinds of consciousness are not separate from the mind, therefore apart from the one mind there are no six sense fields. Alternatively, it may be said: the objective fields are entirely this mind, arising following perfuming without any different substance; it is due to your false thoughts that different characteristics arise. Therefore the Laṅkāvatāra says: the body, provisions, and sustaining abode are produced as in a dream; if there were characteristics of the grasping and the grasped, then what is seen in a dream would have two characteristics, just as in a dream there are no two characteristics. Since, following this answer, a doubt arises in turn, saying: a thought does not arise in isolation, but only arises depending on an object; if there is no different object, what is differentiated? Therefore these two phrases resolve this objection, saying: all differentiation is not differentiation of what is external; just as, relying on a face, one sees one's own face, what is seen in a dream is seeing one's own mind. Therefore the sutra says: "There is not the slightest dharma that can grasp the slightest dharma"—that is its meaning. Therefore it says: "differentiation is differentiating one's own mind." If so, then that would constitute a seer and a seen; why did the previous [text] say there are no two characteristics? Therefore the latter two phrases eliminate this doubt, saying: to eliminate attachment to sense fields, it is said that one sees one's own mind; in reality, it is not that the mind sees the mind. The mind does not even arise; how could there be seeing? Because the original true mind has no characteristic of seeing. Question: As the Pramāṇasamuccaya says, all minds and cetasikas apprehend their own substance, which is called direct perception (pratyakṣa); otherwise, they would not be able to take their own mind as an object. Why is it now said that the mind does not see the mind? Answer: Because the two intentions are different, they are also not contradictory. That [text] is based on conventional truth, establishing the principle, dividing the false mind into several aspects; thus it says that self-awareness (svasaṃvedana) can see the seeing aspect (darśanabhāga). This [text] is based on the principle of ultimate realization, stating that the original true mind is fundamentally without moving thoughts; since there is no seeing, there is neither grasping nor grasped seeing. Even if based solely on conventional truth, what is revealed is also distinct: this reveals that the seeing aspect cannot see itself, using a finger [not touching itself] or a knife [not cutting itself] as a parallel example; that [text] says that self-awareness can see the seeing aspect, using a lamp flame as a parallel example. Even if based solely on the ultimate, what is revealed is also distinct: that [text] says that the cognition and tathatā are distinct as that which realizes and that which is realized, so there is seeing to be realized, taking the mind to see the mind; this [text] says that principle and cognition have no different substance, with no seeing to be realized, so the mind does not see the mind. Here, ultimate and conventional are entirely interfused: speaking of non-existence does not fall into [mere] non-existence, hence it does not destroy existence; speaking of existence does not fall into [mere] existence, hence it does not contradict non-existence. Because non-existence does not contradict existence, it is distinctly existent and yet immediately non-existent; because existence does not obstruct non-existence, it is distinctly non-existent and yet immediately existent. Therefore the two treatises do not contradict each other. Thus, from this principle that the mind does not see the mind and has no characteristics, the Laṅkāvatāra verse says: "Not conditioned by other nor by self; differentiation differentiates things; the five dharmas and two minds are tranquil and devoid of such." The preceding two phrases, relying on consciousness to eliminate sense fields, elucidate the contemplation of mere-consciousness. The present two phrases, relying on tathatā to eliminate consciousness, elucidate the contemplation of tathatā. Although the dharma gates are two, that which is realized is the same: when one contemplation is perfected, the other contemplation is realized. Therefore the Yogācārabhūmi asks about this meaning, saying: when practitioners of contemplation see that the conceptually constructed nature (parikalpita) is without characteristics, into what nature should it be said that they enter? It should be answered that they enter the perfected nature (pariniṣpanna). When entering the perfected nature, what nature should be said to be eliminated? It should be answered that the dependent nature (paratantra) is eliminated. The old Madhyāntavibhāga also reveals this meaning: relying on mere-consciousness, the principle that objects have no substance is established; because sense fields do not exist, the fundamental consciousness does not arise. Therefore, when mere-consciousness is established, there is no consciousness; because consciousness is absent, one then realizes tathatā. Thus we know that the two contemplations share the same realization.