大乘起信論廣釋卷第三．四．五 4.106

4.106

論。此非心識至因義故　釋曰。此明所現難思。遍餘難也。夫言色者。質礙為體。分齊為相。相妨為用。如何可言各各差別皆無分齊不相妨耶。故此答言非心識等。以所現色是真如用。體既無礙。用寧礙耶。其猶一室能礙千燈。多明互融著遍無礙而亦不失明。差別相亦如無間所有眾生。雖一一身悉遍彼處而亦不失受苦分重。故所現色自在難思。此非心識分別知。如前所難。是心識境不可以此而為難也。

[Treatise:] This is not something that the mental consciousness... the meaning of cause. [Commentary:] This clarifies that what is manifested is inconceivable, comprehensively resolving other objections. Generally speaking, form has material obstruction as its substance, boundaries as its characteristics, and mutual obstruction as its function; how could one say that each is distinct, all are without boundaries, and they do not obstruct one another? Therefore, this answers by saying "not something that the mental consciousness..." and so forth. Because the manifested form is the function of tathatā, since the substance is unobstructed, how could the function be obstructed? It is just as a single room can contain a thousand lamps: the multiple lights mutually blend and pervade without obstruction, yet without losing the distinct characteristics of the lights. It is also like the sentient beings in the Avīci Hell: although the body of each one pervades that place, they do not lose their distinct shares of suffering. Therefore, the manifested form is sovereign and inconceivable; it cannot be known through the conceptual discrimination of the mental consciousness. The objection raised earlier is an object of the mental consciousness, and one must not use this to raise an objection.