大乘起信論廣釋卷第三．四．五 4.135

4.135

論。云何對治至外道經說　釋曰。下顯對治。文中有二。初明無始。後顯無終。此初也。以如來藏等者。正明無始。所依藏性既無前際。能依生死何有始耶。無明相者即生死也。若說已下顯始見過。故仁王云。我說三界外別有一乘。眾生藏者。是外道大有經中所說。非七佛說。大有經者即是勝論六句義中大有句也。此性能有一切法故。離實德業而別立也。或亦即是前□論說。從一生覺初眾生也。

[Treatise:] How is this remedied? [One should understand that the tathāgatagarbha has no prior limit … is what is taught in] heterodox treatises—
[Commentary:] "Explication": Below, the antidote is shown. The text has two parts: first, clarifying that there is no beginning; second, showing that there is no end. This is the first. "Because the tathāgatagarbha...", and so forth, directly clarifies that there is no beginning. Since the supported nature of the garbha has no prior limit, how could the dependent saṃsāra have a beginning? The "characteristic of avidyā" is precisely saṃsāra. From "if it is said" onward, it shows the fault of the view of having a beginning. Thus the *Benevolent Kings Sūtra* states: "I say that outside the three realms there is separately a single vehicle, the garbha of sentient beings; this is taught in the heterodox *Mahābhāva Treatise*, not spoken by the seven Buddhas." The *Mahābhāva Treatise* is precisely the category of *bhāva* (great existence) among the six categories of the Vaiśeṣikas. Because this nature is able to possess all dharmas, it is established separately from substance, quality, and action. Or it may also be that which was spoken in the aforementioned treatise, that from the one, intellect arises as the first sentient being.